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1.
Health Econ ; 30(6): 1347-1360, 2021 06.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33763902

ABSTRACT

This note studies the effect of the availability of a test for a virus on the public health of a population. It is shown by example that the existence of a freely available and moderately informative test for a virus may lower society's welfare in comparison to the case where no test exists or access to the test is restricted. In this setting, any test provided to any subset of agents who would find it optimal not to isolate absent the test improves welfare.


Subject(s)
Asymptomatic Diseases/economics , COVID-19 Testing/economics , COVID-19/diagnosis , Models, Economic , Pneumonia, Viral/diagnosis , COVID-19/epidemiology , Humans , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , SARS-CoV-2
2.
J Theor Biol ; 509: 110513, 2021 01 21.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33075365

ABSTRACT

Infamously, the presence of honest communication in a signaling environment may be difficult to reconcile with small (relative) signaling costs or a low degree of common interest between sender (beneficiary) and receiver (donor). This paper posits that one mechanism through which such communication can arise is through inattention on the part of the receiver, which allows for honest communication in settings where-should the receiver be fully attentive-honest communication would be impossible. We explore this idea through the Sir Philip Sidney game in detail and show that some degree of inattention is always weakly better for the receiver and may be strictly better. We compare limited attention to Lachmann and Bergstrom's (1998) notion of a signaling medium and show that the receiver-optimal degree of inattention is equivalent to the receiver-optimal choice of medium.


Subject(s)
Communication , Signal Transduction , Costs and Cost Analysis , Game Theory
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