Exploring health and disease concepts in healthcare practice: an empirical philosophy of medicine study.

In line with recent proposals for experimental philosophy and philosophy of science in practice, we propose that the philosophy of medicine could benefit from incorporating empirical research, just as bioethics has. In this paper, we therefore take first steps towards the development of an empirical philosophy of medicine, that includes investigating practical and moral dimensions. This qualitative study gives insight into the views and experiences of a group of various medical professionals and patient representatives regarding the conceptualization of health and disease concepts in practice and the possible problems that surround them. This includes clinical, epistemological, and ethical issues. We have conducted qualitative interviews with a broad range of participants (n = 17), working in various health-related disciplines, fields and organizations. From the interviews, we highlight several different practical functions of definitions of health and disease. Furthermore, we discuss 5 types of problematic situations that emerged from the interviews and analyze the underlying conceptual issues. By providing theoretical frameworks and conceptual tools, and by suggesting conceptual changes or adaptations, philosophers might be able to help solve some of these problems. This empirical-philosophical study contributes to a more pragmatic way of understanding the relevance of conceptualizing health and disease by connecting the participants' views and experiences to the theoretical debate. Going back and forth between theory and practice will likely result in a more complex but hopefully also better and more fruitful understanding of health and disease concepts.

'If it can't be coded, it doesn't exist'. A historical-philosophical analysis of the new ICD-11 classification of chronic pain.

Chronic pain entails a large burden of disease and high social costs, but is seldom 'in the picture' and barely understood. Until recently, it was not systematically classified but instead viewed as a symptom or sign. In the new International Classification of Diseases, (ICD)-11, to be implemented in 2022, 'chronic' pain is now classified as a separate disease category and, to a certain extent, approached as a 'disease in its own right'. Reasons that have been given for this are not based so much on new scientific insights, but are rather of pragmatic nature. To explore the background of these recent changes in definition and classification of chronic pain, this paper provides a historical-philosophical analysis. By sketching a brief history of how pain experts have been working on the definition and taxonomy since the 1970s, we demonstrate the various social and practical functions that underlie the new ICD-11 classification of chronic pain. Building on this historical-empirical basis, we discuss philosophical issues regarding defining and classifying chronic pain, in particular performativity and pragmatism, and discuss their implications for the broader philosophical debate on health and disease.

Health and disease as practical concepts: exploring function in context-specific definitions.

Despite the longstanding debate on definitions of health and disease concepts, and the multitude of accounts that have been developed, no consensus has been reached. This is problematic, as the way we define health and disease has far-reaching practical consequences. In recent contributions it is proposed to view health and disease as practical- and plural concepts. Instead of searching for a general definition, it is proposed to stipulate context-specific definitions. However, it is not clear how this should be realized. In this paper, we review recent contributions to the debate, and examine the importance of context-specific definitions. In particular, we explore the usefulness of analyzing the relation between the practical function of a definition and the context it is deployed in. We demonstrate that the variety of functions that health and disease concepts need to serve makes the formulation of monistic definitions not only problematic but also undesirable. We conclude that the analysis of the practical function in relation to the context is key when formulating context-specific definitions for health and disease. At last, we discuss challenges for the pluralist stance and make recommendations for future research.