Zika Virus Infection During Research Vaccine Development: Investigation of the Laboratory-Acquired Infection via Nanopore Whole-Genome Sequencing.

Zika virus (ZIKV) emerged as a serious public health problem since the first major outbreak in 2007. Current ZIKV diagnostic methods can successfully identify known ZIKV but are impossible to track the origin of viruses and pathogens other than known ZIKV strains. We planned to determine the ability of Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) in clinical epidemiology by evaluating whether it can successfully detect the origin of ZIKV in a suspected case of laboratory-acquired infection (LAI). ZIKV found in the patient sample was sequenced with nanopore sequencing technology, followed by the production of the phylogenetic tree, based on the alignment of 38 known ZIKV strains with the consensus sequence. The closest viral strain with the consensus sequence was the strain used in the laboratory, with a percent identity of 99.27%. We think WGS showed its time-effectiveness and ability to detect the difference between strains to the level of a single base. Additionally, to determine the global number of LAIs, a literature review of articles published in the last 10 years was performed, and 53 reports of 338 LAIs were found. The lack of a universal reporting system was worrisome, as in the majority of cases (81.1%), the exposure route was unknown.

Laboratory-acquired infections in Canada from 2016 to 2021.

incidents that result in an exposure to human pathogens and toxins can lead to laboratory-acquired infections or intoxications (LAIs). These infections can pose a risk to the public as well, should person-to-person transmission occur outside the laboratory after an LAI. Understanding factors that contribute to exposure incidents involving LAIs may contribute to ways to mitigate future occurrences to ensure the safety of laboratory workers and the communities in which they work. This paper describes nine exposure incidents resulting in LAIs that occurred in Canada from 2016 to 2021. Of the nine cases, most affected people had both high level of education and years of experience working with pathogens. There were varying laboratory types and activities where Salmonella spp. and Escherichia coli accounted for six out of the nine cases. Procedural issues, personal protective equipment issues and sharp-related incidents were the most cited root causes. From this information, it is clear that regular training (even of experienced staff), clear and accurate standard operating procedures, proper hygiene (especially with Salmonella spp. and E. coli) and recognition of exposure incidents at the time of occurrence are important in preventing future LAIs. Only regulated laboratories working with risk group 2 or higher organisms are required to report exposures and LAIs to the Laboratory Incident Notification Canada surveillance system. Because of the small sample size, results and inferences are based on descriptive analyses only.

Corrigendum: Evaluation of the SARS-CoV-2 Inactivation Efficacy Associated With Buffers From Three Kits Used on High-Throughput RNA Extraction Platforms.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.3389/fcimb.2021.716436.].

Evaluation of the SARS-CoV-2 Inactivation Efficacy Associated With Buffers From Three Kits Used on High-Throughput RNA Extraction Platforms.

Rapid and demonstrable inactivation of SARS-CoV-2 is crucial to ensure operator safety during high-throughput testing of clinical samples. The inactivation efficacy of SARS-CoV-2 was evaluated using commercially available lysis buffers from three viral RNA extraction kits used on two high-throughput (96-well) RNA extraction platforms (Qiagen QIAcube HT and the Thermo Fisher KingFisher Flex) in combination with thermal treatment. Buffer volumes and sample ratios were chosen for their optimised suitability for RNA extraction rather than inactivation efficacy and tested against a representative sample type: SARS-CoV-2 spiked into viral transport medium (VTM). A lysis buffer mix from the MagMAX Pathogen RNA/DNA kit (Thermo Fisher), used on the KingFisher Flex, which included guanidinium isothiocyanate (GITC), a detergent, and isopropanol, demonstrated a minimum inactivation efficacy of 1 × 105 tissue culture infectious dose (TCID)50/ml. Alternative lysis buffer mixes from the MagMAX Viral/Pathogen Nucleic Acid kit (Thermo Fisher) also used on the KingFisher Flex and from the QIAamp 96 Virus QIAcube HT Kit (Qiagen) used on the QIAcube HT (both of which contained GITC and a detergent) reduced titres by 1 × 104 TCID50/ml but did not completely inactivate the virus. Heat treatment alone (15 min, 68°C) did not completely inactivate the virus, demonstrating a reduction of 1 × 103 TCID50/ml. When inactivation methods included both heat treatment and addition of lysis buffer, all methods were shown to completely inactivate SARS-CoV-2 inactivation against the viral titres tested. Results are discussed in the context of the operation of a high-throughput diagnostic laboratory.

Staggered enforcement of infection control and prevention measures following four consecutive potential laboratory exposures to imported Brucella melitensis.

