Field trial: disinfection of contaminated anesthetic masks for piglets.

This paper aimed to assess the success of cleaning and disinfection on microbiological contamination of anesthetic masks, which were used for automated isoflurane anesthesia for surgical castration of male piglets. Data collection took place on 11 farms in Southern Germany between September 2020 and June 2022. Each farm was visited three times (one farm having two different anesthesia devices was visited six times), and microbiological assessments took place at four sample points (SP): after unpacking the masks (SP0), after disinfection before anesthesia (SP1), after anesthesia of all piglets to be castrated in this run (SP2), and after disinfection after anesthesia (SP3). The microbiological assessment included the determination of total bacteria count, total count of hemolytic and non-hemolytic mesophilic aerotolerant bacteria and a qualitative detection of indicator bacteria Escherichia (E.) coli, extended-spectrum beta-lactamase-producing E. coli (ESBL) and methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). For analysis, a generalized linear mixed model was applied using farms and farm visits as random effects and sampling points nested in farm visits as fixed effect. The fixed effect was highly significant for all three variables (total bacteria count, total count of hemolytic and non-hemolytic mesophilic aerotolerant bacteria) (p < 0.001). The bacterial counts at SP0 were about the same as at SP3. Concerning indicator bacteria, their presence was highest at SP2 and lowest at SP3. No indicator bacteria were present at SP1. It can be concluded that disinfection of anesthetic masks, especially before performing anesthesia, may effectively protect piglets of the following batch against unwanted transmission of pathogens. These findings will help farmers plan cleaning and disinfection activities.

Examining rhythm and melody processing in young children using FMRI.

While it is often reported that musical experience can have positive effects on cognitive development in young children, the neural basis of such potential effects remains relatively unexplored. Employing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) for such research presents as many challenges as possibilities, not least of which is the fact that young children can find it difficult to remain still and attentive for long periods of time. Here we describe an fMRI scanning protocol designed specifically for young children using short scanning runs, a sparse temporal sampling data acquisition technique, simple rhythmic and melodic discrimination tasks with a button-press response, and a child-oriented preparation session. Children were recruited as part of a large-scale longitudinal study examining the effects of musical training on cognitive development and the structure and function of the growing brain. Results from an initial analysis of 33 children and from the first five children to be re-scanned after musical training indicate that our scanning protocol is successful and that activation differences can be detected both between conditions and over time.

Understanding of literal truth, ironic criticism, and deceptive praise following childhood head injury.

Children with closed head injury (CHI) have semantic-pragmatic language problems that include difficulty in understanding and producing both literal and nonliteral statements. For example, they are relatively insensitive to some of the social messages in nonstandard communication as well as to words that code distinctions among mental states. This suggests that they may have difficulty with comprehension tasks involving first- and second-order intentionality, such as those involved in understanding irony and deception. We studied how 6- to 15-year-old children, typically developing or with CHI, interpret scenarios involving literal truth, ironic criticism, and deceptive praise. Children with severe CHI had overall poorer mastery of the task. Even mild CHI impaired the ability to understand the intentionality underlying deceptive praise. CHI, especially biologically significant CHI, appears to place children at risk for failure to understand language as externalized thought.

Dyslexia and visual-spatial talents: compensation vs deficit model.

There are both theoretical and empirical reasons to support the hypothesis that dyslexia is associated with enhancement of right-hemisphere, visual-spatial skills. However, the neurological evidence is neutral with respect to whether dyslexic visual-spatial abilities should be superior (a compensation model) or inferior (a deficit model). In three studies we tested the hypothesis that dyslexia is associated with superior visual-spatial skills. Individuals with dyslexia not only failed to show superiority on a range of visual-spatial tasks, even when tasks were presented without time constraints, but also demonstrated a deficit on many tasks. Whereas we found attentional problems associated with dyslexia, these did not explain our findings. Results are discussed in terms of the apparent conflict between the failure to find any visual-spatial talent associated with dyslexia and the fact that dyslexia is overrepresented in certain visual-spatial professions.

The origins and ends of giftedness.

Five issues about giftedness are discussed. First, the origins of giftedness are explored. The view that giftedness is entirely a product of training is critiqued. There is indirect evidence for atypical brain organization and innate talent in gifted children: Many gifted children and savants have enhanced right-hemisphere development, language-related difficulties, and autoimmune disorders. Second, the intense motivation of gifted children is discussed. Third, it is argued that gifted children have social and emotional difficulties that set them apart. Fourth, evidence for the often uneven cognitive profiles of such children is presented. Finally, the relationship between childhood giftedness and "domain" creativity in adulthood is discussed. Few gifted children go on to become adult creators because the skills and personality factors required to be a creator are very different from those typical of even the most highly gifted children.

Acquired 'theory of mind' impairments following stroke.

