Neural Correlates of Cognitive Dysfunction in Conditional Reasoning in Schizophrenia: An Event-related Potential Study.

Purpose: Schizophrenia patients show impaired conditional reasoning. This study was to investigate event-related potential (ERP) characteristics of the conditional reasoning in schizophrenia. Patients and methods: Participants included 24 schizophrenia patients and 30 normal controls (NCs), and the measurements of ERPs were conducted during the Wason selection task. Results: Results showed that NCs consistently outperformed schizophrenia patients in terms of accuracy. Among the different rule types of the task, the precautionary type experiment yielded the highest accuracy rates. In contrast, both the descriptive and abstract type experiments resulted in lower accuracy. The RTs of the abstract type experiment were the shortest among the four experiments. In the abstract type of the Wason selection task, the NCs exhibited higher amplitudes for both the N1 and P2 components compared to the schizophrenia patients. At the parietal lobe, the N2 amplitudes were higher for the social contract type of the task compared to the precautionary version. At the frontal lobe, the N2 amplitudes were highest for the abstract type of the task. In the abstract type, the N2 amplitude at the parietal lobe was higher than that at the central lobe. The NCs displayed lower amplitudes for both the P3 and slow wave compared to the schizophrenia patients. Differences were observed between the NC and schizophrenia groups in terms of the latencies for N1, P2, N2, P3 and slow wave components across different experiment types and regions of interest. Conclusion: In conclusion, the observed ERP patterns provide valuable insights into the neural mechanisms underlying the Wason selection task, highlighting the differences between NCs and patients with schizophrenia.

A study on the social contract conditional reasoning of male substance abusers during detoxification.

Previous studies on social contract reasoning of male substance abusers only examined individuals who are using drugs, and most of them compared social contract and nonsocial contract reasoning, and paid less attention to the characteristics of social contract reasoning of substance abusers during withdrawal. In addition, there is little research on the difference between the standard social contract rules and the switched social contract rules. To further explore this issue, experiment 1 examined the differences between 110 male substance abusers' conditional reasoning for descriptive and social contract rules; Experiment 2 examined the differences between 110 other male substance abusers' conditional reasoning for standard and switched social contracts. Results: (1) for male substance abusers, the performance of social contract conditional reasoning is significantly better than descriptive conditional reasoning; (2) the performance of standard social contract rules is significantly better than that of switched social contract rules.

Set-shifting and inhibition interplay affect the rule-matching bias occurrence during conditional reasoning task.

The rule-matching bias is a common error during conditional reasoning tasks, which refers to a tendency to match responses with the lexical context in the conditional rule and leads to incorrect responses. Conditional reasoning is one of the higher-level cognitive abilities affected by many cognitive skills. We aimed to determine whether inhibition and set-shifting skills with rule-matching bias occurrence could be related and, if so, to what quantitative, at a statistically significant level. A total of 30 healthy university students aged 18 to 30 participated in this study. We used the Wason's Selection Task (WST) to measure conditional reasoning and investigated their inhibition and set-shifting skills with the Stroop and Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, respectively. Results showed a significant positive correlation between the number of correct responses to the Stroop test and the Wason Selection Card Test (p=0.614). There was a positive correlation between the number of correct responses to the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and the Wason Selection Card Test (p=0.423). Participants with higher inhibition and set-shifting abilities showed better performance in the conditional reasoning test and lower rule-matching bias errors.

Reasoning outside the box: Divergent thinking is related to logical reasoning.

When people reason, they do so in a way that suggests they are thinking beyond the premises and actively using background knowledge. This study explored the hypothesis that divergent thinking, a key component of creativity, is a unique predictive factor of logical reasoning. A total of 96 adults completed a divergent thinking task and logical reasoning problems with varying forms and contents. Cognitive capacity was measured as a confounding factor. Individual differences in ideational fluency and originality were derived from the divergent thinking task. As hypothesized, originality was predictive of logical reasoning beyond fluency and cognitive capacity.

Specificity effects in reasoning with counterintuitive and arbitrary conditionals.

When people have prior knowledge about an inference, they accept conclusions from specific conditionals (e.g., "If Jack does sports, then Jack loses weight") more strongly than for unspecific conditionals (e.g., "If a person does sports, then the person loses weight"). But can specific phrasings also elevate the acceptance of conclusions from unbelievable conditionals? In Experiment 1, we varied the specificity of counterintuitive conditionals, which described the opposite of what is expected according to everyday experiences ("If Lena/a person studies hard, then Lena/the person will not do well on the test"). In Experiment 2, we varied the specificity of arbitrary conditionals, which had no obvious link between antecedent and consequent ("If Mary/a person goes shopping, then Mary/ the person gets pimples"). All conditionals were embedded in MP and AC inferences. Participants were instructed to reason as in daily life and to evaluate the conclusions on a 7-point Likert scale. Our results showed a specificity effect in both experiments: participants gave higher acceptance ratings for specific than for unspecific conditionals.

