Facial asymmetry tracks genetic diversity among Gorilla subspecies.

Mountain gorillas are particularly inbred compared to other gorillas and even the most inbred human populations. As mountain gorilla skeletal material accumulated during the 1970s, researchers noted their pronounced facial asymmetry and hypothesized that it reflects a population-wide chewing side preference. However, asymmetry has also been linked to environmental and genetic stress in experimental models. Here, we examine facial asymmetry in 114 crania from three Gorilla subspecies using 3D geometric morphometrics. We measure fluctuating asymmetry (FA), defined as random deviations from perfect symmetry, and population-specific patterns of directional asymmetry (DA). Mountain gorillas, with a current population size of about 1000 individuals, have the highest degree of facial FA (explaining 17% of total facial shape variation), followed by Grauer gorillas (9%) and western lowland gorillas (6%), despite the latter experiencing the greatest ecological and dietary variability. DA, while significant in all three taxa, explains relatively less shape variation than FA does. Facial asymmetry correlates neither with tooth wear asymmetry nor increases with age in a mountain gorilla subsample, undermining the hypothesis that facial asymmetry is driven by chewing side preference. An examination of temporal trends shows that stress-induced developmental instability has increased over the last 100 years in these endangered apes.

The impact of armed conflict on protected-area efficacy in Central Africa.

What determines the vulnerability of protected areas, a fundamental component of biodiversity conservation, to political instability and warfare? We investigated the efficacy of park protection at Garamba National Park (Democratic Republic of Congo) before, during and after a period of armed conflict. Previous analysis has shown that bushmeat hunting in the park increased fivefold during the conflict, but then declined, in conjunction with changes in the sociopolitical structures (social institutions) that controlled the local bushmeat trade. We used park patrol records to investigate whether these changes were facilitated by a disruption to anti-poaching patrols. Contrary to expectation, anti-poaching patrols remained frequent during the conflict (as bushmeat offtake increased) and decreased afterwards (when bushmeat hunting also declined). These results indicate that bushmeat extraction was determined primarily by the social institutions. Although we found a demonstrable effect of anti-poaching patrols on hunting pressure, even a fourfold increase in patrol frequency would have been insufficient to cope with wartime poaching levels. Thus, anti-poaching patrols alone may not always be the most cost-effective means of managing protected areas, and protected-area efficacy might be enhanced by also working with those institutions that already play a role in regulating local natural-resource use.

Species protection, the changing informal economy, and the politics of access to the bushmeat trade in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Our understanding of the linkages between the bushmeat trade and the wider informal economy is limited. This lack of knowledge is particularly problematic for conservation under conditions of political instability, when the informal economy can be highly dynamic and impacts on wildlife populations can be severe. To explore these interlinked processes, we conducted a study of the bushmeat trade in Garamba National Park, Democratic Republic of Congo, through a combination of market surveys, semistructured interviews, and direct observation. We focused on the sale of protected and unprotected species in urban and rural markets, and the bushmeat commodity chains that supplied these markets, under conditions of political stability and armed conflict. During peacetime, protected species from the park (predominantly elephant and buffalo) rarely appeared in the rural markets, but they comprised more than half of all bushmeat sales in the urban markets. This pattern reflected differences in the rural and urban commodity chains. Automatic weapons were urban trade. The use of such weapons was discouraged by the traditional chiefs, who administered the village markets. During wartime, the sales of protected species in the urban markets increased fivefold because the military officers fled, leaving behind an open-access system that led to a massive increase in the exploitation of protected species. In contrast, the rural markets remained relatively stable because of the continued authority of the village chiefs. Our results indicate that sociopolitical factors can be an important determinant of species offtake and, therefore, that knowledge of the bushmeat commodity chain can be vital to controlling theprocesses that drive species extraction. In addition, our findings suggest that traditional authorities can be potentially valuable partners for bushmeat management.

Do wildlife laws work? Species protection and the application of a prey choice model to poaching decisions.

Legislation for the protection of species is a global conservation tool. However, in many developing countries lack of resources means that effectiveness relies on voluntary compliance, leading to contradictory assumptions. On one hand, laws introduced without effective enforcement mechanisms carry an implicit assumption that voluntary compliance will occur. On the other hand, it is often openly assumed that, without enforcement, there will in fact be no compliance. Which assumption holds has rarely been rigorously tested. Here we show that laws for the protection of some species of large mammal have no effect on the prey choice patterns of primarily commercial hunters in the Democratic Republic of Congo, confirming the second assumption. We established this result by using an optimal diet model to predict the pattern of prey choice in the absence of regulation. Prey choice patterns predicted by the model were accurate across a range of conditions defined by time, space and type of hunting weapon. Given that hunters will not comply voluntarily, the protection of vulnerable species can only take place through effective enforcement, for example by wildlife authorities restricting access to protected areas, or by traditional authorities restricting the sale of protected species in local markets.