Protocol for the Support Application for Food PAntrieS trial: design, implementation, and evaluation plan for a digital application to promote healthy food access and support food pantry operations.

Introduction: Food-insecure households commonly rely on food pantries to supplement their nutritional needs, a challenge that was underscored during the COVID-19 pandemic. Food pantries, and the food banks that supply them, face common challenges in meeting variable client volume and dietary needs under normal and emergency (e.g., pandemic, natural disaster) conditions. A scalable digital strategy that has the capacity to streamline the emergency food distribution system, while promoting healthy food options, managing volunteer recruitment and training, and connecting to emergency management systems in times of need, is urgently required. To address this gap, we are developing a working mobile application (app) called the Support Application for Food PAntrieS (SAFPAS) and will evaluate its feasibility and impact on food pantry staff preparedness, stocking, and client uptake of healthful foods and beverages in two urban United States settings. Methods: This paper describes the protocol for a randomized controlled trial of the SAFPAS mobile application. We will conduct formative research in Baltimore, Maryland and Detroit, Michigan to develop and refine the SAFPAS app and increase scalability potential to other urban settings. Then we will test the app in 20 food pantries in Baltimore randomized to intervention or comparison. The impact of the app will be evaluated at several levels of the emergency food system, including food pantry clients (n = 360), food pantry staff and volunteers (n = 100), food pantry stock, and city agencies such as the local food bank and Office of Emergency Management. The primary outcome of the SAFPAS trial is to improve the healthfulness of the foods received by food pantry clients, measured using the Food Assessment Scoring Tool (FAST). Post-trial, we will conduct additional formative research in Detroit to prepare the app for scale-up. Discussion: We anticipate that SAFPAS will improve alignment in the supply and demand for healthy foods among food pantry clients, food pantries, and city agencies which supply food in Baltimore. Real-time, bidirectional communication between entities across the system allows for increased situational awareness at all levels during normal and emergency operations. By conducting formative research in Detroit, we hope to increase the scalability of the SAFPAS app to additional settings nationwide. Clinical trial registration: NCT87654321. https://classic.clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT05880004.

A Survey of the Use of Modeling, Simulation, Visualization, and Mapping in Public Health Emergency Operations Centers during the COVID-19 Pandemic.

The COVID-19 pandemic has significantly changed life and work patterns and reshaped the healthcare industry and public health strategies. It posed considerable challenges to public health emergency operations centers (PHEOCs). In this period, digital technologies such as modeling, simulation, visualization, and mapping (MSVM) emerged as vital tools in these centers. Despite their perceived importance, the potential and adaptation of digital tools in PHEOCs remain underexplored. This study investigated the application of MSVM in the PHEOCs during the pandemic in Canada using a questionnaire survey. The results show that digital tools, particularly visualization and mapping, are frequently used in PHEOCs. However, critical gaps, including data management issues, technical and capacity issues, and limitations in the policy-making sphere, still hinder the effective use of these tools. Key areas identified in this study for future investigation include collaboration, interoperability, and various supports for information sharing and capacity building.

The necessity for an integrated Emergency Operations Center (EOC) among first responders: Lesson learned from two Iranian railway accidents.

Introduction: Several train accidents have occurred in Iran in the last twenty years, resulting in considerable loss of human lives. This study aims to investigate and analyze the response process and deficiencies thereof, of three responding organizations to two railway accidents in Iran. Methods: The study was performed in 2 stages to examine the challenges faced by the first responders in the said accidents. In the first stage, a descriptive statistical analysis was conducted to estimate the injuries and loss of human lives. In the second stage, qualitative description (QD) was performed. Technical reports, official documents, and interviews contributed to the sources of primary data. Study participants were members of first responders who were interviewed. Results: The lack of key components like coordination, information-sharing, a single unified command between responders from different organizations, a lack of relief and rescue railway train, and poor inter-organizational interactions in the deployment of relief teams, were found to be the most important challenges. Discussion and conclusion: The analysis of these two accidents showed that the lack of an integrated emergency operations center (EOC) among the organizations involved in the emergency response appears to be the obvious cause of initial confusion and disruption in the response phase which caused a delay which proved fatal. Designing and developing an integrated response plan among responding organizations, preparing an information sharing network, centralized deployment of forces to the site of the accident, strengthening inter-organizational interactions in the form of an incident command system, designing, launching, and using rescue trains on rail routes and use of air emergency facilities in areas with poor accessibility can reduce mortality in future in similar kind of accidents.

