The Production Effect Becomes Spatial.

In the verbal domain, it is well established that words read aloud are better remembered than their silently read counterparts. It has been hypothesized that this production effect stems from the addition of distinctive features, with the caveat that the processing that generates added features interferes with rehearsal. Here, we tested the idea that a similar trade-off is found in the visuospatial domain. In all experiments, a short series of single dots sequentially appeared at various locations on a screen. Participants produced the items by clicking on them at presentation, watched the items appear quietly, or produced an irrelevant click after each item to better even out rehearsal opportunities between produced and control conditions. In Experiment 1, the dots appeared within a visible grid and an order reconstruction task was used. Experiment 2 also called upon reconstruction, but with the grid removed. In Experiments 3, a recall task was used. The results show that producing items hindered performance compared to the control condition. Conversely, production improved performance compared to the control condition where rehearsal was hindered. This is the first demonstration of a visuospatial production effect. The key findings were successfully modeled by the Revised Feature Model (RFM).

Give me enough time to rehearse: presentation rate modulates the production effect.

This paper uses the production effect to test one of the important predictions of a view of memory that is embodied in the Revised Feature Model (RFM). When to-be-recalled lists contain items both read aloud and silently, words read aloud are less well recalled at the beginning of the list and better recalled at the end. According to the RFM, producing the items by reading them aloud adds distinctive features which supports recall, but production also interferes with rehearsal - a process that operates more significantly at the start of a list. This critical role assigned to rehearsal has never been systematically tested. We do this here through a systematic literature review and an experiment that manipulates presentation rate. With a faster presentation rate, rehearsal is less likely; the implication is that the advantage observed for silently read items in the primacy positions should vanish, while the recency advantage for produced items should remain. The systematic review collected an initial sample of 422 unique articles on the production effect in immediate serial recall and revealed the predicted pattern. In addition, in our experiment, the presentation rate was manipulated within an immediate serial recall task (500, 1,000, and 2,000 ms/word). As predicted, the recency advantage for produced items was observed for all presentation speeds. Critically, the production disadvantage for early serial positions was only present for the two slowest rates, but not at the fastest speed. Results were successfully modeled by calling upon the RFM.

Temporal Bell inequalities in cognition.

There is widespread evidence that human memory is constructive, so that recollective processes may alter the information retrieved or impact on subsequent recollections. We examine a framework for narrowing down the nature of such processes, from physics. In Physics, the Temporal Bell (TB) inequality offers a general test of the sensitivity of the context of previous measurements in sequential measurement scenarios, as predicted by quantum theory. We present an empirical memory paradigm that allows a test of the TB inequality, using a novel kind of "change judgment," whereby participants are asked to decide whether there has been a change in a question across different time points of a scenario. Across two experiments, we were able to observe evidence for the violation of a TB inequality in one case, offering evidence for quantum-like processes in memory. The present results complement other recent work purporting the relevance of quantum-like representations in memory and raise questions regarding the adaptive value of such representations.

Modeling verbal short-term memory: A walk around the neighborhood.

When remembering over the short-term, long-term knowledge has a large effect on the number of correctly recalled items and little impact on memory for order. This is true, for example, when the effects of semantic category are examined. Contrary to what these findings suggest, Poirier et al. in 2015 proposed that memory for order relies on the level of activation within long-term networks. Importantly, although their view has been criticized, they showed that manipulating semantic associations led to item migrations that were atypical. In this article, we show that similar migrations can be obtained with another knowledge-based factor: orthographic neighborhood. In three experiments, we manipulated the orthographic neighborhood of to-be-recalled items. The latter is a sublexical factor; as such, it is much less likely than semantic relatedness to involve demand characteristics or grouping strategies. The first experiment established that the neighborhood manipulation produced the pattern of item migrations previously observed with semantic relatedness, confirming that the migration effect can generalize to other variables. The last two experiments suggested that migrations were due to the features shared across list items rather than to item co-activation (as in Poirier et al.). The results were successfully modeled by calling upon the Revised Feature Model, where recall depends on selecting a retrieval candidate based on the features of the cueing information. Overall, our findings underline the usefulness of a model where retrieval is determined by relative distinctiveness and underline that multiple mechanisms can lead to order errors in recall. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Personal ethical settings for driverless cars and the utility paradox: An ethical analysis of public attitudes in UK and Japan.

