Market mindset can increase allocations in the trust game through proportional thinking.

Prior research has demonstrated that adopting the market mindset hinders interpersonal trust. In the present work, we show that this effect is not universal, as trust can rise when people with the market mindset perceive the situation as resembling market-pricing principles. We start by showing that the Trust Game represents an interaction that people perceive as being more similar to market-pricing relationships rather than to communal-sharing relationships (pilot study; N = 114). In a series of three experiments, we then demonstrate that (a) compared to controls, participants with the market mindset make larger allocations in the Trust Game (Experiment 1; N = 131), (b) this effect is mediated by the motivation to use proportional thinking (preregistered Experiment 2; N = 581), and (c) compared to controls, people with the market mindset are more sensitive to proportions-their allocations in the Trust Game are significantly higher when multiplied by 4 compared to when multiplied by 2 (preregistered Experiment 3; N = 931). (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Visualizing risky situations induces a stronger neural response in brain areas associated with mental imagery and emotions than visualizing non-risky situations.

In an fMRI study, we tested the prediction that visualizing risky situations induces a stronger neural response in brain areas associated with mental imagery and emotions than visualizing non-risky and more positive situations. We assumed that processing mental images that allow for "trying-out" the future has greater adaptive importance for risky than non-risky situations, because the former can generate severe negative outcomes. We identified several brain regions that were activated when participants produced images of risky situations and these regions overlap with brain areas engaged in visual, speech, and movement imagery. We also found that producing images of risky situations, in contrast to non-risky situations, was associated with increased neural activation in the insular cortex and cerebellum-the regions involved, among other functions, in emotional processing. Finally, we observed an increased BOLD signal in the cingulate gyrus associated with reward-based decision making and monitoring of decision outcomes. In summary, risky situations increased neural activation in brain areas involved in mental imagery, emotional processing, and decision making. These findings imply that the evaluation of everyday risky situations may be driven by emotional responses that result from mental imagery.

Market hinders interpersonal trust: The exposure to market relationships makes people trust less through elevated proportional thinking and reduced state empathy.

In a series of five experiments, we provided evidence that evoking the market mindset negatively affects trust. We found that the market mindset reduces trust compared with the communal mindset (Experiment 1) and a neutral condition (Experiment 2). Next, we examined the psychological mechanisms behind the detrimental effect of the market mindset on trust and found that this effect was mediated by enhanced proportional thinking (Experiments 3 and 4) and reduced state empathy (Experiments 4 and 5). Finally, in a preregistered Experiment 5, we showed that these two psychological mechanisms are relatively independent.

Evaluating experts may serve psychological needs: Self-esteem, bias blind spot, and processing fluency explain confirmation effect in assessing financial advisors' authority.

When making financial decisions, people often use recommendations from professional advisors. However, before doing so, they must first recognize whether the experts to whom they turn for advice are competent and trustworthy. In the present article, we show that decision-makers ascribe greater authority to those financial advisors whose recommendations confirm their own opinions. We document that this confirmation effect in perceiving financial experts' authority holds for two financial products (investment accounts and health savings accounts) and three different cultures (United States, Poland, and the United Kingdom). Most importantly, we found that the effect might be due to three distinct psychological mechanisms: self-esteem, bias blind spot, and processing fluency. The results presented in this project indicate that receiving financial advice consistent with one's own beliefs (compared to advice inconsistent with those beliefs) is related to higher evaluations of one's own competence in finances, higher self-esteem, and perceiving advisors as less biased and with better processing fluency, which in turn lead to ascribing greater epistemic authority to financial experts. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Trading in search of structure: Market relationships as a compensatory control tool.

Rooting our model in the compensatory control theory, we propose that one reason behind the prevalence of market relationships in modern society is that the fundamental need for orderliness makes them psychologically appealing because of the structure they provide. The initial study confirmed that market relationships are perceived as more structured than communal relationships. In 13 experiments (including 2 preregistered ones), we examined the causal relationship between personal control and preferences for market relationships. First, participants with a threatened sense of control preferred market over communal relationships and interpreted ambiguous social interactions as market-related. Second, the salience of market relationships triggered a sense of control and evoked internal explanations of various events. Finally, priming market relationships reduced the search for other compensatory control tools in the face of external threats. We also demonstrated that market relationships are appealing because of their structure, as perceiving ambiguous situations as market-related after threatening control was moderated by Personal Need for Structure, and the relation between market relationships and the sense of control was mediated by perceived structure. Finally, we tested boundary conditions of the above effects and provided evidence that people facing control threat tend to prefer market-oriented rules in relations with strangers rather than with those close to them, and that the relation between market relationships and sense of control is absent among securely attached individuals. We discuss why market relationships compensate for lack of control and refer to other disciplines to explain this phenomenon. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Worry, Risk Perception, and Controllability Predict Intentions Toward COVID-19 Preventive Behaviors.

