Revision of Antoni Kepinski's concept of information metabolism. / Rewizja koncepcji metabolizmu informacyjnego Antoniego Kepinskiego.

Information metabolism is a key model for describing psychiatric life in the works of a Polish psychiatrist, Antoni Kepinski. Due to the significance of Kepinski's writings on the psychiatric environment in Poland, and also its influence on the cultural life, a significant interpretative trend of this concept was subject to a critical analysis, a trend which relies on identifying information metabolism with the so-called biological model. The biological model is a postulate appearing in Kepinski's writings to describe issues concerning psyche in analogy to the somatic structures of an organism, especially the biology of a cell. This fragment of Kepinski's work was the main reason for his subsequent criticism. This article proves that the concept of information metabolism itself does not include the biological model. Eventually, an example has been provided to show the topicality of the system of Kepinski's information metabolism in relation to the concept of somatic markers of Antonio Damasio.

"[G]azing into the synaptic chasm": the Brain in Beckett's Writing.

This paper argues that Samuel Beckett's interest in functions of the brain is not only evidenced in his notebooks, taken from a number of psychology and psycho-physiognomy texts in the early 1930s, but is also explored and expanded in his fiction and drama. This paper investigates Beckett's fascination with the limits of "cerebral consciousness" and the brain's failure to consciously perceive certain bodily modifications especially when processing emotion. Like Antonio Damasio's definition of emotion as essentially the bodily modifications that include chemical changes, Beckett often exploits the idea of emotion as sorely a bodily phenomenon by creating characters who are unable to consciously perceive and process their emotion. For example, when talking about his own weeping, the narrator of The Unnamable attributes the tears to the malfunctioning of the brain, "liquefied brain", denying, displacing or making physical the feeling of sadness. By examining the ways in which Beckett emphasizes a somatic dimension of emotion and its relation to the brain function and perception in his writing, this paper reveals how he explores the idea of the self and extends the idea to what he calls the "impenetrable self" that cannot be consciously recognized. I argue that if, for Joseph LeDoux, the "notion of synapses as points of communication between cells is […] essential to our efforts to understand who we are in terms of brain mechanisms", for Beckett to expose such unconscious biological mechanisms and "gaps" becomes his own artistic challenge.

Homeostasis y rppresentaciones intelectuales: ua aproximación a la conducta mooral desde la teoría de la emoción de antonio damasio / Homeostasis nd iintellectualrepresentations: an approach to moral behavior based on antonio damasio's theory of emotions / Homostase e reprresntações intelectuais: uma aproximação ao comporrtamento moral a partir da teoria da emoção de antonio damasio

Antonio Damasio elabora una teoría de la mente humana y de la conducta moral a partir de su hipótesis sobre la evolución de los mecanismos de autorregulación biológicos. En ella, a la capacidad para representar relaciones organismo-mundo se le confiere un importante papel en los cambios organizacionales (y, en último término, normativos) que emergen de los sistemas con un sistema nervioso central. Concretamente, en nuestro artículo analizamos, en primer lugar, la tesis acerca de la doble homeostasis biológicamental que caracteriza a los agentes racionales. Desde su perspectiva, la conciencia es producto y manifestación de complejos procesos del procesamiento de representaciones, los cuales favorecen la regulación no consciente. Además, para entender los procesos conscientes también es clave, según Damasio, conocer cómo la evolución de tales mecanismos está asociada con el desarrollo de áreas neuronales próximas al córtex emocional, especialmente, el giro cingulado. Los argumentos que Damasio utiliza para vincular los procesos representacionales con la particular preocupación humana por los sentimientos de los otros (un fenómeno que identifica en el origen de las normas éticas y, en último término, de lo que denomina homeostasis social) es la segunda cuestión que evaluamos.

Antonio Damasio has developeda theory of the human mind and moral conduct based on his hypothesis regarding the evolution of biological self-regulation mechanisms. In it, he affords the ability to represent organism-world relationships an important role in the organizational changes (and, ultimately, in normative or regulatory changes) that emerge from systems with a central nervous system. Specifically, in this article, the authors first analyze the theory of biology-mind dual homeostasis that characterizes rational agents. From that perspective, consciousness is the product and manifestation of complex procedures for processing representations, which favor nonconscious regulation. Moreover, to understand conscious processes Damasio also says it is crucial to know how the evolution of these mechanisms is associated with the development of neural areas near the emotional cortex, especially the cingulate gyrus. The arguments Damasio uses to link representational processes with particular human concern for the feelings of others (a phenomenon that identifies the origin of ethical standards and, ultimately, of what he calls social homeostasis) is the second question the authors evaluate.

