From fringe to mainstream: The Garcia effect.

The rejection of research results is sometimes thought to be justified in cases of individuals embracing fringe ideas that depart significantly from prevailing orthodoxy, or in cases of individuals who lack appropriate expertise or credentials. The case of John Garcia exhibits both of these dimensions, and illustrates that such rejection can delay scientific advancements. Garcia's work decisively challenged what was the orthodoxy in psychology in the midcentury: behaviorism. Behaviorist learning theorists suffered from theory-entrenchment insofar as they failed to acknowledge Garcia's anomalous research findings that ran counter to their theoretical expectations. The case study also illustrates that theories on the margins can become embraced as a result of advancements in adjacent research fields. Studying how Garcia's work moved from fringe to mainstream results in lessons for the philosophy of science and epistemology more generally. Only when we see the mechanisms of exclusion at work can we understand how science and other knowledge production systems can inadvertently act counterproductively via gatekeeping practices that filter out unorthodox points of view.

O estudo do comportamento, a dicotomia inato vs. aprendido e sua (possível) superação / Behavior studies, the nature vs. nurture dichotomy and its (possible) overcoming / El estudio del comportamiento, la dicotomía innato vs. aprendido y su (posible) superación / Les études du comportement, la dichotomie inné vs. appris et son (possible) dépassement

Resumo: O debate inato vs. aprendido continua presente na Academia, bem como na sociedade. Considerando tal cenário, este artigo apresenta o desdobrar das discussões que giram em torno das influências ambientais e genéticas, na gênese dos comportamentos. Para isso, primeiramente é apresentada uma reflexão acerca da definição de comportamento com a finalidade de apresentar o objeto da discussão, bem como a imprecisão em sua caracterização. Posteriormente, são destacadas as principais diferenças entre o pensamento behaviorista e o etológico, e em como essas diferenças impactaram a condução de pesquisas, além de sustentar discursos eugenistas e/ou discriminatórios. Por último, disserta-se sobre uma abordagem não-dicotômica ao tema, na forma dos Sistemas em Desenvolvimento, como uma proposta de superação do debate em questão.

Abstract: Given the remaining prominence of nature vs. nurture debate in academia and society, this article discusses environmental and genetic influences on the genesis of behavior. For this purpose, we first present the definition of behavior and discuss the imprecision in its characterization. Next, we examine the main differences between behaviorist and ethological thinking and their impact on research and on the support of eugenic discourses. To conclude, the article discusses a non-dichotomous approach to behavior based on the Developmental Systems Theory framework to overcome such dualism.

Resumen: El debate innato vs. aprendido permanece presente tanto en la academia como en la sociedad. Considerando este escenario, este artículo presenta el desarrollo de discusiones que giran en torno a las influencias ambientales y genéticas en la génesis del comportamiento. Para ello, en primer lugar, se presenta una reflexión sobre la definición de comportamiento con el fin de presentar el objeto de discusión, así como la imprecisión en su caracterización. Posteriormente, se destacan las principales diferencias entre el pensamiento behaviorista y el etológico, y su impacto en la realización de algunas investigaciones, además de fundamentarse en los discursos eugenésicos y/o discriminatorios. Para finalizar, este artículo discute un enfoque no dicotómico del tema, en la modalidad de Sistemas en Desarrollo, como propuesta para superar el debate en cuestión.

Résumé : Le débat inné vs. savant reste toujours présent dans l'Académie ainsi que dans la société. Au vu ce scénario, cet article discute des influences environnementales et génétiques sur la genèse du comportement. Pour ce faire, on reflète sur la définition du comportement et les imprécisions dans sa caractérisation pour ensuite explorer les principales différences entre la pensée béhavioriste et éthologique et leur impact sur certaines recherches et sur le soutien des discours eugéniques. L'article conclu par présentant une approche non dichotomique fondée sur la Developmental Systems Theory pour surmonter le débat en question.

Drug dependence as a split object: Trajectories of neuroscientification and behavioralization at the Max Planck Institute of Psychiatry.