From 2015 until 2020, Brucella melitensis was isolated four times in our microbiology laboratory. All patients had travelled in endemic-areas. Immediately after the first occurrence, all laboratory staff were risk-stratified and preventive and protective measures were applied according to CDC guidelines. Nineteen workers were exposed and needed chemoprophylaxis and follow-up. At each subsequent occurrence, risk analysis was performed, and additional measures were implemented accordingly, leading to a progressive reduction of exposed staff members to none the fourth time. We describe here the additional measures that permitted this important exposure reduction.

Inguinal Ulceroglandular Tularemia Caused by Francisella tularensis Subspecies holarctica, Canada.

Tularemia is a zoonotic disease caused by the gram-negative coccobacillus Francisella tularensis, a Biosafety Level 3 pathogen and potential agent of bioterrorism. We describe 2 cases of perigenital ulcer disease caused by Francisella tularensis subspecies holarctica in Manitoba, Canada. These cases caused inadvertent exposure among laboratory personnel.

High-risk human-caused pathogen exposure events from 1975-2016.

Biological agents and infectious pathogens have the potential to cause very significant harm, as the natural occurrence of disease and pandemics makes clear. As a way to better understand the risk of Global Catastrophic Biological Risks due to human activities, rather than natural sources, this paper reports on a dataset of 71 incidents involving either accidental or purposeful exposure to, or infection by, a highly infectious pathogenic agent. There has been significant effort put into both reducing the risk of purposeful spread of biological weapons, and biosafety intended to prevent the exposure to, or release of, dangerous pathogens in the course of research. Despite these efforts, there are incidents of various types that could potentially be controlled or eliminated by different lab and/or bioweapon research choices and safety procedures. The dataset of events presented here was compiled during a project conducted in 2019 to better understand biological risks from anthropic sources. The events which are listed are unrelated to clinical treatment of naturally occurring outbreaks, and are instead entirely the result of human decisions and mistakes. While the events cover a wide range of cases, the criteria used covers a variety of events previously scattered across academic, policy, and other unpublished or not generally available sources.

Strengthening Medical Laboratory Systems in Kenya: An Innovative Biosafety Training Model.

Background: With increased rates of laboratory-acquired infections from clinical and research laboratories globally, efforts have been made to improve awareness of modern practices and pursue innovations in biosafety to manage risks and laboratory exposures arising from infectious agents and other hazards. Objectives: This article demonstrates a sustainable biosafety training model developed to enhance laboratory quality and support accreditation in health facilities in Kenya. Methods: A biosafety technical working group was formed, and sensitization meetings held with health managers. Trainings were then conducted for training of trainers (TOTs) who then cascaded trainings in health facilities. This was followed by mentorships and monitoring for implementation. Results: Five sensitization meetings were carried out for 264 health managers. TOTs was done for 48 trained trainers and 1044 laboratory workers in 216 facilities covering 44 counties. Site visits were done in 51 facilities, with biosafety achievements measured in 21 (41%), respectively. Achievements in 21 facilities included the following: improvised eye wash stations in 16 facilities (76%), biological spill kits in 17 (81%), buckets of sand in 15 (71%), fire extinguishers in 12 (57%), hepatitis B vaccination in 14 (66%), establishment of phlebotomy areas in 18 facilities (85%), material safety data sheets in 18 (85%), documentation of incidents and exposures in 16 (76%), and proper waste segregation in 17 (81%). Conclusion: This model ensured rapid scale-up to multiple counties and enabled learners to understand biosafety principles. Due to management buy-in, resources were availed to implement interventions, and this was demonstrated by remarkable achievements across all assessed facilities.

Evaluation of the Risk of Laboratory Microbial Contamination during Routine Testing in Automated Clinical Chemistry and Microbiology Laboratories.

BACKGROUND: Every clinical specimen is potentially infectious, but data regarding risk for contamination of the laboratory environment during routine testing are scarce. We assessed contamination during routine sample analysis in automated clinical chemistry and microbiology laboratories. METHODS: A fluorescent marker was applied to specimen container exteriors to assess the impact of gross contamination. Nonpathogenic MS2 virus was added to remnant blood, urine, and ESwab matrices as a biomarker of cross-contamination. Samples were processed and analyzed using Roche Cobas 8100 and ISE, c502, e602, and c702 modules (blood) and BD Kiestra total laboratory automation (blood, urine, ESwabs) over 3 experiments. Fluorescence transfer to laboratory surfaces and personnel was visualized using ultraviolet light. Surfaces were swabbed and assessed for MS2 cross-contamination by RT-PCR. Adherence to standard precautions by laboratory staff was assessed by observation. RESULTS: Fluorescence was observed on 49 of 165 (30%) laboratory surfaces and personnel and 21 of 93 (23%) total laboratory automation instruments. Fluorescence transferred most frequently to gloves (31/40), computer accessories (9/18), and specimen loading racks (12/12). None of 123 areas swabbed were positive for MS2. Improper personal protective equipment use occurred at a rate of 0.36 and 0.15 events per staff per hour in the chemistry and microbiology laboratories, respectively. Hand-washing compliance was observed for 61 of 132 (46%) staff members evaluated. CONCLUSIONS: Analysis of grossly contaminated specimens on automated chemistry and microbiology equipment elicits a low likelihood of instrument contamination. However, handling contaminated specimen containers can result in contamination of environmental laboratory surfaces, representing a source of risk that is heightened by low adherence to appropriate personal protective equipment.

