The effects of awe on interpersonal forgiveness: the mediating role of small-self.

Awe could increase prosocial behavior, but little is known about its effects on interpersonal forgiveness. This study aims to explore the potential impact of awe on interpersonal forgiveness and the underlying mechanism of this process, using a combination of questionnaires, economic game and computational modeling. In Study 1, we utilized Trait Awe Scale (TAS) and Forgiveness Trait Scale (FTS) to examine the association between trait awe and trait forgiveness. In Study 2, we employed pre-screened video to induce awe, happy and neutral emotions, then evaluated the effects of induced awe on small-self and interpersonal forgiveness in hypothetical interpersonal offensive situations (Study 2a) and two economic interaction situations (Study 2b). Results from Study 1 indicate that there is a positive correlation between trait awe and trait forgiveness. Study 2 reveal that awe can enhance interpersonal forgiveness in both interpersonal conflict situations and economic interaction situations, and this effect is mediated by the sense of small-self elicited by awe. Overall, these findings contribute to our understanding of the potential impact of awe on interpersonal forgiveness and provide valuable insights into the mechanisms through which awe may influence forgiveness. Further research in this area could help to elucidate the potential applications of awe-based interventions in promoting forgiveness and positive social interactions.

The links between physical activity and prosocial behavior: an fNIRS hyperscanning study.

The prevalence of physically inactive lifestyles in modern society raises concerns about the potential association with poor brain health, particularly in the lateral prefrontal cortex, which is crucial for human prosocial behavior. Here, we explored the relationship between physical activity and prosocial behavior, focusing on potential neural markers, including intra-brain functional connectivity and inter-brain synchrony in the lateral prefrontal cortex. Forty participants, each paired with a stranger, completed two experimental conditions in a randomized order: (i) face-to-face and (ii) face stimulus (eye-to-eye contact with a face stimulus of a fictitious person displayed on the screen). Following each condition, participants played economic games with either their partner or an assumed person displayed on the screen. Neural activity in the lateral prefrontal cortex was recorded by functional near-infrared spectroscopy hyperscanning. Sparse multiset canonical correlation analysis showed that a physically inactive lifestyle was covaried with poorer reciprocity, greater trust, shorter decision-making time, and weaker intra-brain connectivity in the dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex and poorer inter-brain synchrony in the ventral lateral prefrontal cortex. These associations were observed exclusively in the face-to-face condition. Our findings suggest that a physically inactive lifestyle may alter human prosocial behavior by impairing adaptable prosocial decision-making in response to social factors through altered intra-brain functional connectivity and inter-brain synchrony.

Energy-Efficient Data Transmission for Underwater Wireless Sensor Networks: A Novel Hierarchical Underwater Wireless Sensor Transmission Framework.

The complexity of the underwater environment enables significant energy consumption of sensor nodes for communication with base stations in underwater wireless sensor networks (UWSNs), and the energy consumption of nodes in different water depths is unbalanced. How to improve the energy efficiency of sensor nodes and meanwhile balance the energy consumption of nodes in different water depths in UWSNs are thus urgent concerns. Therefore, in this paper, we first propose a novel hierarchical underwater wireless sensor transmission (HUWST) framework. We then propose a game-based, energy-efficient underwater communication mechanism in the presented HUWST. It improves the energy efficiency of the underwater sensors personalized according to the various water depth layers of sensor locations. In particular, we integrate the economic game theory in our mechanism to trade off variations in communication energy consumption due to sensors in different water depth layers. Mathematically, the optimal mechanism is formulated as a complex nonlinear integer programming (NIP) problem. A new energy-efficient distributed data transmission mode decision algorithm (E-DDTMD) based on the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) is thus further proposed to tackle this sophisticated NIP problem. The systematic simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of our mechanism in improving the energy efficiency of UWSNs. Moreover, our presented E-DDTMD algorithm achieves significantly superior performance to the baseline schemes.

Association between arginine vasopressin receptor 1A (AVPR1A) polymorphism and inequity aversion.

