Brain death as a moral definition and an act of love: the tale of Moon, Nehviel and Fate.

The vital status of people with a destroyed brain is one of the most discussed topics in medical literature. According to the current legal narrative, people whose brain is destroyed are dead. Nevertheless, a clear biological rationale to support with certainty such a narrative is still lacking. The purported rationale of the "the brain as the central integrator of the body" has proven to be biologically untenable. Persons with a destroyed brain can be maintained viable for long periods of time, showing clear signs of good biological integration. This fact stirs up a continuous seething of heated discussions among scholars, and generates uncertainty among lay people, loss of trust towards the medical community, and highly controversial cases in the media. To try to settle this unresolved situation, we propose a moral narrative, according to which people whose brain is destroyed should be considered as dead. Defining those people as biologically dead is impossible. Their clinical condition is neither life nor death; it is something in between, an artifice created by modern medicine. Yet, we can well state that the irreversible loss of all brain functions is a clinically and scientifically useful point of no return in the process of dying which can guide sound decisions. Through a personal reinterpretation of the myth of Orpheus and Eurydice, we would like to show that the choice to consider people with a destroyed brain as dead is a sound moral decision and an act of love.

[Ethical, deontologic and legal considerations about SIAARTI Document "Clinical ethics recommendations for the allocation of intensive care treatments, in exceptional, resource-limited circumstances".] / Considerazioni etiche, deontologiche e giuridiche sul Documento SIAARTI "Raccomandazioni di etica clinica per l'ammissione a trattamenti intensivi e per la loro sospensione, in condizioni eccezionali di squilibrio tra necessità e risorse disponibili".

On 6 March 2020, the Italian Society of Anaesthesia Analgesia Resuscitation and Intensive care (SIAARTI) published the document "Clinical Ethics Recommendations for Admission to and Suspension of Intensive Care in Exceptional Conditions of Imbalance between Needs and Available Resources". The document, which aims to propose treatment decision-making criteria in the face of exceptional imbalances between health needs and available resources, has produced strong reactions, within the medical-scientific community, in the academic world, and in the media. In the current context of international public health emergency caused by the CoViD-19 epidemic, this work aims to explain the ethical, deontological and legal bases of the SIAARTI Document and to propose methodologic and argumentative integrations that are useful for understanding and placing in context the decision-making criteria proposed. The working group that contributed to the drafting of this paper agrees that it is appropriate that healthcare personnel, who is particularly committed to taking care of those who are currently in need of intensive or sub-intensive care, should benefit from clear operational indications that are useful to orient care and, at the same time, that the population should know in advance which criteria will guide the tragic choices that may fall on each one of us. This contribution therefore firstly reflects on the appropriateness of the SIAARTI standpoint and the objectives of the SIAARTI Document. It then turns to demonstrate how the recommendations it proposes can be framed within a shared interdisciplinary, ethical, deontological and legal perspective.

Clinical ethics: what the anesthesiologist and the intensivist need to know.

Clinical ethics if often perceived as an intuitive understanding of what is right versus wrong. This is insufficient for healthcare workers in general, but particularly for anesthesiologists and intensivists, who often must weigh up complex and emergent life or death decisions and subsequently justify these decisions to their team and patients, as well as patient's families. Articulating the rationale for such decisions is an arduous task. Thus, a brief introduction to the basic conceptual framework and vocabulary of clinical ethics may be useful to this population of physicians. The most important concept is that interventions offered should be both clinically appropriate and ethically proportionate, desirable by both the patient and the medical team, and offering a meaningful benefit to the patient within the context of his or her own life narrative. This puts an emphasis on understanding, from the patient or his/her proxies, not just who the patient is biologically but also biographically: that is what gives meaning to his/her life subjectively, and what quality of life would be compatible with this level of functioning, as well as when he/she would wish life sustaining therapy to be withheld or withdrawn.

"Why can't I give you my organs after my heart has stopped beating?" An overview of the main clinical, organisational, ethical and legal issues concerning organ donation after circulatory death in Italy.

Donation after circulatory death (DCD) is a valuable option for the procurement of functioning organs for transplantation. Clinical results are promising and public acceptance is quite good in most western countries. Yet, although DCD is widespread in Europe, several problems still persist in Italy as well as in some other countries. This paper aims to describe the main clinical, organisational, ethical and legal issues at stake, bearing in mind the particular situation created by Italian legislation. Currently, as regards DCD, Italy is somewhat different from other countries. Therefore, every effort should be made for the safe and effective implementation of DCD programs: uncontrolled DCD programs should be promoted and encouraged, within the framework of shared and authoritative rules. At the same time, we need to tackle the question of controlled DCD, promoting debate among all involved subjects regarding the fundamental issues of end-of-life care within protocols that best integrate the highest standard of care for the dying and the legitimate interests of those awaiting a life-saving organ.

