Real-world long-term effects on blood pressure and other cardiovascular risk factors for patients in digital therapeutics.

PURPOSE: Hypertension is a leading causeof premature death worldwide and a major public health problem. This study investigated the long-term effects (>1 year) of digital hypertension monitoring by home blood pressure (HBP) measurements in combination with individualized remote treatment via a Swedish Digital Therapeutics platform in a large patient population. METHODS: The primary endpoint, HBP, and exploratory endpoints, BMI, alcohol consumption, stress level, physical activity, and smoking, were assessed every 3 months for 540 and 360 days, respectively, in 7752 Swedish primary hypertension patients. Patients received individualized medical treatments and lifestyle advice via asynchronous text-based communication in an app. Changes from baseline in endpoints were calculated for the whole population and for subgroups defined by baseline SBP ≥135 (high SBP), 125-135 (suboptimal SBP), 115-125 (optimal SBP), and <115 mmHg (low SBP). RESULTS: After 360 days of treatment, the whole population showed a significant increase of 57% (from 37 to 58%) in the proportion of patients with controlled SBP (i.e. SBP of 115-135 mmHg). The largest reduction in SBP of 13.8 mmHg was observed for the high SBP subgroup, whereas for the low SBP subgroup, SBP increased by 13.4 mmHg. BP improved most in the first three months, and for both the high and low BP subgroups, the improvement continued during the 540-day study period. Significant beneficial changes were also observed for some exploratory endpoints including BMI and smoking. CONCLUSIONS: In conclusion, the digital therapeutics platform was associated with significant improvement in BP control and associated risk factors, which were maintained over a longer period.

As predicted by theory: choice and competition in a publicly funded and regulated regional health system yield improved access and cost control.

BACKGROUND: New Public Management (NPM) has been widely used to introduce competition into public healthcare. Results have been mixed, and there has been much controversy about the appropriateness of a private sector-mimicking governance model in a public service. One voice in the debate suggested that rather than discussing whether competition is "good" or "bad" the emphasis should be on exploring the conditions for a successful implementation. METHODS: We report a longitudinal case study of the introduction of patient choice and allowing private providers to enter a publicly funded market. Patients in need of hip or knee replacement surgery are allowed to choose provider, and those are paid a fixed reimbursement for the full care episode (bundled payment). Providers are financially accountable for complications. Data on number of patients, waiting lists and times, costs to the public purchaser, and complications were collected from public registries. Providers were interviewed at three points in time during a nine-year follow-up period. Time-series of the quantitative data were exhibited and the views of actors involved were explored in a thematic analysis of the interviews. RESULTS: The policy goals of improving access to care and care quality while controlling total costs were achieved in a sustained way. Six themes were identified among actors interviewed and those were consistent over time. The design of the patient choice model was accepted, although all providers were discontent with the level of reimbursement. Providers felt that quality, timeliness of service and staff satisfaction had improved. Public and private providers differed in terms of patient-mix and developed different strategies to adjust to the reimbursement system. Private providers were more active in marketing and improving operation room efficiency. All providers intensified cooperation with referring physicians. Close attention was paid to following the rules set by the purchaser. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS: The sustained cost control was an effect of bundled payment. What this study shows is that both public and private providers adhere long-term to regulations by a public purchaser that also controls entrance to the market. The compensation was fixed and led to competition on quality, as predicted by theory.