Pacing strategy in trail running: A cognitive subtractive model of the affective balance between effort and pleasure?

The objective of the present study was to undercover the cognitive rules developed by athletes in pacing strategy during a trail running competition. Fifty participants completed a questionnaire on how decisions were made around pacing. Each questionnaire consisted of 12 scenarios that featured the two components of affective balance (effort and pleasure) as information cues. We applied repeated-measures analyses of variance and Tukey's post hoc tests to the data. The results showed that pleasure and effort had a significant effect on deciding to reduce the pace and deciding to maintain the pace. The type of cognitive rule depended on the pacing outcome, with a subtractive integration rule when deciding to maintain the pace and a conjunction integration rule when deciding to reduce the pace. The presence of two different cognitive rules emphasized the importance of information integration in pacing strategy.

Role of Cue Training, Context, and Stimulus Intensity on Fear Generalization in Humans.

Fear generalization is a crucial mechanism underlying maladaptive behavior, but factors influencing this process are not fully understood. We investigated the effects of cue training and context on fear generalization and how cognitive rules influence responses to different conditions. We also examined the role of stimulus intensity in fear generalization to provide insight into fear generalization mechanisms. Participants (n = 104) completed a fear emotion task with two stages: acquisition and generalization testing. Subjective fear expectancy ratings were used as outcome measures. Participants who received single threat cue training exhibited stronger fear generalization responses than those who received discrimination training with threat and safe cues. Participants who received discrimination training and used linear rules had the strongest fear response to the largest stimulus. Therefore, a safe cue may mitigate fear generalization but could increase fear responses to more intense stimuli. Altering context did not change the fear generalization response because fear generalization is mainly governed by the association between the conditioned stimulus and the unconditioned fear stimulus. The present study emphasizes the multifaceted nature of fear generalization and the importance of examining multiple factors to understand this phenomenon. These findings elucidate fear learning and provide insights needed for effective interventions for maladaptive behavior.

Toward a more nuanced understanding of probability estimation biases.

In real life, we often have to make judgements under uncertainty. One such judgement task is estimating the probability of a given event based on uncertain evidence for the event, such as estimating the chances of actual fire when the fire alarm goes off. On the one hand, previous studies have shown that human subjects often significantly misestimate the probability in such cases. On the other hand, these studies have offered divergent explanations as to the exact causes of these judgment errors (or, synonymously, biases). For instance, different studies have attributed the errors to the neglect (or underweighting) of the prevalence (or base rate) of the given event, or the overweighting of the evidence for the individual event ('individuating information'), etc. However, whether or to what extent any such explanation can fully account for the observed errors remains unclear. To help fill this gap, we studied the probability estimation performance of non-professional subjects under four different real-world problem scenarios: (i) Estimating the probability of cancer in a mammogram given the relevant evidence from a computer-aided cancer detection system, (ii) estimating the probability of drunkenness based on breathalyzer evidence, and (iii & iv) estimating the probability of an enemy sniper based on two different sets of evidence from a drone reconnaissance system. In each case, we quantitatively characterized the contributions of the various potential explanatory variables to the subjects' probability judgements. We found that while the various explanatory variables together accounted for about 30 to 45% of the overall variance of the subjects' responses depending on the problem scenario, no single factor was sufficient to account for more than 53% of the explainable variance (or about 16 to 24% of the overall variance), let alone all of it. Further analyses of the explained variance revealed the surprising fact that no single factor accounted for significantly more than its 'fair share' of the variance. Taken together, our results demonstrate quantitatively that it is statistically untenable to attribute the errors of probabilistic judgement to any single cause, including base rate neglect. A more nuanced and unifying explanation would be that the actual biases reflect a weighted combination of multiple contributing factors, the exact mix of which depends on the particular problem scenario.

Heuristic Vetoing: Top-Down Influences of the Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic Can Override the Bottom-Up Information in Visual Images.