Biosafety Concerns During the Collection, Transportation, and Processing of COVID-19 Samples for Diagnosis.

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, which started in China, has created a panic among the general public and health care/laboratory workers. Thus far, there is no medication or vaccine to prevent and control the spread of COVID-19. As the virus is airborne and transmitted through droplets, there has been significant demand for face masks and other personal protective equipment to prevent the spread of infection. Health care and laboratory workers who come in close contact with infected people or material are at a high risk of infection. Therefore, robust biosafety measures are required at hospitals and laboratories to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Various diagnostic platforms including of serological, molecular and other advanced tools and techniques have been designed and developed for rapid detection of SARS-CoV-2 and each has its own merits and demerits. Molecular assays such as real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) has been used worldwide for diagnosis of COVID-19. Samples such as nasal swabs or oropharyngeal swabs are used for rRT-PCR. Laboratory acquired infection has been a significant problem worldwide, which has gained importance during the current pandemic as the samples for rRT-PCR may contain intact virus with serious threat. COVID-19 can spread to workers during the sampling, transportation, processing, and disposal of tested samples. Here, we present an overview on advances in diagnosis of COVID-19 and details the issues associated with biosafety procedures and potential safety precautions to be followed during collection, transportation, and processing of COVID-19 samples for laboratory diagnosis so as to avoid virus infection.

Laboratory-Acquired Dengue Virus Infection, United States, 2018.

Investigation of a dengue case in a laboratory worker in North Carolina, USA, revealed that the case-patient prepared high-titer dengue virus stocks soon before illness onset. Improper doffing of gloves with an open finger wound likely resulted in cutaneous exposure. This case reinforces recommendations for enhanced precautions when working with high-titer dengue virus.

Brucella Exposure Risk Events in 10 Clinical Laboratories, New York City, USA, 2015 to 2017.

From 2015 to 2017, 11 confirmed brucellosis cases were reported in New York City, leading to 10 Brucella exposure risk events (Brucella events) in 7 clinical laboratories (CLs). Most patients had traveled to countries where brucellosis is endemic and presented with histories and findings consistent with brucellosis. CLs were not notified that specimens might yield a hazardous organism, as the clinicians did not consider brucellosis until they were notified that bacteremia with Brucella was suspected. In 3 Brucella events, the CLs did not suspect that slow-growing, small Gram-negative bacteria might be harmful. Matrix-assisted laser desorption ionization-time of flight mass spectrometry (MALDI-TOF MS), which has a limited capacity to identify biological threat agents (BTAs), was used during 4 Brucella events, which accounted for 84% of exposures. In 3 of these incidents, initial staining of liquid media showed Gram-positive rods or cocci, including some cocci in chains, suggesting streptococci. Over 200 occupational exposures occurred when the unknown isolates were manipulated and/or tested on open benches, including by procedures that could generate infectious aerosols. During 3 Brucella events, the CLs examined and/or manipulated isolates in a biological safety cabinet (BSC); in each CL, the CL had previously isolated Brucella Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommendations to prevent laboratory-acquired brucellosis (LAB) were followed; no seroconversions or LAB cases occurred. Laboratory assessments were conducted after the Brucella events to identify facility-specific risks and mitigations. With increasing MALDI-TOF MS use, CLs are well-advised to adhere strictly to safe work practices, such as handling and manipulating all slow-growing organisms in BSCs and not using MALDI-TOF MS for identification until BTAs have been ruled out.

Imported Brucellosis In The Era Of Dramatically Increasing Immigrants And Foreign Travelers From Endemic Areas: Occupational Hazards Of Secondary Infection Among Laboratory Technicians In A Nonendemic Country.