Driverless cars are predicted to dramatically reduce collisions and casualties on the roads. However, there has been controversy about how they should be programmed to respond in the event of an unavoidable collision. Should they aim to save the most lives, prioritise the lives of pedestrians, or occupants of the vehicle? Some have argued that driverless cars should all be programmed to minimise total casualties. While this would appear to have wide international public support, previous work has also suggested regional variation and public reluctance to purchase driverless cars with such a mandated ethical setting. The possibility that algorithms designed to minimise collision fatalities would lead to reduced consumer uptake of driverless cars and thereby to higher overall road deaths, represents a potential "utility paradox". To investigate this paradox further, we examined the views of the general public about driverless cars in two online surveys in the UK and Japan, examining the influence of choice of a "personal ethical setting" as well as of framing on hypothetical purchase decisions. The personal ethical setting would allow respondents to choose between a programme which would save the most lives, save occupants or save pedestrians. We found striking differences between UK and Japanese respondents. While a majority of UK respondents wished to buy driverless cars that prioritise the most lives or their family members' lives, Japanese survey participants preferred to save pedestrians. We observed reduced willingness to purchase driverless cars with a mandated ethical setting (compared to offering choice) in both countries. It appears that the public values relevant to programming of driverless cars differ between UK and Japan. The highest uptake of driverless cars in both countries can be achieved by providing a personal ethical setting. Since uptake of driverless cars (rather than specific algorithm used) is potentially the biggest factor in reducing in traffic related accidents, providing some choice of ethical settings may be optimal for driverless cars according to a range of plausible ethical theories.

Context effects in similarity judgments.

Tversky's (1977) famous demonstration of a diagnosticity effect indicates that the similarity between the same two stimuli depends on the presence of contextual stimuli. In a forced choice task, the similarity between a target and a choice, appears to depend on the other choices. Specifically, introducing a distractor grouped with one of the options would reduce preference for the grouped option. However, the diagnosticity effect has been difficult to replicate, casting doubt on its robustness and our understanding of contextual effects in similarity generally. We propose that the apparent brittleness of the diagnosticity effect is because it is in competition with an opposite attraction effect. Even though in both the similarity and decision-making literatures there are indications for such a competition, we provide the first direct experimental demonstration of how an attraction effect can give way to a diagnosticity one, as a distractor option is manipulated. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Constructive Biases in Clinical Judgment.

With a pair of oppositely valenced stimuli, rating the first one sometimes leads to a more extreme evaluation for the second (e.g., if the second is negatively valenced, rating the first stimulus would lead to a more negative rating for the second). We considered an evaluation bias in the case of clinical diagnosis relating to eating disorders. A population sample which included experienced clinical psychologists and psychiatrists showed partial evidence of an evaluation bias, when judging descriptions of individuals designed to be consistent with eating disorders or not. Quantum probability theory, the probability rules from quantum mechanics without any of the physics, is particularly well-suited to modeling the evaluation bias (and constructive influences generally), because a measurement (or judgment) can change the state of the system. We applied a previous quantum model to the present result, an extension of the model embodying noisy processes, and belief adjustment model. We discuss how model fits inform an examination of rationality in the observed behavior.

The production effect over the long term: Modeling distinctiveness using serial positions.

The production effect is a well-established finding: If some words within a list are read aloud, that is, produced, they are better remembered than their silently read neighbors. The effect has been extensively studied with long-term memory tasks. Recently, using immediate serial recall and short-term order reconstruction, Saint-Aubin et al. (2021) reported informative interactions between the production effect and serial positions. Here, we asked whether these interactions would also be observed with the long-term memory tasks used in the field. In Experiment 1, pure and mixed lists of eight words were presented in both order reconstruction and free recall tasks, with a 30-s filled retention interval. In Experiment 2, the list length was extended to 24 words; in Experiment 3, 10-word lists were used with a 2-min retention interval. Results from all experiments aligned well with those observed in short-term memory. With mixed lists, where produced and silently read words alternated, produced items were better recalled, leading to sawtooth serial position curves. With pure lists, produced items were better recalled when studied in the last serial positions, but they were less well recalled for the primacy positions. Results were readily accounted for by the revised feature model, originally developed to explain short-term memory performance. The findings and model suggest that produced items are encoded with more item-specific, modality-related features and that this generates a relative distinctiveness advantage in short- and long-term memory. However, the richer encoding comes at a cost: It appears to disrupt rehearsal. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Violations of locality and free choice are equivalent resources in Bell experiments.

