The unconscious and the transcendental: Husserlian phenomenology in intersubjective systems theory.

The relational turn in psychoanalysis can be identified by the replacement of Freudian drives for intersubjectivity as main regulative principle. "Intersubjective systems theory" is the name of one strand within the relational turn that explicitly locates its philosophical foundations in a number of phenomenological insights. In this paper, I investigate some of the essential phenomenological assumptions underlying intersubjective systems theory. I identify 2 main problems: 1. intersubjective systems theory relies on the premise that meaning is intersubjectively constituted, yet fails to offer an account of this constitution; 2. intersubjective systems theory is based on an ambiguous conception of the unconscious. The aim of this paper is to show how Husserlian phenomenology offers a valuable theoretical foundation for intersubjective systems theory in the sense that it presents a convincing account of the intersubjective constitution of meaning that in its very constitution allows for a dynamic and situational relation between consciousness and unconsciousness.

The shift from quantitative to qualitative thinking-problems and prospects as viewed from Husserl's and Hegel's philosophy.

This article contrasts the views of the philosophers Husserl and Hegel on quantification in science and compares their proposals for conducting rigorous qualitative research. Both deem quantification integral to science, but furthermore proposed methodologies to investigate qualitative necessities achieved by a shift in conscious activity and awareness. However, their methodologies differ significantly. While Husserl rejects idealization and instead proposes intuitive means to ideate qualitative essential relations, Hegel suggests idealizing less one-sidedly, namely, qualitatively over and above quantitatively. The article first examines how quantification is achieved and how it contrasts with measuring. This contrast reveals that measuring implies knowledge of qualities. These qualities, however, thus far remain oddly external to the mathematical relations linking the various established equations. The article then follows Husserl's reconstruction of the development of science to illustrate the dismissal of many experiential qualities and how philosophy further amplified skepticism about science on qualities. Husserl's notion of the life-world and the method of eidetic variation are then introduced as means to counterbalance mathematical proceedings in science. However, this method reveals both eidetic qualitative structures and psychical structures without being able to distinguish between them. It is thus susceptible to idiosyncratic, traditional, and cultural biases. Subsequently, Hegel's description of the shift in conscious experience that sets qualitative from quantitative thinking apart is introduced. This shift may overcome the biases, but it faces skepticism that calls for further investigation of the experience of different kinds of thinking.

The monoid-now: a category theoretic approach to the structure of phenomenological time-consciousness.

Human consciousness is characterized by constant transitions in time. On the other hand, what is consciously experienced always possesses the temporal feature of "now." In consciousness, "now" constantly holds different contents, yet it remains "now" no matter how far it goes. This duality is thematized in Husserlian phenomenology as "the standing-streaming now." Although this phrase appears contradictory in everyday language, it has a structure that can be clearly understood and formalized. In this paper, we show that this structure can be described as a monoid in category theory. Furthermore, monoids can be transformed into the coslice category, which corresponds to the way of perceiving present moments as juxtaposed in succession. The seemingly contradictory nature of the "now" as both flowing and standing can be precisely structured and comprehended through the monoid, while the perspective of the "now" as discrete points on a timeline can be effectively formalized using the coslice category. This framework helps us more precisely understand the differences between ordinary consciousness and meditative consciousness, specifically the experience of the "eternal now." We illustrate how the meditative states of consciousness presented in the early Buddhist scriptures (Pali Canon) and Dogen's Shobogenzo remarkably reflect a monoid structure.

Reframing Anorexia Nervosa: A Phenomenological Exploration of the Self-Other Relationship with Husserl's Intersubjective Theory.

This paper explores the overlooked contributions of Husserl's Phenomenology of intersubjectivity in understanding anorexia nervosa. It highlights the intricate relationship between the self and others, emphasizing their mutual constitution while acknowledging inherent differences. The distorted body image approach often overlooks this perspective, leading to psychopathological issues in individuals with anorexia nervosa. By integrating subjective experience and external observation, a more balanced and equal intersubjective relationship can be established. Utilizing this philosophical framework allows for a deeper understanding of the disorder's dynamics and sheds new light on the subjective experiences of individuals with anorexia nervosa in relation to others.