Antonio Damasio elabora uma teoria da mente humana e do comportamento moral a partir de suas hipóteses sobre a evolução dos mecanismos de autorregulação biológicos. Nela, à capacidade para representar relações organismo-mundo é conferido um papel importante nas mudanças organizacionais (e, em última análise, normativas) que emergem dos sistemas com um sistema nervoso central. Concretamente, neste artigo, analisa-se, em primeiro lugar, a tese acerca da dupla homeostase biológica-mental que caracteriza os agentes racionais. De acordo com sua perspectiva, a consciência é produto e manifestação de complexos processos do processamento de representações, os quais favorecem a regulação não consciente. Além disso, para entender os processos conscientes, também é chave, segundo Damasio, conhecer como a evolução desses mecanismos está associada com o desenvolvimento de áreas neuronais próximas do córtex emocional, especialmente, do giro cingulado. Os argumentos que Damasio utiliza para vincular os processos representacionais com a particular preocupação humana pelos sentimentos dos outros (um fenômeno que identifica na origem das normas éticas e no que denomina homeostase social) é a segunda questão avaliada.

Alexitimia: dificuldade de expressão ou ausência de sentimento? Uma análise teórica / Alexithymia: difficulty of expression or absence of feeling? A theoretical analysis

O objetivo deste ensaio é apresentar uma base conceitual para diferenciar emoções de sentimentos, a partir das ideias de LeDoux e Damásio, e usar essa base numa abordagem sobre o conceito e as origens da alexitimia, constructo recentemente desenvolvido para retratar a dificuldade de expressar emoções e sentimentos. Nessa abordagem, é questionado se o alexitímico não expressa ou não tem sentimentos. A conclusão deste ensaio é que no alexitímico as emoções ocorrem normalmente, mas os sentimentos, que requerem circuitos cerebrais adicionais em relação aos acionados pelas emoções, não são desenvolvidos de forma adequada. São apresentadas as limitações do trabalho e sugestões para um programa de pesquisa.(AU)

The aim of this essay is to present a conceptual basis to differentiate emotions from feelings, based on LeDoux and Damasio's ideas, and to use this basis for an approach to Alexithymia's concept and origins, a construct recently developed to explain the difficulty of expressing emotions and feelings. In this approach, it is questioned whether alexithymic individuals do not express or do not have feelings. The conclusion of this essay is that emotions occur normally in alexithymic individuals, but that feelings, which require additional brain circuits in relation to those driven by emotions, are not developed properly. Limitations of this work and suggestions for a research program are presented.(AU)

Alexitimia: dificuldade de expressão ou ausência de sentimento? Uma análise teórica / Alexithymia: difficulty of expression or absence of feeling? A theoretical analysis

O objetivo deste ensaio é apresentar uma base conceitual para diferenciar emoções de sentimentos, a partir das ideias de LeDoux e Damásio, e usar essa base numa abordagem sobre o conceito e as origens da alexitimia, constructo recentemente desenvolvido para retratar a dificuldade de expressar emoções e sentimentos. Nessa abordagem, é questionado se o alexitímico não expressa ou não tem sentimentos. A conclusão deste ensaio é que no alexitímico as emoções ocorrem normalmente, mas os sentimentos, que requerem circuitos cerebrais adicionais em relação aos acionados pelas emoções, não são desenvolvidos de forma adequada. São apresentadas as limitações do trabalho e sugestões para um programa de pesquisa.

The aim of this essay is to present a conceptual basis to differentiate emotions from feelings, based on LeDoux and Damasio's ideas, and to use this basis for an approach to Alexithymia's concept and origins, a construct recently developed to explain the difficulty of expressing emotions and feelings. In this approach, it is questioned whether alexithymic individuals do not express or do not have feelings. The conclusion of this essay is that emotions occur normally in alexithymic individuals, but that feelings, which require additional brain circuits in relation to those driven by emotions, are not developed properly. Limitations of this work and suggestions for a research program are presented.