Bell inequalities rest on three fundamental assumptions: realism, locality, and free choice, which lead to nontrivial constraints on correlations in very simple experiments. If we retain realism, then violation of the inequalities implies that at least one of the remaining two assumptions must fail, which can have profound consequences for the causal explanation of the experiment. We investigate the extent to which a given assumption needs to be relaxed for the other to hold at all costs, based on the observation that a violation need not occur on every experimental trial, even when describing correlations violating Bell inequalities. How often this needs to be the case determines the degree of, respectively, locality or free choice in the observed experimental behavior. Despite their disparate character, we show that both assumptions are equally costly. Namely, the resources required to explain the experimental statistics (measured by the frequency of causal interventions of either sort) are exactly the same. Furthermore, we compute such defined measures of locality and free choice for any nonsignaling statistics in a Bell experiment with binary settings, showing that it is directly related to the amount of violation of the so-called Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequalities. This result is theory independent as it refers directly to the experimental statistics. Additionally, we show how the local fraction results for quantum-mechanical frameworks with infinite number of settings translate into analogous statements for the measure of free choice we introduce. Thus, concerning statistics, causal explanations resorting to either locality or free choice violations are fully interchangeable.

What Can Performance in the IEDS Task Tell Us About Attention Shifting in Clinical Groups?

The Intra-Extra-dimensional set shift task (IEDS) is a widely used test of learning and attention, believed to be sensitive to aspects of executive function. The task proceeds through a number of stages, and it is generally claimed that patterns of errors across stages can be used to discriminate between reduced attention switching and more general reductions in rates of learning. A number of papers have used the IEDS task to argue for specific attention shifting difficulties in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and Schizophrenia, however, it remains unclear how well the IEDS really differentiates between reduced attention shifting and other causes of impaired performance. To address this issue, we introduce a simple computational model of performance in the IEDS task, designed to separate the competing effects of attention shifting and general learning rate. We fit the model to data from ASD and comparison individuals matched on age and IQ, as well as to data from four previous studies which used the IEDS task. Model fits do not show consistent evidence for reductions in attention shifting rates in ASD and Schizophrenia. Instead, we find performance is better explained by differences in learning rate, particularly from punishment, which we show correlates with IQ. We, therefore, argue that the IEDS task is not a good measure of attention shifting in clinical groups. LAY SUMMARY: The Intra-Extra-Dimensional Set shift task (IEDS) is often given to autistic individuals, who tend to make more errors relative to comparison groups. This higher error rate is taken to mean that autistic individuals struggle with attention control. Our computational model of the IEDS shows that the performance of ASD and some other clinical groups can be explained instead by differences in learning rate, rather than differences in attention control.

Perspectives on Correctness in Probabilistic Inference from Psychology.

Research into decision making has enabled us to appreciate that the notion of correctness is multifaceted. Different normative framework for correctness can lead to different insights about correct behavior. We illustrate the shifts for correctness insights with two tasks, the Wason selection task and the conjunction fallacy task; these tasks have had key roles in the development of logical reasoning and decision making research respectively. The Wason selection task arguably has played an important part in the transition from understanding correctness using classical logic to classical probability theory (and information theory). The conjunction fallacy has enabled a similar shift from baseline classical probability theory to quantum probability. The focus of this overview is the latter, as it represents a novel way for understanding probabilistic inference in psychology. We conclude with some of the current challenges concerning the application of quantum probability theory in psychology in general and specifically for the problem of understanding correctness in decision making.

Dissociating visuo-spatial and verbal working memory: It's all in the features.