Although numerous studies have focused on brain functions related to inequity aversion, few have examined its genetic basis. Here, we show the association between estimated inequity aversion and polymorphisms in three genes associated with human sociality. Non-student adult participants took part in five economic game experiments on different days. Disadvantageous inequity aversion (DIA) and advantageous inequity aversion (AIA) were calculated from behavioural responses using Bayesian estimation. We investigated the association between genetic polymorphisms in the oxytocin receptor (OXTR rs53576), arginine vasopressin receptor 1A (AVPR1A RS3) and opioid receptor mu 1 (OPRM1 rs1799971) and inequity aversion. Regarding AVPR1A RS3, participants with the SS genotype had higher AIA than those with the SL or LL genotypes, but no association was found for DIA. Moreover, we observed no aversion associations for OXTR rs53576 or OPRM1 rs1799971. The results suggest that AVPR1A plays an important role in aversion when one's own gain is greater than that of others. Our findings may provide a solid theoretical basis for future studies on the relationship between genetic polymorphisms and inequity aversion.

Right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex regulates default prosociality preference.

The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex has been shown to be associated with prosocial behavior. However, the direction of this relationship remains controversial. To resolve inconsistencies in the existing literature, we introduced the concept of default prosociality preference and hypothesized that this preference moderates the relationship between gray matter volume in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and prosocial behavior. This study analyzed the data of 168 participants obtained from voxel-based morphometry, 4 types of economic games, and 3 different measures of social value orientation that represent default prosociality preference. Here we show that, in individuals who were consistently classified as proself on the 3 social value orientation measures, gray matter volume in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was positively associated with prosocial behavior. However, in individuals who were consistently classified as prosocial, the direction of this association was vice versa. These results indicate that the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex regulates default prosociality preference.

Association Between Polymorphism (5-HTTLPR) of the Serotonin Transporter Gene and Behavioral Response to Unfair Distribution.

Behavioral responses to unfair distribution have been measured mainly using the Ultimatum Game (UG). Recent studies examining the biological basis of behavioral responses to unfair distribution have focused attention on the role of the serotonin transporter gene. However, studies, to date, have been conducted on non-Asians, and it has not been confirmed whether similar results can be seen in other ethnic groups. It has also been shown that behavioral responses to unfair distribution are not only seen in the case of victims themselves but also in the case of third parties not directly affected. This study aimed to determine whether the results of the previous study would be replicated in an Asian population and whether the serotonin transporter gene would also be associated with behavior toward unfair distribution by third parties. We examined the association between polymorphisms (5-HTTLPR) of the serotonin transporter gene and participants' behavior in the UG and the third-party punishment game (TPPG). The results did not show an association between punishment for unfair proposals in the TPPG and genetic polymorphisms, while participants with the SL/LL genotype were more likely to reject unfair offers in the UG than those with the SS genotype. These results indicate that 5-HTTLPR is associated with behavior when unfair intentions are directed at oneself.

Direct feedback and social conformity promote behavioral change via mechanisms indexed by centroparietal positivity: Electrophysiological evidence from a role-swapping ultimatum game.

Our behavior is shaped by multiple factors, including direct feedback (seeing the outcomes of our past actions) and social observation (in part, via a drive to conform to other peoples' behaviors). However, it remains unclear how these two processes are linked in the context of behavioral change. This is important to investigate, as behavioral change is associated with distinct neural correlates that reflect specific aspects of processing, such as information integration and rule updating. To clarify whether these processes characterize both direct learning and conformity, we elicited the two within the same task, using a role-swapping version of the Ultimatum Game-a fairness paradigm where subjects decide how to share a pot of money with other players-while electroencephalography (EEG) data were recorded. Behavioral results showed that subjects decided how to divide the pot based on both direct feedback (seeing whether their past proposals were accepted or rejected) and social observation (copying the splits that others just proposed). Converging EEG evidence revealed that increased centroparietal positivity (P2, P3b, and late positivity) indexed behavioral changes motivated by direct feedback and those motivated by drives to conform. However, exploratory analyses also suggest that these two motivating factors may also be dissociable, and that frontal midline theta oscillations may predict behavioral changes linked to direct feedback but not conformity. Overall, this study provides novel electrophysiological evidence regarding the different forms of behavioral change. These findings are also relevant for understanding the mechanisms of social information processing that underlie successful cooperation.