Pathologies of imagination and affectivity: the genesis of the unconscious in Marc Richir.

In their recent work in phenomenological psychopathology, Andreas Rosén Rasmussen and Joseph Parnas argue that there is an expressive relationship between the anomalies of imagination reported in schizophrenic spectrum disorders (SSDs) and an underlying generative self- or ipseity disorder. The authors build their argument on an updated review of the phenomenological model of consciousness, by which each experience articulates itself in ipseity according to its modality. Therefore, they explain imagination as the figuration of an absent object mediated by the imaginary and accompanied by a sense of irreality. Finally, by drawing on patients' descriptions, Rasmussen and Parnas show that SSD imagination disorders testify to the breakdown of this model of consciousness. In this article, I aim to complexify the scenario summarized above by focusing on the contribution made by the phenomenologist Marc Richir in his late masterwork Phantasia, imagination et affectivité (2004). To this end, I examine the genetic analyses of the pathologies of the imaginary that Richir develops through a non-standard interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology of imagination (in particular, Hua XXIII, text n.16, 1912). In my examination, I aim to unfold an alternative model of consciousness that (a) is based on the gap between the architectonic registers of phantasia and imagination (and the corresponding stages of sense-making and the institution of sense), (b) takes account of the role of affectivity in those registers, (c) places the pathologies of the imaginary in the quasi-empathy that characterizes the missed encounter with the other, and (d) links the institution of these pathologies with the psychoanalytic account of the fixation of the phantasm.

The use of Husserl's phenomenology in nursing research: A discussion paper.

AIMS: To discuss how Husserl's descriptive phenomenology, as a philosophy and approach, has been used and reported in researching the experiences of others, using the topic of foreign-trained nurses. DESIGN: Discussion paper. DATA SOURCES: A systematic search of MEDLINE (PubMed), CINAHL, SCOPUS, British Nursing Database and PsycInfo was carried out in December 2021. The inclusion criteria were peer-reviewed phenomenological research articles, grounded by Husserl's philosophy, conducted among foreign-trained nurses and published in English from 2000 to 2021. FINDINGS: Two main themes were the outcome of critically reviewing relevant selected literature, 'referring to the original philosophy is not enough' and 'phenomenological findings need to be phenomenological'. These findings confirm some arguments about nurse researchers' discrepant use of phenomenology in their studies, including the proper application of phenomenological notions on the ground. IMPLICATION FOR NURSING: Nurse researchers need to clearly distinguish between phenomenology and other qualitative research approaches and consider the uniqueness of philosophical underpinnings that are essential in Husserl's phenomenology, which also need to be clearly applied and reflected in their studies. CONCLUSION: There are continually existing discrepancies and variations in using phenomenology by nurse researchers. These variations were uniquely evident when nurse researchers could not provide enough philosophical grounds and assumptions to their studies and underestimated the need to keep up with the various applications of Husserl's phenomenological notions, including the proper practice of phenomenological attitude. Therefore, it is recommended that nurse researchers should opt for different, less complex qualitative approaches if they do not adequately prepare and understand what constitutes phenomenology and the particulars of Husserl's philosophy. IMPACT: What problem did the study address? Phenomenology remains popular in nursing. However, it can confuse nurse researchers and may result in an improper understanding of its core concepts. The use of phenomenology in nursing has been criticized over the years with nurse researchers being accused of conducting phenomenological research inconsistent with the original philosophy. What were the main findings? Using phenomenology by nurse researchers is various and includes some discrepancies. This variation is caused by not complying with essential philosophical grounds and underestimating proper applications of Husserl's phenomenological notions. Where and on whom will the research have impact? Outcomes of this paper illustrate examples of proper and improper uses of Husserl's phenomenology in nursing research, including critical considerations, which can guide nurse researchers aiming to conduct descriptive phenomenological research. Additionally, nurse lecturers can utilize this paper to show and emphasize the importance of philosophical grounds in phenomenology. NO PATIENT OR PUBLIC CONTRIBUTION: Due to the nature of this discussion paper addressing philosophical and methodological aspects using examples from the literature, no direct patient or public contribution was required.