The role of polio emergency operations centers: perspectives for future disease control initiatives in Nigeria.

The Nigeria Polio Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) was established in October 2012 to strengthen coordination, provide strategic direction based on real-time data analysis, and manage all operational aspects of the polio eradication program. The establishment of seven state-level polio EOCs followed. With success achieved in the interruption of wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission as certified in 2020, the future direction of the polio EOC is under consideration. This paper describes the role of the polio EOC in other emergencies and perspectives on future disease control initiatives. A description of the functionality and operations of the polio EOC and a review of documentation of non-polio activities supported by the EOC was done. Key informant insights of national and state-level stakeholders were collected through an electronic questionnaire to determine their perspectives on the polio EOC's contributions and its future role in other public health interventions. The polio EOC structure is based on an incident management system with clear terms of reference and accountability and with full partner coordination. A decline in WPV1 cases was observed from 122 cases in 2012 to 0 in 2015; previously undetected transmission of WPV1 was confirmed in 2016 and all transmission was interrupted under the coordination of the EOCs at national and state levels. During 2014-2019, the polio EOC infrastructure and staff expertise were used to investigate and respond to outbreaks of Ebola, measles, yellow fever, and meningitis and to oversee maternal and neonatal tetanus elimination campaigns. The EOC structure at the national and state levels has contributed to the positive achievements in the polio eradication program in Nigeria and further in the coordination of other disease control and emergency response activities. The transition of the polio EOCs and their capacities to support other non-polio programs will contribute to harnessing the country's capacity for effective coordination of public health initiatives and disease outbreaks.

Descriptive epidemiology of poliomyelitis cases due to wild poliovirus type 1 and wild poliovirus type 3 in Nigeria, 2000-2020.

Introduction: in August 2020, the World Health Organization African Region was certified free of wild poliovirus (WPV) when Nigeria became the last African country to interrupt wild poliovirus transmission. The National Polio Emergency Operations Center instituted in 2012 to coordinate and manage Nigerian polio eradication efforts reviewed the epidemiology of WPV cases during 2000-2020 to document lessons learned. Methods: we analyzed reported WPV cases by serotype based on age, oral poliovirus vaccine immunization history, month and year of reported cases, and annual geographic distribution based on incidence rates at the Local Government Area level. The observed trends of cases were related to major events and the poliovirus vaccines used during mass vaccination campaigns within the analysis period. Results: a total of 3,579 WPV type 1 and 1,548 WPV type 3 laboratory-confirmed cases were reported with onset during 2000-2020. The highest WPV incidence rates per 100,000 population in Local Government Areas were 19.4, 12.0, and 11.3, all in 2006. Wild poliovirus cases were reported each year during 2000-2014; the endemic transmission went undetected throughout 2015 until the last cases in 2016. Ten events/milestones were highlighted, including insurgency in the northeast which led to a setback in 2016 with four cases from children previously trapped in security-compromised areas. Conclusion: Nigeria interrupted WPV transmission despite the challenges faced because of the emergency management approach, implementation of mass vaccination campaigns, the commitment of the government agencies, support from global polio partners, and special strategies deployed to conduct vaccination and surveillance in the security-compromised areas.

Establishing a Public Health Emergency Operations Center in an Outbreak-Prone Country: Lessons Learned in Uganda, January 2014 to December 2021.

Uganda is highly vulnerable to public health emergencies (PHEs) due to its geographic location next to the Congo Basin epidemic hot spot, placement within multiple epidemic belts, high population growth rates, and refugee influx. In view of this, Uganda's Ministry of Health established the Public Health Emergency Operations Center (PHEOC) in September 2013, as a central coordination unit for all PHEs in the country. Uganda followed the World Health Organization's framework to establish the PHEOC, including establishing a steering committee, acquiring legal authority, developing emergency response plans, and developing a concept of operations. The same framework governs the PHEOC's daily activities. Between January 2014 and December 2021, Uganda's PHEOC coordinated response to 271 PHEs, hosted 207 emergency coordination meetings, trained all core staff in public health emergency management principles, participated in 21 simulation exercises, coordinated Uganda's Global Health Security Agenda activities, established 6 subnational PHEOCs, and strengthened the capacity of 7 countries in public health emergency management. In this article, we discuss the following lessons learned: PHEOCs are key in PHE coordination and thus mitigate the associated adverse impacts; although the functions of a PHEOC may be legalized by the existence of a National Institute of Public Health, their establishment may precede formally securing the legal framework; staff may learn public health emergency management principles on the job; involvement of leaders and health partners is crucial to the success of a public health emergency management program; subnational PHEOCs are resourceful in mounting regional responses to PHEs; and service on the PHE Strategic Committee may be voluntary.

