Incentivized collaborative care to disseminate and enhance contingency-management services.

Contingency management is especially effective in supporting medication adherence and drug abstinence among people with opioid use disorder. However, the incorporation of contingency management into clinical practice has been slow. The present study was designed to evaluate the feasibility, acceptability, and usability of incentives for providers as a means of accelerating collaborative care with contingency management. Thirteen buprenorphine prescribers served as participants in a nonexperimental study. The prescribers who referred patients to a contingency-management service received monetary incentives for reviewing patient performance data and describing their use of these data in treatment decisions. The results show that this approach is feasible, acceptable, and easy to use for everyone involved. Self-reports indicate improved prescriber-patient relationships and more informed care. However, prescriber-focused incentives did not appear to greatly enhance access to contingency-management services for patients. Thus, provider incentives may be beneficial but further research is needed to advance adoption of contingency management.

Illustrating the Financial Consequences of Outcome-Based Payment Models From a Payers Perspective: The Case of Autologous Gene Therapy Atidarsagene Autotemcel (Libmeldy®).

OBJECTIVES: To illustrate the financial consequences of implementing different managed entry agreements (managed entry agreements for the Dutch healthcare system for autologous gene therapy atidarsagene autotemcel [Libmeldy]), while also providing a first systematic guidance on how to construct managed entry agreements to aid future reimbursement decision making and create patient access to high-cost, one-off potentially curative therapies. METHODS: Three payment models were compared: (1) an arbitrary 60% price discount, (2) an outcome-based spread payment with discounts, and (3) an outcome-based spread payment linked to a willingness to pay model with discounts. Financial consequences were estimated for full responders (A), patients responding according to the predicted clinical pathway presented in health technology assessment reports (B), and unstable responders (C). The associated costs for an average patient during the time frame of the payment agreement, the total budget impact, and associated benefits expressed in quality-adjusted life-years of the patient population were calculated. RESULTS: When patients responded according to the predicted clinical pathway presented in health technology assessment reports (scenario B), implementing outcome-based reimbursement models (models 2 and 3) had lower associated budget impacts while gaining similar benefits compared with the discount (scenario 1, €8.9 million to €6.6 million vs €9.2 million). In the case of unstable responders (scenario C), costs for payers are lower in the outcome-based scenarios (€4.1 million and €3.0 million, scenario 2C and 3C, respectively) compared with implementing the discount (€9.2 million, scenario 1C). CONCLUSIONS: Outcome-based models can mitigate the financial risk of reimbursing atidarsagene autotemcel. This can be considerably beneficial over simple discounts when clinical performance was similar to or worse than predicted.

Understanding the municipal-level design and adaptation of pay-for-performance schemes across two states of Brazil.

The design of complex health systems interventions, such as pay for performance (P4P), can be critical to determining such programmes' success. In P4P programmes, the design of financial incentives is crucial in shaping how these programmes work. However, the design of such schemes is usually homogenous across providers within a given scheme. Consequently, there is a limited understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of P4P design elements from the implementers' perspective. This study takes advantage of the unique context of Brazil, where municipalities adapted the federal incentive design, resulting in variations in incentive design across municipalities. The study aims to understand why municipalities in Brazil chose certain P4P design features, the associated challenges, and the local adaptations made to address problems in scheme design. This study was a multiple-case study design relying on qualitative data from twenty municipalities from two states in northeastern Brazil. We conducted two key informant interviews with municipal-level stakeholders and focus group discussions with primary care providers. We also reviewed municipal PMAQ laws in each municipality. We found substantial variation in the design choices made by municipalities regarding 'who was incentivised', the 'payment size' and 'frequency'. Design choices affected relationships within municipalities and within teams. Challenges were chiefly associated with fairness relating to 'who received the incentive', 'what is incentivised', and the 'incentive size'. Adaptations were made to improve fairness, mostly in response to pressure from the healthcare workers. The significant variation in design choices across municipalities and providers' response to them highlights the importance of considering local context in the design and implementation of P4P schemes and ensuring flexibility to accommodate local preferences and emerging needs. Attention is needed to ensure the choice of 'who is incentivised' and the 'size of incentives' are inclusive and fair, and the allocation and 'use of funds' are transparent.

