An eye-tracking examination of readers' sensitivity to pragmatic scope information during the processing of conditional inducements.

Previous research into conditional inducements has shown that readers are sensitive after reading such conditionals to pragmatic scope differences between promises and threats; specifically, threats can be referred to as promises, but promises cannot be referred to as threats. Crucially, previous work has not revealed whether such scope effects emerge while processing the conditional itself. In the experiment reported here, participants' eye movements were recorded while they read vignettes containing conditional promises and threats. We observed a reading time penalty on the conditional itself when participants read a conditional promise that was described as a "threat" (e.g., Liam threatened Perry "if you tell dad, then I'll take equal responsibility"). There was no such penalty when the word "promise" was presented before a conditional threat. These results suggest that readers are sensitive during reading of the conditional itself to pragmatic scope differences between "threats" and "promises." (PsycINFO Database Record

'It's hard to write a good article': The online comprehension of excuses as indirect replies.

In an eye-tracking experiment, we examined how readers comprehend indirect replies when they are uttered in reply to a direct question. Participants read vignettes that described two characters engaged in dialogue. Each dialogue contained a direct question (e.g., How are you doing in Chemistry?) answered with an excuse (e.g., The exams are not fair). In response to direct questions, such indirect replies are typically used to avoid a face-threatening disclosure (e.g., doing badly on the Chemistry course). Our goal was to determine whether readers are sensitive during reading to the indirect meaning communicated by such replies. Of the three contexts we examined, the first described a negative, face-threatening situation and the second a positive, non-face threatening situation, while the third was neutral. Analysis of reading times to the replies provides strong evidence that readers are sensitive online to the face-saving function of indirect replies.

"This Isn't a Promise, It's a Threat".

Participants had their eye movements recorded as they read vignettes containing implied promises and threats. We observed a reading time penalty when participants read the word "threat" when it anaphorically referred to an implied promise. There was no such penalty when the word "promise" was used to refer to an implied threat. On a later measure of processing we again found a reading time penalty when the word "threat" was used to refer to a promise, but also when the word "promise" was used to refer to a threat. These results suggest that anaphoric processing of such expressions is driven initially by sensitivity to the semantic scope differences of "threats" versus "promises." A threat can be understood as a type of promise, but a promise cannot be understood as a type of threat. However, this effect was short lived; readers were ultimately sensitive to mismatched meaning, regardless of speech act performed.

Slippery slope arguments imply opposition to change.

Slippery slope arguments (SSAs) of the form if A, then C describe an initial proposal (A) and a predicted, undesirable consequence of this proposal (C) (e.g., "If cannabis is ever legalized, then eventually cocaine will be legalized, too"). Despite SSAs being a common rhetorical device, there has been surprisingly little empirical research into their subjective evaluation and perception. Here, we present evidence that SSAs are interpreted as a form of consequentialist argument, inviting inferences about the speaker's (or writer's) attitudes. Study 1 confirmed the common intuition that a SSA is perceived to be an argument against the initial proposal (A), whereas Study 2 showed that the subjective strength of this inference relates to the subjective undesirability of the predicted consequences (C). Because arguments are rarely made out of context, in Studies 3 and 4 we examined how one important contextual factor, the speaker's known beliefs, influences the perceived coherence, strength, and persuasiveness of a SSA. Using an unobtrusive dependent variable (eye movements during reading), in Study 3 we showed that readers are sensitive to the internal coherence between a speaker's beliefs and the implied meaning of the argument. Finally, Study 4 revealed that this degree of internal coherence influences the perceived strength and persuasiveness of the argument. Together, these data indicate that SSAs are treated as a form of negative consequentialist argument. People infer that the speaker of a SSA opposes the initial proposal; therefore, SSAs are only perceived to be persuasive and conversationally relevant when the speaker's attitudes match this inference.

Conditional advice and inducements: are readers sensitive to implicit speech acts during comprehension?

Conditionals can implicitly convey a range of speech acts including promises, tips, threats and warnings. These are traditionally divided into the broader categories of advice (tips and warnings) and inducements (promises and threats). One consequence of this distinction is that speech acts from within the same category should be harder to differentiate than those from different categories. We examined this in two self-paced reading experiments. Experiment 1 revealed a rapid processing penalty when inducements (promises) and advice (tips) were anaphorically referenced using a mismatching speech act. In Experiment 2 a delayed penalty was observed when a speech act (promise or threat) was referenced by a mismatching speech act from the same category of inducements. This suggests that speech acts from the same category are harder to discriminate than those from different categories. Our findings not only support a semantic distinction between speech act categories, but also reveal pragmatic differences within categories.