Women exaggerate, men downplay: Gendered endorsement of emotional dramatization stereotypes contributes to gender bias in pain expectations.

The current work tested whether perceivers believe that women, relative to men, are likely to exaggerate versus downplay pain, an effect we refer to as the gender-pain exaggeration bias. The gender-pain exaggeration bias was operationalized as the extent to which perceivers believe women, relative to men, claim more pain than they feel. Across four experiments, we found that women were expected to exaggerate pain more than men and men were expected to downplay pain more than women (Studies 1-4). Further, judgments that women were more emotionally dramatizing than men contributed to this gender-pain exaggeration bias (Studies 2 and 4). We also assessed whether perceiver-level differences in endorsement of gendered emotional dramatization stereotypes (Studies 3-4) moderated this gender-pain exaggeration bias and found that endorsement of gendered emotional dramatization stereotypes moderated this bias. In sum, we document a relative gender-pain exaggeration bias wherein perceivers believe women, relative to men, to be emotionally dramatizing and therefore more likely to exaggerate versus downplay their pain. This bias may lead perceivers to interpret women's, relative to men's, pain reports as overstatements, inauthentic, or dramatized. Thus, the current work may have implications for well-documented biases in perceptions of (i.e., underestimating) and responses to (i.e., undertreating) women's pain.

Denver pain authenticity stimulus set (D-PASS).

We introduce the Denver Pain Authenticity Stimulus Set (D-PASS), a free resource containing 315 videos of 105 unique individuals expressing authentic and posed pain. All expressers were recorded displaying one authentic (105; pain was elicited via a pressure algometer) and two posed (210) expressions of pain (one posed expression recorded before [posed-unrehearsed] and one recorded after [posed-rehearsed] the authentic pain expression). In addition to authentic and posed pain videos, the database includes an accompanying codebook including metrics assessed at the expresser and video levels (e.g., Facial Action Coding System metrics for each video controlling for neutral images of the expresser), expressers' pain threshold and pain tolerance values, averaged pain detection performance by naïve perceivers who viewed the videos (e.g., accuracy, response bias), neutral images of each expresser, and face characteristic rating data for neutral images of each expresser (e.g., attractiveness, trustworthiness). The stimuli and accompanying codebook can be accessed for academic research purposes from https://digitalcommons.du.edu/lsdl_dpass/1/ . The relatively large number of stimuli allow for consideration of expresser-level variability in analyses and enable more advanced statistical approaches (e.g., signal detection analyses). Furthermore, the large number of Black (n = 41) and White (n = 56) expressers permits investigations into the role of race in pain expression, perception, and authenticity detection. Finally, the accompanying codebook may provide pilot data for novel investigations in the intergroup or pain sciences.

Some Evidence That Truth-Tellers Are More Attractive Than Liars.

Despite the prevalence of deception, people rarely doubt others' sincerity. However, indirect evaluations of liars and truth-tellers may differ even in the absence of suspicion about veracity. Across three studies, we provide evidence for the truth attraction effect in two samples of target stimuli and three samples of participant judges. Target people are perceived as more attractive when telling the truth versus when they lie, an effect mediated by target warmth and openness. The truth attraction effect is stronger for female targets (vs. males); however, it is unaffected by the gender of the judge. Findings suggest people may be more likely to approach truth-tellers versus liars, even when not actively judging veracity. We discuss the challenges and benefits of treating both targets and participants as random factors in linear mixed-effect analyses and join the chorus of calls to increase the number of target stimuli in deception research.

Interpersonal Consequences of Deceptive Expressions of Sadness.

Emotional expressions evoke predictable responses from observers; displays of sadness are commonly met with sympathy and help from others. Accordingly, people may be motivated to feign emotions to elicit a desired response. In the absence of suspicion, we predicted that emotional and behavioral responses to genuine (vs. deceptive) expressers would be guided by empirically valid cues of sadness authenticity. Consistent with this hypothesis, untrained observers (total N = 1,300) reported less sympathy and offered less help to deceptive (vs. genuine) expressers of sadness. This effect was replicated using both posed, low-stakes, laboratory-created stimuli, and spontaneous, real, high-stakes emotional appeals to the public. Furthermore, lens models suggest that sympathy reactions were guided by difficult-to-fake facial actions associated with sadness. Results suggest that naive observers use empirically valid cues to deception to coordinate social interactions, providing novel evidence that people are sensitive to subtle cues to deception.