Does pay-for-performance design matter? Evidence from Brazil.

Pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes have been shown to have mixed effects on health care outcomes. A challenge in interpreting this evidence is that P4P is often considered a homogenous intervention, when in practice schemes vary widely in their design. Our study contributes to this literature by providing a detailed depiction of incentive design across municipalities within a national P4P scheme in Brazil [Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ)] and exploring the association of alternative design typologies with the performance of primary health care providers. We carried out a nation-wide survey of municipal health managers to characterize the scheme design, based on the size of the bonus, the providers incentivized and the frequency of payment. Using OLS regressions and controlling for municipality characteristics, we examined whether each design feature was associated with better family health team (FHT) performance. To capture potential interactions between design features, we used cluster analysis to group municipalities into five design typologies and then examined associations with quality of care. A majority of the municipalities included in our study used some of the PMAQ funds to provide bonuses to FHT workers, while the remaining municipalities spent the funds in the traditional way using input-based budgets. Frequent bonus payments (monthly) and higher size bonus allocations (share of 20-80%) were strongly associated with better team performance, while who within a team was eligible to receive bonuses did not in isolation appear to influence performance. The cluster analysis showed what combinations of design features were associated with better performance. The PMAQ score in the 'large bonus/many workers/high-frequency' cluster was 8.44 points higher than the 'no bonus' cluster, equivalent to a difference of 21.7% in the mean PMAQ score. Evidence from our study shows how design features can potentially influence health provider performance, informing the design of more effective P4P schemes.

The fairness of human resource management practices: an assessment by the justice sensitive.

Introduction: Although fairness is a pervasive and ongoing concern in organizations, the fairness of human resource management practices is often overlooked. This study examines how individual differences in justice sensitivity influence the extent to which human resource management practices are perceived to convey principles of organizational justice. Methods: Analysis was performed on a matching sample of 283 university students from three academic units in two countries having responded at two time points. Justice sensitivity was measured with the 40-item inventory developed and validated by Schmitt et al. (2010). Respondents were instructed to indicate to what extent each of 61 human resource management practices generally conveys principles of organizational justice. Results: Justice sensitivity was positively associated with subsequent assessments of the justice contents of human resource management practices. The distinction between self-oriented and other-oriented justice sensitivities was helpful in determining perceptions of these human resource management practices and of a subset of pay-for-performance practices. Discussion: The findings inform current research about the meanings borne by human resource management practices, and also increase understanding of entity judgment formation as an important aspect of systemic justice.

A Randomized Controlled Trial of a Pay-for-Performance Initiative to Reduce Costs of Care for High-Need Psychiatric Patients.

OBJECTIVE: Pay-for-performance (P4P) initiatives hold promise for improving health care delivery but are rarely applied to behavioral health or tested in randomized controlled trials (RCTs). This RCT examined the effectiveness of a P4P initiative to reduce total cost of 24-hour care among patients with high needs for psychiatric care in a large county in California. METHODS: From August 2016 to March 2022, a total of 652 adult residents of Santa Clara County, California, were enrolled in a P4P initiative (mean±SD age=46.7±13.3 years, 61% male, 51% White, and 60% diagnosed as having a bipolar or psychotic disorder). Participants were randomly assigned to usual full-service partnerships from the county (N=327) or a comparable level of care from a contractor who agreed to a schedule of financial penalties and rewards based on whether enrollees (N=325) used more or less care than a historical cohort of similar county patients. The primary outcome was total cost of 24-hour psychiatric services. Secondary outcomes were costs of each of the 24-hour care services. RESULTS: The proportion of the total sample that used 24-hour psychiatric services decreased over the 36-month study period. Intent-to-treat analyses revealed no differences between the two study conditions in total care costs during the follow-up period. No significant care utilization differences were observed between the two conditions in most of the individual 24-hour services. CONCLUSIONS: A P4P initiative for high-need patients was no more effective than usual care for reducing costs of 24-hour psychiatric care.

Effect on hospital incentive payments and quality performance of a hospital pay for performance (P4P) programme in Belgium.