The Horizons of Chronic Shame.

Experiences of shame are not always discrete, but can be recurrent, persistent or enduring. To use the feminist phenomenologist Sandra Lee Bartky's formulation, shame is not always an acute event, but can become a "pervasive affective attunement" (Bartky, 1990: 85). Instead of experiencing shame as a discrete event with a finite duration, it can be experienced as a persistent, and perhaps, permanent possibility in daily life. This sort of pervasive or persistent shame is commonly referred to as "chronic shame" (Pattison, 2000; Nathanson, 1992; Dolezal, 2015). Chronic shame is frequently associated with political oppression and marginalization. In chronic shame, it is the potentiality of shame, rather than the actuality, that is significant. In other words, the anticipation of shame (whether explicit or implicit) comes to be a defining feature of one's lived experience. Living with chronic shame has important socio-political consequences. Thus far, chronic shame has eluded simple phenomenological analysis, largely because chronic shame often does not have a clear experiential profile: it is frequently characterised by the absence rather than the presence of shame. The aim of this article is to provide a phenomenology of chronic shame, drawing from Edmund Husserl's formulation of the 'horizon' as a means a to discuss structural aspects of chronic shame experiences, in particular how chronic shame is characterised by structures of absence and anticipation.

From transcendental egology to orientation theory: Toward a mereological foundation for the different senses of the "self" in conscious experience.

In the present work, we aim to make a contribution to the origins of the notion of "minimum self" in Husserl's phenomenology. Starting from the difference between the philosophy of the subject and the philosophy of the self, the aim of this research is to show that the Cartesian association between both philosophies would not exactly correspond to the conception of the self, as we find it in Edmund Husserl's works. With this, we intend to nuance Heidegger's accusation of Husserl's "Cartesianism," At the same time, we show how a detailed analysis of the "senses of the self" in Husserl's phenomenology allows extracting the notion of "minimal self" as it has been introduced in the current and lively debate between psychiatry and phenomenology. In our research, we also show that in order to move the theory of the transcendental ego toward the theory of the orientation of the life of consciousness, it is necessary to consider the foundation of the concepts of ego in the technical vocabulary of the formal mereology of the Husserl's third "Logical Investigation."

Moments of realization: extending Homeworld in British-African Novelist Doris Lessing's Four-Gated City.

For Husserl, the homeworld is the tacit, taken-for-granted sphere of experiences, understanding, and situations marking out a world that is comfortable, usual, and "the way things are and should be." Always, according to Husserl, the homeworld is in some mode of lived mutuality with an alienworld-a world as seen as a realm of difference, atypicality, and otherness. In this article, I draw on British-African novelist Doris Lessing's 1969 novel, The Four-Gated City, to consider the shifting homeworld of protagonist Martha Quest, a young white African woman emigrating to battle-scarred London immediately after World War II. Throughout the novel, Quest finds herself in unfamiliar or challenging situations where the world she takes for granted is called into question. Lessing draws on these life-testing experiences to portray Quest's shifting understandings of other individuals' homeworlds that at first she sees as atypical, abnormal, or unreal.

Healing the Lifeworld: On personal and collective individuation.

