Comparing Environmental Risk Regulations in China and the United States.

The relative stringency of risk regulation across countries may have significant implications for public health and environmental outcomes, as well as for economic and trade impacts. In this study, we build on prior literature-which has often employed qualitative case studies, and has often focused on comparing the United States and Europe-by using a quantitative evidential reasoning approach to compare the relative stringency of federal/central level written rules for 45 randomly selected environmental risks in the United States and China. We find that, on average, in this sample of 45 environmental risks, the written rules for environmental risk regulation were more stringent in the United States than in China. Within this sample, we find that relative stringency was selective, leaning in both directions, as the United States and China each regulated some risks more stringently than the other; for example, the US written rules were more stringent for risks of toxic chemicals and most air pollutants, whereas China's written rules were more stringent for risks in agriculture. We also observe nuanced differences in relative regulatory stringency within sectors and risks; even where one country regulated one risk more stringently, the other country may regulate certain aspects of that risk more stringently. We comment on possible explanations for the patterns we observe. Our methods and findings may contribute to better understanding of comparative risk regulation across the United States and China, and worldwide. We also recognize that in addition to the written rules studied here, countries may also vary in their implementation.

Social science research to inform solar geoengineering.

What are the benefits and drawbacks, and for whom?.

Learning to Manage the Multirisk World.

Risk assessment, perception, and management tend to focus on one risk at a time. But we live in a multirisk world. This essay in honor of the 40th anniversary of the Society for Risk Analysis (SRA) and the journal Risk Analysis suggests that we can-and have already begun to-strengthen risk analysis and policy outcomes by moving from a focus on the single to the multiple-multiple stressors, multiple impacts, and multiple decisions. This evolution can improve our abilities to assess actual risks, to confront and weigh risk-risk trade-offs and innovate risk-superior moves, and to build learning into adaptive regulation that adjusts over time. Recognizing the multirisk reality can help us understand complex systems, foresee unintended consequences, design better policy solutions, and learn to improve.

Using decision analysis to improve malaria control policy making.

Malaria and other vector-borne diseases represent a significant and growing burden in many tropical countries. Successfully addressing these threats will require policies that expand access to and use of existing control methods, such as insecticide-treated bed nets (ITNs) and artemesinin combination therapies (ACTs) for malaria, while weighing the costs and benefits of alternative approaches over time. This paper argues that decision analysis provides a valuable framework for formulating such policies and combating the emergence and re-emergence of malaria and other diseases. We outline five challenges that policy makers and practitioners face in the struggle against malaria, and demonstrate how decision analysis can help to address and overcome these challenges. A prototype decision analysis framework for malaria control in Tanzania is presented, highlighting the key components that a decision support tool should include. Developing and applying such a framework can promote stronger and more effective linkages between research and policy, ultimately helping to reduce the burden of malaria and other vector-borne diseases.

Precautionary regulation in Europe and the United States: a quantitative comparison.

Much attention has been addressed to the question of whether Europe or the United States adopts a more precautionary stance to the regulation of potential environmental, health, and safety risks. Some commentators suggest that Europe is more risk-averse and precautionary, whereas the United States is seen as more risk-taking and optimistic about the prospects for new technology. Others suggest that the United States is more precautionary because its regulatory process is more legalistic and adversarial, while Europe is more lax and corporatist in its regulations. The flip-flop hypothesis claims that the United States was more precautionary than Europe in the 1970s and early 1980s, and that Europe has become more precautionary since then. We examine the levels and trends in regulation of environmental, health, and safety risks since 1970. Unlike previous research, which has studied only a small set of prominent cases selected nonrandomly, we develop a comprehensive list of almost 3,000 risks and code the relative stringency of regulation in Europe and the United States for each of 100 risks randomly selected from that list for each year from 1970 through 2004. Our results suggest that: (a) averaging over risks, there is no significant difference in relative precaution over the period, (b) weakly consistent with the flip-flop hypothesis, there is some evidence of a modest shift toward greater relative precaution of European regulation since about 1990, although (c) there is a diversity of trends across risks, of which the most common is no change in relative precaution (including cases where Europe and the United States are equally precautionary and where Europe or the United States has been consistently more precautionary). The overall finding is of a mixed and diverse pattern of relative transatlantic precaution over the period.

Hormesis, hotspots and emissions trading.

Instrument choice--the comparison of technology standards, performance standards, taxes and tradable permits--has been a major topic in environmental law and environmental economics. Most analyses assume that emissions and health effects are positively and linearly related. If they are not, this complicates the instrument choice analysis. This article analyses the effects of a nonlinear dose-response function on instrument choice. In particular, it examines the effects of hormesis (high-dose harm but low-dose benefit) on the choice between fixed performance standards and tradable emissions permits. First, the article distinguishes the effects of hormesis from the effects of local emissions. Hormesis is an attribute of the dose-response or exposure-response relationship. Hotspots are an attribute of the emissions-exposure relationship. Some pollutants may be hormetic and cause local emissions-exposure effects; others may be hormetic without causing local emissions-exposure effects. It is only the local exposure effects of emissions that pose a problem for emissions trading. Secondly, the article shows that the conditions under which emissions trading would perform less well or even perversely under hormesis, depend on how stringent a level of protection is set. Only when the regulatory standard is set at the nadir of the hormetic curve would emissions trading be seriously perverse (assuming other restrictive conditions as well), and such a standard is unlikely. Moreover, the benefits of the overall programme may justify the risk of small perverse effects around this nadir. Thirdly, the article argues that hotspots can be of concern for two distinct reasons, harmfulness and fairness. Lastly, the paper argues that the solution to these problems may not be to abandon market-based incentive instruments and their cost-effectiveness gains, but to improve them further by moving from emissions trading and emissions taxes to risk trading and risk taxes. In short, the article argues that hormesis does not pose a general obstacle to emissions trading or emissions taxes, but that in those cases where hormesis does pose such a problem, a shift toward risk trading or risk taxes would be the superior route.