ABSTRACT
The organization of fisheries in the Amazon region is an important theme, since the current management model is based mainly on the closed fishing season policy. This strategy suspends the catching of specific fish stocks and provides subsidies to professional fishers. Thus, the present study analyzed, through mathematical modeling, the behavioral interfaces of illegal fisheries that occurred between 1992 to 2017 in the Amazon basin, considering the hydrological seasonality and the effect of the presence or absence of the Closed Fishing Season law (CFSL). The data were tabulated and used for the construction of two illegal fishing scenarios. The first showed negative impacts with the absence of the CFSL, indicated by the high number of seizures of illegal catches that occurred during the period in which river water level is rising and showed continued growth over time. However, the second scenario showed apprehension apexes occurring at the beginning of the high-water level and at beginning of the low water level, with a continuous decrease in the seizures of illegal catches due to the new law. Thus, the ecosystem model constructed is a promising instrument for testing hypotheses and for formulating and monitoring management scenarios for fisheries in the region.(AU)
O ordenamento pesqueiro na região amazônica é um tema importante, uma vez que o atual modelo de gestão se baseia principalmente na política do defeso. Essa estratégia suspende a captura de estoques específicos de peixes e fornece subsídios aos pescadores profissionais. Assim, o presente estudo analisou, por meio da modelagem matemática, as interfaces comportamentais da pesca ilegal que ocorreram entre 1992 e 2017 na bacia Amazônica, considerando a sazonalidade hidrológica e o efeito da presença ou ausência da Lei do Defeso (LD). Os dados foram tabulados e utilizados para a construção de dois cenários de pesca ilegal. O primeiro apresentou impactos negativos com a ausência da LD, apontado pelo elevado número de apreensões de pescado ilegais que ocorreram durante o período da enchente, momento em que o nível da água do rio está subindo, e apresentou crescimento contínuo ao longo do tempo. No entanto, o segundo cenário mostrou ápices de apreensões ocorridas no início da cheia e no início da seca, com redução contínua das apreensões de capturas ilegais devido a lei LD. Assim, o modelo ecossistêmico construído é um instrumento promissor para testar hipóteses e para formular e monitorar cenários de gestão para a pesca na região.(AU)
Subject(s)
Animals , Fishing Industry , Products Arrest , Legislation, Environmental , Fishes , Amazonian EcosystemABSTRACT
The organization of fisheries in the Amazon region is an important theme, since the current management model is based mainly on the closed fishing season policy. This strategy suspends the catching of specific fish stocks and provides subsidies to professional fishers. Thus, the present study analyzed, through mathematical modeling, the behavioral interfaces of illegal fisheries that occurred between 1992 to 2017 in the Amazon basin, considering the hydrological seasonality and the effect of the presence or absence of the Closed Fishing Season law (CFSL). The data were tabulated and used for the construction of two illegal fishing scenarios. The first showed negative impacts with the absence of the CFSL, indicated by the high number of seizures of illegal catches that occurred during the period in which river water level is rising and showed continued growth over time. However, the second scenario showed apprehension apexes occurring at the beginning of the high-water level and at beginning of the low water level, with a continuous decrease in the seizures of illegal catches due to the new law. Thus, the ecosystem model constructed is a promising instrument for testing hypotheses and for formulating and monitoring management scenarios for fisheries in the region.
O ordenamento pesqueiro na região amazônica é um tema importante, uma vez que o atual modelo de gestão se baseia principalmente na política do defeso. Essa estratégia suspende a captura de estoques específicos de peixes e fornece subsídios aos pescadores profissionais. Assim, o presente estudo analisou, por meio da modelagem matemática, as interfaces comportamentais da pesca ilegal que ocorreram entre 1992 e 2017 na bacia Amazônica, considerando a sazonalidade hidrológica e o efeito da presença ou ausência da Lei do Defeso (LD). Os dados foram tabulados e utilizados para a construção de dois cenários de pesca ilegal. O primeiro apresentou impactos negativos com a ausência da LD, apontado pelo elevado número de apreensões de pescado ilegais que ocorreram durante o período da enchente, momento em que o nível da água do rio está subindo, e apresentou crescimento contínuo ao longo do tempo. No entanto, o segundo cenário mostrou ápices de apreensões ocorridas no início da cheia e no início da seca, com redução contínua das apreensões de capturas ilegais devido a lei LD. Assim, o modelo ecossistêmico construído é um instrumento promissor para testar hipóteses e para formular e monitorar cenários de gestão para a pesca na região.
Subject(s)
Animals , Products Arrest , Fishing Industry , Legislation, Environmental , Fishes , Amazonian EcosystemABSTRACT
Illegal fishing poses a major threat to conservation of marine resources worldwide. However, there is still limited empirical research that quantifies illegal catch levels. We used the randomized response technique to estimate the proportion of divers and the quantities of loco (Concholepas concholepas) they extracted illegally. Loco have been managed for the past 17 years through a territorial user rights for fisheries system (TURFs) in Chile. Illegal fishing of loco was widespread within the TURFs system. Official reported landings (i.e., legal landings) accounted for 14-30% of the total loco extraction. Our estimates suggest that ignoring the magnitude of illegal fishing and considering only official landing statistics may lead to false conclusions about the status and trends of a TURFs managed fishery. We found evidence of fisher associations authorizing their members to poach inside TURFs, highlighting the need to design TURFs systems so that government agencies and fishers' incentives and objectives align through continuous adaptation. Government support for enforcement is a key element for the TURFs system to secure the rights that are in place.