Intertwining personal and reward relevance: evidence from the drift-diffusion model.

In their seminal paper 'Is our self nothing but reward', Northoff and Hayes (Biol Psychiatry 69(11):1019-1025, Northoff, Hayes, Biological Psychiatry 69(11):1019-1025, 2011) proposed three models of the relationship between self and reward and opened a continuing debate about how these different fields can be linked. To date, none of the proposed models received strong empirical support. The present study tested common and distinct effects of personal relevance and reward values by de-componenting different stages of perceptual decision making using a drift-diffusion approach. We employed a recently developed associative matching paradigm where participants (N = 40) formed mental associations between five geometric shapes and five labels referring personal relevance in the personal task, or five shape-label pairings with different reward values in the reward task and then performed a matching task by indicating whether a displayed shape-label pairing was correct or incorrect. We found that common effects of personal relevance and monetary reward were manifested in the facilitation of behavioural performance for high personal relevance and high reward value as socially important signals. The differential effects between personal and monetary relevance reflected non-decisional time in a perceptual decision process, and task-specific prioritization of stimuli. Our findings support the parallel processing model (Northoff & Hayes, Biol Psychiatry 69(11):1019-1025, Northoff, Hayes, Biological Psychiatry 69(11):1019-1025, 2011) and suggest that self-specific processing occurs in parallel with high reward processing. Limitations and further directions are discussed.

Self-bias modulates saccadic control.

We present novel data on the role of attention in eliciting enhanced processing of stimuli associated with self. Participants were required to make pro- or anti-saccades according to whether learned shape-label pairings matched or mismatched. When stimuli matched participants were required to make an anti-saccade, and when the stimuli mismatched a pro-saccade was required. We found that anti-saccades were difficult to make to stimuli associated with self when compared to stimuli associated with a friend and a stranger. In contrast, anti-saccades to friend-stimuli were easier to make than anti-saccades to stranger-stimuli. In addition, a correct anti-saccade to a self-associated stimulus disrupted subsequent pro-saccade trials, relative to when the preceding anti-saccade was made to other stimuli. The data indicate that self-associated stimuli provide a strong cue for explicit shifts of attention to them, and that correct anti-saccades to such stimuli demand high levels of inhibition (which carries over to subsequent pro-saccade trials). The self exerts an automatic draw on attention.