Today, drug dependence is often understood as a "brain disease" and as an indication for behavioral therapy. In this article, I trace the historical development of the notions of drug dependence as a neuronal and behavioral problem in the local research context of the Max Planck Institute of Psychiatry in Munich, Germany. Focusing on the period from the 1950s to the 1980s, I argue that the neuroscientific and behaviorist understanding of "dependence" had two different trajectories that were yoked together under the same institution of self-proclaimed basic research: (a) the neuroscientific notion derived from an older toxicological approach to drug effects that was then accompanied by biochemical methods from the 1950s onwards, and neurochemical approaches from the 1960s and 1970s; and (b) the behaviorist notion had predecessors in psychotherapeutic approaches to addiction that emerged in the 1950s and took a psychodynamic orientation at the Institute. When the Institute positioned itself as a basic research establishment and developed a unified structure during the 1960s, these psychodynamic approaches were excluded for being "too applied." Soon afterward, behaviorist psychotherapeutic approaches to drug dependence emerged in the 1970s, emphasizing their foundation in basic research. Even though neuroscientific and behaviorist notions had some overlaps through the use of animal experimentation and by referring to basic research, researchers using the two approaches remained separate in their respective units during the time period under analysis. When conceptualizing the local scientific occupation with "drug dependence," I apply here the history of science concept of a "split object." Like the "boundary object," the split object is plastic enough to adapt to local conditions and robust enough to maintain its genuine identity. Compared with the boundary object, however, the split object does not invite scientific collaboration. It does, nonetheless, enable epistemic coexistence under a common institutional goal.

Matching, behavioral economics, and teleological behaviorism: Final cause analysis of substance use and health behavior.

Howard Rachlin and his contemporaries pioneered basic behavioral science innovations that have been usefully applied to advance understanding of human substance use disorder and related health behaviors. We briefly summarize the innovations of molar behaviorism (the matching law), behavioral economics, and teleological behaviorism. Behavioral economics and teleological behaviorism's focus on final causes are especially illuminating for these applied fields. Translational and applied research are summarized for laboratory studies of temporal discounting and economic demand, cohort studies of alcohol and other drug use in the natural environment, and experimental behavioral economic modeling of health behavior-related public health policies. We argue that the teleological behavioral perspective on health behavior is conducive to and merges seamlessly with the contemporary socioecological model of health behavior, which broadens the contextual influences (e.g., community, economic, infrastructure, health care access and policy) of individuals' substance use and other health risk behaviors. Basic-to-applied translations to date have been successful and bode well for continued applications of basic science areas pioneered by Howard Rachlin and his contemporaries.

Howard Rachlin: An extended scientist.

During the latter half of his career, Rachlin's work increasingly focused on integrating the study of temporal discounting and social cooperation-choices for an extended self. His notion of a self that is extended across time and social space is a useful framework within which to consider Rachlin's impact as a philosopher, scientist, and mentor over the course of his 56-year career in behavior science.

The voluntary operant and the operant nature of volition: Three views.

Many philosophers, psychologists, and lay folk associate volition with autonomy (actions are independent of an individual's environment) and free will (individuals originate their actions). Most behaviorists hold these views to be incompatible with behavior analyses. The present paper describes volition as interpreted by B. F. Skinner, Howard Rachlin, and Allen Neuringer. Skinner relates volition to positively reinforced operant behavior. That works because, like operants, voluntary actions are free, in the sense of not physically constrained; they affect their environments, often resulting in positive outcomes, and are sometimes unpredictable. Rachlin, while incorporating Skinnerian methods, interprets volition within his own Teleological Behaviorism framework. For Rachlin, reinforcement of an individual response is often incompatible with voluntary control, thereby disagreeing with Skinner. Responses are voluntary only when they are members of extended response patterns. Neuringer also begins with Skinner's operants, but argues that, under the control of reinforcing consequences, both voluntary actions and operant responses are sometimes predictable and other times "truly" unpredictable. Neuringer does not assume that environments determine voluntary actions, thereby disagreeing with Skinner and Rachlin. Taken together, the agreements and disagreements among these three behaviorists may help to shed light on the relationship between operants and volition.

The weight of harm: A Response to "Editor's Note: Societal changes and expression of concern about Rekers and Lovaas' (1974) Behavioral Treatment of Deviant Sex-Role Behaviors in a Male Child".

In 1974, Rekers and Lovaas published an article in the Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis (JABA) wherein the authors coached a 4-year-old child's parents to ignore and physically abuse him when he engaged in behaviors that were identified by the authors as inappropriate for a child whose sex assigned at birth was male. In October 2020, a Statement of Concern regarding Rekers and Lovaas (1974) was published in JABA (SEAB & LeBlanc, 2020), which described concerns regarding the paper and then provided justification for the journal's decision to not retract this paper. In this current response, I provide a counterpoint to the Statement of Concern, arguing that (a) the available evidence strongly suggests that the original study was unethical and misaligned with the principles of Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA), and (b) the evidence presented to support its contemporaneous ethicality is insufficient. I end with an argument that Rekers and Lovaas (1974) should be retracted and discuss the critical role of ethics and social significance for the field of ABA.