Deception is associated with reduced social connection.

Lies can have major consequences if undetected. Research to date has focused primarily on the consequences of deception for receivers once lies are discovered. We advance deception research and relationship science by studying the social consequences of deception for the sender-even if their lies remain undetected. In a correlational study of video conversations (Study 1; N = 776), an experimental study of text conversations (Study 2; N = 416), and a survey of dispositional tendencies (Study 3; N = 399), we find consistent evidence that people who lie tend to assume that others are lying too, and this impedes their ability to form social connections. The findings provide insight into how (dis)honesty and loneliness may go together, and suggest that lies-even when undetected-harm our relationships.

Theories of power: Perceived strategies for gaining and maintaining power.

What does it take to gain and maintain power? Aristotle believed that power was afforded to individuals that acted in virtuous ways that promote the greater good. Machiavelli, nearly 2,000 years later, argued to great effect that power could be taken through the use of manipulation, coercion, and strategic violence. With these historical perspectives as a conceptual foundation, we validate a 2-factor measure of theories of power (TOPS; Study 1), which captures lay theories of how power is gained and maintained among family members, at work, and in international politics (Study 2). We differentiate TOPS from other established measures of power, highlighting that these beliefs about power are conceptually distinct from widely used measures of dominance and prestige, and uniquely predict social outcomes. Turning to social class, we find that participants who make upward social comparisons perceive themselves to be of lower class and endorse less collaborative and more coercive theories of power, relative to those who make downward comparisons and report themselves to be higher in the class hierarchy (Studies 3a and 3b). Building upon these findings, we identify theory of power endorsement as a correlate of interpersonal trust, and a mediator of how lower class individuals, who endorse less collaborative views of power, report less trust of institutions and individuals (Study 4). Theories of power provide a novel construct for understanding power dynamics at multiple levels of analysis. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

How deception and believability feedback affect recall.

While research suggests that telling lies can distort memory for the truth, the effects of receiving feedback about the believability about one's lies are not known. We hypothesised that participants who exaggerated the number of stolen items (vs. told the truth) in a mock insurance claim and then received feedback that their statement was believable (vs. not believable) would incorporate this lie into memory. In a two-phase between-subjects design, participants saw images of an office pre- and post-theft and were randomly assigned to report the number of stolen items accurately (truth-tellers) or exaggerate (liars). They were then randomly assigned to receive feedback that their statement was believable or not. Approximately two weeks later, participants' recall of the theft was measured. Liars and truth-tellers recalled a similar number of stolen items, but liars had less accurate recall for exactly which items were stolen. Liars (vs. truth-tellers) also made more omission errors. The majority of participants who fabricated additional stolen items (65.7%) incorporated one or more of these (false) items into their memory. Results suggest that source monitoring errors may lead fabricated details to be incorporated into memory. Although no effects of believability feedback were observed, recommendations for future researchers are discussed.

The Connection Between Deception Detection and Financial Exploitation of Older (vs. Young) Adults.

Although poor deception detection accuracy is thought to be an important risk factor for fraud among older adults, this link has not been explicitly studied. Using a cross-sectional design, older and young adults viewed and made judgments of real, high-stakes truths and lies with financial consequences. Older (vs. young) adults exhibited a greater truth bias when evaluating individuals pleading for help in finding a missing relative, which was associated with greater donations to deceptive pleaders. However, all participants were highly vulnerable to fraud. Future research should consider both risk and protective factors affecting financial fraud across the lifespan.

Different physiological reactions when observing lies versus truths: Initial evidence and an intervention to enhance accuracy.

Humans consistently face the challenge of discerning liars from truth-tellers. Hundreds of studies in which observers judge the veracity of laboratory-created lies and truths suggest that this is a difficult task; in this context, lie-detection accuracy is notoriously poor. Challenging these findings and traditional methodologies in lie-detection research, we draw upon the somatic marker hypothesis and research on interoception to find that: (a) people experience physiological reactions indicating increased sympathetic arousal while observing real, high-stakes lies (vs. truths), and (b) attending to these physiological reactions may improve lie-detection accuracy. Consistent with the tipping point framework, participants demonstrated more physiological arousal and vasoconstriction while observing real crime liars versus truth-tellers, but not mock crime liars versus truth-tellers (Experiment 1; N = 48). Experiment 2 replicated this effect in a larger sample of participants (N = 169). Experiment 3 generalized this effect to a novel set of stimuli; participants demonstrated more physiological arousal to game show contestants who lied (vs. told the truth) about their intention to cooperate in a high-stakes economic game (N = 71). In an intervention study (Experiment 4; N = 428), participants were trained to attend to their physiological signals; lie-detection accuracy increased relative to a control condition. Experiment 5 (N = 354) replicated this effect, and the addition of a bogus training condition suggested that increased accuracy was not simply attributable to self-focused attention. Findings highlight the limitations of relying on laboratory-created lies to study human lie-detection and suggest that observers have automatic, physiological reactions to being deceived. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Hedge Fund Managers With Psychopathic Tendencies Make for Worse Investors.

