Rawls and Animal Moral Personality.

The relationship between animal rights and contractarian theories of justice such as that of Rawls has long been vexed. In this article, I contribute to the debate over the possibility of inclusion of animals in Rawls's theory of justice by critiquing the rationale he gives for their omission: that they do not possess moral personality. Contrary to Rawls's assumptions, it appears that some animals may possess the moral powers that comprise moral personality, albeit to a lesser extent than most humans. Some animals can act in pursuit of preferences and desires (and communicate them non-verbally), which might be taken as implicitly selecting a conception of the good; further, scientific research demonstrating inequity aversion and social play behaviors suggests that some animals can have a sense of justice relating to their own social groups. I conclude that Rawls's theory needs to acknowledge any animals that can be considered to meet the threshold of moral personality, while the concept of moral personality as a range property may also require reconsideration.

Ontogénesis del sentido de justicia. El criterio de igualdad analizado desde la psicología del desarrollo / Ontogeny of the sense of justice. The criterion of equality analyzed by developmental psychology / Ontogênese do senso de justiça. O critério da igualdade analisado a partir da psicologia do desenvolvimento

Resumen: El objetivo del artículo es realizar un relevamiento de las investigaciones llevadas a cabo en el ámbito de la psicología del desarrollo en relación con la ontogénesis de la tendencia a recurrir en forma espontánea e inconsciente al criterio de igualdad en las evaluaciones de escenarios intersubjetivos. Como mostraré a lo largo del trabajo, existen dos modelos marcadamente diferentes (e incluso conflictivos en ciertos aspectos) para explicar dicho surgimiento. Un primer modelo (al que llamaré "modelo dual") propone interpretar la ontogénesis del sentido de justicia en base a dos momentos diferentes, claramente secuenciados, y expresión de mecanismos psicológicos distintos y relativamente independientes: el momento de manifestación de la Aversión a la Desigualdad Desventajosa (ADD) (alrededor de los cuatro años), y el de la Aversión a la Desigualdad Ventajosa (ADV) (alrededor de los ocho años). El segundo modelo (al que llamaré "modelo unitario") propone, por el contrario, que los niños comienzan a recurrir a criterios de igualdad cerca de los 12 meses de edad, y, fundamentalmente, que dicho criterio de igualdad es independiente de -o, al menos, lógicamente previo a- la distinción entre ADD y ADV. Sugeriré, no obstante, que la divergencia entre ambos modelos no es obstáculo para concluir que los resultados de las investigaciones realizadas durante la última década ofrecen fundamentos sólidos para comenzar a comprender la especificidad de la ontogénesis de nuestro sentido de justicia.

Abstract: The aim of the article is to offer a review of the research in developmental psychology concerning the first manifestations of our tendency to resort -in a spontaneous and unconscious manner- to the criterion of equality in our assessment of intersubjective situations. As I will show throughout the paper, two different (and even conflicting) models have been proposed to explain those early manifestations. The first model, (which I will call "dual model") suggests that we interpret the ontogenesis of our sense of justice through two distinct and clearly sequenced moments, which are the expression of two distinct and relatively independent psychological modules: the moments of manifestation of our Disadvantageous Inequality Aversion (DIA) (around four years of old) and our Advantageous Inequality Aversion (AIA) (around eight years old). The second model (which I will call "unitary model") suggests, on the contrary, that children begin to resort to the criterion of equality when they are around 12 months old, and that such criterion is independent from -or, at least, logically prior to- the distinction between DIA and AIA. I will suggest, nevertheless, that the differences between both models should not hinder us from concluding that the research produced throughout the last decade has provided us with a solid ground to begin to understand the specificity of the ontogeny of our sense of justice.

Resumo: O objetivo do artigo será fazer uma pesquisa das investigações do campo da psicologia do desenvolvimento em relação ao surgimento da tendência de se recorrer espontaneamente e inconscientemente ao critério de igualdade em nossas avaliações de cenários intersubjetivos. Embora, como vou mostrar durante todo o trabalho, há dois modelos diferentes para explicar esse surgimento, os resultados das pesquisas realizadas durante a última década oferecem bases sólidas para começar a entender a especificidade da ontogênese do nosso senso de justiça.

The Moral Importance of Reflective Empathy.

This is a reply to Jesse Prinz and Paul Bloom's skepticism about the moral importance of empathy. It concedes that empathy is spontaneously biased to individuals who are spatio-temporally close, as well as discriminatory in other ways, and incapable of accommodating large numbers of individuals. But it is argued that we could partly correct these shortcomings of empathy by a guidance of reason because empathy for others consists in imagining what they feel, and, importantly, such acts of imagination can be voluntary - and, thus, under the influence of reflection - as well as automatic. Since empathizing with others motivates concern for their welfare, a reflectively justified empathy will lead to a likewise justified altruistic concern. In addition, we argue that such concern supports another central moral attitude, namely a sense of justice or fairness.

The Distinction of the Sense of Justice between Western & Chinese Societies and Its Effect on Regulatory Ethics / 中国医学伦理学

This article discusses the variation process of the sense of justice in western and traditional Chinese society,and its effect on regulatory ethics.Western regulatory ethics takes "making use of evil to restrain evil" as its regulatory principle,whose purpose is "to increase goodness by evil",while Chinese regulatory ethics employs "taking goodness in restraining evil" as its regulatory principle.The Chinese regulatory ethics puts morality in the first place,using morality to replace regulatory systems.The distinctions of cultures and the sense of justice between western and Chinese societies cause the different viewpoints in relevant systems and regulations.