The paper argues that the dynamics of personal and collective individuation could be interrelated and bear ethical significance thanks to an analysis of the Lifeworld and intersubjectivity that link together the genetic and the generative perspectives of phenomenology. The first section of the paper recalls the epistemological and ontological implications of Husserl's and Stein's analysis of personal individuation in relation to what Husserl would call, later, the "Lifeworld" and the intersubjective constitution of communities. The second section of the paper turns to a phenomenology of the Lifeworld through an analysis of refugees' care and the intersubjective dynamics involved in the clinic of exile. Such an example will bring to light the importance of embodiment and intercorporeity to grasp the process through which the genetic constitution of the Lifeworld constitutes itself as a collective process of individuation trying to heal the scars of historicity. Consequently, individuation will appear as a personal and collective task, rather than a static and ego-centered achievement that would be forgetful of our fundamental interdependency. Finally, the last section argues that "healing the Lifeworld" does not amount to conceive of its "horizon" as being itself a predetermined "telos" of transcendental subjectivity, as if this open structure could be itself constituted. Rather, the varieties of the Lifeworld and its paradoxical movement of appropriation and differentiation point to a relational ontology that considers the becoming of a common and meaningful world as a limit-problem of phenomenology and, perhaps, its ethical and critical promise.

A meditação histórica de Husserl a propósito das ciências naturais e do subjetivismo moderno / Husserl's historical meditation on the natural sciences and modern subjectivism / La meditación histórica de Husserl sobre las ciencias naturales y el subjetivismo moderno

Acompanhamos, neste artigo, o exercício de filosofia histórica realizado por Husserl em A crise das ciências europeias e a fenomenologia transcendental. Nosso propósito é salientar o movimento arqueológico proposto pelo filósofo como forma de oposição ao esquecimento dos fundamentos da atitude das ciências naturais, que perpassa igualmente o subjetivismo moderno e, por conseguinte, o projeto de uma psicologia científica. Detemo-nos nas análises de Husserl em torno da matematização da natureza, do dualismo cartesiano e do empirismo.

We follow, in this article, the exercise of historical philosophy carried out by Husserl in The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology. Our purpose is to highlight the archaeological movement proposed by the philosopher as a form of opposition to the forgetfulness of the natural sciences' attitude foundations, which also permeates modern subjectivism and, consequently, the design of a scientific psychology. We focus on Husserl's analyses of the mathematization of nature, Cartesian dualism, and empiricism.

Seguimos, en este artículo, el ejercicio de la filosofía histórica llevado a cabo por Husserl en La crisis de las ciencias europeas y la fenomenología trascendental. Nuestro propósito es destacar el movimiento arqueológico propuesto por el filósofo como una forma de oposición al olvido de los fundamentos de la actitud de las ciencias naturales, que también impregna el subjetivismo moderno y, en consecuencia, el diseño de una psicología científica. Nos centramos en el análisis de Husserl respecto de la matematización de la naturaleza, el dualismo cartesiano y el empirismo.

Inner Conflict of Personality in the Paradigm of Existential-Phenomenological Ontology.

This article analyzes the problem of internal personality conflicts from the the standpoint of existential-phenomenological ontology. The article presents a theoretical substantiation of phenomenological ontology as a nonclassical paradigm in the human sciences to solve existential conflicts in personality. It is noted that the main models of internal conflict do not give a satisfactory answer to the question of psychogenesis and psychological mechanisms for resolving existential conflicts. It is emphasized that it is perspective to analyze internal conflicts, relying upon phenomenological ontology and the existential approach. The main provisions of phenomenological ontology presented in the works of Husserl and Heidegger, as the founders of this scientific direction, are considered in a psychological context. A classification of existential experiences of a difficult life world is proposed, depending on the intra- and inter-orientation of mental processes. The concepts of the self-closing life world, ambivalent Other, ambivalent intentionality, spontaneous involvement are introduced, making it possible to substantiate a conceptual model for resolving existential personality conflicts. It is concluded that the resolution of existential conflicts is associated with the feeling of an intersubjective life-world, in which the ambivalent Other and spontaneous bodily involvement play a primary role.

