Implications for practice: challenges for healthcare leaders in fostering patient safety.

Although various government and regulatory organisations have identified practices that may enhance patient safety, there is little empirical or theoretical research to inform the decisions of healthcare leaders seeking to create patient safety programmes within their hospitals and clinics. In order to understand the challenges facing hospital and health system executives, we describe the experience of the Executive Session on Patient Safety. The executives identified five major problems in leading patient safety: 1) how should executives structure their organisations to deliver safe care? 2) how should executives monitor and measure their organisation's safety performance? 3) how should executives spread and sustain patient safety innovation? 4) how should executives manage the relationship with the external environment? and 5) how should executives manage their own behaviour in order to lead for safety? The organisational infrastructure needed for safer care is being developed by practitioners out in the field as a matter of necessity. Strengthening the scientific basis for organisational leadership in patient safety is a vital but neglected area of study.

Physician-reviewers' perceptions and judgments about quality of care.

OBJECTIVE: Although Peer Review Organizations (PROs) and researchers rely on physicians to assess quality of care, little is known about what physicians think about when they judge quality. We sought to identify features of individual cases that are associated with physicians' judgments. DESIGN: Using 1994 Medicare data, we selected hospitalizations for 1134 beneficiaries in 42 acute care hospitals in California and Connecticut. The sample was enriched with 17 surgical and six medical complications identified using diagnosis and procedure codes. PRO physicians confirmed quality problems using a structured implicit chart review instrument and provided written open-ended comments about each case. We coded physicians' comments for factors presumed to influence judgments about quality. RESULTS: In crude and adjusted comparisons, reviewers questioned quality more frequently in cases with serious or fatal outcomes, technical mishaps and inadequate documentation. Among surgical (but not medical) patients, they were less likely to record poor quality among patients presenting with an acute illness. CONCLUSION: Factors other than the adequacy of key processes of care are associated with physician-reviewers' judgments about quality.

A physician-based voluntary reporting system for adverse events and medical errors.

OBJECTIVE: To create a voluntary reporting method for identifying adverse events (AEs) and potential adverse events (PAEs) among medical inpatients. DESIGN: Medical house officers asked their peers about obstacles to care, injuries or extended hospitalizations, and problems with medications that affected their patients. Two independent reviewers coded event narratives for adverse outcomes, responsible parties, preventability, and process problems. We corroborated house officers' reports with hospital incident reports and conducted a retrospective chart review. SETTING: The cardiac step-down, oncology, and medical intensive care units of an urban teaching hospital. INTERVENTION: Structured confidential interviews by postgraduate year-2 and -3 medical residents of interns during work rounds. MEASUREMENTS AND MAIN RESULTS: Respondents reported 88 events over 3 months. AEs occurred among 5 patients (0.5% of admissions) and PAEs among 48 patients (4.9% of admissions). Delayed diagnoses and treatments figured prominently among PAEs (54%). Clinicians were responsible for the greatest number of incidents (55%), followed by workers in the laboratory (11%), radiology (15%), and pharmacy (3%). Respondents identified a variety of problematic processes of care, including problems with diagnosis (16%), therapy (26%), and failure to provide clinical and support services (29%). We corroborated 84% of reported events in the medical record. Participants found voluntary peer reporting of medical errors unobtrusive and agreed that it could be implemented on a regular basis. CONCLUSIONS: A physician-based voluntary reporting system for medical errors is feasible and acceptable to front-line clinicians.

Use of administrative data to find substandard care: validation of the complications screening program.

OBJECTIVE: The use of administrative data to identify inpatient complications is technically feasible and inexpensive but unproven as a quality measure. Our objective was to validate whether a screening method that uses data from standard hospital discharge abstracts identifies complications of care and potential quality problems. DESIGN: This was a case-control study with structured implicit physician reviews. SETTING: Acute-care hospitals in California and Connecticut in 1994. PATIENTS: The study included 1,025 Medicare beneficiaries greater than 265 years of age. METHODS: Using administrative data, we stratified acute-care hospitals by observed-to-expected complication rates and randomly selected hospitals within each state. We randomly selected cases flagged with 1 of 17 surgical complications and 6 medical complications. We randomly selected controls from unflagged cases. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURE: Peer-review organization physicians' judgments about the presence of the flagged complication and potential quality-of-care problems. RESULTS: Physicians confirmed flagged complications in 68.4% of surgical and 27.2% of medical cases. They identified potential quality problems in 29.5% of flagged surgical and 15.7% of medical cases but in only 2.1% of surgical and medical controls. The rate of physician-identified potential quality problems among flagged cases exceeded 25% in 9 surgical screens and 1 medical screen. Reviewers noted several potentially mitigating circumstances that affected their judgments about quality, including factors related to the patients' illness, the complexity of the case, and technical difficulties that clinicians encountered. CONCLUSIONS: For some types of complications, screening administrative data may offer an efficient approach for identifying potentially problematic cases for physician review. Understanding the basis for physicians' judgments about quality requires more investigation.

Confidential clinician-reported surveillance of adverse events among medical inpatients.