Can conditionals explain explanations? A modus ponens model of B because A.

We suggest a normative model for the evaluation of explanations B because A based on probabilistic conditional reasoning and compare it with empirical data. According to the modus ponens model of explanations, the probability of B because A should equal the joint probability of the conditional if A then B and the explanans A. We argue that B because A expresses the conjunction of A and B as well as positive relevance of A for B. In Study 1, participants (N = 80) judged the subjective probabilities of 20 sets of statements with a focus on belief-based reasoning under uncertainty. In Study 2, participants (N = 376) were assigned to one of six item sets for which we varied the inferential relevance of A for B to explore boundary conditions of our model. We assessed the performance of our model across a range of analyses and report results on the Equation, a fundamental model in research on probabilistic reasoning concerning the evaluation of conditionals. In both studies, results indicate that participants' belief in statements B because A followed model predictions systematically. However, a sizeable proportion of sets of beliefs contained at least one incoherence, indicating deviations from the norms of rationality suggested by our model. In addition, results of Study 2 lend support to the idea that inferential relevance may be relevant for the evaluation of both conditionals and explanations.

Looking behind: Turning cards in the selection task.

Wason's selection task requires that one imagine which of four cards, each of which has a letter on one side and a number on the other, one would have to turn over to determine whether a statement about the cards is true or false. For example, one might see four cards showing T, H, 6, and 4 and be asked to say which card or cards one would have to turn over to determine whether a statement in the form of If a card has T on one side, it has 4 on the other is true. In the great majority of experiments with this task no cards are actually turned. This limits the conclusions that can be drawn from experimental results. In two experiments participants actually turned (had a computer turn) virtual cards so as to show what they contained on their originally hidden sides. Participants were given a monetary incentive to do well on the task, and they performed it, with trial-by-trial feedback, many times. Performance was much better than is typically obtained with the more common way of performing the task. Results also demonstrate the importance of the precise wording of the statement to be evaluated and how a misinterpretation could help account for a tendency for people to turn only a single card even when the turning of two is required. Results prompt several questions of a theoretical nature and are discussed as they relate to recent theoretical treatments of the selection task.

Conditional content, explicit information and generating cases: Sources for suppressing inferences.

In the present study, we evaluate the suppression effect by asking participants to make inferences with everyday conditionals ("if A, then B"; "if Ana finds a friend, then she will go to the theatre"), choosing between three possible conclusions ("she went to the theatre"; "she did not go to the theatre"; "it cannot be concluded"). We test how these inferences can be influenced by three factors: a) when the content of the conditional induces us to think about disabling conditions that prevent us from accepting the consequent (A and ¬B) or alternative conditions that induce us to think about other antecedents that could also lead to the consequent (¬A and B), b) when explicit information is given about what really happened (e.g. Ana found a friend but they did not go to the theatre; or Ana did not find a friend but she went to the theatre) and c) when participants have to look for concrete disabling (e.g. Ana's friend had to work) and alternative cases (e.g. Ana's sister wanted to go to the theatre) before making the inferences. Previous studies have shown what were called "suppression effects": disabling conditions reduced valid inferences while considering alternatives led to a reduction in fallacies. These two "suppression effects" were shown in Experiment 1: a) in an Implicit condition that included just the content factor of the conditional and b) with a greater magnitude in a second Explicit condition that included the three factors (content, explicit information and search for counterexamples). Experiment 2 compared the same Explicit condition with another in which participants, instead of looking for counterexamples, completed a control task of looking for synonyms. In addition, half the participants looked for a few items (2 cases) and the other half for many items (5 cases). Results again showed the suppressing effect in all the conditions, but the magnitude was greater in the counterexample condition. No relevant differences were obtained according to the number of cases generated; the most relevant result was that the factors provided an additive effect on the suppression.

Reasoning With Conditionals About Everyday and Mathematical Concepts in Primary School.