It is widely assumed that psychopathic personality traits promote success in high-powered, competitive contexts such as financial investment. By contrast, empirical studies find that psychopathic leaders can be charming and persuasive, but poor performers who mismanage, bully, and engage in unethical behavior. By coding nonverbal behaviors displayed in semistructured interviews, we identified the psychopathic, Machiavellian, and narcissistic tendencies in 101 hedge fund managers, and examined whether these traits were associated with financial performance over the course of 10 diverse years of economic volatility (2005-2015). Managers with greater psychopathic tendencies produced lower absolute returns than their less psychopathic peers, and managers with greater narcissistic traits produced decreased risk-adjusted returns. The discussion focuses on the costs of Dark Triad traits in financial investment, and organizational leadership more generally.

Can Ordinary People Detect Deception After All?

The tipping point framework of lie detection posits that people can, and do, accurately detect deception. This framework pinpoints three circumstances that aid accuracy: (i) using methods of measurement that circumvent controlled, conscious cognition; (ii) when individual differences or situational factors portend potent risks to lie detection failure, such as in high-stakes or threatening settings; and (iii) when factors diminish concern over the relationship or reputation costs of asserting that someone has lied. We thus depict a psychological system that registers lie detection consistently in nonconscious reactions (e.g., brain based, bodily, indirect social evaluations) and that allows information into consciousness to inform overt assessments of lies when the costs of failing to detect deception exceed those of signaling distrust.

Unacquainted callers can predict which citizens will vote over and above citizens' stated self-predictions.

People are regularly asked to report on their likelihoods of carrying out consequential future behaviors, including complying with medical advice, completing educational assignments, and voting in upcoming elections. Despite these stated self-predictions being notoriously unreliable, they are used to inform many strategic decisions. We report two studies examining stated self-prediction about whether citizens will vote. We find that most self-predicted voters do not actually vote despite saying they will, and that campaign callers can discern which self-predicted voters will not actually vote. In study 1 (n = 4,463), self-predicted voters rated by callers as "100% likely to vote" were 2 times more likely to actually vote than those rated unlikely to vote. Study 2 (n = 3,064) replicated this finding and further demonstrated that callers' prediction accuracy was mediated by citizens' nonverbal signals of uncertainty and deception. Strangers can use nonverbal signals to improve predictions of follow through on self-reported intentions-an insight of potential value for politics, medicine, and education.

Virtues, Vices, and Political Influence in the U.S. Senate.

What qualities make a political leader more influential or less influential? Philosophers, political scientists, and psychologists have puzzled over this question, positing two opposing routes to political power--one driven by human virtues, such as courage and wisdom, and the other driven by vices, such as Machiavellianism and psychopathy. By coding nonverbal behaviors displayed in political speeches, we assessed the virtues and vices of 151 U.S. senators. We found that virtuous senators became more influential after they assumed leadership roles, whereas senators who displayed behaviors consistent with vices--particularly psychopathy--became no more influential or even less influential after they assumed leadership roles. Our results inform a long-standing debate about the role of morality and ethics in leadership and have important implications for electing effective government officials. Citizens would be wise to consider a candidate's virtue in casting their votes, which might increase the likelihood that elected officials will have genuine concern for their constituents and simultaneously promote cooperation and progress in government.

Physically scarce (vs. enriched) environments decrease the ability to tell lies successfully.

