Beyond valence in the perception of likelihood: the role of emotion specificity.

Positive and negative moods have been shown to increase likelihood estimates of future events matching these states in valence (e.g., E. J. Johnson & A. Tversky, 1983). In the present article, 4 studies provide evidence that this congruency bias (a) is not limited to valence but functions in an emotion-specific manner, (b) derives from the informational value of emotions, and (c) is not the inevitable outcome of likelihood assessment under heightened emotion. Specifically, Study 1 demonstrates that sadness and anger, 2 distinct, negative emotions, differentially bias likelihood estimates of sad and angering events. Studies 2 and 3 replicate this finding in addition to supporting an emotion-as-information (cf. N. Schwarz & G. L. Clore, 1983), as opposed to a memory-based, mediating process for the bias. Finally, Study 4 shows that when the source of the emotion is salient, a reversal of the bias can occur given greater cognitive effort aimed at accuracy.

Attitudes and attitude change.

We review empirical and conceptual developments over the past four years (1992-1995) on attitudes and persuasion. A voluminous amount of material was produced concerning attitude structure, attitude change, and the consequences of holding attitudes. In the structure area, particular attention is paid to work on attitude accessibility, ambivalence, and the affective versus cognitive bases of attitudes. In persuasion, our review examines research that has focused on high effort cognitive processes (central route), low effort processes (peripheral route), and the multiple roles by which variables can have an impact on attitudes. Special emphasis is given to work on cognitive dissonance and other biases in message processing, and on the multiple processes by which mood influences evaluations. Work on the consequences of attitudes focuses on the impact of attitudes on behavior and social judgments.

Positive mood can increase or decrease message scrutiny: the hedonic contingency view of mood and message processing.

Currently dominant explanations of mood effects on persuasive message processing (i.e., cognitive capacity and feelings as information) predict that happy moods lead to less message scrutiny than neutral or sad moods. The hedonic contingency view (D. T. Wegener & R. E. Petty, 1994) predicts that happy moods can sometimes be associated with greater message processing activity because people in a happy mood are more attentive than neutral or sad people to the hedonic consequences of their actions. Consistent with this view, Experiment 1 finds that a happy mood can lead to greater message scrutiny than a neutral mood when the message is not mood threatening. Experiment 2 finds that a happy mood leads to greater message scrutiny than a sad mood when an uplifting message is encountered, but to less message scrutiny when a depressing message is encountered.

Flexible correction processes in social judgment: the role of naive theories in corrections for perceived bias.

Unlike many models of bias correction, our flexible correction model posits that corrections occur when judges are motivated and able to adjust assessments of targets according to their naive theories of how the context affects judgments of the target(s). In the current research, people flexibly correct assessments of different targets within the same context according to the differing theories associated with the context-target pairs. In Study 1, shared theories of assimilation and contrast bias are identified. Corrections consistent with those theories are obtained in Studies 2 and 3. Study 4 shows that idiographic measures of theories of bias predict the direction and magnitude of corrections. Implications of this work for corrections of attributions and bias removal in general are discussed.

Mood management across affective states: the hedonic contingency hypothesis.

Mood management in positive and negative moods is relevant to a variety of social phenomena and has been especially important in the helping literature. Theorists have predicted that sad people strategically engage in mood management activities more than happy people. However, application of learning principles across affective states led the authors to hypothesize that hedonic rewards are more contingent on scrutiny of hedonic consequences in happy than sad states. Thus, happy people should scrutinize the hedonic consequences of potential behaviors more than sad people. A selective exposure paradigm was used to test this hedonic contingency hypothesis. People in whom happy, sad, or neutral states were induced were asked to choose activities in which to engage. In 3 experiments, happy people based their choices on the affective consequences of those activities more than sad or neutral individuals. Implications for interpreting past work are discussed.

The problem of equivalent models in applications of covariance structure analysis.

For any given covariance structure model, there will often be alternative models that are indistinguishable from the original model in terms of goodness of fit to data. The existence of such equivalent models is almost universally ignored in empirical studies. A study of 53 published applications showed that equivalent models exist routinely, often in large numbers. Detailed study of three applications showed that equivalent models may often offer substantively meaningful alternative explanations of data. The importance of the equivalent model phenomenon and recommendations for managing and confronting the problem in practice are discussed.