BACKGROUND: Brucellosis, an important zoonotic disease, is endemic in various parts of the world. Patients diagnosed with brucellosis in developed countries are often travelers and immigrants from endemic areas. This pathogen is listed as biosafety level 3, which means that it is highly contagious and therefore a risk to clinical laboratory technicians. CASE PRESENTATION: A 43-year-old Chinese man, who could not understand Japanese, visited our hospital because of an intermittent fever that had persisted for 5 months. Associated symptoms included muscle pain whenever he had a fever. He reported currently working as a welder in Japan. However, his previous employment working in animal husbandry in Heilongjiang, mainland China was not determined at the initial visit owing to language barriers. Two sets of blood culture showed nonfermenting gram-negative bacilli, initially misidentified as Ochrobactrum anthropi and subsequently identified as Brucella abortus. Six-week doxycycline and rifampicin were administered, with intravenous gentamicin for the initial 1 week. The patient recovered without relapse, confirmed by the negative result of a Brucella agglutination test. The patient's wife and three laboratory technicians were required to undergo blood examinations, which revealed no evidence of infection; however, they received prophylaxis with 3 weeks' doxycycline and rifampicin. CONCLUSION: In nonendemic countries, immigrants with imported brucellosis can be treated, to prevent secondary brucellosis infection, an occupational hazard among laboratory technicians. Greater attention is needed for positive findings of blood cultures, which may initially be misidentified as O. anthropi. When providing medical care for immigrants with fever of unknown origin, it is especially important for primary care physicians to overcome language barriers so as to assess pertinent information regarding their home country, such as previous employment, to prevent the spread the imported zoonoses in the era of a dramatically increasing number of immigrants and foreign travelers.

A Review of Laboratory-Acquired Infections in the Asia-Pacific: Understanding Risk and the Need for Improved Biosafety for Veterinary and Zoonotic Diseases.

A rapid review was performed to determine (1) the number and causes of reported laboratory-acquired infections (LAI) in the Asia-Pacific region; (2) their significance and threat to the community; (3) the primary risk factors associated with LAIs; (4) the consequences in the event of a LAI or pathogen escape; and (5) to make general recommendations regarding biosafety practices for diagnosis and research in the Asia-Pacific region. A search for LAI and zoonoses in the Asia-Pacific region using online search engines revealed a relatively low number of reports. Only 27 LAI reports were published between 1982 and 2016. The most common pathogens associated with LAIs were dengue virus, Arthroderma spp., Brucella spp., Mycobacterium spp., Rickettsia spp., and Shigella spp. Seventy-eight percent (21 out of 27 LAI reports) occurred in high-income countries (i.e., Australia, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) where laboratories were likely to comply with international biosafety standards. Two upper-middle income countries (China (2), and Malaysia (2)) and one lower-middle income country (India (2)) reported LAI incidents. The majority of the reports (fifty-two percent (14/27)) of LAIs occurred in research laboratories. Five LAI reports were from clinical or diagnostic laboratories that are considered at the frontier for zoonotic disease detection. Governments and laboratories in the Asia-Pacific region should be encouraged to report LAI cases as it provides a useful tool to monitor unintended release of zoonotic pathogens and to further improve laboratory biosafety. Non-reporting of LAI events could pose a risk of disease transmission from infected laboratory staff to communities and the environment. The international community has an important and continuing role to play in supporting laboratories in the Asia-Pacific region to ensure that they maintain the safe working environment for the staff and their families, and the wider community.

An accidental laboratory exposure to Brucella melitensis: the prospective post-exposure management and a detailed investigation into the nature of the exposure.

Our aim was to prospectively manage 22 Brucella-exposed individuals and identify the lapses in laboratory practices that lead to the exposure. The exposed individuals were risk-stratified, assessed for post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP), counselled to self-monitor symptoms and followed-up with three serology tests. Staff laboratory practices were recorded. Ten out of 13 high-risk individuals received PEP within 48 h of exposure. Compliance with PEP and serology monitoring was 90 and 96 %, respectively. No brucellosis cases were documented. A single handler manipulated the Brucella isolate on the open bench. Movement of the isolate was tracked in detail, highlighting various points of laboratory non-conformance. Early PEP intervention is effective in preventing acquired brucellosis. Our pragmatic post-exposure management achieved high PEP and serology compliance. We experience first-hand how regular staff engagement motivated PEP adherence and interval blood sampling attendance. The enforcement of practical strategies and safety practices was also implemented without compromising our laboratory processing times.

Frequency of Instrument, Environment, and Laboratory Technologist Contamination during Routine Diagnostic Testing of Infectious Specimens.