Anything for a cheerio: Brown capuchins (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) consistently coordinate in an Assurance Game for unequal payoffs.

Unequal outcomes disrupt cooperation in some situations, but this has not been tested in the context of coordination in economic games. To explore this, we tested brown capuchins (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) on a manual version of the Stag Hunt (or Assurance) Game, in which individuals sequentially chose between two options, Stag or Hare, and were rewarded according to their choices and that of their partner. Typically, coordination on Stag results in an equal highest payout, whereas coordinating on Hare results in a guaranteed equal but lower payoff and uncoordinated play results in the lowest payoff when playing Stag. We varied this structure such that one capuchin received double the rewards for the coordinated Stag outcome; thus, it was still both animals' best option, but no longer equally rewarding. Despite the inequality, capuchins coordinated on Stag in 78% of trials, and neither payoff structure nor their partner's choice impacted their decision. Additionally, there was no relationship between self-scratching, a measure of stress in capuchins, and choices. After completing the study, we discovered our reward, cheerios, was sufficiently valuable that in another study, capuchins never refused it, so post hoc we repeated the study using a lower value reward, banana flavored pellets. Capuchins completed only 26% of the pellet trials (compared to 98% with cheerios), constraining our ability to interpret the results, but nonetheless the monkeys showed a decrease in preference for Stag, particularly when they received fewer rewards for the coordinated Stag outcome. These results reinforce capuchins' ability to find coordinated outcomes in the Stag Hunt game, but more work is needed to determine whether the monkeys did not mind the inequality or were unwilling to sacrifice a highly preferred food to rectify it. In either case, researchers should carefully consider the impact of their chosen rewards on subjects' choices.

Association of Polymorphism of Arginine-Vasopressin Receptor 1A (AVPR1a) Gene With Trust and Reciprocity.

Oxytocin (OXT) is known to play an important role in trust, whereas the involvement of other peptide hormones has not been evaluated. In this study, we focused on microsatellite polymorphisms in the intron of the arginine-vasopressin receptor 1a (AVPR1a) gene and examined whether the association between the repeat lengths in the intron of AVPR1a is associated with trust and reciprocity in humans. Four-hundred and thirty-three participants played the trust game, answered the attitudinal trust question, and their buccal cells were collected. Results showed that men with a short form of AVPR1a tend to send more money to the opponent, even if there is a possibility of being betrayed by the opponent. Additionally, people with a short form of AVPR1a tended to return money to the opponent who trusts them. However, attitudinal trust was not associated with AVPR1a. These results indicate that arginine-vasopressin receptor 1a plays an important role in trust and reciprocal behaviors.

Heart versus head: Differential bodily feedback causally alters economic decision-making.

Metaphorically, altruistic acts, such as monetary donations, are said to be driven by the heart, whereas sound financial investments are guided by reason, embodied by the head. In a unique experiment, we tested the effects of these bodily metaphors using biofeedback and an incentivized economic decision-making paradigm. Participants played a repeated investment game with a simulated partner, alternating between tactical investor and altruistic investee. When making decisions, participants received counterbalanced visual feedback from their own or a simulated partner's heart or head, as well as no feedback. As investor, participants transferred a greater proportion of their endowments when exposed to visual feedback from their own head than to feedback from their own heart or no feedback at all. These effects were not observed when the source of the feedback was the simulated partner. As investee, heart feedback predicted greater altruistic returns than head or no feedback, but this effect did not differ based on source (own vs partner). Consistent with a dual-process framework, we suggest that people may be encouraged to invest more or be more altruistic when receiving bodily feedback from conceptually diametric sources.

Pupil mimicry and trust - Implication for depression.

