Hindsight bias doesn't always come easy: causal models, cognitive effort, and creeping determinism.

Creeping determinism, a form of hindsight bias, refers to people's hindsight perceptions of events as being determined or inevitable. This article proposes, on the basis of a causal-model theory of creeping determinism, that the underlying processes are effortful, and hence creeping determinism should disappear when individuals lack the cognitive resources to make sense of an outcome. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were asked to read a scenario while they were under either low or high processing load. Participants who had the cognitive resources to make sense of the outcome perceived it as more probable and necessary than did participants under high processing load or participants who did not receive outcome information. Experiment 3 was designed to separate 2 postulated subprocesses and showed that the attenuating effect of processing load on hindsight bias is not due to a disruption of the retrieval of potential causal antecedents but to a disruption of their evaluation. Together the 3 experiments show that the processes underlying creeping determinism are effortful, and they highlight the crucial role of causal reasoning in the perception of past events.

Automatic processing of pain: the change of implicit pain associations after psychotherapy.

This study explores the utility of a pain IAT for the assessment of dysfunctional cognitive beliefs in chronic pain patients before and after a cognitive behaviour therapy. A patient group suffering from chronic pain (N=25) treated with a 4-week cognitive behavioural psychotherapy is compared with an untreated healthy control group (N=27) at two points in time. In addition, both groups completed a self-esteem questionnaire (Rosenberg-scale) and a self-esteem IAT. In the clinical group a questionnaire assessing self-reported pain cognitions was administered. The pain IAT was able to differentiate between chronic pain patients and healthy controls before the treatment. Most important, pain-related implicit associations could be shown to change over the course of treatment in the clinical group of chronic pain patients. Results provide first evidence for an application of the IAT in chronic pain research.

Hindsight bias and the activation of counterfactual mind-sets.

Previous research has shown that conditional counterfactuals are positively related to the magnitude of creeping determinism. Unlike previous experiments which show this increased hindsight bias to occur after exceptional antecedents, we investigated another possible factor, namely a prior activation of a counterfactual mind-set. We investigated our prediction using a hypothetical scenario. Prior to reading the hindsight scenario some participants were asked to solve a scrambled-sentence test including conditional counterfactual sentences. Results of two experiments were consistent with our predictions: Participants that solved the scrambled-sentence test perceived the outcome to be more inevitable than participants in a no-outcome control condition and participants in a no-prime control condition. Furthermore, we found that this increase in creeping determinism was mediated by the perceived causal strength of the target antecedent for the occurrence of the outcome, and that the priming-effect did not occur when an unconditional counterfactual mind-set was activated before. The results are interpreted as supporting a causal-model theory of the hindsight bias.

How many hindsight biases are there?

The answer is three: questioning a conceptual default assumption in hindsight bias research, we argue that the hindsight bias is not a unitary phenomenon but consists of three separable and partially independent subphenomena or components, namely, memory distortions, impressions of foreseeability and impressions of necessity. Following a detailed conceptual analysis including a systematic survey of hindsight characterizations in the published literature, we investigated these hindsight components in the context of political elections. We present evidence from three empirical studies that impressions of foreseeability and memory distortions (1) show hindsight effects that typically differ in magnitude and sometimes even in direction, (2) are essentially uncorrelated, and (3) are differentially influenced by extraneous variables. A fourth study found similar dissociations between memory distortions and impressions of necessity. All four studies thus provide support for a separate components view of the hindsight bias. An important consequence of such a view is that apparent contradictions in research findings as well as in theoretical explanations (e.g., cognitive vs. social-motivational) might be alleviated by taking differences between components into account. We also suggest conditions under which the components diverge or converge.

The inferiority complex in paranoia readdressed: a study with the Implicit Association Test.

INTRODUCTION: It has been theorised that patients with persecutory delusions display a lack of covert self-esteem (formerly termed the 'inferiority complex'), while at the same time displaying normal or even heightened levels of explicit self-esteem. However, the empirical basis for this assumption is inconsistent. METHODS: In view of apparent shortcomings of prior studies to assess implicit self-esteem, the Implicit Association Test was utilised to readdress this theory. The Rosenberg scale served as an index of overt self-esteem. A total of 23 schizophrenic patients, 13 of whom showed current symptoms of persecutory delusions, participated in the study; 41 healthy and 14 depressed participants served as controls. RESULTS: Schizophrenic patients showed decreased levels of both implicit and explicit self-esteem relative to healthy controls. In line with recent studies, patients with current ideas of persecutory delusions displayed greater explicit self-esteem than nonparanoid patients. CONCLUSIONS: The present study lends partial support for the notion that persecutory delusions serve as a defence against low implicit self-esteem, although the explicit self-esteem of these patients is still lower than in normal participants. Apart from abnormalities of attributional style, which have been assumed to convert low into high self-esteem, the assumption that a 'feeling of personal significance' heightens self-esteem in paranoid schizophrenia deserves further consideration.