BACKGROUND: Belgium initiated a hospital pay for performance (P4P) programme after a decade of fixed bonus budgets for "quality and safety contracts". This study examined the effect of P4P on hospital incentive payments, performance on quality measures, and the association between changes in quality performance and incentive payments over time. METHODS: The Belgian government provided information on fixed bonus budgets in 2013-2017 and hospital incentive payments as well as hospital performance on quality measures for the P4P programmes in 2018-2020. Descriptive analyses were conducted to map the financial repercussion between the two systems. A difference-in-difference analysis evaluated the association between quality indicator performance and received incentive payments over time. RESULTS: Data from 87 acute-care hospitals were analyzed. In the transition to a P4P programme, 29% of hospitals received lower incentive payments per bed. During the P4P years, quality performance scores increased yearly for 55% of hospitals and decreased yearly for 5% of hospitals. There was a significant larger drop in incentive payments for hospitals that scored above median with the start of the P4P programme. CONCLUSIONS: The transition from fixed bonus budgets for quality efforts to a new incentive payment in a P4P programme has led to more hospitals being financially impacted, although the effect is marginal given the small P4P budget. Quality indicators seem to improve over the years, but this does not correlate with an increase in reward per bed for all hospitals due to the closed nature of the budget.

Impact of reimbursement systems on patient care - a systematic review of systematic reviews.

BACKGROUND: There is not yet sufficient scientific evidence to answer the question of the extent to which different reimbursement systems influence patient care and treatment quality. Due to the asymmetry of information between physicians, health insurers and patients, market-based mechanisms are necessary to ensure the best possible patient care. The aim of this study is to investigate how reimbursement systems influence multiple areas of patient care in form of structure, process and outcome indicators. METHODS: For this purpose, a systematic literature review of systematic reviews is conducted in the databases PubMed, Web of Science and the Cochrane Library. The reimbursement systems of salary, bundled payment, fee-for-service and value-based reimbursement are examined. Patient care is divided according to the three dimensions of structure, process, and outcome and evaluated in eight subcategories. RESULTS: A total of 34 reviews of 971 underlying primary studies are included in this article. International studies identified the greatest effects in categories resource utilization and quality/health outcomes. Pay-for-performance and bundled payments were the most commonly studied models. Among the systems examined, fee-for-service and value-based reimbursement systems have the most positive impact on patient care. CONCLUSION: Patient care can be influenced by the choice of reimbursement system. The factors for successful implementation need to be further explored in future research.

Primary care providers' preferences for pay-for-performance programs: a discrete choice experiment study in Shandong China.

BACKGROUND: Pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes are commonly used to incentivize primary healthcare (PHC) providers to improve the quality of care they deliver. However, the effectiveness of P4P schemes can vary depending on their design. In this study, we aimed to investigate the preferences of PHC providers for participating in P4P programs in a city in Shandong province, China. METHOD: We conducted a discrete choice experiment (DCE) with 882 PHC providers, using six attributes: type of incentive, whom to incentivize, frequency of incentive, size of incentive, the domain of performance measurement, and release of performance results. Mixed logit models and latent class models were used for the statistical analyses. RESULTS: Our results showed that PHC providers had a strong negative preference for fines compared to bonuses (- 1.91; 95%CI - 2.13 to - 1.69) and for annual incentive payments compared to monthly (- 1.37; 95%CI - 1.59 to - 1.14). Providers also showed negative preferences for incentive size of 60% of monthly income, group incentives, and non-release of performance results. On the other hand, an incentive size of 20% of monthly income and including quality of care in performance measures were preferred. We identified four distinct classes of providers with different preferences for P4P schemes. Class 2 and Class 3 valued most of the attributes differently, while Class 1 and Class 4 had a relatively small influence from most attributes. CONCLUSION: P4P schemes that offer bonuses rather than fines, monthly rather than annual payments, incentive size of 20% of monthly income, paid to individuals, including quality of care in performance measures, and release of performance results are likely to be more effective in improving PHC performance. Our findings also highlight the importance of considering preference heterogeneity when designing P4P schemes.

A new look at physicians' responses to financial incentives: Quality of care, practice characteristics, and motivations.