Echoing many of the themes of the seminal work of Atkinson and Shiffrin (The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 2; 89-195, 1968), this paper uses the feature model (Nairne, Memory & Cognition, 16, 343-352, 1988; Nairne, Memory & Cognition, 18; 251-269, 1990; Neath & Nairne, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 2; 429-441, 1995) to account for performance in working-memory tasks. The Brooks verbal and visuo-spatial matrix tasks were performed alone, with articulatory suppression, or with a spatial suppression task; the results produced the expected dissociation. We used approximate Bayesian computation techniques to fit the feature model to the data and showed that the similarity-based interference process implemented in the model accounted for the data patterns well. We then fit the model to data from Guérard and Tremblay (2008, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 34, 556-569); the latter study produced a double dissociation while calling upon more typical order reconstruction tasks. Again, the model performed well. The findings show that a double dissociation can be modelled without appealing to separate systems for verbal and visuo-spatial processing. The latter findings are significant as the feature model had not been used to model this type of dissociation before; importantly, this is also the first time the model is quantitatively fit to data. For the demonstration provided here, modularity was unnecessary if two assumptions were made: (1) the main difference between spatial and verbal working-memory tasks is the features that are encoded; (2) secondary tasks selectively interfere with primary tasks to the extent that both tasks involve similar features. It is argued that a feature-based view is more parsimonious (see Morey, 2018, Psychological Bulletin, 144, 849-883) and offers flexibility in accounting for multiple benchmark effects in the field.

Perspectives on correctness in probabilistic inference from psychology

Research into decision making has enabled us to appreciate that the notion of correctness is multifaceted. Different normative framework for correctness can lead to different insights about correct behavior. We illustrate the shifts for correctness insights with two tasks, the Wason selection task and the conjunction fallacy task; these tasks have had key roles in the development of logical reasoning and decision making research respectively. The Wason selection task arguably has played an important part in the transition from understanding correctness using classical logic to classical probability theory (and information theory). The conjunction fallacy has enabled a similar shift from baseline classical probability theory to quantum probability. The focus of this overview is the latter, as it represents a novel way for understanding probabilistic inference in psychology. We conclude with some of the current challenges concerning the application of quantum probability theory in psychology in general and specifically for the problem of understanding correctness in decision making

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A quantum theory account of order effects and conjunction fallacies in political judgments.

Are our everyday judgments about the world around us normative? Decades of research in the judgment and decision-making literature suggest the answer is no. If people's judgments do not follow normative rules, then what rules if any do they follow? Quantum probability theory is a promising new approach to modeling human behavior that is at odds with normative, classical rules. One key advantage of using quantum theory is that it explains multiple types of judgment errors using the same basic machinery, unifying what have previously been thought of as disparate phenomena. In this article, we test predictions from quantum theory related to the co-occurrence of two classic judgment phenomena, order effects and conjunction fallacies, using judgments about real-world events (related to the U.S. presidential primaries). We also show that our data obeys two a priori and parameter free constraints derived from quantum theory. Further, we examine two factors that moderate the effects, cognitive thinking style (as measured by the Cognitive Reflection Test) and political ideology.

A quantum probability framework for human probabilistic inference.

There is considerable variety in human inference (e.g., a doctor inferring the presence of a disease, a juror inferring the guilt of a defendant, or someone inferring future weight loss based on diet and exercise). As such, people display a wide range of behaviors when making inference judgments. Sometimes, people's judgments appear Bayesian (i.e., normative), but in other cases, judgments deviate from the normative prescription of classical probability theory. How can we combine both Bayesian and non-Bayesian influences in a principled way? We propose a unified explanation of human inference using quantum probability theory. In our approach, we postulate a hierarchy of mental representations, from 'fully' quantum to 'fully' classical, which could be adopted in different situations. In our hierarchy of models, moving from the lowest level to the highest involves changing assumptions about compatibility (i.e., how joint events are represented). Using results from 3 experiments, we show that our modeling approach explains 5 key phenomena in human inference including order effects, reciprocity (i.e., the inverse fallacy), memorylessness, violations of the Markov condition, and antidiscounting. As far as we are aware, no existing theory or model can explain all 5 phenomena. We also explore transitions in our hierarchy, examining how representations change from more quantum to more classical. We show that classical representations provide a better account of data as individuals gain familiarity with a task. We also show that representations vary between individuals, in a way that relates to a simple measure of cognitive style, the Cognitive Reflection Test. (PsycINFO Database Record

The rational status of quantum cognition.

