ABSTRACT
"Morphological computation" is an increasingly important concept in robotics, artificial intelligence, and philosophy of the mind. It is used to understand how the body contributes to cognition and control of behavior. Its understanding in terms of "offloading" computation from the brain to the body has been criticized as misleading, and it has been suggested that the use of the concept conflates three classes of distinct processes. In fact, these criticisms implicitly hang on accepting a semantic definition of what constitutes computation. Here, I argue that an alternative, mechanistic view on computation offers a significantly different understanding of what morphological computation is. These theoretical considerations are then used to analyze the existing research program in developmental biology, which understands morphogenesis, the process of development of shape in biological systems, as a computational process. This important line of research shows that cognition and intelligence can be found across all scales of life, as the proponents of the basal cognition research program propose. Hence, clarifying the connection between morphological computation and morphogenesis allows for strengthening the role of the former concept in this emerging research field.
ABSTRACT
Theodor Boveri's (1862-1915) and Eric Davidson's (1937-2015) achievements represent thoroughly two quite distant time frames in the history of the mechanistic approaches to development, that Jane Maienschein (2014) has characterized respectively as the era of the "experimental embryo" and of the "computed embryo". Nonetheless, Davidson's special bond to Boveri is meant to emphasize the genealogical continuity of an embryological tradition of mechanistic philosophy that, differently from molecular biology, is committed to an explanation of the hereditary transmission of organization. Davidson's genealogical claim is reconsidered through a contextualized analysis of the function of machine-like models and of the role of experiment in the making of their respective mechanistic philosophies. This analysis may help to shed light on resilience and change in the understanding of a mechanistic approach to development.
Subject(s)
Aquatic Organisms/growth & development , Developmental Biology/history , Invertebrates/growth & development , Vertebrates/growth & development , Animals , History, 19th Century , History, 20th CenturyABSTRACT
O objetivo deste trabalho foi delinear uma proposta possível de síntese entre análise do comportamento e neurociências a partir do exame de seus fundamentos teóricofilosóficos. Para tanto, o primeiro passo da pesquisa consistiu na análise do posicionamento de Skinner acerca das explicações fisiológicas do comportamento. Essa análise foi realizada tendo em vista quatro questões centrais: (a) Quais são os argumentos apresentados pelo autor para justificar a autonomia da análise do comportamento perante as neurociências? (b) Quais são as suas críticas às explicações fisiológicas? (c) Quais são os interlocutores de Skinner em suas críticas? (d) Qual é, para Skinner, a real função das neurociências na explicação do comportamento? Após a realização desse estágio, procedemos à análise dos fundamentos teórico-filosóficos das neurociências, que teve como fio condutor duas metateorias presentes na área: a metateoria cognitivista, normalmente associada à neurociência cognitiva, e a metateoria mecanicista, ligada às neurociências celular e molecular. Concluímos que, ao contrário da metateoria cognitivista, que é plenamente incompatível com o behaviorismo radical, a metateoria mecanicista apresenta estratégias de pesquisa semelhantes às da análise do comportamento. Por fim, visando contribuir para o estabelecimento de um núcleo teórico-filosófico comum à análise do comportamento e às neurociências, encerramos o trabalho com reflexões acerca de tópicos pertinentes ao tema, estando entre eles a aproximação entre o behaviorismo radical e a metateoria mecanicista; a abordagem integrativa e descentralizadora denominada sistema comportamental; o operacionismo skinneriano e o significado dos termos psicológicos; e a importância da síntese entre análise do comportamento e neurociências(AU)
The aim of this work was to propose a possible synthesis between behavior analysis and neuroscience through the exam of its theoretical and philosophical foundations. To do so, we started by providing answers to the following questions regarding Skinners ideas about neuroscience: (a) What arguments did Skinner present in order to justify the independence of behavior analysis from physiology? (b) What were his criticisms against physiological explanations of behavior? (c) Who were the main targets of Skinners criticism? (d) What was for him the real function of neuroscience in the explanation of behavior? We proceeded then to the analysis of neurosciences theoretical and philosophical foundations. This analysis was based upon two main metatheories associated to the field: the cognitive metatheory, related to cognitive neuroscience, and the mechanistic metatheory, related to cellular and molecular neuroscience. We concluded that while cognitive metatheory is incompatible with behavior analysis, there are relevant similarities between the mechanistic thinking and radical behaviorism. The final chapter was dedicated to the discussion of some topics related to this matter, among which were the similarities between radical behaviorism and mechanistic metatheory; the integrative and decentralized approach called behavioral system; Skinners operationism and the meaning of psychological terms; and the very importance of the synthesis between behavior analysis and neuroscience to the explanation of behavi(AU)