There is considerable controversy about what causes (in)effectiveness of physician performance pay in improving the quality of care. Using a behavioral experiment with German primary-care physicians, we study the incentive effect of performance pay on service provision and quality of care. To explore whether variations in quality are based on the incentive scheme and the interplay with physicians' real-world profit orientation and patient-regarding motivations, we link administrative data on practice characteristics and survey data on physicians' attitudes with experimental data. We find that, under performance pay, quality increases by about 7pp compared to baseline capitation. While the effect increases with the severity of illness, the bonus level does not significantly affect the quality of care. Data linkage indicates that primary-care physicians in high-profit practices provide a lower quality of care. Physicians' other-regarding motivations and attitudes are significant drivers of high treatment quality.

Value-Based Health Care in Perioperative Medicine: Process Maps and Costing to Determine Best Practices.

Perioperative care in the United States is largely based on current fee-for-service models. Fee-for-service models are not based on the true cost of services provided, charges do not equal costs, and reimbursement varies based on insurer. Value-based health care is defined as patient-centered outcomes over cost of providing these services. Process mapping and time-driven activity-based costing can be used to define actual cost of services provided. Outcomes after discharge can be measured, so that the overall value of care provided can be assessed and improved based on the outcomes and costs identified.

Financial incentives for integrated care: A scoping review and lessons for evidence-based design.

BACKGROUND: In response to the increasing prevalence of people with chronic conditions, healthcare systems restructure to integrate care across providers. However, many systems fail to achieve the desired outcomes. One likely explanation is lack of financial incentives for integrating care. OBJECTIVES: We aim to identify financial incentives used to promote integrated care across different types of providers for patients with common chronic conditions and assess the evidence on (cost-)effectiveness and the facilitators/barriers to their implementation. METHODS: This scoping review identifies studies published before December 2021, and includes 33 studies from the United States and the Netherlands. RESULTS: We identify four types of financial incentives: shared savings, bundled payments, pay for performance, and pay for coordination. Substantial heterogeneity in the (cost-)effectiveness of these incentives exists. Key implementation barriers are a lack of infrastructure (e.g., electronic medical records, communication channels, and clinical guidelines). To facilitate integration, financial incentives should be easy to communicate and implement, and require additional financial support, IT support, training, and guidelines. CONCLUSIONS: All four types of financial incentives may promote integrated care but not in all contexts. Shared savings appears to be the most promising incentive type for promoting (cost-)effective care integration with the largest number of favourable studies allowing causal interpretations. The limited evidence pool makes it hard to draw firm conclusions that are transferable across contexts.

Society for Maternal-Fetal Medicine Special Statement: Clinical quality measures in obstetrics.

This article provides an updated overview and critique of clinical quality measures relevant to obstetrical care. The history of the quality movement in the United States and the proliferation of quality metrics over the past quarter-century are reviewed. Common uses of quality measures are summarized: payment programs, accreditation, public reporting, and quality improvement projects. We present listings of metrics that are reported by physicians or hospitals, either voluntarily or by mandate, to government agencies, payers, "watchdog" ratings organizations, and other entities. The costs and other burdens of extracting data and reporting metrics are summarized. The potential for unintended adverse consequences of the use of quality metrics is discussed along with approaches to mitigating adverse consequences. Finally, some recent attempts to develop simplified core measure sets are presented, with the promise that the complex and burdensome quality-metric enterprise may improve in the near future.

Diabetes self-management education on the sustainability of metabolic control in type 2 diabetes patients: Diabetes share care program in Taiwan.

BACKGROUND: Diabetes self-management education (DSME) improves glycemic and metabolic control. However, the frequency, duration and sustainability of DSME for improving metabolic control have not been well studied. METHODS: The Diabetes Share Care Program (DSCP) stage 1 provided DSME every 3 months. If participants entering DSCP stage 1 ≥ 2 years and HbA1c < 7%, they can be transferred to stage 2 (DSME frequency: once a year). Three-to-one matching between DSCP stage 1 and stage 2 groups based on the propensity score method to match the two groups in terms of HbA1c and diabetes duration. We identified 311 people living with type 2 diabetes in DSCP stage 1 and 86 in stage 2 and evaluated their metabolic control and healthy behaviors annually for 5 years. RESULTS: In the first year, HbA1c in the DSCP stage 2 group was significantly lower than that in the stage 1 group. In the first and the fifth years, the percentage of patients achieving HbA1c < 7% was significantly higher in the DSCP stage 2 group than the stage 1 group. There was no significant difference in other metabolic parameters between the two groups during the 5-year follow-up. Self-monitoring of blood glucose (SMBG) frequency was associated with a reduced HbA1c after 5 years (95% CI: -0.0665 to -0.0004). CONCLUSION: We demonstrated sustainable effects of at least 2-year DSME on achieving better glycemic control for at least 1 year. SMBG contributed to improved glycemic control. The results may be applied to the reimbursement strategy in diabetes education.