Individuals suffering from depression often have difficulty trusting others. Previous research has shown a relationship between trust formation and pupil mimicry - the synchronization of pupil sizes between individuals. The current study therefore examined whether pupil mimicry is weaker in depressed individuals and an underlying factor of their low levels of trust. Forty-two patients with major depressive disorder (MDD) and 40 healthy control subjects played trust games with virtual partners. Images of these partners' eye regions were presented to participants before they had to make a monetary investment decision. Partners' pupils either dilated, constricted, or remained static over the course of 4-s interactions. During the task, participants' pupil sizes were recorded with eye-tracking equipment to assess mimicry. The results confirm that patients with MDD were somewhat less trusting than controls and used another's pupillary cues differently when deciding to trust. Specifically, whereas healthy controls trusted partners with dilating pupils more than partners with constricting pupils, patients with MDD particularly trusted partners whose pupils changed in size less, regardless of whether partners' pupils were dilating or constricting. This difference in investment behavior was unrelated to differences in pupil mimicry, which was equally apparent in both groups and fostered trust to the same extent. Whereas lower levels of trust observed in patients with MDD could not be explained by differences in pupil mimicry, our data show that pupil dilation mimicry might help people to trust. These findings provide further evidence for the important role of pupil size and pupil mimicry in interpersonal trust formation and shed light on the pathophysiology of clinically low trust in patients with MDD.

Response time in economic games reflects different types of decision conflict for prosocial and proself individuals.

Behavioral and neuroscientific studies explore two pathways through which internalized social norms promote prosocial behavior. One pathway involves internal control of impulsive selfishness, and the other involves emotion-based prosocial preferences that are translated into behavior when they evade cognitive control for pursuing self-interest. We measured 443 participants' overall prosocial behavior in four economic games. Participants' predispositions [social value orientation (SVO)] were more strongly reflected in their overall game behavior when they made decisions quickly than when they spent a longer time. Prosocially (or selfishly) predisposed participants behaved less prosocially (or less selfishly) when they spent more time in decision making, such that their SVO prosociality yielded limited effects in actual behavior in their slow decisions. The increase (or decrease) in slower decision makers was prominent among consistent prosocials (or proselfs) whose strong preference for prosocial (or proself) goals would make it less likely to experience conflict between prosocial and proself goals. The strong effect of RT on behavior in consistent prosocials (or proselfs) suggests that conflict between prosocial and selfish goals alone is not responsible for slow decisions. Specifically, we found that contemplation of the risk of being exploited by others (social risk aversion) was partly responsible for making consistent prosocials (but not consistent proselfs) spend longer time in decision making and behave less prosocially. Conflict between means rather than between goals (immediate versus strategic pursuit of self-interest) was suggested to be responsible for the time-related increase in consistent proselfs' prosocial behavior. The findings of this study are generally in favor of the intuitive cooperation model of prosocial behavior.

Pupil-mimicry conditions trust in partners: moderation by oxytocin and group membership.

Across species, oxytocin, an evolutionarily ancient neuropeptide, facilitates social communication by attuning individuals to conspecifics' social signals, fostering trust and bonding. The eyes have an important signalling function; and humans use their salient and communicative eyes to intentionally and unintentionally send social signals to others, by contracting the muscles around their eyes and pupils. In our earlier research, we observed that interaction partners with dilating pupils are trusted more than partners with constricting pupils. But over and beyond this effect, we found that the pupil sizes of partners synchronize and that when pupils synchronously dilate, trust is further boosted. Critically, this linkage between mimicry and trust was bound to interactions between ingroup members. The current study investigates whether these findings are modulated by oxytocin and sex of participant and partner. Using incentivized trust games with partners from ingroup and outgroup whose pupils dilated, remained static or constricted, this study replicates our earlier findings. It further reveals that (i) male participants withhold trust from partners with constricting pupils and extend trust to partners with dilating pupils, especially when given oxytocin rather than placebo; (ii) female participants trust partners with dilating pupils most, but this effect is blunted under oxytocin; (iii) under oxytocin rather than placebo, pupil dilation mimicry is weaker and pupil constriction mimicry stronger; and (iv) the link between pupil constriction mimicry and distrust observed under placebo disappears under oxytocin. We suggest that pupil-contingent trust is parochial and evolved in social species in and because of group life.