20 anos de presença no Brasil: reflexões de Angela Ales Bello sobre contribuições da fenomenologia clássica à psicologia, psicopatologia e estudo da experiência religiosa / 20 years of presence in Brazil: reflections by Angela Ales Bello on the contributions ofClassical Phenomenology to Psychology, Psychopathology and the study of religious experience

Em 2021 a Revista Memorandum alcançou o marco de 20 anos de publicação ininterrupta, difundindo no país pesquisas do campo da fenomenologia, memória, história e religião. No mesmo ano, celebramos também 20 anos do início da parceria da filósofa italiana Angela Ales Bello com pesquisadores brasileiros. Como um brinde à dupla comemoração, discutimos neste texto a originalidade da fenomenologia clássica e suas contribuições para as ciências em geral e, em particular, para a psicologia, psicopatologia e estudo das religiões. Também é realizado um resgate de memórias sobre o início do intercâmbio com pesquisadores brasileiros que contribuiu a um só tempo para o desenvolvimento da psicologia fenomenológica no país e para a consolidação da revista Memorandum como periódico de referência nesta área. (AU)

In 2021, the journal Memorandum reached the milestone of 20 years of uninterrupted publication, disseminating research in the field of phenomenology, memory, history and religion in the country. In the same year, we also celebrated 20 years since the beginning of the partnership between Italian philosopher Angela Ales Bello and Brazilian researchers. As a toast to the double celebration, in this text we discuss the originality of classical phenomenology and its contributions to the sciences in general and, in particular, to psychology, psychopathology and the study of religions. A rescue of memories about the beginning of the exchange with Brazilian researchers is also carried out, which contributed at the same time to the development of phenomenological psychology in the country and to the consolidation of Memorandum as a reference journal in this area. (AU)

20 anos de presença no Brasil: reflexões de Angela Ales Bello sobre contribuições da fenomenologia clássica à psicologia, psicopatologia e estudo da experiência religiosa / 20 years of presence in Brazil: reflections by Angela Ales Bello on the contributions ofClassical Phenomenology to Psychology, Psychopathology and the study of religious experience / 20 years of presence in Brazil: reflections by Angela Ales Bello on the contributions ofClassical Phenomenology to Psychology, Psychopathology and the study of religious experience

Em 2021 a Revista Memorandum alcançou o marco de 20 anos de publicação ininterrupta,difundindo no país pesquisas do campo da fenomenologia, memória, história e religião. No mesmo ano, celebramos também 20 anos do início da parceria da filósofa italiana Angela Ales Bello com pesquisadores brasileiros. Como um brinde à dupla comemoração, discutimos neste texto a originalidade da fenomenologia clássica e suas contribuições para as ciências em geral e, em particular, para a psicologia, psicopatologia e estudo das religiões. Também é realizado um resgate de memórias sobre o início do intercâmbio com pesquisadores brasileiros que contribuiu a um só tempo para o desenvolvimento da psicologia fenomenológica no país e para a consolidação da revista Memorandum como periódico de referência nesta área.

In 2021, the journal Memorandum reached the milestone of 20 years of uninterrupted publication, disseminating research in the field of phenomenology, memory, history and religion in the country. In the same year, we also celebrated 20 years since the beginning of the partnership between Italian philosopher Angela Ales Bello and Brazilian researchers. As a toast to the double celebration, in this text we discuss the originality of classical phenomenology and its contributions to the sciences in general and, in particular, to psychology, psychopathology and the study of religions. A rescue of memories about the beginning of the exchange with Brazilian researchers is also carried out, which contributed at the same time to the development of phenomenological psychology in the country and to the consolidation of Memorandum as a reference journal in this area.

How to Develop Phenomenology as Psychology: from Description to Elucidation, Exemplified Based on a Study of Dream Analysis.

The purpose of this paper is to introduce a methodological concept of phenomenological elucidation to promote the development of phenomenology as psychology. After offering a minimal review of the historical relationship between phenomenology and psychology, the first section gives a brief overview of the descriptive phenomenological approach developed by A. Giorgi and other psychologists. However, for phenomenology to evolve as a human science, the method should not remain descriptive. One needs to be able to answer the question of "why". The second section outlines the process of phenomenological elucidation on the topic of dream analysis. This process answers the question of "why" based on identifying differences between the fundamental phenomenological structure of the dream experience and that of the real experience. Husserl's classification of intentionalities is used as a heuristic for this identification. In the final section, phenomenological elucidation is defined as a way to answer the "why" question by treating the differences between the experiences in question as specific cases of more fundamental differences in phenomenological structure. This method is expected to be effective in the development of phenomenology as psychology, that is, as an empirical human science.