Laboratory testing to support the care of patients with highly infectious diseases may pose a risk for laboratory workers. However, data on the risk of virus transmission during routine laboratory testing conducted using standard personal protective equipment (PPE) are sparse. Our objective was to measure laboratory contamination during routine analysis of patient specimens. Remnant specimens were spiked with the nonpathogenic bacteriophage MS2 at 1.0 × 107 PFU/ml, and contamination was assessed using reverse transcriptase PCR (RT-PCR) for MS2. Specimen containers were exteriorly coated with a fluorescent powder to enable the visualization of gross contamination using UV light. Testing was performed by two experienced laboratory technologists using standard laboratory PPE and sample-to-answer instrumentation. Fluorescence was noted on the gloves, bare hands, and laboratory coat cuffs of the laboratory technologist in 36/36 (100%), 13/36 (36%), and 4/36 (11%) tests performed, respectively. Fluorescence was observed in the biosafety cabinet (BSC) in 8/36 (22%) tests, on test cartridges/devices in 14/32 (44%) tests, and on testing accessory items in 29/32 (91%) tests. Fluorescence was not observed on or in laboratory instrumentation or adjacent surfaces. In contrast to fluorescence detection, MS2 detection was infrequent (3/286 instances [1%]) and occurred during test setup for the FilmArray instrument and on FilmArray accessory equipment. The information from this study may provide opportunities for the improvement of clinical laboratory safety practices so as to reduce the risk of pathogen transmission to laboratory workers.

Laboratory-acquired infections of Salmonella enterica serotype Typhi in South Africa: phenotypic and genotypic analysis of isolates.

BACKGROUND: Workers in clinical microbiology laboratories are exposed to a variety of pathogenic microorganisms. Salmonella species is among the most commonly reported bacterial causes of laboratory-acquired infections. We report on three cases of laboratory-acquired Salmonella enterica serotype Typhi (Salmonella Typhi) infection which occurred over the period 2012 to 2016 in South Africa. METHODS: Laboratory investigation included phenotypic and genotypic characterization of isolates. Phenotypic analysis included standard microbiological identification techniques, serotyping and antimicrobial susceptibility testing. Genotypic analysis included the molecular subtyping methodologies of pulsed-field gel electrophoresis analysis, multilocus sequence typing and whole-genome sequencing (WGS); with WGS data analysis including phylogenetic analysis based upon comparison of single nucleotide polymorphism profiles of isolates. RESULTS: All cases of laboratory-acquired infection were most likely the result of lapses in good laboratory practice and laboratory safety. The following critical issues were highlighted. There was misdiagnosis and misreporting of Salmonella Typhi as nontyphoidal Salmonella by a diagnostic laboratory, with associated public health implications. We highlight issues concerning the importance of accurate fluoroquinolone susceptibility testing and interpretation of results according to updated guidelines. We describe potential shortcomings of a single disk susceptibility screening test for fluoroquinolone susceptibility and suggest that confirmatory minimum inhibitory concentration testing should always be performed in cases of invasive Salmonella infections. These antimicrobial susceptibility testing issues resulted in inappropriate ciprofloxacin therapy which may have been responsible for failure in clearance of pathogen from patients. Salmonella Typhi capsular polysaccharide vaccine was not protective in one case, possibly secondarily to a faulty vaccine. CONCLUSIONS: Molecular subtyping of isolates proved effective to investigate the genetic relatedness of isolates. Molecular subtyping data interpreted together with epidemiological data allowed us to pinpoint the most likely sources for our cases of laboratory-acquired infection.

[Study on the immunization status and its influencing factors among workers from the polio network laboratories in China].

Objective: To Investigate the immune status and influencing factors of provincial polio network laboratory (PNL) workers in China so as to provide evidence for the development of related strategies to protect personnel working at the PNLs. Methods: All the practitioners from the PNLs at the provincial centers for disease control, were selected as objects for this study, from October to December, 2016, under a questionnaire survey. Information on status of immunity and influencing factors was collected, with SAS software, trend chi-square used for statistics analysis. Results: A total of 77 workers were involved in this survey, with 60 (78%) of them completed the polio-based immune program but the rest 17 (22%) remained records unclear. 66 people (about 86%) remembered clearly that they had received vaccination when engaging in the polio-lab work, but the rest 11 (14%) with only partial vaccination records. We also noticed that the Influencing factors realted to vaccination status were: age (χ(2)=2.48, P<0.05), title (χ(2)=2.51, P<0.05), years of employment (P<0.000 1), education (χ(2)=0.74, P=0.46) and gender (χ(2)=0.46, P=0.50). Conclusion: Immune status of the Chinese provincial PNL practitioners appeared fairly good as 86% of all the workers had received polio-related vaccination, with 41% of them completed a 3-time inoculation program, when started working in this field.