How to protect incompetent clinical research subjects involved in critical care or emergency settings.

Clinical research is an essential component of medical activity, and this is also true in intensive care. Adequate information and consent are universally considered necessary for the protection of research subjects. However, in emergency situations, the majority of critical patients are unable to consent and a valid legal representative is often unavailable. The situation is even more complex in Italy, where the relevant legislation fails to specify how investigators should manage research in emergency or critical care setting when it involves incompetent patients who do not have an appointed legal representative. While special measures for the protection of incompetent subjects during emergency research are necessary, not allowing such research at all dooms critically ill patients to receive non-evidence-based treatments without the prospect of improvement. The recently-issued EU Regulation n. 536/2014 will probably help shed light on this situation. Indeed, it specifically addresses the issue of "research in emergency situations" and introduces detailed rules aimed at protecting patients while allowing research. In this article, we argue that obtaining informed consent during emergency research on incompetent subjects in unrealistic, and that in most cases substituted judgment on the part of a proxy carries major flaws. Strict criteria in evaluating the risk-benefit ratio of proposed intervention and a careful evaluation of the trial by a local or national Research Ethics Committee are perhaps the most practicable solution.

Biomarkers in kidney and heart disease.

There is much symptomatic similarity between acute kidney disease and acute heart disease. Both may present with shortness of breath and chest discomfort, and thus it is not surprising that biomarkers of acute myocardial and renal disease often coexist in many physicians' diagnostic work-up schedules. In this review we explore the similarities and differences between current and future tests of myocardial and renal injury and function, with particular emphasis on the diagnostic utility of currently available biomarkers to assist with the diagnosis of cardiorenal syndromes. Imaging studies have not traditionally been viewed as clinical biomarkers, but as tests of structure and function; they contribute to the diagnostic process, and we believe that they should be considered alongside more traditional biomarkers such as blood and urine measurements of circulating proteins and metabolites. We discuss the place of natriuretic peptides, novel tests of kidney damage as well as kidney function and conclude with a discussion of their place in guiding future research studies whose goals must include better characterization of the degree of dysfunction imposed on one organ system by failure of the other.

Cardiorenal syndromes: an executive summary from the consensus conference of the Acute Dialysis Quality Initiative (ADQI).

The cardiorenal syndrome (CRS) is a disorder of the heart and kidneys whereby acute or chronic dysfunction in one organ may induce acute or chronic dysfunction of the other. The general definition has been expanded into five subtypes reflecting the primacy of organ dysfunction and the time-frame of the syndrome: CRS type 1 = acute worsening of heart function leading to kidney injury and/or dysfunction; CRS type 2 = chronic abnormalities in heart function leading to kidney injury or dysfunction; CRS type 3 = acute worsening of kidney function leading to heart injury and/or dysfunction; CRS type 4 = chronic kidney disease leading to heart injury, disease and/or dysfunction, and CRS type 5 = systemic conditions leading to simultaneous injury and/or dysfunction of heart and kidney. Different pathophysiological mechanisms are involved in the combined dysfunction of heart and kidney in these five types of the syndrome.

Cardio-renal syndromes: report from the consensus conference of the acute dialysis quality initiative.

A consensus conference on cardio-renal syndromes (CRS) was held in Venice Italy, in September 2008 under the auspices of the Acute Dialysis Quality Initiative (ADQI). The following topics were matter of discussion after a systematic literature review and the appraisal of the best available evidence: definition/classification system; epidemiology; diagnostic criteria and biomarkers; prevention/protection strategies; management and therapy. The umbrella term CRS was used to identify a disorder of the heart and kidneys whereby acute or chronic dysfunction in one organ may induce acute or chronic dysfunction in the other organ. Different syndromes were identified and classified into five subtypes. Acute CRS (type 1): acute worsening of heart function (AHF-ACS) leading to kidney injury and/or dysfunction. Chronic cardio-renal syndrome (type 2): chronic abnormalities in heart function (CHF-CHD) leading to kidney injury and/or dysfunction. Acute reno-cardiac syndrome (type 3): acute worsening of kidney function (AKI) leading to heart injury and/or dysfunction. Chronic reno-cardiac syndrome (type 4): chronic kidney disease leading to heart injury, disease, and/or dysfunction. Secondary CRS (type 5): systemic conditions leading to simultaneous injury and/or dysfunction of heart and kidney. Consensus statements concerning epidemiology, diagnosis, prevention, and management strategies are discussed in the paper for each of the syndromes.