Autism does not limit strategic thinking in the "beauty contest" game.

A popular hypothesis in developmental psychology is that individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have a specific impairment or developmental delay in their ability to reason about other people's mental processes, especially when this reasoning process is of a higher-order, recursive, or nested variety. One type of interpersonal interaction that involves this sort of complex reasoning about others' minds is an economic game, and because economic games have been extensively modeled in behavioral economics, they provide a unique testbed for a quantitative and precise analysis of cognitive functioning in ASD. This study specifically asked whether ASD is associated with strategic depth in the economic game known as The Beauty Contest, in which all players submit a number from 0 to 100, and the winner is the player who submits the number closest to 2/3 of the mean of all numbers submitted. Unexpectedly, the distribution of responses among adult participants with ASD reflected a level of strategic reasoning at least as deep as that of their neurotypical peers, with the same proportion of participants with ASD being characterized as "higher order" strategic players. Thus, whatever mentalistic reasoning abilities are necessary for typical performance in the context of this economic game appear to be largely intact, and therefore unlikely to be fundamental to persistent social dysfunction in ASD.

Tomada de decisão no sharing game: um estudo exploratório sobre o efeito de variáveis contextuais / Decision making in the sharing game: an exploratory study on the effect of contextual variables / Toma de decisiones en el sharing game: un estudio exploratorio sobre el efecto de variables contextuales

O Sharing Game é um jogo econômico que estuda as motivações envolvidas na distribuição de recursos. O participante deve escolher, em uma série de tentativas, entre duas opções com uma quantidade de recursos para ele e para outro participante passivo. Nestas opções, a diferença entre os recursos dos participantes é sempre a mesma, mas em uma delas - opção ótima - o distribuidor recebe mais e o outro participante mais ainda, e em outra - opção não ótima - o distribuidor recebe menos e o outro menos ainda. A partir das escolhas dos participantes, é averiguado quantos foram otimizadores, igualitários e competitivos. O objetivo deste trabalho foi investigar o Sharing Game em diversos contextos. Foram realizadas sete condições (n=233) com estudantes universitários recrutados por conveniência. As condições envolveram ganho e perda de recurso, dinheiro hipotético e real, distribuição de tempo e informação prévia sobre o receptor. A porcentagem de escolhas ótimas em cada condição foi calculada e os participantes foram classificados em uma das três categorias apresentadas. Em todas as condições, a maioria das escolhas do distribuidor balanceou seus recursos com os do receptor. Nas condições em que o receptor já começava o jogo com pontos, houve uma maior frequência de escolhas competitivas. A frequência de escolhas ótimas foi maior na condição Ganho de Dinheiro Real, As escolhas igualitárias foram mais frequentes na condição Tempo para realizar uma Tarefa Tediosa. Variações na distrbuição das escolhas demonstram que o Sharing Game é sensível à situação em que é jogado...

The Sharing Game, an economic game, studies the motivations involved in resources allocation. The participant faces several trials in which he must choose between two options, both with an amount of resources for him and for other passive participant. On these two options, the difference between the participants' resources is always the same, but in one of them - optimal option - the distributor receives more and the receiver even more, and in another - non optimal option - the distributor receives less and the other even less. From their choice, participants may be classified as optimizers, egalitarians or competitives. The objective of this study was to provide different contexts for the Sharing Game and investigate their effects. Seven conditions (n=233) were conducted with university students recruited by convenience. Conditions involved gain and loss of resource, real and hypothetical money, distribution of time and prior information about the receiver. The percentage of optimal choices in each condition was calculated and the participants were classified into one of those three categories accordingly. In all conditions, most choices of the distributor balanced their resources with the receiver. In conditions where the receiver has already started the game with points, there was a higher frequency of competitive choices. The frequency of optimal choices was higher in the condition Sharing Real Money. The egalitarian choices were more frequent in the condition Sharing Time to perform a Tedious Task. Variations in the choices distribution demonstrate that the Sharing Game is sensitive to the situation in which it is played...