Husserl, the mathematization of nature, and the informational reconstruction of quantum theory.

As is well known, the late Husserl warned against the dangers of reifying and objectifying the mathematical models that operate at the heart of our physical theories. Although Husserl's worries were mainly directed at Galilean physics, the first aim of our paper is to show that many of his critical arguments are no less relevant today. By addressing the formalism and current interpretations of quantum theory, we illustrate how topics surrounding the mathematization of nature come to the fore naturally. Our second aim is to consider the program of reconstructing quantum theory, a program that currently enjoys popularity in the field of quantum foundations. We will conclude by arguing that, seen from this vantage point, certain insights delivered by phenomenology and quantum theory regarding perspectivity are remarkably concordant. Our overall hope with this paper is to show that there is much room for mutual learning between phenomenology and modern physics.

O sujeito anímico e o sujeito espiritual em Ideias II / The psychic subject and the spiritual subject in Ideas II / El sujeto anímico y el sujeto espiritual en Ideias II

Neste artigo pretendo evidenciar como a relação entre sujeito anímico e sujeito espiritual é fundamental para a compreensão da intersubjetividade e do mundo da vida (Lebenswelt). Em Ideias II, Husserl explica como, a partir do eu, sujeito e objeto são constituídos no mundo: natureza, alma e espírito. Estes três estratos do sendo são conhecidos a partir da atitude teorética e da atitude espiritual e, no processo, se dá a explicitação do eu. Numa atitude teorética, temos constituição da natureza, para o que o corpo (Körper/Leib) é fundamental. Em seguida, a constituição de objetos de natureza anímica, humana ou animal, incluindo a autopercepção. Assumindo a atitude espiritual, o outro é percebido (Urpräsenz), inicialmente, como corpo junto às coisas e, ao lado desta percepção, há uma apercepção (Appräsenz) dos horizontes co-dados. Há uma identidade entre o corpo alheio e o meu, é o momento da empatia (Einfühlung). O mundo constituído a partir de uma atitude naturalista ou teórica é uma redução do mundo circundante (Umwelt), mas o mundo cotidiano da atitude personalista ou espiritual lhe antecede, o mundo vital (Lebenswelt). É, portanto, através da atitude personalista ou espiritual, que se constitui uma comunidade de sujeitos espirituais.

In this article I intend to highlight how the relationship between psychic subject and spiritual subject is fundamental for the understanding of intersubjectivity and the life world (Lebenswelt). In Ideas II, Husserl explains how, from the self, subject and object are constituted in the world: nature, soul and spirit. These three strata of the being are known from the theoretical attitude and the spiritual attitude and, in the process, the self is explicit. In a theoretical attitude we have nature's constitution, for which the body (Körper / Leib) is fundamental. Then the constitution of objects of animic nature, human or animal, including self-perception. Assuming the spiritual attitude, the other is perceived (Urpräsenz) initially as a body together with things, and beside this perception there is an apprehension (Appräsenz) of co-given horizons. There is an identity between the body of others and mine, it is the moment of empathy (Einfühlung). The world constituted from a naturalistic or theoretical attitude is a reduction of the surrounding world (Umwelt), but the everyday world of the personalistic or spiritual attitude precedes it, the life-world (Lebenswelt). It is therefore through the personalistic or spiritual attitude that a community of spiritual subjects is constituted.