[COVID-19 emergency operations center: experience of the Rio de Janeiro municipality, BrazilCentro de operaciones de emergencia en respuesta a la COVID-19: la experiencia del municipio de Rio de Janeiro]. / Centro de operações de emergência na COVID-19: a experiência do município do Rio de Janeiro.

The present report describes the implementation of an emergency operations center to coordinate the response to the COVID-19 pandemic in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Following the public health emergency management framework proposed by the World Health Organization (WHO), this temporary center (COE COVID-19 RIO) started operating in January 2021. The report is organized along five themes: legal framework; structure, planning, and procedures; institutional articulation; health information for decision-making; and risk communication. Major advances obtained with the initiative include improvements in governance for the management of COVID-19, increase in the synergy among sectors and institutions, improved information sharing in relation to COVID-19 prevention and control measures, innovation in epidemiologic analyses, and gains in transparency and decision-making opportunities. In conclusion, even if conceived at an advanced stage of the pandemic in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, the COE COVID-19 RIO has played a relevant role in shaping the city's responses to the pandemic. Also, despite its temporary character, the experience will leave a lasting legacy for the management of future public health emergencies in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro.

En el presente artículo se describe la experiencia al establecerse un centro de operaciones de emergencia (COE) para coordinar la respuesta a la pandemia de COVID-19 en el municipio de Rio de Janeiro (Brasil). Siguiendo el modelo de gestión de emergencias de salud pública promovido por la Organización Mundial de la Salud (OMS), este centro temporal se activó en enero del 2021. El informe se estructuró con base en cinco ejes temáticos: marco legal; estructura, planes y procedimientos; articulaciones institucionales; información en materia de salud para sustentar las decisiones; y comunicación sobre riesgos. Entre los principales avances relacionados con esta iniciativa cabe destacar los adelantos en cuanto a la gobernanza para organizar la forma de enfrentar la COVID-19, el aumento de la sinergia entre los sectores y las instituciones correspondientes, un mayor intercambio de información sobre las medidas de prevención y control de la enfermedad, innovación en los análisis epidemiológicos, mayor transparencia en la toma de decisiones y decisiones tomadas de manera más oportuna. Se llegó a la conclusión de que este COE, a pesar de que había sido establecido en una fase avanzada de la pandemia en la ciudad, tuvo un papel importante en la estructuración de la respuesta. Sin embargo, a pesar de su carácter temporal, la experiencia demostró ser un importante legado para enfrentar futuras emergencias de salud pública en el municipio de Rio de Janeiro.

Centro de operações de emergência na COVID-19: a experiência do município do Rio de Janeiro / COVID-19 emergency operations center: experience of the Rio de Janeiro municipality, Brazil / Centro de operaciones de emergencia en respuesta a la COVID-19: la experiencia del municipio de Rio de Janeiro

RESUMO O presente artigo descreve a experiência de implantação de um centro de operações de emergência (COE) para coordenação da resposta à pandemia de COVID-19 no município do Rio de Janeiro, Brasil. Seguindo o modelo de gestão de emergências em saúde pública preconizado pela Organização Mundial da Saúde (OMS), este centro de caráter temporário (COE COVID-19 RIO) foi ativado em janeiro de 2021. O relato foi estruturado com base em cinco eixos temáticos: arcabouço legal; estrutura, planos e procedimentos; articulações institucionais; informações em saúde para apoio decisório; e comunicação de risco. Entre os avanços importantes relacionados ao estabelecimento desta iniciativa, destacaram-se ganhos em governança para a organização do enfrentamento à COVID-19, aumento da sinergia entre setores e instituições, maior compartilhamento de informações em relação às medidas de prevenção e controle da doença, inovação nas análises epidemiológicas e ganhos na transparência e oportunidade na tomada de decisões. Concluiu-se que, mesmo sendo concebido em estágio avançado da pandemia na cidade, o COE COVID-19 RIO teve papel relevante na estruturação da resposta. Ainda, apesar do caráter temporário do COE, a experiência mostrou-se como importante legado para a condução de futuras emergências em saúde pública no município do Rio de Janeiro.

