Neonatal Organ and Tissue Donation for Research: Options Following Death by Natural Causes.

The donation of organs and tissues from neonates (birth to 28 days) for transplantation has been a relatively infrequent occurrence. Less common has been the use of neonatal organs and tissues for research. Specific ethical and legal questions beg for rational and transparent guidelines with which to evaluate referrals of potential donors. Donation of organs and tissues from a neonate can play a key role in the care and support provided to families by health care professionals around the time of a neonate's death. We report on the recovery of neonatal organs and tissues for research. A working group made up of bioethicists, neonatologists, lawyers, obstetric practioners as well as organ procurement and tissue banking professionals evaluated legal, ethical and medical issues. Neonatal donor family members were also consulted. Our primary goals were (a) to ensure that referrals were made in compliance with all applicable federal and state laws, regulations and institutional protocols, and (b) to follow acceptable ethical standards. Algorithms and policies designed to assist in the evaluation of potential neonatal donors were developed. Neonatal donation is proving increasingly valuable for research into areas including diabetes, pulmonary, gastrointestinal, genitourinary and neurological development, rheumatoid arthritis, autism, childhood psychiatric and neurologic disorders, treatment of MRSA infection and pediatric emergency resuscitation. The development of policies and procedures will assist medical professionals who wish to offer the option of donation to family members anticipating the death of a neonate.

Poverty: Not a Justification for Banning Physician-Assisted Death.

Many critics of the legalization of physician-assisted death oppose it in part because they fear it will further disadvantage those who are already economically disadvantaged. This argument points to a serious problem of how economic considerations can influence medical decisions, but in the context of PAD, the concern is not borne out. We will provide empirical evidence suggesting that concerns about money influence medical decisions throughout the full course of illness, but at the end of life, financial pressure is much more likely to influence a decision to pursue or reject aggressive life-extending care than it is to influence a request for PAD. We will also address the question of whether financial pressure as a result of being poor-particularly in the context of an inadequate social safety net-robs people of their autonomy, rendering their informed request and consent invalid. We argue that it does not. We will emphasize the impracticality and injustice of rejecting the role of poverty as a legitimate factor in decision-making, the irrational distinction between PAD and withdrawal of life-sustaining care, and the more appropriate focus on the great flaws in the American health care system.

When slippery slope arguments miss the mark: a lesson from one against physician-assisted death.

In 1989, Susan Wolf convincingly warned of a troublesome consequence that should discourage any movement in American society towards physician-assisted death-a legal backlash against the gains made for limiting life-sustaining treatment. The authors demonstrate that this dire consequence did not come to pass. As physician-assisted suicide gains a foothold in USA and elsewhere, many other slippery slope arguments are being put forward. Although many of these speculations should be taken seriously, they do not justify halting the new practice. Instead, our courts, regulatory agencies, journalists, professional organisations and researchers should carefully monitor and study it as it unfolds, allowing continuous improvement just as our society has done in implementing the practice of limiting life-sustaining treatment.

A Conceptual Model for the Translation of Bioethics Research and Scholarship.

While the bioethics literature demonstrates that the field has spent substantial time and thought over the last four decades on the goals, methods, and desired outcomes for service and training in bioethics, there has been less progress defining the nature and goals of bioethics research and scholarship. This gap makes it difficult both to describe the breadth and depth of these areas of bioethics and, importantly, to gauge their success. However, the gap also presents us with an opportunity to define this scope of work for ourselves and to help shape the broader conversation about the impact of academic research. Because of growing constraints on academic funding, researchers and scholars in many fields are being asked to demonstrate and also forecast the value and impact of their work. To do that, and also to satisfy ourselves that our work has meaningful effect, we must understand how our work can motivate change and how that change can be meaningfully measured. In a field as diverse as bioethics, the pathways to and metrics of change will likewise be diverse. It is therefore critical that any assessment of the impact of bioethics research and scholarship be informed by an understanding of the nature of the work, its goals, and how those goals can and ought to be furthered. In this paper, we propose a conceptual model that connects individual bioethics projects to the broader goals of scholarship, describing the translation of research and scholarly output into changes in thinking, practice, and policy. One of the key implications of the model is that impact in bioethics is generally the result of a collection of projects rather than of any single piece of research or scholarship. Our goal is to lay the groundwork for a thoroughgoing conversation about bioethics research and scholarship that will advance and shape the important conversation about their impact.

A Pilot Evaluation of Portfolios for Quality Attestation of Clinical Ethics Consultants.

Although clinical ethics consultation is a high-stakes endeavor with an increasing prominence in health care systems, progress in developing standards for quality is challenging. In this article, we describe the results of a pilot project utilizing portfolios as an evaluation tool. We found that this approach is feasible and resulted in a reasonably wide distribution of scores among the 23 submitted portfolios that we evaluated. We discuss limitations and implications of these results, and suggest that this is a significant step on the pathway to an eventual certification process for clinical ethics consultants.

The Outcome of Patients With 2 Different Protocols of Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders: An Observational Cohort Study.