The ongoing pandemic of COVID-19 has already had serious worldwide health, socio-economic, political, and educational consequences. In the present study, we investigated what factors can motivate young adults to comply with the recommended preventive measures against coronavirus infection. Even though young people are less likely to suffer severe medical consequences from the virus, they can still transmit it to more vulnerable individuals. Surprisingly, we found no significant effects of previously successful experimental manipulations (e.g., enhancing self-efficacy, and visual aids) that aimed to improve risk understanding and impact COVID-19 related behavioral intentions. Instead, intentions toward preventive behaviors were predicted by self-reported worry, perceived controllability of the pandemic, and risk perception. Interestingly, worry about health, and worry about restricting personal freedom predicted behavioral intentions in diverging directions. In particular, participants who were worried about health, were more willing to obey strict hygiene and social distancing restrictions. In contrast, participants who were worried about personal restrictions, were less ready to adopt these preventive actions.

Willingness to Bear Economic Costs in the Fight Against the COVID-19 Pandemic.

The COVID-19 pandemic has created a situation in which people have to choose between economic and health values. This raises the question of what psychological mechanisms determine people's willingness to bear economic costs to protect health? To answer this question, we examined whether such willingness is better described by compensatory or lexicographic models of decision making in situations involving risk or uncertainty. We compared decisions regarding COVID-19 and occupational diseases to establish a pandemic-independent baseline and to determine whether the mechanisms behind the trade-offs are the same in both cases. Additionally, we tested whether people's willingness to accept economic costs is related to psychological factors such as fear, feeling of control, declared knowledge about the COVID-19 pandemic, predictions concerning the expected length of the pandemic, and perceived effectiveness of actions taken to fight the coronavirus. In total, 354 Polish participants from Prolific Academic took part in this study. The results were consistent with the view that decisions are made primarily to protect sacred values and are therefore not based on compensatory models. In line with this view, participants were sensitive neither to the risk vs. uncertainty manipulation nor to the perceived effectiveness of the lockdown. Instead, their behavior was congruent with lexicographic models in which the protection of health and in particular the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic appeared to be the most important dimension, and the single criterion to be used in decision making.

Lay Evaluation of Financial Experts: The Action Advice Effect and Confirmation Bias.

The goal of this experimental project was to investigate lay peoples' perceptions of epistemic authority (EA) in the field of finance. EA is defined as the extent to which a source of information is treated as evidence for judgments independently of its objective expertise and based on subjective beliefs. Previous research suggested that EA evaluations are biased and that lay people tend to ascribe higher EA to experts who advise action (in the case of medical experts) or confirm clients' expectations (in the case of politicians). However, there has been no research into biases in lay evaluations of financial experts and this project is aimed to fill this gap. Experiment 1 showed that lay people tended to ascribe greater authority to financial consultants who gave more active advice to clients considering taking out a mortgage. Experiment 2 confirmed the action advice effect found in Experiment 1. However, the outcomes of Experiments 2 and - particularly - 3 suggested that this bias might also be due to clients' desire to confirm their own opinions. Experiment 2 showed that the action advice effect was moderated by clients' own opinions on taking loans. Lay people ascribed the greatest EA to the advisor in the scenario in which he advised taking action and where this coincided with the client's positive opinion on the advisability of taking out a loan. In Experiment 3 only participants with a positive opinion on the financial product ascribed greater authority to experts who recommended it; participants whose opinion was negative tended to rate consultants who advised rejecting the product more highly. To conclude, these three experiments revealed that lay people ascribe higher EA to financial consultants who advise action rather than maintenance of the status quo, but this effect is limited by confirmation bias: when the client's a priori opinion is salient, greater authority is ascribed to experts whose advice confirms it. In this sense, results presented in the present paper suggest that the action advice effect might be also interpreted as a specific manifestation of confirmation bias.

The Affective Bases of Risk Perception: Negative Feelings and Stress Mediate the Relationship between Mental Imagery and Risk Perception.