ABSTRACT The present report describes the implementation of an emergency operations center to coordinate the response to the COVID-19 pandemic in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Following the public health emergency management framework proposed by the World Health Organization (WHO), this temporary center (COE COVID-19 RIO) started operating in January 2021. The report is organized along five themes: legal framework; structure, planning, and procedures; institutional articulation; health information for decision-making; and risk communication. Major advances obtained with the initiative include improvements in governance for the management of COVID-19, increase in the synergy among sectors and institutions, improved information sharing in relation to COVID-19 prevention and control measures, innovation in epidemiologic analyses, and gains in transparency and decision-making opportunities. In conclusion, even if conceived at an advanced stage of the pandemic in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, the COE COVID-19 RIO has played a relevant role in shaping the city's responses to the pandemic. Also, despite its temporary character, the experience will leave a lasting legacy for the management of future public health emergencies in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro.

RESUMEN En el presente artículo se describe la experiencia al establecerse un centro de operaciones de emergencia (COE) para coordinar la respuesta a la pandemia de COVID-19 en el municipio de Rio de Janeiro (Brasil). Siguiendo el modelo de gestión de emergencias de salud pública promovido por la Organización Mundial de la Salud (OMS), este centro temporal se activó en enero del 2021. El informe se estructuró con base en cinco ejes temáticos: marco legal; estructura, planes y procedimientos; articulaciones institucionales; información en materia de salud para sustentar las decisiones; y comunicación sobre riesgos. Entre los principales avances relacionados con esta iniciativa cabe destacar los adelantos en cuanto a la gobernanza para organizar la forma de enfrentar la COVID-19, el aumento de la sinergia entre los sectores y las instituciones correspondientes, un mayor intercambio de información sobre las medidas de prevención y control de la enfermedad, innovación en los análisis epidemiológicos, mayor transparencia en la toma de decisiones y decisiones tomadas de manera más oportuna. Se llegó a la conclusión de que este COE, a pesar de que había sido establecido en una fase avanzada de la pandemia en la ciudad, tuvo un papel importante en la estructuración de la respuesta. Sin embargo, a pesar de su carácter temporal, la experiencia demostró ser un importante legado para enfrentar futuras emergencias de salud pública en el municipio de Rio de Janeiro.

Experience and practice of the Emergency Operations Center, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention: a case study of response to the H7N9 outbreak.

BACKGROUND: Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is a place to provide response to public health emergencies. Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC)'s EOC was officially established in 2016, which has been the core department for the public health emergencies and risk response. In recent years, we have been continuously improving the function of EOC through many incidents. In the study, we hope to share the construction status, operation management experience of China CDC's EOC and the response process in the human avian influenza A (H7N9) outbreak. MAIN TEXT: The China CDC's EOC mainly focus on building the five core elements including sites/places and facilities, information and data, plans and procedures, training and exercises, and logistics. Based on summarizing previous emergency response, the China CDC's EOC established its own incident management and the standardized response procedures. The event-specific data, context-specific data and event management data could be obtained through various source. The logistics department of the EOC also provides comprehensive support. The well-trained staff is another necessary conditions for its operation. Through sharing the response process of H7N9 outbreak, it further explains the EOC's functions in the five phases of outbreak response, such as the formulation of the incident response framework, monitoring, personnel dispatch and resource mobilization. CONCLUSIONS: The EOC contributes to faster and more efficient responses during emergencies which enable a greater reduction in morbidity and mortality. Compared with the traditional incident response process, under the command and coordination of China CDC's EOC, each group involved in the response has a clearer goal, responsibilities and tasks at each stage. Meanwhile, each group also gave full play to its own expertise and advantages. As a whole, incident response tended to be more specialized and precise, which generally improves the efficiency of incident response. However, different countries and regions have different response processes to the events. We still suggested that appropriate emergency operation plan should be made according to the complexity of incident response in the region when constructing response mechanism, through our experience. And the China CDC's EOC is still at growing and groping phase.