What is episodic memory and how do we use it?

What are the neural and computational principles that give rise to episodic memory? Although memory is probably the most studied topic in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, most research has focused on learning at the micro-level. I outline the limitations of this approach and propose a 'molar' approach to tackle episodic memory at the scale of life.

Clinical Animal Behaviour: Paradigms, Problems and Practice.

Both the public and clinicians are interested in the application of scientific knowledge concerning problem animal behaviour and its treatment. However, in order to do this effectively it is essential that individuals have not only scientific literacy but also an appreciation of philosophical concepts underpinning a particular approach and their practical implications on the knowledge generated as a result. This paper highlights several common misunderstandings and biases associated with different scientific perspectives relevant to clinical animal behaviour and their consequences for how we determine what may be a useful treatment for a given patient. In addition to more reflective evaluation of results, there is a need for researchers to report more information of value to clinicians; such as relevant treatment outcomes, effect sizes, population characteristics. Clinicians must also appreciate the limitations of population level study results to a given case. These challenges can however be overcome with the careful critical reflection using the scientific principles and caveats described.

A Case for Observability.

Observability is a tricky concept that has been used by philosophers and scientists in an inconsistent and vague way. In this article a reformulation and operational analysis (as used by Skinner, 1945) of this concept is proposed and its implications are discussed. According to the view presented in this article, observation is defined as the act of making contact with a natural phenomenon and should not be conflated with observability, which is defined as the potential to make contact with a natural phenomenon. On the basis of our current faculties and tools, observability may be divided into four levels, labeled as (1) public, (2) private, (3) technology-enhanced, and (4) conceptual. Conceptual observability (typically referred to as interpretation) is especially important for scientific purposes, as long as it is informed by observations conducted at the other levels. Entities that fail to classify in those categories should be considered unobservable. It is further suggested that because all natural phenomena by definition lie within the observability spectrum, the notion of existence might be restated in terms of observability. An observability-based truth criterion is also proposed, according to which a statement may be considered true insofar it tacts (i.e., is controlled by) an observable event or series of events. Last, some implications of the present conceptualization of observability for putative psychological entities will be discussed.

A Scientific Approach to Conscious Experience, Introspection, and Unconscious Processing: Vision and Blindsight.

Although subjective conscious experience and introspection have long been considered unscientific and banned from psychology, they are indispensable in scientific practice. These terms are used in scientific contexts today; however, their meaning remains vague, and earlier objections to the distinction between conscious experience and unconscious processing, remain valid. This also applies to the distinction between conscious visual perception and unconscious visual processing. Damage to the geniculo-striate pathway or the visual cortex results in a perimetrically blind visual hemifield contralateral to the damaged hemisphere. In some cases, cerebral blindness is not absolute. Patients may still be able to guess the presence, location, shape or direction of movement of a stimulus even though they report no conscious visual experience. This "unconscious" ability was termed "blindsight". The present paper demonstrates how the term conscious visual experience can be introduced in a logically precise and methodologically correct way and becomes amenable to scientific examination. The distinction between conscious experience and unconscious processing is demonstrated in the cases of conscious vision and blindsight. The literature on "blindsight" and its neurobiological basis is reviewed. It is shown that blindsight can be caused by residual functions of neural networks of the visual cortex that have survived cerebral damage, and may also be due to an extrastriate pathway via the midbrain to cortical areas such as areas V4 and MT/V5.

Terapia de conducta: raíces, evolución y reflexión sobre la vigencia delconductismo en el contexto clínico / Behavior therapy: roots, evolution, and reflection on the relevance of behaviorism in the clinical context

La Terapia de Conducta, así como sus tres generaciones, ha mostrado ser la tecnología psicoterapéutica con mayor evidencia empírica en psicología clínica y de la salud. Sin embargo, cada una de estas generaciones parte de unas bases filosóficas diferentes. En este trabajo se presenta brevemente su recorrido histórico, sus puntos fuertes y los posibles inconvenientes que nos encontramos en cada una. En primer lugar, el Conductismo (metodológico y radical) y sus diversas técnicas basadas en los principios del aprendizaje, seguido por el surgir de las Terapias Cognitivo-Conductuales en un contexto histórico marcado por el cognitivismo y siendo, a día de hoy, las más eficaces para una amplia variedad de casuísticas. Por último, las denominadas Terapias de Tercera Generación (o Contextuales), tecnología derivada del contextualismo funcional que sienta la base de estas. Como conclusiones, se recoge la relevancia del debate sobre cuál es el objeto de estudio de la psicología y se remarca la adherencia a los Tratamientos Psicológicos Basados en la Evidencia.(AU)

