ABSTRACT
Species diversity underpins all ecosystem services that support life. Despite this recognition and the great advances in detecting biodiversity, exactly how many and which species co-occur and interact, directly or indirectly in any ecosystem is unknown. Biodiversity accounts are incomplete; taxonomically, size, habitat, mobility or rarity biased. In the ocean, the provisioning of fish, invertebrates and algae is a fundamental ecosystem service. This extracted biomass depends on a myriad of microscopic and macroscopic organisms that make up the fabric of nature and which are affected by management actions. Monitoring them all and attributing changes to management policies is daunting. Here we propose that dynamic quantitative models of species interactions can be used to link management policy and compliance with complex ecological networks. This allows managers to qualitatively identify 'interaction-indicator' species, which are highly impacted by management policies through propagation of complex ecological interactions. We ground the approach in intertidal kelp harvesting in Chile and fishers' compliance with policies. Results allow us to identify sets of species that respond to management policy and/or compliance, but which are often not included in standardized monitoring. The proposed approach aids in the design of biodiversity programmes that attempt to connect management with biodiversity change. This article is part of the theme issue 'Detecting and attributing the causes of biodiversity change: needs, gaps and solutions'.
Subject(s)
Biodiversity , Ecosystem , Animals , Invertebrates , Biomass , FishesABSTRACT
Illegal fishing in small-scale fisheries is a contentious issue and resists a straightforward interpretation. Particularly, there is little knowledge regarding cooperative interactions between legal and illegal fishers and the potential effects on fisheries arising from these interactions. Taking the Chilean king crab (Lithodes santolla; common name centolla) fishery as a case study, our goal is twofold: (i) to model the effect of illegal-legal fishers' interactions on the fishery and (ii) analyze how management and social behavior affect fishery's outcomes. We framed the analysis of this problem within game theory combined with network theory to represent the architecture of competitive interactions. The fishers' system was set to include registered (legal) fishers and unregistered (illegal) fishers. In the presence of unregistered fishers, legal fishers may decide to cooperate (ignoring the presence of illegal fishers) or defect, which involves becoming a "super fisher" and whitewashing the captures of illegal fishers for a gain. The utility of both players, standard fisher and super fisher depend on the strategy chosen by each of them, as well as on the presence of illegal fishers. The nodes of the network represent the legal fishers (both standard and super fishers) and the links between nodes indicate that these fishers compete for the resource, assumed to be finite and evenly distributed across space. The decision to change (or not) the adopted strategy is modeled considering that fishers are subjected to variable levels of temptation to whitewash the illegal capture and to social pressure to stop doing so. To represent the vital dynamics of the king crab, we propose a model that includes the Allee effect and a term accounting for the crab extraction. We found that the super fisher strategy leads to the decrease of the king crab population under a critical threshold as postulated in the tragedy of the commons hypothesis when there are: (i) high net extraction rates of the network composed of non-competing standard fishers, (ii) high values of the extent of the fishing season, and (iii) high density of illegal fishers. The results suggest that even in the presence of super fishers and illegal fishers, the choice of properly distributed fishing/closure cycles or setting an extraction limit per vessel can prevent the king crab population from falling below a critical threshold. This finding, although controversial, reflects the reality of this fishery that, for decades, has operated under a dynamic in which whitewashing and super fishers have become well established within the system.