El Sharing Game es un juego económico que estudia las motivaciones que intervienen en la distribución de los recursos. El participante debe elegir, en una serie de intentos, entre dos opciones que ofrecen recursos para él y otro participante pasivo. La diferencia entre los recursos de los participantes es siempre la misma, pero en uno de ellas - opción optimizada - el distribuidor recibe más y otro participante más aún, y en la otra - opción no optimizada - el distribuidor recibe menos y el otro menos. Desde de sus elecciones, se averigua cuántos eran los optimizadores, igualitarias y competitivos. Este estudio investigó el Sharing Game en diferentes contextos. Fueran realizadas siete condiciones con estudiantes universitarios (n =233). Las condiciones implican la ganancia y la pérdida de recursos, el dinero hipotético y real, la distribución del tiempo y de la información previa sobre el receptor. Se calculó el porcentaje de decisiones óptimas en cada condición y los participantes fueron clasificados en una de tres categorías presentadas. En todas las condiciones, la mayoría de los dispensadores balancearán sus recursos con el receptor. En condiciones en las que el receptor estaba empezando el juego con puntos, hubo una mayor frecuencia de opciones competitivas. La frecuencia de las elecciones óptimas fué más grande en la condición que recibió Dinero Real; las opciones igualitarias fue más frecuente en la condición de tiempo dividido para realizar una tarefa tediosa. Los cambios en la distribución muestran que el Sharing Game es sensible al contexto...

Tomada de decisão no sharing game: um estudo exploratório sobre o efeito de variáveis contextuais / Decision making in the sharing game: an exploratory study on the effect of contextual variables / Toma de decisiones en el sharing game: un estudio exploratorio sobre el efecto de variables contextuales

O Sharing Game é um jogo econômico que estuda as motivações envolvidas na distribuição de recursos. O participante deve escolher, em uma série de tentativas, entre duas opções com uma quantidade de recursos para ele e para outro participante passivo. Nestas opções, a diferença entre os recursos dos participantes é sempre a mesma, mas em uma delas - opção ótima - o distribuidor recebe mais e o outro participante mais ainda, e em outra - opção não ótima - o distribuidor recebe menos e o outro menos ainda. A partir das escolhas dos participantes, é averiguado quantos foram otimizadores, igualitários e competitivos. O objetivo deste trabalho foi investigar o Sharing Game em diversos contextos. Foram realizadas sete condições (n=233) com estudantes universitários recrutados por conveniência. As condições envolveram ganho e perda de recurso, dinheiro hipotético e real, distribuição de tempo e informação prévia sobre o receptor. A porcentagem de escolhas ótimas em cada condição foi calculada e os participantes foram classificados em uma das três categorias apresentadas. Em todas as condições, a maioria das escolhas do distribuidor balanceou seus recursos com os do receptor. Nas condições em que o receptor já começava o jogo com pontos, houve uma maior frequência de escolhas competitivas. A frequência de escolhas ótimas foi maior na condição Ganho de Dinheiro Real, As escolhas igualitárias foram mais frequentes na condição Tempo para realizar uma Tarefa Tediosa. Variações na distrbuição das escolhas demonstram que o Sharing Game é sensível à situação em que é jogado.(AU).