A research link between conditional reasoning and mathematics has been reported only for late adolescents and adults, despite claims about the pivotal importance of conditional reasoning, i.e., reasoning with if-then statements, in mathematics. Secondary students' problems with deductive reasoning in mathematics have been documented for a long time. However, evidence from developmental psychology shows that even elementary students possess some early conditional reasoning skills in familiar contexts. It is still an open question to what extent conditional reasoning with mathematical concepts differs from conditional reasoning in familiar everyday contexts. Based on Mental Model Theory (MMT) of conditional reasoning, we assume that (mathematical) content knowledge will influence the generation of models, when conditionals concern mathematical concepts. In a cross-sectional study, 102 students in Cyprus from grades 2, 4, and 6 solved four conditional reasoning tasks on each type of content (everyday and mathematical). All four logical forms, modus ponens (MP), modus tollens (MT), denial of the antecedent (DA), and affirmation of the consequent (AC), were included in each task. Consistent with previous findings, even second graders were able to make correct inferences on some logical forms. Controlling for Working Memory (WM), there were significant effects of grade and logical form, with stronger growth on MP and AC than on MT and DA. The main effect of context was not significant, but context interacted significantly with logical form and grade level. The pattern of results was not consistent with the predictions of MMT. Based on analyses of students' chosen responses, we propose an alternative mechanism explaining the specific pattern of results. The study indicates that deductive reasoning skills arise from a combination of knowledge of domain-general principles and domain-specific knowledge. It extends results concerning the gradual development of primary students' conditional reasoning with everyday concepts to reasoning with mathematical concepts adding to our understanding of the link between mathematics and conditional reasoning in primary school. The results inspire the development of educational interventions, while further implications and limitations of the study are discussed.

The Suppression of Inferences From Counterfactual Conditionals.

We examine two competing effects of beliefs on conditional inferences. The suppression effect occurs for conditionals, for example, "if she watered the plants they bloomed," when beliefs about additional background conditions, for example, "if the sun shone they bloomed" decrease the frequency of inferences such as modus tollens (from "the plants did not bloom" to "therefore she did not water them"). In contrast, the counterfactual elevation effect occurs for counterfactual conditionals, for example, "if she had watered the plants they would have bloomed," when beliefs about the known or presupposed facts, "she did not water the plants and they did not bloom" increase the frequency of inferences such as modus tollens. We report six experiments that show that beliefs about additional conditions take precedence over beliefs about presupposed facts for counterfactuals. The modus tollens inference is suppressed for counterfactuals that contain additional conditions (Experiments 1a and 1b). The denial of the antecedent inference (from "she did not water the plants" to "therefore they did not bloom") is suppressed for counterfactuals that contain alternatives (Experiments 2a and 2b). We report a new "switched-suppression" effect for conditionals with negated components, for example, "if she had not watered the plants they would not have bloomed": modus tollens is suppressed by alternatives and denial of the antecedent by additional conditions, rather than vice versa (Experiments 3a and 3b). We discuss the implications of the results for alternative theories of conditional reasoning.

Belief and Counterfactuality: A Teleological Theory of Belief Attribution.

The development and relation of counterfactual reasoning and false belief understanding were examined in 3- to 7-year-old children (N = 75) and adult controls (N = 14). The key question was whether false belief understanding engages counterfactual reasoning to infer what somebody else falsely believes. Findings revealed a strong correlation between false belief and counterfactual questions even in conditions in which children could commit errors other than the reality bias (r p  = .51). The data suggest that mastery of belief attribution and counterfactual reasoning is not limited to one point in development but rather develops over a longer period. Moreover, the rare occurrence of reality errors calls into question whether young children's errors in the classic false belief task are indeed the result of a failure to inhibit what they know to be actually the case. The data speak in favor of a teleological theory of belief attribution and challenges established theories of belief attribution.

To detect or not to detect: A replication and extension of the three-stage model.

When faced with a decision, people generally show a bias toward heuristic processing, even if it leads to the incorrect decision, such as in the base-rate neglect task. The crucial question is whether people know that they are biased. Recently, the three-stage model (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015) suggested that detecting this bias (conflict detection) is imperfect and a consistent source of bias because some people do not recognize that they are making biased decisions. In Experiment 1, participants completed a base-rate neglect task as replication of Pennycook et al. (2015). In Experiment 2, a conditional reasoning task was added as an extension to test the boundary conditions of the model. Results in Experiment 1 indicated that detection failures were a significant source of bias. However, results in Experiment 2 on the conditional reasoning task indicated that the three-stage model may be incompatible with a complex task such as conditional reasoning, an issue explored in detail in the General discussion.

Conditional Reasoning in Schizophrenic Patients.

