ABSTRACT
Neste ensaio, sustentamos a ideia de que o pensamento estruturalista faz parte da crítica espontânea aos reducionismos que cercam a psicologia. Partimos da cisão radical entre o ponto de vista cientificista e o da metafísica que se expressa nos projetos de psicologia científica do fim do século XIX. Em seguida, destacamos a importância da perspectiva estruturalista na revisão das relações antinômicas do subjetivo e do objetivo operada no seio da Psicologia ao longo do século XX. Mostramos que a rejeição da causalidade unilinear em prol da causalidade em rede freou o avanço das teorias unilaterais, ou reducionistas, na psicologia. Consideramos, ademais, a ideia de estrutura como ponto de convergência entre a psicologia e a filosofia. Acima de seu caráter explicativo, a noção de estrutura revela um registro epistemológico capaz de reaproximar a psicologia da relativização do ideal de neutralidade cientificista. A importância do pensamento estruturalista na psicologia conduz-nos à consideração da história do conhecimento psicológico enquanto tipo de investigação pertencente à história da cultura.
In this essay, we sustain the idea that structuralist thinking is part of spontaneous criticism against the reductionisms that surround psychology. We depart from the radical split-up between the scientific viewpoint and that of metaphysics, expressed in the end-19th century scientific psychology projects. Next, we highlight the importance of the structuralist perspective in the review of the antinomic relations between the subjective and objective, operated at the heart of psychology throughout the 20th century. We show that the rejection of unilineal causality in favor of network causality curbed the advancement of unilateral or reductionist theories in psychology. Moreover, we consider the idea of structure as a point of convergence between psychology andphilosophy. More than its explanatory nature, the notion of structure reveals an epistemological register capable of re-approximating psychology to the relativization of the ideal of scientificneutrality. The importance of structuralist thinking in psychology makes us consider the history of psychological knowledge as a type of research that belongs to cultural history.
Subject(s)
Humans , Knowledge , Philosophy , Psychology/historyABSTRACT
The goal of science is truth through knowledge. But medicine's truth is not altogether the same as science's truth.Science works with ideas, imagination and intuition, but essentially has to do with facts. Medicine has also to deal with meaning.This is not an argument for less science in medicine, but for more and better science; better in the sense of better attuned to 'the rest of life'.Truthfulness is a core principle of medical practice and medical science.But a kind of untruthfulness is common in day-to-day clinical practice.The fundamental untruth is the illusion of certainty.The inexcusable untruth is to reduce the patient's problem to it to its narrow biomedical parameters and to allow the patient as a person to vanish from our gaze.Science fails medicine by the narrowness of the scope of things it is willing to investigate. Important areas of medicine have been neglected as a consequence.The medical research culture must change if it is to promote science for understanding alongside science for manipulation. We need to be unsparingly critical of the distinction between useful science and wasteful science."Medical knowledge is not knowledge acquired primarily for its own sake (but) for a specific purpose-the care of the sick."(1.)