En este artículo pretendo destacar cómo la relación entre el sujeto anímico y el sujeto espiritual es fundamental para la comprensión de la intersubjetividad y el mundo de la vida (Lebenswelt). En Ideas II, Husserl explica cómo, desde el yo, el sujeto y el objeto están constituidos en el mundo: naturaleza, alma y espíritu. Estos tres estratos del ser se conocen por la actitud teórica y la actitud espiritual y, en el proceso, el yo es explícito. En una actitud teórica, tenemos la constitución de la naturaleza, para la cual el cuerpo (Körper / Leib) es fundamental. Luego la constitución de objetos de naturaleza anímica, humana o animal, incluida la auto percepción. Asumiendo la actitud espiritual, el otro se percibe (Urpräsenz) inicialmente como un cuerpo junto con las cosas, y además de esta percepción hay una apercepción (Appräsenz) de los horizontes compartidos. Existe una identidad entre el cuerpo de los demás y el mío, es el momento de la empatía (Einfühlung). El mundo constituido por una actitud naturalista o teórica es una reducción del mundo circundante (Umwelt), pero el mundo cotidiano de la actitud personalista o espiritual lo precede, el mundo de la vida (Lebenswelt). Por lo tanto, es a través de la actitud personalista o espiritual que se constituye una comunidad de sujetos espirituales.

Pathology as a phenomenological tool.

The phenomenological method (or rather, methods) has been fruitfully used to study the experience of illness in recent years. However, the role of illness is not merely that of a passive object for phenomenological scrutiny. I propose that illness, and pathology more generally, can be developed into a phenomenological method in their own right. I claim that studying cases of pathology, breakdown, and illness offer illumination not only of these experiences, but also of normal function and the tacit background that underpins it. In particular, I claim that the study of embodiment can be greatly enhanced, and indeed would be incomplete, without attending to bodily breakdown and what I term bodily doubt. I offer an analogy between illness and Husserl's epoché, suggesting that both are a source of distancing, and therefore motivate a reflective stance.

How Do Social Structures Become Taken for Granted? Social Reproduction in Calm and Crisis.

This paper identifies experiential processes through which social structures become taken for granted, termed processes of "structure marginalization". Passive processes of structure marginalization relegate social structures to the margin of experience without the use of higher-order cognitive acts such as evaluation and reflection. Examples include adapting to social structures via routine and habitual practices (material reification), a lack of conscious awareness of the complexity, historical formation, and other details of social structures (ignorance), and rendering social structures irrelevant when they are unreflectively judged to be of no value for achieving ends (nullification). Active processes of structure marginalization reflectively and discursively relegate social structures to marginal consciousness. Examples include the use of naturalistic and necessitarian explanations for the social order that implicitly justify it as inalterable or "just the way things are" (discursive reification), normative justifications for the status quo (legitimation), and conscious awareness of one's powerlessness to control social-structural conditions (helplessness). Active processes of structure marginalization originate in passive processes. The goal of the typology is to explain, at the level of experience, why social structures typically remain unproblematic and unnoticed in everyday life, even during periods of social crisis and change or when existing structures produce harmful effects.

Why should nurses care if Heidegger was a Nazi? Pragmatics, politics and philosophy in nursing.

Nursing and nurses have become reliant on qualitative methods to understand the meaning of nursing care, and many nurse researchers use Heideggerian Interpretivist phenomenology approaches. Often these nurses are unaware of Martin Heidegger's role in the German National Socialist Party of the 1930s and his allegiance to fascist ideology. We ask: can a bad person have good ideas? In line with pragmatic thinkers such as Richard Rorty, we argue that instead of value judgements on people and their ideas, nurses should consider ideas as a product of a historical/social and political time and space. In urging a critical political engagement, we argue for a Husserlian approach. In opposition to Heidegger's interpretivist phenomenology approach, in which the hegemony of the day is integral to the phenomena being studied, we propose that a more expressive, collaborative engagement using Husserlian descriptive phenomenology approach would serve better in encouraging a more critical engagement with how ideas are used by groups of people, how some groups might be advantaged and others disadvantaged. Our conclusion is that the separation of ideas from political and social context is dangerous, and nurses, including nurse researchers, must understand how their research ideas and methods influence and are influenced by political agendas.