The ability to attribute thoughts and feelings to self and others ('theory of mind') has been hypothesised to have an innate neural basis and a dedicated cognitive mechanism. Evidence in favour of this proposal has come from autism; a brain-based developmental disorder which appears to be characterised by impaired theory of mind, despite sometimes good general reasoning skills/IQ. To date no case of specific acquired theory of mind impairment has been reported. The present study examined theory of mind in adults who had suffered right hemisphere stroke, a group known to show pragmatic and social difficulties. In one study using story materials and two using cartoons, patients' understanding of materials requiring attribution of mental states (e.g. ignorance, false belief) was significantly worse than their understanding of non-mental control materials. Data from healthy elderly subjects, and a small group of left hemisphere patients (who received the tasks in modified form), suggest that this impairment on mental state tasks is not a function of task difficulty. The findings support the notion of a dedicated cognitive system for theory of mind, and suggest a role for the healthy right hemisphere in the attribution of mental states.

Distinguishing lies from jokes: theory of mind deficits and discourse interpretation in right hemisphere brain-damaged patients.

Right-hemisphere brain damaged (RHD) patients and a normal control group were tested for their ability to infer first- and second-order mental states and to understand the communicative intentions underlying ironic jokes and lies. Subjects listened to stories involving a character who had either a true or a false belief about another character's knowledge. Stories ended either with an ironic joke or a lie by this character. In the joke stories, the speaker knew that the listener knew the truth (a true second-order belief) and did not expect the listener to believe what was said; in the lie stories, the speaker did not know that the listener actually knew the truth (a false second-order belief) and thus did expect the listener to believe what was said. RHD patients performed significantly worse than control subjects on one of two measures of second-order belief, which suggests that the ability to make second-order mental state attributions is fragile and unreliable following right-hemisphere damage. RHD patients in addition performed worse than controls when asked to distinguish lies from jokes, confirming their known difficulties with discourse interpretation. For both groups, the ability to distinguish lies from jokes was strongly correlated with two measures of the ability to attribute correctly second-order beliefs. These results suggest that the fragility of RHD patients' understanding of second-order mental states underlies a portion of their difficulties in discourse comprehension, but that the underlying impairment is not restricted to right hemisphere dysfunction.

The getting of wisdom: theory of mind in old age.

Theory of mind, the ability to attribute mental states, has been little explored beyond the early school years. Yet, later development, including possible patterns of breakdown, has important implications for current debate concerning the modularity/domain-specificity of the cognitive and neurological systems underlying theory of mind. This article reports a first study of theory of mind in normal aging. The results suggest that although performance on tasks with nonmental content may decrease with age, performance on theory of mind tasks remains intact and may even improve over the later adult years. The implications of these findings for the cognitive processes underlying theory of mind are discussed.

The effects of right-hemisphere brain damage on patients' use of terms of personal reference.

Successful communication depends on social as well as linguistic factors. In conversation, for example, a speaker must often refer to another person. Choosing an appropriate term of personal reference requires a speaker to consider several features of the discourse context, including properties of the persons being referred to and what knowledge is shared between the speaker and his or her addressee. In a pair of similar studies, we examined how right-hemisphere brain-damaged (RHD) patients and nonbrain-damaged control subjects use these different kinds of information in choosing formal (e.g., "Mr. Harding") versus informal ("Oliver") terms of reference for an absent third person. Stimulus vignettes manipulated three variables: the occupational status of the referent, the speaker's familiarity with the referent (i.e., the degree to which the speaker and referent were personally acquainted), and the addressee's familiarity (i.e., the degree to which the addressee and referent were personally acquainted). Relative to the control subjects, the RHD patients showed decreased use of both familiarity variables when choosing formal over informal labels, but apparently preserved sensitivity to the status variable. These results suggest how decreased use of the knowledge shared between a speaker and addressee disrupts RHD patients' discourse and thus contributes to these patients' aberrant interpersonal behavior. In addition. In addition, the results from the second study demonstrated an asymmetry in how female versus male subjects responded to the status manipulation.

Human NAD(P)H:quinone oxidoreductase induction in human hepatoma cells after exposure to industrial acrylates, phenolics, and metals.

