ABSTRACT
A substantial number of social science studies have shown a lack of conceptual clarity, inadequate understanding of the nature of the empirical research approaches, and undue preference for deduction, which have caused much confusion, created paradigmatic incommensurability, and impeded scientific advancement. This study, through conceptual review and analysis of canonical discussions of concepts and the reasoning approaches of deduction and induction and their applications in social science theorization by philosophers and social scientists, is purported to unveil the logical nature of empirical research and examine the legitimacy of the preference of deduction among social scientists. The findings note that conceptual clarity as the foundation of social science research, exchange, and replication can be achieved through interdisciplinary stress of conceptual analyses to establish universal measurements and that the primacy of deduction in social sciences needs to concede to or be balanced with induction for new knowledge, more discoveries, and scientific advancement. The study recommends that institutions and researchers of social sciences invest more in conceptual analysis and inductive research through collaboration and separate efforts.