Behavior Therapy—as well as its three generations—has been shown to be the psychotherapeutic technology with the most empirical evidence in clinical and health psychology. However, each of its generations is based on different philosophical foundations. In this paper, we briefly present their historical background, their strengths, and the possible drawbacks that we find in each one. First, behaviorism (methodological and radical) and its various techniques based on the principles of learning, followed by the emergence of cognitive-behavioral therapies in a historical context marked by cognitivism and, today, the most effective technique for a wide variety of cases. Finally, those known as third generation (or contextual) therapies, a technology derived from functional contextualism that is the basis of these therapies. As conclusions, the relevance of the debate surrounding the object of study of psychology and the adherence to evidence-based psychological treatments is highlighted.(AU)

Countercontrol: A Relational Frame Theory (RFT) Account and Revival of a 70-Year-Old Skinnerian Term.

Countercontrol is a Skinnerian operant concept that posits that an individual's attempts to exert control over another person's behavior may evoke a countercontrolling response from the person being controlled that functions to avoid or escape the potentially aversive conditions generated by the controller. Despite Skinner's historical concerns regarding the detrimental effects of countercontrol in terms of hindering optimal societal growth and cultural evolution, the concept has not been widely applied within behavior analysis. Drawing from recent developments in rule-governed behavior and relational frame theory, this article seeks to explicate countercontrol from a contemporary behavior analytic perspective and presents several modern-day societal applications. In particular, a relational frame theory account of rule-governed behavior is used as a framework to elucidate the behavioral processes by which rule-following occurs (or fails to occur) in the context of countercontrol. Implications of a renewed focus on countercontrol for understanding pressing societal issues are also discussed.

The Issue of Proxies and Choice Architectures. Why EU Law Matters for Recommender Systems.

Recommendations are meant to increase sales or ad revenue, as these are the first priority of those who pay for them. As recommender systems match their recommendations with inferred preferences, we should not be surprised if the algorithm optimizes for lucrative preferences and thus co-produces the preferences they mine. This relates to the well-known problems of feedback loops, filter bubbles, and echo chambers. In this article, I discuss the implications of the fact that computing systems necessarily work with proxies when inferring recommendations and raise a number of questions about whether recommender systems actually do what they are claimed to do, while also analysing the often-perverse economic incentive structures that have a major impact on relevant design decisions. Finally, I will explain how the choice architectures for data controllers and providers of AI systems as foreseen in the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the proposed EU Digital Services Act (DSA) and the proposed EU AI Act will help to break through various vicious circles, by constraining how people may be targeted (GDPR, DSA) and by requiring documented evidence of the robustness, resilience, reliability, and the responsible design and deployment of high-risk recommender systems (AI Act).

Sensing Qualia.

Accounting for qualia in the natural world is a difficult business, and it is worth understanding why. A close examination of several theories of mind-Behaviorism, Identity Theory, Functionalism, and Integrated Information Theory-will be discussed, revealing shortcomings for these theories in explaining the contents of conscious experience: qualia. It will be argued that in order to overcome the main difficulty of these theories the senses should be interpreted as physical detectors. A new theory, Grounded Functionalism, will be proposed, which retains multiple realizability while allowing for a scientifically based approach toward accounting for qualia in the natural world.

Un hombre mecánico. A Clockwork Orange, de Stanley Kubrick / A mechanical man. A Clockwork Orange, by Stanley Kubrick

En diciembre 2021 el periodista Oscar Ranzani publicó en el diario Página/12 dos importantes notas por el 50 aniversario del estreno de La naranja mecánica. En una de ella entrevistó a gente de cine, en la otra a psicoanalistas. El presente artículo, preparado especialmente por Eduardo Laso desarrolla esta segunda perspectiva a partir de tesis anteriores contenidas en su libro "Ética y malestar" y retomadas en el comentario de Juan Jorge Michel Fariña, que forma parte del mencionado reportaje: "Alex, el personaje de La naranja mecánica, funda su ética en la máxima de goce del marqués de Sade. Es decir, edifica sus acciones y las de sus drugos (los jóvenes que integran la banda criminal que comanda Alex) en una forma del mal que le genera, sin embargo, un inquietante bienestar (…) Cuando Alex es apresado y sometido al tratamiento Ludovico, nos encontramos con el reverso de esta máxima sadeana, ahora ejercida por la ciencia. Podemos decir que el programa de rehabilitación ejerce el bien en el mal, es decir, en nombre de un bien supremo (la curación, la rehabilitación) somete al sujeto a las peores vejaciones. Esta dialéctica kantiano-sadeana entre el mal en el bien y el bien en el mal, formalizada por Lacan en 1966, es un hallazgo de la novela de Burgess, publicada en 1962. Y por cierto una de las cuestiones analíticas más potentes de la película de Kubrick