Use of statewide financial incentives to improve documentation of hernia and mesh characteristics in ventral hernia repair.

BACKGROUND: Documentation of intraoperative details is critical for understanding and advancing hernia care, but is inconsistent in practice. Therefore, to improve data capture on a statewide level, we implemented a financial incentive targeting documentation of hernia defect size and mesh use. METHODS: The Abdominal Hernia Care Pathway (AHCP), a voluntary pay for performance (P4P) initiative, was introduced in 2021 within the statewide Michigan Surgical Quality Collaborative (MSQC). This consisted of an organizational-level financial incentive for achieving 80% performance on eight specific process measures for ventral hernia surgery, including complete documentation of hernia defect size and location, as well as mesh characteristics and fixation technique. Comparisons were made between AHCP and non-AHCP sites in 2021. RESULTS: Of 69 eligible sites, 47 participated in the AHCP in 2021. There were N = 5362 operations (4169 at AHCP sites; 1193 at non-AHCP sites). At AHCP sites, 69.8% of operations had complete hernia documentation, compared to 50.5% at non-AHCP sites (p < 0.0001). At AHCP sites, 91.4% of operations had complete mesh documentation, compared to 86.5% at non-AHCP sites (p < 0.0001). The site-level hernia documentation goal of 80% was reached by 14 of 47 sites (range 14-100%). The mesh documentation goal was reached by 41 of 47 sites (range 4-100%). CONCLUSIONS: Addition of an organizational-level financial incentive produced marked gains in documentation of intra-operative details across a statewide surgical collaborative. The relatively large effect size-19.3% for hernia-is remarkable among P4P initiatives. This result may have been facilitated by surgeons' direct role in documenting hernia size and mesh use. These improvements in data capture will foster understanding of current hernia practices on a large scale and may serve as a model for improvement in collaboratives nationally.

Pay-for-performance programs effectiveness in healthcare: the case of the end-stage renal disease quality incentive program.

This paper focuses on Medicare's End-Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program (QIP). QIP aims to promote high-quality services in outpatient dialysis facilities by tying their payments to their performance on pre-specified quality measures. In this paper, employing principal-agent theory, we examine the effectiveness of QIP by exploring the changes in various clinical/operational measures when they become a part of the program as a performance measure. We study five QIP quality measures; two are operational: hospitalization and readmission. And three others are clinical: blood transfusion, hypercalcemia, and dialysis adequacy. Overall, we observe a significant improvement in all QIP quality measures after being included in the program, except for readmission. We recommend adjusting the weight and redesigning the readmission measure for Medicare to incentivize providers to reduce readmission. We also discuss establishing care coordination and employing data-driven clinical decision support systems as opportunities for dialysis facilities to improve the care delivery process.

Association of a Heart Failure Management Incentive in Primary Care With Clinical Outcomes: A Retrospective Cohort Study.

BACKGROUND: We aim to examine the association between primary care physicians' billing of Q050A, a pay-for-performance heart failure (HF) management incentive fee code, and the composite outcome of mortality, hospitalization, and emergency department visits. METHODS AND RESULTS: This population-based cohort study linked administrative health databases in Ontario, Canada, for patients with HF aged >66 years between January 1, 2008, and March 31, 2020. Cases were patients with HF who had a Q050A fee code billed. Cases and controls were matched 1:1 on age, sex, patient status on being rostered to a primary care physician, cardiologist, or internist visit in the 6 months before study enrollment, Johns Hopkins Adjusted Clinical Group resource use bands, days between HF diagnosis and study enrollment (±2 years), and the logit of the propensity score. A Cox proportional hazards model assessed the association of Q050A with the outcome. A total of 59 664 cases had a Q050A billed, whereas 244 883 patients did not. Before matching, patients who had a Q050A billed were more likely to be men (52% versus 49%), were rostered to a primary care physician (100% versus 96%), had a higher Charlson Comorbidity Index, and had higher health care costs. The mean follow-up was 481 days for cases and 530 days for controls. The composite outcome (hazard ratio, 1.11 [95% CI, 1.09-1.12]) was significantly higher for cases than controls. CONCLUSIONS: The Q050A incentive improved financial compensation for primary care physicians managing patients with HF but was not associated with improvements in the outcome. Research on promoting evidence-based HF management is warranted.

