Strategic decision making in live streaming e-commerce through tripartite evolutionary game analysis.

This article delves into the current popular phenomenon of live streaming e-commerce, with a specific focus on issues related to product quality and after-sales service. It constructs an evolutionary game model that encompasses three key stakeholders: e-commerce platforms, consumers, and streamers. The study conducts a thorough analysis of the interactions and strategic choices among these entities, investigating the stability of equilibrium strategy combinations within the game system and the influence of various factors on decision-making behaviors. Furthermore, the validity of the analytical conclusion is corroborated through the application of simulation analysis methods. The study finds that for the consumer, strategies such as reducing losses encountered due to quality issues under strict demands, enhancing compensation in these scenarios, and increasing benefits for maintaining stringent requirements during live streaming sessions can motivate them to adopt more stringent strategies. For the streamer, essential factors in promoting the selection of high-quality products include increasing the benefits associated with such choices and reducing the probability of quality issues, or alternatively, decreasing the gains from lower-quality selections and increasing the likelihood of encountering quality problems with these products. For the e-commerce platform, strategically adjusting the profit-sharing ratio to maintain collaborative momentum and influence the enthusiasm of both consumers and streamers is a critical strategy to avert market scenarios akin to prisoner's dilemmas and tragic outcomes. Overall, this research offers profound insights into the complex strategic evolution within the live commerce market, providing valuable guidance for interaction strategies among e-commerce platforms, consumers, and streamers. Its implications for practical decision-making optimization and strategic formulation are of significant importance.

Sustainable strategies for green supply chain within the platform economy consider subsidies and marketing efforts.

As consumers' green awareness continues to grow, the level of a product's eco-friendliness and the quality of its marketing have become significant factors in shaping consumers' purchasing decisions. The power structures within the supply chain, as well as corresponding government subsidy policies, are also key elements influencing sustainable strategies for the green supply chain. In a green supply chain comprising one manufacturer and one e-commerce platform, two sales models exist within the online e-commerce platforms: reselling and agency selling. This paper establishes and analyzes three distinct Stackelberg game models, namely: manufacturer-led model without subsidy (bm), manufacturer-led model with subsidy (sm), and platform-led model with subsidy (sp). The results are shown as follows, with the rise of consumers' environmental awareness, more consumers opt for green products, inspiring the manufacturer to increase its optimal greenness and platform to enhance its optimal marketing efforts level. Notably, government subsidies provide a significant stimulus. An increase in the green technology cost coefficient leads to a decline in the manufacturer's profits across all three modes. Intriguingly, the manufacturer's profits are always highest in the sp mode. As the marketing efforts cost coefficient increases, the platform's profits decrease in the bm and sm modes. In contrast, in the sp mode, the platform's profits increase rather than a decrease. The choice of mode primarily depends on the platform's marketing efforts cost coefficient. When this coefficient exceeds a threshold, the platform chooses the sp mode. However, due to the relatively low marketing efficiency in this scenario, the manufacturer prefers the sm mode. For the government, the sp mode involves agency selling, serves as an effective mechanism to redistribute subsidies, thereby yielding the maximum social welfare benefits. Management insights are provided for the manufacturer and platform managers to make decisions about the degree of greenness and marketing efforts level, along with insights for governments to optimize subsidy policies.

Analysis of Volatile Flavor Substances in the Enzymatic Hydrolysate of Lanmaoa asiatica Mushroom and Its Maillard Reaction Products Based on E-Nose and GC-IMS.

An electronic nose (E-Nose) and gas chromatography-ion mobility spectrometry (GC-IMS) were used to analyze the volatile flavor compounds (VFCs) of the enzymatic hydrolysate of Lanmaoa asiatica and its Maillard reaction products (MRPs). E-Nose sensors have strong response signals to sulfide, nitrogen oxides, alcohols, and aldehyde ketone, and the aroma profile was increased after the Maillard reaction (MR). According to GC-IMS, A total of 84 known compounds were identified. Aldehydes, ketones and alcohols are the main VFCs. After MR, the concentrations of some alcohols decreased, and the concentration of pyrazines and ketones increased. Principal component analysis (PCA) and similarity analysis showed that the enzymatic hydrolysate and MRPs were different and could be effectively distinguished. In conclusion, this study clarified the changes in VFCs before and after the MR. The results can provide a theoretical basis for the quality control and flavor changes during the processing of Lanmaoa asiatica and provide a new method for flavor analysis of edible mushrooms and their products.

Impact of coronavirus pandemic on sharing mode of manufacturer.

Service platform has developed rapidly in car-sharing, consumers often buy or own cars but not fully utilize and share them. Since the coronavirus pandemic has affected sales and people's attitudes towards car-sharing, which brought both opportunities and challenges to the platform and changed the operating mode of manufacturers, some traditional manufacturers have motivated to cooperate with third-party platform. In this paper, we develop an analytical framework to examine the pricing decisions and optimal mode selection of manufacturer under the COVID-19 epidemic. Considering the supply chain consists of a manufacturer and a third-party sharing platform. We analyze three scenarios including no sharing, customers-to-customers, and mixed sharing, then employ a game theoretic approach to get equilibrium solutions and analytically derive the optimal mode choice. Our analysis shows that when the operation and maintenance cost is low, manufacturer will join the third-party platform, and the sharing price increase in operation and maintenance cost, while the selling price decrease in operation and maintenance cost. When the value perception factor less than the threshold, the manufacturer will retain sales channel, and the selling demand decrease in value perception factor in the growing market, the sharing demand has the same trend, vice versa. Furthermore, we find that if the operation and maintenance cost is low and value perception factor is high, mixed sharing is the best choice for the manufacturer, while the manufacturer will choose no car-sharing when the value perception factor is relatively low.