Evaluation of Oklahoma's Electronic Death Registration System and Event Fatality Markers for Disaster-Related Mortality Surveillance - Oklahoma USA, May 2013.

INTRODUCTION: Official counts of deaths attributed to disasters are often under-reported, thus adversely affecting public health messaging designed to prevent further mortality. During the Oklahoma (USA) May 2013 tornadoes, Oklahoma State Health Department Division of Vital Records (VR; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma USA) piloted a flagging procedure to track tornado-attributed deaths within its Electronic Death Registration System (EDRS). To determine if the EDRS was capturing all tornado-attributed deaths, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC; Atlanta, Georgia USA) evaluated three event fatality markers (EFM), which are used to collate information about deaths for immediate response and retrospective research efforts. METHODS: Oklahoma identified 48 tornado-attributed deaths through a retrospective review of hospital morbidity and mortality records. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC; Atlanta, Georgia USA) analyzed the sensitivity, timeliness, and validity for three EFMs, which included: (1) a tornado-specific flag on the death record; (2) a tornado-related term in the death certificate; and (3) X37, the International Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision (ICD-10) code in the death record for Victim of a Cataclysmic Storm, which includes tornadoes. RESULTS: The flag was the most sensitive EFM (89.6%; 43/48), followed by the tornado term (75.0%; 36/48), and the X37 code (56.2%; 27/48). The most-timely EFM was the flag, which took 2.0 median days to report (range 0-10 days), followed by the tornado term (median 3.5 days; range 1-21), and the X37 code (median >10 days; range 2-122). Over one-half (52.1%; 25/48) of the tornado-attributed deaths were missing at least one EFM. Twenty-six percent (11/43) of flagged records had no tornado term, and 44.1% (19/43) had no X37 code. Eleven percent (4/36) of records with a tornado term did not have a flag. CONCLUSION: The tornado-specific flag was the most sensitive and timely EFM. Using the flag to collate death records and identify additional deaths without the tornado term and X37 code may improve immediate response and retrospective investigations. Moreover, each of the EFMs can serve as quality controls for the others to maximize capture of all disaster-attributed deaths from vital statistics records in the EDRS.Issa AN, Baker K, Pate D, Law R, Bayleyegn T, Noe RS. Evaluation of Oklahoma's Electronic Death Registration System and event fatality markers for disaster-related mortality surveillance - Oklahoma USA, May 2013. Prehosp Disaster Med. 2019;34(2):125-131.

Processo de priorização de ocorrências no serviço de atendimento móvel de urgência / Processo de priorización de ocurrencias en el servicio de atención móvil de urgencias / Process of priorization of occurrences in the mobile emergency service

Objetivo identificar características das ocorrências priorizadas pela Central de Regulação do Serviço de Atendimento Móvel de Urgência de uma grande metrópole e compreender quais fatores influenciam os médicos reguladores no processo de priorização de despacho de ambulância. Método estudo retrospectivo com métodos mistos, entre 2012 e 2014. As variáveis despacho e tempo de regulação foram investigadas. As entrevistas realizadas foram submetidas à análise de conteúdo. Resultados a demanda é majoritariamente clínica, classificada com Determinantes de alta prioridade e prioritariamente dos serviços de segurança pública. O tempo resposta é inversamente proporcional à prioridade. Médicos priorizam casos com: risco de morte; deterioração clínica; necessidade de transporte; vulnerabilidade associada à idade e violência. Conclusão condições clínicas, vulnerabilidade e risco determinam o tipo de atendimentos e o tempo de resposta. Diante de um cenário de poucos recursos, a atuação dos médicos reguladores no processo de priorização visa adequar a demanda à oferta disponível.