In December 2021, the journalist and psychologist Oscar Ranzani published two important notes in the newspaper Página/12 for the 50th anniversary of the premiere of A Clockwork Orange. In one of them he interviewed film people, in the other psychoanalysts. This article, specially prepared by Eduardo Laso, develops this second perspective based on previous theses contained in his book "Ethics and Malaise" and taken up in the comment by Juan Jorge Michel Fariña, which is part of the aforementioned report: "Alex, the character of A Clockwork Orange, bases its ethics on the maxim of jouissance of the Marquis de Sade. That is to say, he builds his actions and those of his droogs (the young people who make up the criminal gang commanded by him) in a form of evil that generates, however, a disturbing well-being (...) When Alex is arrested and subjected to the Ludovico treatment, we find the reverse of this Sadean maxim, now exercised by science. We can say that the rehabilitation program exercises good in evil, that is, in the name of a supreme good (healing, rehabilitation) it subjects Alex to the worst abuse. This Kantian-Sadean dialectic between evil in good and good in evil, formalized by Lacan in 1966, is a finding of Burgess's novel, published in 1962. And certainly one of the most powerful analytical questions of the film of Kubrick

Mechanisms of Behavior Change in Substance Use Disorder With and Without Formal Treatment.

This article provides a narrative review of studies that examined mechanisms of behavior change in substance use disorder. Several mechanisms have some support, including self-efficacy, craving, protective behavioral strategies, and increasing substance-free rewards, whereas others have minimal support (e.g., motivation, identity). The review provides recommendations for expanding the research agenda for studying mechanisms of change, including designs to manipulate putative change mechanisms, measurement approaches that expand the temporal units of analysis during change efforts, more studies of change outside of treatment, and analytic approaches that move beyond mediation tests. The dominant causal inference approach that focuses on treatment and individuals as change agents could be expanded to include a molar behavioral approach that focuses on patterns of behavior in temporally extended environmental contexts. Molar behavioral approaches may advance understanding of how recovery from substance use disorder is influenced by broader contextual features, community-level variables, and social determinants of health.

Conceptual Foundations: Teaching the Historical Development of Radical Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Science.

This article outlines a graduate-level course on the philosophical, conceptual, and historical (PCH) foundations of radical behaviorism, which is the philosophy of science that underlies behavior analysis. As described, the course is for a 15-week semester, and is organized into weekly units. The units in the first half of the course are concerned with the influences of other viewpoints in the history of psychology on the development of behavior analysis and radical behaviorism. The units in the second half are concerned with the PCH foundations of eight basic dimensions of radical behaviorism. Throughout, a course examining the foundations of radical behaviorism is seen as compatible with related courses in the other three domains of behavior analysis-the experimental analysis of behavior, applied behavior analysis, and service delivery-and as integral to the education of all behavior analysts.

Humble Behaviorism Redux.

The need to bring behavior analysis to scale is no more obvious or urgent than now. Collaboration between behavior analysts and healthcare workers, educators, policymakers, mental health clinicians, social workers, and so many other professionals is critical to reaching under-resourced and traditionally marginalized populations. First, however, interprofessional collaboration must be adopted widely and reinforced within the behavior analytic community. Disciplinary centrism and hubris pose barriers to effective interprofessional collaboration, leading one to assume the position that practitioners of the same discipline are better trained and smarter than those of a different field. However, cultural humility (Wright, Behavior Analysis in Practice, 12(4), 805-809, 2019) is an alternative to disciplinary centrism that allows professionals to retain identities born of cultural histories and training (Pecukonis, Journal of Teaching in Social Work, 40(3), 211-220, 2020). Furthermore, cultural reciprocity is a process of self-observation and collaborative inquiry that involves questioning one's own assumptions and forces individuals (and professions) to confront the contradictions between their values and their practices (Kalyanpur & Harry, 1999). In this paper, we revisit the call for Humble Behaviorism first made by Alan Neuringer in 1991 and the recommendations of fellow behavior analysts since. Specifically, we introduce a framework of cultural reciprocity to guide humble behaviorists as they acquire behaviors necessary to establish and maintain productive interprofessional relationships. We encourage them to act on their ethical and moral duties to address social problems of global concern and bring behavior analysis to scale.