Recent research has documented that affect plays a crucial role in risk perception. When no information about numerical risk estimates is available (e.g., probability of loss or magnitude of consequences), people may rely on positive and negative affect toward perceived risk. However, determinants of affective reactions to risks are poorly understood. In a series of three experiments, we addressed the question of whether and to what degree mental imagery eliciting negative affect and stress influences risk perception. In each experiment, participants were instructed to visualize consequences of risk taking and to rate riskiness. In Experiment 1, participants who imagined negative risk consequences reported more negative affect and perceived risk as higher compared to the control condition. In Experiment 2, we found that this effect was driven by affect elicited by mental imagery rather than its vividness and intensity. In this study, imagining positive risk consequences led to lower perceived risk than visualizing negative risk consequences. Finally, we tested the hypothesis that negative affect related to higher perceived risk was caused by negative feelings of stress. In Experiment 3, we introduced risk-irrelevant stress to show that participants in the stress condition rated perceived risk as higher in comparison to the control condition. This experiment showed that higher ratings of perceived risk were influenced by psychological stress. Taken together, our results demonstrate that affect-laden mental imagery dramatically changes risk perception through negative affect (i.e., psychological stress).

Money Cues Increase Agency and Decrease Prosociality Among Children: Early Signs of Market-Mode Behaviors.

People can get most of their needs broadly satisfied in two ways: by close communal ties and by dealings with people in the marketplace. These modes of relating-termed communal and market-often necessitate qualitatively different motives, behaviors, and mind-sets. We reasoned that activating market mode would produce behaviors consistent with it and impair behaviors consistent with communal mode. In a series of experiments, money-the market-mode cue-was presented to Polish children ages 3 to 6. We measured communal behavior by prosocial helpfulness and generosity and measured market behavior by performance and effort. Results showed that handling money (compared with other objects) increased laborious effort and reduced helpfulness and generosity. The effects of money primes were not due to the children's mood, liking for money, or task engagement. This work is the first to demonstrate that young children tacitly understand market mode and also understand that money is a cue to shift into it.

Affect-laden imagery and risk taking: the mediating role of stress and risk perception.

This paper investigates how affect-laden imagery that evokes emotional stress influences risk perception and risk taking in real-life scenarios. In a series of three studies, we instructed participants to imagine the consequences of risky scenarios and then rate the intensity of the experienced stress, perceived risk and their willingness to engage in risky behavior. Study 1 showed that people spontaneously imagine negative rather than positive risk consequences, which are directly related to their lower willingness to take risk. Moreover, this relationship was mediated by feelings of stress and risk perception. Study 2 replicated and extended these findings by showing that imagining negative risk consequences evokes psychophysiological stress responses observed in elevated blood pressure. Finally, in Study 3, we once again demonstrated that a higher intensity of mental images of negative risk consequences, as measured by enhanced brain activity in the parieto-occipital lobes, leads to a lower propensity to take risk. Furthermore, individual differences in creating vivid and intense negative images of risk consequences moderated the strength of the relationship between risk perception and risk taking. Participants who created more vivid and intense images of negative risk consequences paid less attention to the assessments of riskiness in rating their likelihood to take risk. To summarize, we showed that feelings of emotional stress and perceived riskiness mediate the relationship between mental imagery and risk taking, whereas individual differences in abilities to create vivid mental images may influence the degree to which more cognitive risk assessments are used in the risk-taking process.

Saving can save from death anxiety: mortality salience and financial decision-making.

Four studies tested the idea that saving money can buffer death anxiety and constitute a more effective buffer than spending money. Saving can relieve future-related anxiety and provide people with a sense of control over their fate, thereby rendering death thoughts less threatening. Study 1 found that participants primed with both saving and spending reported lower death fear than controls. Saving primes, however, were associated with significantly lower death fear than spending primes. Study 2 demonstrated that mortality primes increase the attractiveness of more frugal behaviors in save-or-spend dilemmas. Studies 3 and 4 found, in two different cultures (Polish and American), that the activation of death thoughts prompts people to allocate money to saving as opposed to spending. Overall, these studies provided evidence that saving protects from existential anxiety, and probably more so than spending.

When does information about probability count in choices under risk?

The question addressed in the present research is whether in naturalistic risky decision environments people are sensitive to information about the probability parameter. In Study 1, we showed that in naturalistic scenarios participants generally revealed little interest in obtaining information about the outcomes and probabilities. Moreover, participants asked fewer questions about probabilities for scenarios containing moral considerations. In Study 2, it was shown that, when supplied with information on probabilities, people could be sensitive to this information. This sensitivity depends on two factors. People were less sensitive to probabilities in scenarios perceived as containing ethical considerations. People were also less sensitive to probabilities when they were faced with a single-choice situation than when they were faced with a series of lotteries with different probabilities. This can be accounted for in terms of the evaluability principle.