Objetivo identificar características de las ocurrencias priorizadas por el Centro Regulador del Servicio de Atención Móvil de Urgencias de una gran metrópolis y comprender cuales factores influyen en los médicos reguladores en el proceso de priorización de despacho de ambulancia. Método estudio retrospectivo con métodos mistos, entre 2012 y 2014. Las variables despacho y tiempo de regulación fueron investigadas. Las entrevistas realizadas fueron sometidas al análisis de contenido. Resultados la demanda es principalmente clínica, clasificada con Determinantes de alta prioridad y prioritariamente de los servicios de seguridad pública. El tiempo de respuesta es inversamente proporcional a la prioridad. Médicos priorizan casos con: riesgo de muerte; deterioro clínico; necesidad de trasporte; vulnerabilidad asociada al edad y violencia. Conclusión condiciones clínicas, vulnerabilidad y riesgo determinan el tipo de atención y el tiempo de respuesta. Ante un escenario de pocos recursos, la actuación de los médicos reguladores en el proceso de priorización visa adecuar la demanda a la oferta disponible.

Objective identify characteristics of the events prioritized by the Regulation Office of the Mobile Emergency Care Service in a major city and understand which factors influence the regulating physicians in the ambulance dispatch prioritization process. Method retrospective study with a mixed-methods design, undertaken between 2012 and 2014. The variables dispatch and regulation time were investigated. The interviews held were submitted to content analysis. Results the nature of the demand is mainly clinical, classified with high-priority determinants, mainly from public safety services. The response time is inversely proportional to the priority. Physicians prioritize cases with: risk of death; clinical deterioration; need for transport; vulnerability associated with age and violence. Conclusion clinical conditions, vulnerability and risk determine the type of care and the response time. In a scenario of few resources, the regulating physicians' activities in the prioritization process is intended to adapt the demand to the available supply.

Sustainable Model for Public Health Emergency Operations Centers for Global Settings.

Capacity to receive, verify, analyze, assess, and investigate public health events is essential for epidemic intelligence. Public health Emergency Operations Centers (PHEOCs) can be epidemic intelligence hubs by 1) having the capacity to receive, analyze, and visualize multiple data streams, including surveillance and 2) maintaining a trained workforce that can analyze and interpret data from real-time emerging events. Such PHEOCs could be physically located within a ministry of health epidemiology, surveillance, or equivalent department rather than exist as a stand-alone space and serve as operational hubs during nonoutbreak times but in emergencies can scale up according to the traditional Incident Command System structure.

A 3-year Health Care Coalition Experience in Advancing Hospital Evacuation Preparedness.

This report outlines a 3-year health care coalition effort to advance and test community capacity for a large-scale hospital evacuation. The multi-year effort utilized a variety workshops, seminars, webinars, tabletops, functional exercises, and culminated with a full-scale exercise testing hospital evacuation. While most hospital evacuation exercises focus on internal movement of patients, this exercise process tested command-level decision making and it tested external partners such as transportation agencies, law enforcement, receiving hospitals, and local emergency management. This process delivered key coalition-building activities and offered a variety of training and exercise opportunities to assist a number of organizations, all at different stages of hospital evacuation planning. The 2012 Hospital Preparedness Program outlined the incorporation of health care coalition activities to transform individual organization preparedness to community-level readiness. This report outlines a health care coalition effort to deliver training and exercises to advance community capacity for a large-scale hospital evacuation. Lowe JJ , Hansen KF , Sanger KK , Obaid JM . A 3-year health care coalition experience in advancing hospital evacuation preparedness. Prehosp Disaster Med. 2016;31(6):658-662.

Analysis of good practice of public health Emergency Operations Centers.

OBJECTIVE: To study the public health Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs)in the US, the European Union, the UK and Australia, and summarize the good practice for the improvement of National Health Emergency Response Command Center in Chinese National Health and Family Planning Commission. METHODS: Literature review was conducted to explore the EOCs of selected countries. RESULTS: The study focused on EOC function, organizational structure, human resources and information management. The selected EOCs had the basic EOC functions of coordinating and commanding as well as the public health related functions such as monitoring the situation, risk assessment, and epidemiological briefings. The organizational structures of the EOCs were standardized, scalable and flexible. Incident Command System was the widely applied organizational structure with a strong preference. The EOCs were managed by a unit of emergency management during routine time and surge staff were engaged upon emergencies. The selected EOCs had clear information management framework including information collection, assessment and dissemination. CONCLUSIONS: The performance of National Health Emergency Response Command Center can be improved by learning from the good practice of the selected EOCs, including setting clear functions, standardizing the organizational structure, enhancing the human resource capacity and strengthening information management.