Conditional reasoning (if p then q) is used very frequently in everyday situations. Conditional reasoning is impaired in brain-lesion patients, psychopathy, alcoholism, and polydrug dependence. Many neurocognitive deficits have also been described in schizophrenia. We assessed conditional reasoning in 25 patients with schizophrenia, 25 depressive patients, and 25 controls, using the Wason selection task in three different domains: social contracts, precautionary rules, and descriptive rules. Control measures included depression, anxiety, and severity of schizophrenia measures as a Verbal Intelligence Scale. Patients with schizophrenia were significantly impaired on all conditional reasoning tasks compared to depressives and controls. However, the social contract and precautions tasks yielded better results than the descriptive tasks. Differences between groups disappeared for social contract but remained for precautions and descriptive tasks when verbal intelligence was used as a covariate. These results suggest that domain-specific reasoning mechanisms, proposed by evolutionary psychologists, are relatively resilient in the face of brain network disruptions that impair more general reasoning abilities. Nevertheless, patients with schizophrenia could encounter difficulties understanding precaution rules and social contracts in real-life situations resulting in unwise risk-taking and misunderstandings in the social world.

Interactions between inferential strategies and belief bias.

The dual strategy model of reasoning proposed by Verschueren, Schaeken, and d'Ydewalle (Thinking & Reasoning, 11(3), 239-278, 2005a; Memory & Cognition, 33(1), 107-119, 2005b) suggests that people can use either a statistical or a counterexample-based strategy to make deductive inferences. Subsequent studies have supported this distinction and investigated some properties of the two strategies. In the following, we examine the further hypothesis that reasoners using statistical strategies should be more vulnerable to the effects of conclusion belief. In each of three studies, participants were given abstract problems used to determine strategy use and three different forms of syllogism with believable and unbelievable conclusions. Responses, response times, and feeling of rightness (FOR) measures were taken. The results show that participants using a statistical strategy were more prone to the effects of conclusion belief across all three forms of reasoning. In addition, statistical reasoners took less time to make inferences than did counterexample reasoners. Patterns of variation in response times and FOR ratings between believable and unbelievable conclusions were very similar for both strategies, indicating that both statistical and counterexample reasoners were aware of conflict between conclusion belief and premise-based reasoning.

Probabilistic conditional reasoning: Disentangling form and content with the dual-source model.

The present research examines descriptive models of probabilistic conditional reasoning, that is of reasoning from uncertain conditionals with contents about which reasoners have rich background knowledge. According to our dual-source model, two types of information shape such reasoning: knowledge-based information elicited by the contents of the material and content-independent information derived from the form of inferences. Two experiments implemented manipulations that selectively influenced the model parameters for the knowledge-based information, the relative weight given to form-based versus knowledge-based information, and the parameters for the form-based information, validating the psychological interpretation of these parameters. We apply the model to classical suppression effects dissecting them into effects on background knowledge and effects on form-based processes (Exp. 3) and we use it to reanalyse previous studies manipulating reasoning instructions. In a model-comparison exercise, based on data of seven studies, the dual-source model outperformed three Bayesian competitor models. Overall, our results support the view that people make use of background knowledge in line with current Bayesian models, but they also suggest that the form of the conditional argument, irrespective of its content, plays a substantive, yet smaller, role.

Arguments from Developmental Order.

In this article, I investigate a special type of argument regarding the role of development in theorizing about psychological processes and cognitive capacities. Among the issues that developmental psychologists study, discovering the ontogenetic trajectory of mechanisms or capacities underpinning our cognitive functions ranks highly. The order in which functions are developed or capacities are acquired is a matter of debate between competing psychological theories, and also philosophical conceptions of the mind - getting the role and the significance of the different steps in this order right could be seen as an important virtue of such theories. Thus, a special kind of strategy in arguments between competing philosophical or psychological theories is using developmental order in arguing for or against a given psychological claim. In this article, I will introduce an analysis of arguments from developmental order, which come in two general types: arguments emphasizing the importance of the early cognitive processes and arguments emphasizing the late cognitive processes. I will discuss their role in one of the central tools for evaluating scientific theories, namely in making inferences to the best explanation. I will argue that appeal to developmental order is, by itself, an insufficient criterion for theory choice and has to be part of an argument based on other core explanatory or empirical virtues. I will end by proposing a more concerted study of philosophical issues concerning (cognitive) development, and I will present some topics that also pertain to a full-fledged 'philosophy of development.'

Ranking Theory and Conditional Reasoning.

Ranking theory is a formal epistemology that has been developed in over 600 pages in Spohn's recent book The Laws of Belief, which aims to provide a normative account of the dynamics of beliefs that presents an alternative to current probabilistic approaches. It has long been received in the AI community, but it has not yet found application in experimental psychology. The purpose of this paper is to derive clear, quantitative predictions by exploiting a parallel between ranking theory and a statistical model called logistic regression. This approach is illustrated by the development of a model for the conditional inference task using Spohn's (2013) ranking theoretic approach to conditionals.