The successful detection of deception is of critical importance to adaptive social relationships and organizations, and perhaps even national security. However, research in forensic, legal, and social psychology demonstrates that people are generally very successful deceivers. The goal of the current research was to test an intervention with the potential to decrease the likelihood of successful deception. We applied findings in the architectural, engineering, and environmental sciences that has demonstrated that enriched environments (vs. scarce ones) promote the experience of comfort, positive emotion, feelings of power and control, and increase productivity. We hypothesized that sparse, impoverished, scarcely endowed environments (vs. enriched ones) would decrease the ability to lie successfully by making liars feel uncomfortable and powerless. Study 1 examined archival footage of an international sample of criminal suspects (N = 59), including innocent relatives (n = 33) and convicted murderers (n = 26) emotionally pleading to the public for the return of a missing person. Liars in scarce environments (vs. enriched) were significantly more likely to reveal their lies through behavioral cues to deception. Study 2 (N = 79) demonstrated that the discomfort and subsequent powerlessness caused by scarce (vs. enriched) environments lead people to reveal behavioral cues to deception. Liars in scarce environments also experienced greater neuroendocrine stress reactivity and were more accurately detected by a sample of 66 naïve observers (Study 3). Taken together, data suggest that scarce environments increase difficulty, and decrease success, of deception. Further, we make available videotaped stimuli of Study 2 liars and truth-tellers.

Some evidence for unconscious lie detection.

To maximize survival and reproductive success, primates evolved the tendency to tell lies and the ability to accurately detect them. Despite the obvious advantage of detecting lies accurately, conscious judgments of veracity are only slightly more accurate than chance. However, findings in forensic psychology, neuroscience, and primatology suggest that lies can be accurately detected when less-conscious mental processes (as opposed to more-conscious mental processes) are used. We predicted that observing someone tell a lie would automatically activate cognitive concepts associated with deception, and observing someone tell the truth would activate concepts associated with truth. In two experiments, we demonstrated that indirect measures of deception detection are significantly more accurate than direct measures. These findings provide a new lens through which to reconsider old questions and approach new investigations of human lie detection.

Prime time news: the influence of primed positive and negative emotion on susceptibility to false memories.

We examined the relation between emotion and susceptibility to misinformation using a novel paradigm, the ambiguous stimuli affective priming (ASAP) paradigm. Participants (N = 88) viewed ambiguous neutral images primed either at encoding or retrieval to be interpreted as either highly positive or negative (or neutral/not primed). After viewing the images, they either were asked misleading or non-leading questions. Following a delay, memory accuracy for the original images was assessed. Results indicated that any emotional priming at encoding led to a higher susceptibility to misinformation relative to priming at recall. In particular, inducing a negative interpretation of the image at encoding led to an increased susceptibility of false memories for major misinformation (an entire object not actually present in the scene). In contrast, this pattern was reversed when priming was used at recall; a negative reinterpretation of the image decreased memory distortion relative to unprimed images. These findings suggest that, with precise experimental control, the experience of emotion at event encoding, in particular, is implicated in false memory susceptibility.

Cry me a river: identifying the behavioral consequences of extremely high-stakes interpersonal deception.

Deception evolved as a fundamental aspect of human social interaction. Numerous studies have examined behavioral cues to deception, but most have involved inconsequential lies and unmotivated liars in a laboratory context. We conducted the most comprehensive study to date of the behavioral consequences of extremely high-stakes, real-life deception--relative to comparable real-life sincere displays--via 3 communication channels: speech, body language, and emotional facial expressions. Televised footage of a large international sample of individuals (N = 78) emotionally pleading to the public for the return of a missing relative was meticulously coded frame-by-frame (30 frames/s for a total of 74,731 frames). About half of the pleaders eventually were convicted of killing the missing person on the basis of overwhelming evidence. Failed attempts to simulate sadness and leakage of happiness revealed deceptive pleaders' covert emotions. Liars used fewer words but more tentative words than truth-tellers, likely relating to increased cognitive load and psychological distancing. Further, each of these cues explained unique variance in predicting pleader sincerity.

The eyes don't have it: lie detection and Neuro-Linguistic Programming.

Proponents of Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP) claim that certain eye-movements are reliable indicators of lying. According to this notion, a person looking up to their right suggests a lie whereas looking up to their left is indicative of truth telling. Despite widespread belief in this claim, no previous research has examined its validity. In Study 1 the eye movements of participants who were lying or telling the truth were coded, but did not match the NLP patterning. In Study 2 one group of participants were told about the NLP eye-movement hypothesis whilst a second control group were not. Both groups then undertook a lie detection test. No significant differences emerged between the two groups. Study 3 involved coding the eye movements of both liars and truth tellers taking part in high profile press conferences. Once again, no significant differences were discovered. Taken together the results of the three studies fail to support the claims of NLP. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.