Analysis of good practice of public health Emergency Operations Centers

Objective: To study the public health Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs)in the US, the European Union, the UK and Australia, and summarize the good practice for the improvement of National Health Emergency Response Command Center in Chinese National Health and Family Planning Commission. Methods: Literature review was conducted to explore the EOCs of selected countries. Results: The study focused on EOC function, organizational structure, human resources and information management. The selected EOCs had the basic EOC functions of coordinating and commanding as well as the public health related functions such as monitoring the situation, risk assessment, and epidemiological briefings. The organizational structures of the EOCs were standardized, scalable and flexible. Incident Command System was the widely applied organizational structure with a strong preference. The EOCs were managed by a unit of emergency management during routine time and surge staff were engaged upon emergencies. The selected EOCs had clear information management framework including information collection, assessment and dissemination. Conclusions: The performance of National Health Emergency Response Command Center can be improved by learning from the good practice of the selected EOCs, including setting clear functions, standardizing the organizational structure, enhancing the human resource capacity and strengthening information management.

Analysis of good practice of Public Health Emergency Operations Centers

Objective:To study the public health Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs)in the US, the European Union, the UK and Australia, and summarize the good practice for the improvement of National Health Emergency Response Command Center in Chinese National Health and Family Planning Commission.Methods:Literature review was conducted to explore the EOCs of selected countries.Results:The study focused on EOC function, organizational structure, human resources and information management. The selected EOCs had the basic EOC functions of coordinating and commanding as well as the public health related functions such as monitoring the situation, risk assessment, and epidemiological briefings. The organizational structures of the EOCs were standardized, scalable and flexible. Incident Command System was the widely applied organizational structure with a strong preference. The EOCs were managed by a unit of emergency management during routine time and surge staff were engaged upon emergencies. The selected EOCs had clear information management framework including information collection, assessment and dissemination.Conclusions:The performance of National Health Emergency Response Command Center can be improved by learning from the good practice of the selected EOCs, including setting clear functions, standardizing the organizational structure, enhancing the human resource capacity and strengthening information management.

Analysis of good practice of public health Emergency Operations Centers

OBJECTIVE@#To study the public health Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs)in the US, the European Union, the UK and Australia, and summarize the good practice for the improvement of National Health Emergency Response Command Center in Chinese National Health and Family Planning Commission.@*METHODS@#Literature review was conducted to explore the EOCs of selected countries.@*RESULTS@#The study focused on EOC function, organizational structure, human resources and information management. The selected EOCs had the basic EOC functions of coordinating and commanding as well as the public health related functions such as monitoring the situation, risk assessment, and epidemiological briefings. The organizational structures of the EOCs were standardized, scalable and flexible. Incident Command System was the widely applied organizational structure with a strong preference. The EOCs were managed by a unit of emergency management during routine time and surge staff were engaged upon emergencies. The selected EOCs had clear information management framework including information collection, assessment and dissemination.@*CONCLUSIONS@#The performance of National Health Emergency Response Command Center can be improved by learning from the good practice of the selected EOCs, including setting clear functions, standardizing the organizational structure, enhancing the human resource capacity and strengthening information management.

Addressing the gap between public health emergency planning and incident response: Lessons learned from the 2009 H1N1 outbreak in San Diego County.

Objectives: Since 9/11, Incident Command System (ICS) and Emergency Operations Center (EOC) are relatively new concepts to public health, which typically operates using less hierarchical and more collaborative approaches to organizing staff. This paper describes the 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak in San Diego County to explore the use of ICS and EOC in public health emergency response. Methods: This study was conducted using critical case study methodology consisting of document review and 18 key-informant interviews with individuals who played key roles in planning and response. Thematic analysis was used to analyze data. Results: Several broad elements emerged as key to ensuring effective and efficient public health response: 1) developing a plan for emergency response; 2) establishing the framework for an ICS; 3) creating the infrastructure to support response; 4) supporting a workforce trained on emergency response roles, responsibilities, and equipment; and 5) conducting regular preparedness exercises. Conclusions: This research demonstrates the value of investments made and that effective emergency preparedness requires sustained efforts to maintain personnel and material resources. By having the infrastructure and experience based on ICS and EOC, the public health system had the capability to surge-up: to expand its day-to-day operation in a systematic and prolonged manner. None of these critical actions are possible without sustained funding for the public health infrastructure. Ultimately, this case study illustrates the importance of public health as a key leader in emergency response.