Induction of the endogenous human NAD(P)H:quinone oxidoreductase (HQOR1) gene in the human hepatoma cell line HepG2 was measured at both the enzyme activity and RNA levels after exposure to a variety of industrial compounds. An RNA probe was designed that was complementary to portions of both the coding region and the 3'-nontranslated region unique to the largest (2.7-kilobase) HQOR1 transcript. Induction by three strong inducers of HQOR1 verified the utility of the antisense RNA probe. Ten industrial chemicals were evaluated as potential inducers, i.e. acrylonitrile, Sb2O3, BaO, CdCl2, CuCl, ethyl acrylate, methyl acrylate, MoO3, phenol, and toluene. Induction at the RNA level was about 2-fold higher than at the enzyme activity level except in the case of acrylonitrile, for which induction at the enzyme activity and RNA levels was similar. There was no preferential induction of the 2.7-kilobase transcript for any chemical tested, including 2,3,7,8-tetrachloro-dibenzo-p-dioxin, which had previously been reported to preferentially induce this transcript. Six of the 10 industrial chemicals, including four previously untested chemicals (phenol, Sb2O3, CuCl, and MoO3), were found to induce the HQOR1 gene. By comparison, previous studies in rodent systems failed to accurately predict the human HQOR1 gene response. Two chemicals previously shown to be inducers in rodent systems (methyl acrylate and CdCl2 failed to induce the HQOR1 gene. These results emphasize the importance of analyzing induction of the endogenous human gene, rather than simply extrapolating from rodent systems or gene fusion experiments.

When 3-year-olds pass the appearance--reality test.

Sixty-eight 3-year-olds received a standard appearance-reality task along with either a trick task, in which the appearance question was placed in the context of a deceptive game, or a reduced information processing task, in which a dual object (e.g., a sponge-rock) was presented along with an object that matched the dual object's identity (a sponge) and one that matched the dual object's appearance (a rock). Children were more likely to pass either the trick or reduced information processing task and fail the standard than the reverse. Thus, 3-year-olds can grasp the distinction between appearance and reality (a) when their goal is to trick someone, which may prime them to think about the other's mental state, and (b) when they do not need to held conflicting object identities in mind at the same time.

Children's understanding of the meaning and functions of verbal irony.

We investigated children's understanding of irony and sensitivity to irony's meanness and humor. In Study 1, 89 participants (5-6-year-olds, 8-9-year-olds, adults) heard ironic and literal criticisms, and literal compliments. Comprehension of irony emerged between 5 and 6 years of age. Ratings of humor increased with age; ratings of meanness did not (showing that all ages perceived irony as more muted than literal criticism). In Study 2, results from 135 participants (6-7-year-olds, 8-9-year-olds, and adults) replicated these findings and revealed the role of form and intonation. Thus, comprehension of irony emerges between 5 and 6 years of age, and sensitivity to the muting function develops prior to sensitivity to the humor function.

Talents and disorders: relationships among handedness, sex, and college major.

One-hundred and nine consistent left- and right-handers participated in an experiment investigating the role of Handedness, Sex, and College Major in predicting spatial talents, verbal problems, immune disorders, allergies, and myopia. Left-handers had poor verbal ability. Males in spatial majors (requiring extensive math) had high spatial ability and poor verbal ability. Left-handed males in spatial majors had high spatial ability, poor verbal ability, an elevated incidence of asthma, and a marginally higher incidence of myopia. No trade-off between spatial and verbal ability was found. Results provide qualified support for Geschwind and Galaburda's (1987) hypothesis of the "Pathology of Superiority."

Three-year-olds' understanding of mental states: the influence of trickery.

This study examined the claim that children under 4 cannot conceptualize false mental states. Fifty-one children between 3;0 and 4;2 were tested in a Standard and a Trick Condition. In the Standard Condition, children were given a modified version of the Smarties task developed by Hogrefe, Wimmer, and Perner (1986). In the Trick Condition, the Smarties task was modified so that children were required to trick another person by switching the contents of a familiar box. Results revealed that a majority of subjects responded correctly to Ignorance and False Belief Questions in the Trick Condition, but not in the Standard Condition. There were no differences in children's ability to attribute ignorance and false belief. These results suggest that even young 3-year-olds have the ability to attribute mental states that differ from their own, even though this ability has proved elusive and difficult to demonstrate.

Does processing style affect recall of the Rey-Osterrieth or Taylor complex figures?

This study investigated the effects of visual vs. verbal processing style preferences on immediate recall accuracy for the Rey-Osterrieth and Taylor Complex Figure Tests. Undergraduates were classified as visualizers or verbalizers and asked to copy either the Rey-Osterrieth or Taylor figure and then draw it from memory. A subset of subjects reported the strategy they used to reproduce the figure. Visualizers showed better reproduction accuracy than verbalizers for the Rey-Osterrieth test, and for this test approximately 80% of verbalizers as well as visualizers reported using a visual strategy. For the Taylor, no effect of processing style was obtained, and close to half of the verbalizers (43%) reported using their preferred verbal strategy, while 82% of the visualizers used a visual strategy. These results suggest that a general preference for thinking "in images" is important for predicting visual memory accuracy only on tests such as the Rey-Osterrieth which do not lend themselves easily to a verbal strategy. In contrast, for the Taylor test, deficits to the visual imagery system may be circumvented and obscured by the verbalizers' use of verbal recall strategies. Thus, in test batteries, the Rey-Osterrieth and the Taylor Tests should not be used interchangeably.