Classic probability theory (CPT) is generally considered the rational way to make inferences, but there have been some empirical findings showing a divergence between reasoning and the principles of classical probability theory (CPT), inviting the conclusion that humans are irrational. Perhaps the most famous of these findings is the conjunction fallacy (CF). Recently, the CF has been shown consistent with the principles of an alternative probabilistic framework, quantum probability theory (QPT). Does this imply that QPT is irrational or does QPT provide an alternative interpretation of rationality? Our presentation consists of 3 parts. First, we examine the putative rational status of QPT using the same argument as used to establish the rationality of CPT, the Dutch Book (DB) argument, according to which reasoners should not commit to bets guaranteeing a loss. We prove the rational status of QPT by formulating it as a particular case of an extended form of CPT, with separate probability spaces produced by changing context. Second, we empirically examine the key requirement for whether a CF can be rational or not; the results show that participants indeed behave rationally, at least relative to the representations they employ. Finally, we consider whether the conditions for the CF to be rational are applicable in the outside (nonmental) world. Our discussion provides a general and alternative perspective for rational probabilistic inference, based on the idea that contextuality requires either reasoning in separate CPT probability spaces or reasoning with QPT principles. (PsycINFO Database Record

The triangle inequality constraint in similarity judgments.

Since Tversky's (1977) seminal investigation, the triangle inequality, along with symmetry and minimality, have had a central role in investigations of the fundamental constraints on human similarity judgments. The meaning of minimality and symmetry in similarity judgments has been straightforward, but this is not the case for the triangle inequality. Expressed in terms of dissimilarities, and assuming a simple, linear function between dissimilarities and distances, the triangle inequality constraint implies that human behaviour should be consistent with Dissimilarity (A,B) + Dissimilarity (B,C) ≥ Dissimilarity (A,C), where A, B, and C are any three stimuli. We show how we can translate this constraint into one for similarities, using Shepard's (1987) generalization law, and so derive the multiplicative triangle inequality for similarities, Sim(A,C)≥Sim(A,B)⋅Sim(B,C) where 0≤Sim(x,y)≤1. Can humans violate the multiplicative triangle inequality? An empirical demonstration shows that they can.

Zeno's paradox in decision-making.

Classical probability theory has been influential in modelling decision processes, despite empirical findings that have been persistently paradoxical from classical perspectives. For such findings, some researchers have been successfully pursuing decision models based on quantum theory (QT). One unique feature of QT is the collapse postulate, which entails that measurements (or in decision-making, judgements) reset the state to be consistent with the measured outcome. If there is quantum structure in cognition, then there has to be evidence for the collapse postulate. A striking, a prioriprediction, is that opinion change will be slowed down (under idealized conditions frozen) by continuous judgements. In physics, this is the quantum Zeno effect. We demonstrate a quantum Zeno effect in decision-making in humans and so provide evidence that advocates the use of quantum principles in decision theory, at least in some cases.

Challenging the classical notion of time in cognition: a quantum perspective.

All mental representations change with time. A baseline intuition is that mental representations have specific values at different time points, which may be more or less accessible, depending on noise, forgetting processes, etc. We present a radical alternative, motivated by recent research using the mathematics from quantum theory for cognitive modelling. Such cognitive models raise the possibility that certain possibilities or events may be incompatible, so that perfect knowledge of one necessitates uncertainty for the others. In the context of time-dependence, in physics, this issue is explored with the so-called temporal Bell (TB) or Leggett-Garg inequalities. We consider in detail the theoretical and empirical challenges involved in exploring the TB inequalities in the context of cognitive systems. One interesting conclusion is that we believe the study of the TB inequalities to be empirically more constrained in psychology than in physics. Specifically, we show how the TB inequalities, as applied to cognitive systems, can be derived from two simple assumptions: cognitive realism and cognitive completeness. We discuss possible implications of putative violations of the TB inequalities for cognitive models and our understanding of time in cognition in general. Overall, this paper provides a surprising, novel direction in relation to how time should be conceptualized in cognition.