Lack of clarity about the exact clinical implications of do-not-resuscitate (DNR) has caused confusion that has been addressed repeatedly in the literature. To provide improved understanding about the portability of DNR and the medical care provided to DNR patients, the state of Ohio passed a Do-Not-Resuscitate Law in 1998, which clearly pointed out 2 different protocols of do-not-resuscitate: DNR comfort care (DNRCC) and DNR comfort care arrest (DNRCC-Arrest). The objective of this study was to examine the outcome of patients with the 2 different protocols of DNR orders.This is a retrospective observational study conducted in a medical intensive care unit (MICU) in a hospital located in Northeast Ohio. The medical records of the initial admissions to the MICU during data collection period were concurrently and retrospectively reviewed. The association between 2 variables was examined using Chi-squared test or Student's t-test. The outcome of DNRCC, DNRCC-Arrest, and No-DNR patients were compared using multivariate logistic regression analysis.The total of 188 DNRCC-Arrest, 88 DNRCC, and 2051 No-DNR patients were included in this study. Compared with the No-DNR patients, the DNRCC (odds ratio = 20.77, P < 0.01) and DNRCC-Arrest (odds ratio = 3.69, P < 0.01) patients were more likely to die in the MICU. Furthermore, the odds of dying during MICU stay for DNRCC patients were 7.85 times significantly higher than that for DNRCC-Arrest patients (odds ratio = 7.85, P < 0.01).Given Do-Not-Resuscitate Law in Ohio, we examined the outcome of the 2 different protocols of DNR orders, and to compare with the conventional DNR orders. Similar to conventional DNR, DNDCC and DNRCC-Arrest were both associated with the increased risk of death. Patients with DNRCC were more likely to be associated with increased risk of death than those with DNRCC-Arrest.

Ellen Grass Memorial Lecture: Brain Death: Useful Myth or Problem Waiting to Happen?

In this paper, I will argue that in an intensive care environment, the exact moment of death is neither a scientific nor philosophical "fact." Rather, it is a socially constructed notion used to maximize organ procurement while avoiding responsibility for killing patients by removing their organs-the so-called dead donor rule. I will first review the tremendous importance of the declaration of death in all societies and point out how it once was and now has again become problematic. Next, I will review the importance of distinguishing among definitions, criteria, and tests. I will conclude that the current protocols for taking organs from brain-dead patients do so by maintaining several legal and clinical fictions. They are fictions because they are conceptually and clinically suspect and have been created primarily to avoid controversy. This has allowed removal of organs that save and improve many thousands of lives. I will argue that while brain-dead patients are not certainly dead, they are certainly beyond harm. In this sense, they are as good as dead as long as they and their families have agreed to organ procurement. Whether the current fictions about brain death are durable remains to be seen.

The Texas Advanced Directive Law: Unfinished Business.

The Texas Advance Directive Act allows physicians and hospitals to overrule patient or family requests for futile care. Purposefully not defining futility, the law leaves its determination in specific cases to an institutional process. While the law has received several criticisms, it does seem to work constructively in the cases that come to the review process. We introduce a new criticism: While the law has been justified by an appeal to professional values such as avoiding harm to patients, avoiding the provision of unseemly care, and good stewardship of medical resources, it is applied incompletely. It allows physicians and institutional committees to refuse "futile" treatments desired by patients and families while at the same time providing no way of regulating physicians who recommend or even push "futile" treatments in similar cases. In this sense, the TADA is incomplete on its own terms.

Patient-satisfaction surveys on a scale of 0 to 10: improving health care, or leading it astray?

Patient-satisfaction surveys can call attention to the importance of treating patients with dignity and respect, but good ratings depend more on manipulable patient perceptions than on good medicine. In fact, the pressure to get good ratings can lead to bad medicine.

Two distinct Do-Not-Resuscitate protocols leaving less to the imagination: an observational study using propensity score matching.

BACKGROUND: Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) patients tend to receive less medical care after the order is written. To provide a clearer approach, the Ohio Department of Health adopted the Do-Not-Resuscitate law in 1998, indicating two distinct protocols of DNR orders that allow DNR patients to choose the medical care: DNR Comfort Care (DNRCC), implying DNRCC patients receive only comfort care after the order is written; and DNR Comfort Care-Arrest (DNRCC-Arrest), implying that DNRCC-Arrest patients are eligible to receive aggressive interventions until cardiac or respiratory arrest. The aim of this study was to examine the medical care provided to patients with these two distinct protocols of DNR orders. METHODS: Data were collected from August 2002 to December 2005 at a medical intensive care unit in a university-affiliated teaching hospital. In total, 188 DNRCC-Arrest patients, 88 DNRCC patients, and 2,051 non-DNR patients were included. Propensity score matching using multivariate logistic regression was used to balance the confounding variables between the 188 DNRCC-Arrest and 2,051 non-DNR patients, and between the 88 DNRCC and 2,051 non-DNR patients. The daily cost of intensive care unit (ICU) stay, the daily cost of hospital stay, the daily discretionary cost of ICU stay, six aggressive interventions, and three comfort care measures were used to indicate the medical care patients received. The association of each continuous variable and categorical variable with having a DNR order written was analyzed using Student's t-test and the χ2 test, respectively. The six aggressive interventions and three comfort care measures performed before and after the order was initiated were compared using McNemar's test. RESULTS: DNRCC patients received significantly fewer aggressive interventions and more comfort care after the order was initiated. By contrast, for DNRCC-Arrest patients, the six aggressive interventions provided were not significantly decreased, but the three comfort care measures were significantly increased after the order was initiated. In addition, the three medical costs were not significantly different between DNRCC and non-DNR patients, or between DNRCC-Arrest and non-DNR patients. CONCLUSIONS: When medical care provided to DNR patients is clearly indicated, healthcare professionals will provide the medical care determined by patient/surrogate decision-makers and healthcare professionals, rather than blindly decreasing medical care.