Efecto de factores temáticos y pragmáticos en razonamiento condicional con textos narrativos / Effect of thematic and pragmatic factors in conditional reasoning with narrative texts

En esta investigación experimental se analiza la importancia de factores de tipo temático y pragmático en tareas de inferencia condicional, incluidas en textos narrativos, que describen situaciones plausibles de la vida cotidiana. Se manipula el tipo de contenido (causal versus promesa/amenaza), la congruencia de los textos (congruente versus no congruente), la probabilidad de ocurrencia empírica de los enunciados condicionales (deterministas, probabilísticos y ninguna relación), y el tipo de regla condicional (Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens, Afirmación del Consecuente y Negación del Antecedente). A partir de un paradigma de selección de respuesta, además de elegir la conclusión, los sujetos debían indicar la seguridad con la que hacían dicha selección. Los resultados pusieron de manifiesto que: (a) Los sujetos que razonaban con textos congruentes, obtenían mejores resultados y manifestaban sentirse más seguros de sus respuestas que los que razonaban con textos no congruentes; (b) se obtuvieron las tasas más elevadas de aciertos y la mayor seguridad en las respuesta cuando se razonaba con enunciados deterministas, que siempre suceden en el mundo real (c) el tipo de contenido no registró efectos principales, pero sí se obtuvieron efectos interactivos significativos entre el contenido y la congruencia de los textos. Los resultados obtenidos se discuten en el marco de los principales enfoques teóricos actuales de razonamiento condicional.

The purpose of this investigation is to explore the importance of thematic and pragmatic factors in conditional inference tasks, included in narrative texts, which described plausible everyday situations. Content type (causal versus promise/threat), text coherence (coherent versus non-coherent), the probability of empiric occurrence in conditional statements (deterministic, probabilistic and without specific relation), and the type of conditional rule (Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens, Affirmation of the Consequent and Denial of the Antecedent) were manipulated. Using an answer-selection paradigm, as well as choosing the conclusion, the subjects indicated the level of certainty with which they made their selection. The results showed that: (a) The subjects who reasoned with coherent texts obtained better results and declared feeling more certain of their answers than those who reasoned with incoherent texts; (b) when reasoning is carried out with deterministic statements, which always occur in the real world, the highest number of correct answers, as well as the highest level of certainty in the choice of answer, is achieved. (c) The content type did not register any principal effects, but significant interactive effects of this variable were obtained with text coherence. The results obtained were discussed within the framework of the principal current theoretical approaches to conditional reasoning.

Neural correlates of deductive reasoning: An ERP study with the Wason Selection Task.

The Wason Selection Task (WST) is a well-known test of reasoning in which one turns over cards to test a rule about the two faces. Modifications were made to the WST to enable more direct and analytical investigation of reasoning processes. The modifications included extensive training to reduce variations in task interpretation, isolation of working memory in the decision phase, a separate rule for each card and variations in the form of the rule (number-letter as well as letter-number), separate scoring for each card, and inclusion of control cards that could be recognized by features without relational processing. The cognitive complexity of each card was also analyzed to enable investigation of this factor. Behavioral and event-related potential data were recorded. Negative cards differed from positive cards and control cards were differentiated from cards involved in inferences. The N2 component differentiated the negative conditions (not-P, not-Q cards) from the positive conditions (P, Q cards). The P3 component was largest for control and P cards (the simpler conditions). The late slow wave tended to show more sustained processing of not-P, not-Q and Q cards and was little influenced by the simpler control and P cards. Effects were interpreted in terms of cognitive complexity. In particular, the negative conditions had a larger N2 response than the positive conditions, reflecting greater cognitive complexity of the former and their sustained processing.

Eye Movements Reveal How Readers Infer Intentions From the Beliefs and Desires of Others.

We examine how the beliefs and desires of a protagonist are used by readers to predict their intentions as a narrative vignette unfolds. Eye movement measures revealed that readers rapidly inferred an intention when the protagonist desired an outcome, even when this inference was not licensed by the protagonist's belief state. Reading was immediately disrupted when participants encountered a described action that contradicted this inference. During intermediate processing, desire inferences were moderated by the protagonist's belief state. Effects that emerged later in the text were again driven solely by the protagonist's desires. These data suggest that desire-based inferences are initially drawn irrespective of belief state, but are then quickly inhibited if not licensed by relevant beliefs. This inhibition of desire-based inferences may be an effortful process as it was not systematically sustained in later steps of processing.