The Sharing Game, an economic game, studies the motivations involved in resources allocation. The participant faces several trials in which he must choose between two options, both with an amount of resources for him and for other passive participant. On these two options, the difference between the participants' resources is always the same, but in one of them - optimal option - the distributor receives more and the receiver even more, and in another - non optimal option - the distributor receives less and the other even less. From their choice, participants may be classified as optimizers, egalitarians or competitives. The objective of this study was to provide different contexts for the Sharing Game and investigate their effects. Seven conditions (n=233) were conducted with university students recruited by convenience. Conditions involved gain and loss of resource, real and hypothetical money, distribution of time and prior information about the receiver. The percentage of optimal choices in each condition was calculated and the participants were classified into one of those three categories accordingly. In all conditions, most choices of the distributor balanced their resources with the receiver. In conditions where the receiver has already started the game with points, there was a higher frequency of competitive choices. The frequency of optimal choices was higher in the condition Sharing Real Money. The egalitarian choices were more frequent in the condition Sharing Time to perform a Tedious Task. Variations in the choices distribution demonstrate that the Sharing Game is sensitive to the situation in which it is played.(AU).

El Sharing Game es un juego económico que estudia las motivaciones que intervienen en la distribución de los recursos. El participante debe elegir, en una serie de intentos, entre dos opciones que ofrecen recursos para él y otro participante pasivo. La diferencia entre los recursos de los participantes es siempre la misma, pero en uno de ellas - opción optimizada - el distribuidor recibe más y otro participante más aún, y en la otra - opción no optimizada - el distribuidor recibe menos y el otro menos. Desde de sus elecciones, se averigua cuántos eran los optimizadores, igualitarias y competitivos. Este estudio investigó el Sharing Game en diferentes contextos. Fueran realizadas siete condiciones con estudiantes universitarios (n =233). Las condiciones implican la ganancia y la pérdida de recursos, el dinero hipotético y real, la distribución del tiempo y de la información previa sobre el receptor. Se calculó el porcentaje de decisiones óptimas en cada condición y los participantes fueron clasificados en una de tres categorías presentadas. En todas las condiciones, la mayoría de los dispensadores balancearán sus recursos con el receptor. En condiciones en las que el receptor estaba empezando el juego con puntos, hubo una mayor frecuencia de opciones competitivas. La frecuencia de las elecciones óptimas fué más grande en la condición que recibió Dinero Real; las opciones igualitarias fue más frecuente en la condición de tiempo dividido para realizar una tarefa tediosa. Los cambios en la distribución muestran que el Sharing Game es sensible al contexto.(AU).

Self-concept in fairness and rule establishment during a competitive game: a computational approach.

People consider fairness as well as their own interest when making decisions in economic games. The present study proposes a model that encompasses the self-concept determined by one's own kindness as a factor of fairness. To observe behavioral patterns that reflect self-concept and fairness, a chicken game experiment was conducted. Behavioral data demonstrates four distinct patterns; "switching," "mutual rush," "mutual avoidance," and "unfair" patterns. Model estimation of chicken game data shows that a model with self-concept predicts those behaviors better than previous models of fairness, suggesting that self-concept indeed affects human behavior in competitive economic games. Moreover, a non-stationary parameter analysis revealed the process of reaching consensus between the players in a game. When the models were fitted to a continuous time window, the parameters of the players in a pair with "switching" and "mutual avoidance" patterns became similar as the game proceeded, suggesting that the players gradually formed a shared rule during the game. In contrast, the difference of parameters between the players in the "unfair" and "mutual rush" patterns did not become stable. The outcomes of the present study showed that people are likely to change their strategy until they reach a mutually beneficial status.

The development of the effect of peer monitoring on generosity differs among elementary school-age boys and girls.

The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of peer monitoring on generosity in boys and girls aged 6-12 years. A total of 120 elementary school students played a one-shot dictator game (DG) with and without peer monitoring by classmates. Children decided how to divide 10 chocolates between themselves and a classmate either in a condition in which their allocations were visible to their peers, or in private. While the effect of peer monitoring on the allocation amount in the DG was clearly present in boys, it was not observed in girls. Furthermore, the effect of peer monitoring in boys appeared at the age of 9 years. These results suggest that the motivation to draw peers' attention plays a stronger role for older boys than for girls or younger boys. The potential roles of higher-order theory of mind, social roles, and emergence of secondary sex characteristics on the influence of peer monitoring on generosity shown by boys are discussed.