When making decisions under uncertainty, human subjects do not always act as rational decision makers, but often resort to one or more mental "shortcuts", or heuristics, to arrive at a decision. How do such "top-down" processes affect real-world decisions that must take into account empirical, "bottom-up" sensory evidence? Here we use recognition of camouflaged objects by expert viewers as an exemplar case to demonstrate that the effect of heuristics can be so strong as to override the empirical evidence in favor of heuristic information, even though the latter is random. We provided the viewers a random number that we told them was the estimate of a drone reconnaissance system of the probability that the visual image they were about to see contained a camouflaged target. We then showed them the image. We found that the subjects' own estimates of the probability of the target in the image reflected the random information they were provided, and ignored the actual evidence in the image. However, when the heuristic information was not provided, the same subjects were highly successful in finding the target in the same set of images, indicating that the effect was solely attributable to the availability of heuristic information. Two additional experiments confirmed that this effect was not idiosyncratic to camouflage images, visual search task, or the subjects' prior training or expertise. Together, these results demonstrate a novel aspect of the interaction between heuristics and sensory information during real-world decision making, where the former can be strong enough to veto the latter. This 'heuristic vetoing' is distinct from the vetoing of sensory information that occurs in certain visual illusions.

Biasing Influence of 'Mental Shortcuts' on Diagnostic Decision-Making: Radiologists Can Overlook Breast Cancer in Mammograms When Prior Diagnostic Information Is Available.

When making decisions under uncertainty, people in all walks of life, including highly trained medical professionals, tend to resort to using 'mental shortcuts', or heuristics. Anchoring-and-adjustment (AAA) is a well-known heuristic in which subjects reach a judgment by starting from an initial internal judgment ('anchored position') based on available external information ('anchoring information') and adjusting it until they are satisfied. We studied the effects of the AAA heuristic during diagnostic decision-making in mammography. We provided practicing radiologists (N = 27 across two studies) a random number that we told them was the estimate of a previous radiologist of the probability that a mammogram they were about to see was positive for breast cancer. We then showed them the actual mammogram. We found that the radiologists' own estimates of cancer in the mammogram reflected the random information they were provided and ignored the actual evidence in the mammogram. However, when the heuristic information was not provided, the same radiologists detected breast cancer in the same set of mammograms highly accurately, indicating that the effect was solely attributable to the availability of heuristic information. Thus, the effects of the AAA heuristic can sometimes be so strong as to override the actual clinical evidence in diagnostic tasks.

Conceptos básicos de la Teoría Funcional de la Cognición y algunas de sus aplicaciones / Information Integration Theory: Basis Concepts and Applications

RESUMEN La vida cotidiana demanda la toma de juicios o decisiones constantes. Algunas de ellas pueden ser más o menos complejas, dependiendo de factores éticos, sociales, históricos y políticos del contexto social y, de la interacción de estos factores en los sujetos que juzgan. El objetivo de este artículo es exponer cómo la Teoría Funcional de la Cognición permite hacer un análisis detallado del proceso cognitivo de toma de decisión, en el que operan: la valoración de los estímulos, la integración de la representación psicológica de esos estímulos y, finalmente, la respuesta explícita. Este proceso de juicio cumple con tres reglas: adición, multiplicación y promedio, que permiten observar las funciones que se generan entre los factores implicados en las decisiones y la emisión de un juicio. Esta teoría tiene importantes aplicaciones en las áreas de la psicología clínica y de la salud, la psicología política, la psicología del deporte y la psicología del desarrollo, áreas en las cuáles el artículo presenta los hallazgos más relevantes.

ABSTRACT Daily life demands constant making judgments or decisions. Some of those decisions may be more or less complex depending on ethical, social, historical and political context of social factors and the interaction of these factors with subjects who judge. The aim of this article is to show how Functional Theory of Cognition allows detailed cognitive decision making process analysis, in which they operate: the valuation of stimuli, integration of psychological representation of these stimuli and finally, explicit answer. This process of judgment meets three rules: addition, multiplication, average, for observing the functions that are generated between the factors involved in decisions and issuing a judgment. This theory has had important applications in the areas of clinical psychology and health, political psychology, sports psychology and developmental psychology, areas in which the paper presents the most relevant findings.

Judging patients' pain from external cues.

Nurses, nurse's aides, and physicians were presented with vignettes describing elderly patients and were asked to assess their level of pain from four external cues (facial expression, verbalizations, avoidance of movements and positions, and interpersonal contact) in three conditions: when the illness was not known, when it was known to be arthritis, and when it was known to be cancer. For all health caregivers, the most important cue for judging pain was patients' facial expression. When the nature of the illness was not known, the impact of this cue was stronger than when the nature of the illness was known.