Subject(s)
Anomura , Fisheries , Hunting , Animals , Chile , Humans , Hunting/legislation & jurisprudence , Models, TheoreticalABSTRACT
The organization of fisheries in the Amazon region is an important theme, since the current management model is based mainly on the closed fishing season policy. This strategy suspends the catching of specific fish stocks and provides subsidies to professional fishers. Thus, the present study analyzed, through mathematical modeling, the behavioral interfaces of illegal fisheries that occurred between 1992 to 2017 in the Amazon basin, considering the hydrological seasonality and the effect of the presence or absence of the Closed Fishing Season law (CFSL). The data were tabulated and used for the construction of two illegal fishing scenarios. The first showed negative impacts with the absence of the CFSL, indicated by the high number of seizures of illegal catches that occurred during the period in which river water level is rising and showed continued growth over time. However, the second scenario showed apprehension apexes occurring at the beginning of the high-water level and at beginning of the low water level, with a continuous decrease in the seizures of illegal catches due to the new law. Thus, the ecosystem model constructed is a promising instrument for testing hypotheses and for formulating and monitoring management scenarios for fisheries in the region.(AU)
O ordenamento pesqueiro na região amazônica é um tema importante, uma vez que o atual modelo de gestão se baseia principalmente na política do defeso. Essa estratégia suspende a captura de estoques específicos de peixes e fornece subsídios aos pescadores profissionais. Assim, o presente estudo analisou, por meio da modelagem matemática, as interfaces comportamentais da pesca ilegal que ocorreram entre 1992 e 2017 na bacia Amazônica, considerando a sazonalidade hidrológica e o efeito da presença ou ausência da Lei do Defeso (LD). Os dados foram tabulados e utilizados para a construção de dois cenários de pesca ilegal. O primeiro apresentou impactos negativos com a ausência da LD, apontado pelo elevado número de apreensões de pescado ilegais que ocorreram durante o período da enchente, momento em que o nível da água do rio está subindo, e apresentou crescimento contínuo ao longo do tempo. No entanto, o segundo cenário mostrou ápices de apreensões ocorridas no início da cheia e no início da seca, com redução contínua das apreensões de capturas ilegais devido a lei LD. Assim, o modelo ecossistêmico construído é um instrumento promissor para testar hipóteses e para formular e monitorar cenários de gestão para a pesca na região.(AU)
Subject(s)
Animals , Fishing Industry , Products Arrest , Legislation, Environmental , Fishes , Amazonian EcosystemABSTRACT
The organization of fisheries in the Amazon region is an important theme, since the current management model is based mainly on the closed fishing season policy. This strategy suspends the catching of specific fish stocks and provides subsidies to professional fishers. Thus, the present study analyzed, through mathematical modeling, the behavioral interfaces of illegal fisheries that occurred between 1992 to 2017 in the Amazon basin, considering the hydrological seasonality and the effect of the presence or absence of the Closed Fishing Season law (CFSL). The data were tabulated and used for the construction of two illegal fishing scenarios. The first showed negative impacts with the absence of the CFSL, indicated by the high number of seizures of illegal catches that occurred during the period in which river water level is rising and showed continued growth over time. However, the second scenario showed apprehension apexes occurring at the beginning of the high-water level and at beginning of the low water level, with a continuous decrease in the seizures of illegal catches due to the new law. Thus, the ecosystem model constructed is a promising instrument for testing hypotheses and for formulating and monitoring management scenarios for fisheries in the region.
O ordenamento pesqueiro na região amazônica é um tema importante, uma vez que o atual modelo de gestão se baseia principalmente na política do defeso. Essa estratégia suspende a captura de estoques específicos de peixes e fornece subsídios aos pescadores profissionais. Assim, o presente estudo analisou, por meio da modelagem matemática, as interfaces comportamentais da pesca ilegal que ocorreram entre 1992 e 2017 na bacia Amazônica, considerando a sazonalidade hidrológica e o efeito da presença ou ausência da Lei do Defeso (LD). Os dados foram tabulados e utilizados para a construção de dois cenários de pesca ilegal. O primeiro apresentou impactos negativos com a ausência da LD, apontado pelo elevado número de apreensões de pescado ilegais que ocorreram durante o período da enchente, momento em que o nível da água do rio está subindo, e apresentou crescimento contínuo ao longo do tempo. No entanto, o segundo cenário mostrou ápices de apreensões ocorridas no início da cheia e no início da seca, com redução contínua das apreensões de capturas ilegais devido a lei LD. Assim, o modelo ecossistêmico construído é um instrumento promissor para testar hipóteses e para formular e monitorar cenários de gestão para a pesca na região.