BACKGROUND: Although iatrogenic injury poses a significant risk to hospitalized patients, detection of adverse events (AEs) is costly and difficult. METHODS: The authors developed a confidential reporting method for detecting AEs on a medicine unit of a teaching hospital. Adverse events were defined as patient injuries. Potential adverse events (PAEs) represented errors that could have, but did not result in harm. Investigators interviewed house officers during morning rounds and by e-mail, asking them to identify obstacles to high quality care and iatrogenic injuries. They compared house officer reports with hospital incident reports and patients' medical records. A multivariate regression model identified correlates of reporting. RESULTS: One hundred ten events occurred, affecting 84 patients. Queries by e-mail (incidence rate ratio [IRR] = 0.16; 95% confidence interval [95% CI], 0.05 to 0.49) and on days when house officers rotated to a new service (IRR = 0.12; 95% CI, 0.02 to 0.91) resulted in fewer reports. The most commonly reported process of care problems were inadequate evaluation of the patient (16.4%), failure to monitor or follow up (12.7%), and failure of the laboratory to perform a test (12.7%). Respondents identified 29 (26. 4%) AEs, 52 (47.3%) PAEs, and 29 (26.4%) other house officer-identified quality problems. An AE occurred in 2.6% of admissions. The hospital incident reporting system detected only one house officer-reported event. Chart review corroborated 72.9% of events. CONCLUSIONS: House officers detect many AEs among inpatients. Confidential peer interviews of front-line providers is a promising method for identifying medical errors and substandard quality.

Making medication safety a strategic organizational priority.

Since January 1998 the Executive Session on Medical Error and Patient Safety at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government has periodically convened a group of 25 to 30 practitioners (and a few academics) to discuss issues and identify strategies and solutions concerning patient safety. This profile is adapted from a case study presented at the Executive Session.

Patients discharged against medical advice from a general medicine service.

This study compares the demographic features and hospital course of all 472 patients discharged against medical advice from the general medicine service of an urban teaching hospital between 1984 and 1995 and 1,113 control patients discharged with physician approval. In the multivariate analysis, younger age (odds ratio [OR] 0.97 per year; 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.96, 0.98), male gender (OR 1.9; 95% CI 1.4, 2.4), lack of health insurance (OR 2.0; 95% CI 1.3, 3.1), Medicaid applicant or recipient status (OR 2.2; 95% CI 1.6, 3.1), admission through the emergency department (OR 2.2; 95% CI 1.4, 3.5), and lack of a personal attending physician at the time of admission (OR 2.1; 95% CI 1.6, 2.8) increased the odds of discharge against medical advice. Fifty-four percent of patients who left against medical advice were readmitted to the hospital during the study period; 98% were then discharged with physician approval. Patients who left the hospital against medical advice included many disadvantaged individuals without ongoing primary care.

A house officer-sponsored quality improvement initiative: leadership lessons and liabilities.

BACKGROUND: House officers play an important role in the care of hospitalized patients, yet they are infrequent participants in quality improvement (QI) activities. A grassroots QI initiative among medical house officers was implemented at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center's East Campus in Boston from 1995 through 1997. FINDINGS: A group of house officer volunteers completed five of nine projects, including a survey that demonstrated frequent failures of cardiac monitor-defibrillators in the emergency room. Reaching out to key administrators produced several quick fixes. Developing effective, ongoing partnerships with clinical departments and QI professionals proved more problematic. DISCUSSION: Residency training programs that provide experience in QI give house officers a potentially valuable skill and an additional means to improve the quality of patient care. Yet many obstacles work against house officers' participation in QI initiatives, including long hours and the daily demands of patient care, rotating monthly assignments, and clinical leaders' assumption that they have little interest in QI. The organizers of the officer problem-solving group over-estimated the hospital resources at their disposal and failed to build mechanisms to ensure the initiative's continuation into its second year, when their own interest waned and no new group of leaders emerged to take their place. CONCLUSION: House officers represent an underused resource for QI. They are skilled at identifying problems but have difficulty executing sustained and complex QI initiatives. Peer leadership is a potent means to mobilize resident-physician participation but may require faculty or staff involvement and support to guarantee its continuity.

House officer education and organizational obstacles to quality improvement.

BACKGROUND: House officers are physicians-in-training who provide the bulk of direct medical care for patients in teaching hospitals. Because of their intimate, ongoing role in patient care, they occupy a particularly advantageous position in the health care system for identifying and solving common organizational problems that undermine the quality and increase the cost of care. Yet most house officers are inadequately prepared to address problems in organizational and technical support systems which undermine the delivery of health care. In fact, house officers' strategies for coping with the demands of residency training often perpetuate problems. CASES: Cases describing prescription errors, lost laboratory data, and inappropriate beeper-related interruptions in care illustrate how house officers contribute unwittingly to poor quality and costly care. RECOMMENDATIONS: Department chairs, residency program directors, and senior clinicians should create opportunities for house officers to participate in interdisciplinary problem-solving teams. Medical faculty should instruct house officers in the principles and practice of quality improvement, integrating this material into existing teaching conferences and other educational activities. Instruction should be case based, data intensive, and jargon free, modeled by clinicians with training and experience in quality management and related disciplines. Senior clinicians and department officials should endorse organizational problem solving as a legitimate, appropriate, and valuable activity for every well-trained physician.

Deciding to buy expensive technology. The case of biliary lithotripsy.

Acquiring expensive, new medical technology requires an evaluation of the efficacy and effectiveness, safety, profitability, feasibility, and risk of a project in the context of the hospital's social responsibility and institutional strategy. A case study of the decision to bring biliary lithotripsy to Strong Memorial Hospital illustrates how these criteria offer managers a coherent approach to difficult and consequential decisions about acquiring medical technology.

Acquiring advanced technology. Decision-making strategies at twelve medical centers.

This study describes decision making regarding the acquisition of technology in 12 major medical centers. The financial impact of a project was the most widely cited criterion of decision, but financial considerations were less important than either the impact of a technology on the quality of clinical care or its contribution to teaching and research. Rarely were criteria set out explicitly or in advance. Although exemplary models exist, the technology assessment process at most institutions is described as "political," "informal," or "ad hoc."