How to further develop quality competition in the German healthcare system? Results of a Delphi expert study.

INTRODUCTION: Many international healthcare systems use quality competition to improve the quality of care. The corresponding instruments include quality measurement, public reporting, selective contracting, and pay for performance. The German healthcare system clearly shows that the possibilities are often limited in the status quo. Therefore, a need for practicable and evidence-based proposals are necessary to further the development of quality competition. METHODS: We conducted a national analysis and an international comparison (Switzerland, Netherlands and USA) as a pre-study to derive recommendations. On this basis, we designed a Delphi study with a consensus objective. Experts from relevant stakeholder groups in the German healthcare system were selected using purposive sampling for this study. RESULTS: The experts saw potential for quality improvement in the further development of quality competition. Quality measurement and public reporting were rated as empowering tools. There was mostly disagreement on whether quality competition should be further developed in a more regulatory or entrepreneur-based manner. However, there was a clear consensus that further development must be coordinated between the stakeholders, step-by-step and scientifically supported. In addition, the impulse should be supported by a legislatively introduced reform. CONCLUSIONS: Finally, these empirically based recommendations highlight the need for a coordinated coexistence of a top-down and a bottom-up approach. The developed blueprint proposal serves as an impetus for practical considerations of implementation.

Diabetes Pay-for-Performance Program Participation and Dialysis Risk in Relation to Educational Attainment: A Retrospective Cohort Study.

Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs for diabetes care enable the provision of comprehensive and continuous health care to diabetic patients. However, patient outcomes may be affected by the patient's educational attainment. The present retrospective cohort study aimed to examine the effects of the educational attainment of diabetic patients on participation in a P4P program in Taiwan and the risk of dialysis. The data were obtained from the National Health Insurance Research Database of Taiwan. Patients newly diagnosed with type 2 diabetes mellitus (T2DM) aged 45 years from 2002 to 2015 were enrolled and observed until the end of 2017. The effects of their educational attainment on their participation in a P4P program were examined using the Cox proportional hazards model, while the impact on their risk for dialysis was investigated using the Cox proportional hazards model. The probability of participation in the P4P program was significantly higher in subjects with a junior high school education or above than in those who were illiterate or had only attained an elementary school education. Subjects with higher educational attainment exhibited a lower risk for dialysis. Different educational levels had similar effects on reducing dialysis risk among diabetic participants in the P4P program.

Pay-for-Performance incentives for specialised services in England: a mixed methods evaluation.

BACKGROUND: A Pay-for-Performance (P4P) programme, known as Prescribed Specialised Services Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (PSS CQUIN), was introduced for specialised services in the English NHS in 2013/2014. These services treat patients with rare and complex conditions. We evaluate the implementation of PSS CQUIN contracts between 2016/2017 and 2018/2019. METHODS: We used a mixed methods evaluative approach. In the quantitative analysis, we used a difference-in-differences design to evaluate the effectiveness of ten PSS CQUIN schemes across a range of targeted outcomes. Potential selection bias was addressed using propensity score matching. We also estimated impacts on costs by scheme and financial year. In the qualitative analysis, we conducted semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions to gain insights into the complexities of contract design and programme implementation. Qualitative data analysis was based on the constant comparative method, inductively generating themes. RESULTS: The ten PSS CQUIN schemes had limited impact on the targeted outcomes. A statistically significant improvement was found for only one scheme: in the clinical area of trauma, the incentive scheme increased the probability of being discharged from Adult Critical Care within four hours of being clinically ready by 7%. The limited impact may be due to the size of the incentive payments, the complexity of the schemes' design, and issues around ownership, contracting and flexibility. CONCLUSION: The PSS CQUIN schemes had little or no impact on quality improvements in specialised services. Future P4P programmes in healthcare could benefit from lessons learnt from this study on incentive design and programme implementation.