Lost in pandemic time: a phenomenological analysis of temporal disorientation during the Covid-19 crisis.

People have experienced many forms of temporal disorientation during the Covid-19 crisis. For this study, we collected a rich corpus of reports on the multifaceted experiences of disorientation during the pandemic. In this paper, we study the resulting corpus using a descriptive approach. We identify six emerging themes: temporal rift; temporal vertigo; impoverished time; tunnel vision; spatial and social scaffolding of time; suspended time. We offer a phenomenological analysis of each of the themes. Based on the phenomenological analysis, we draw a key distinction between episodic and existential forms of temporal disorientation, and we argue that the Covid-19 crisis is best conceptualised as a period of suspended time.

Time experience in patients with schizophrenia and affective disorders.

BACKGROUND: The experience of time, or the temporal order of external and internal events, is essential for humans. In psychiatric disorders such as depression and schizophrenia, impairment of time processing has been discussed for a long time. AIMS: In this explorative pilot study, therefore, the subjective time feeling as well as objective time perception were determined in patients with depression and schizophrenia, along with possible neurobiological correlates. METHODS: Depressed (n = 34; 32.4 ± 9.8 years; 21 men) and schizophrenic patients (n = 31; 35.1 ± 10.7 years; 22 men) and healthy subjects (n = 33; 32.8 ± 14.3 years; 16 men) were tested using time feeling questionnaires, time perception tasks and critical flicker-fusion frequency (CFF) and loudness dependence of auditory evoked potentials (LDAEP) to determine serotonergic neurotransmission. RESULTS: There were significant differences between the three groups regarding time feeling and also in time perception tasks (estimation of given time duration) and CFF (the "DOWN" condition). Regarding the LDAEP, patients with schizophrenia showed a significant negative correlation to time experience in terms of a pathologically increased serotonergic neurotransmission with disturbed time feeling. CONCLUSIONS: Impairment of time experience seems to play an important role in depression and schizophrenia, both subjectively and objectively, and novel neurobiological correlates have been uncovered. It is suggested, therefore, that alteration of experience of time should be increasingly included in the current psychopathological findings.

Scale for Space and Time Experience in Psychosis: Converging Phenomenological and Psychopathological Perspectives.

INTRODUCTION: Abnormalities in the experience of space and time are fundamental to understanding schizophrenia spectrum disorders, but the precise relation between such abnormalities and psychopathological symptoms is still unclear. Therefore, the aim of our study was to introduce a novel scale for space and time experience in psychosis (STEP), specifically devised to assess schizophrenia spectrum disorders. METHODS: The STEP scale is a semiquantitative instrument developed on the basis of several items from previous scales and phenomenological reports addressing the experience of space and time. We applied the STEP scale to three groups of subjects (patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders, patients with predominant affective symptoms, and healthy control subjects), to whom we also applied other more general psychopathological scales, such as the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale and the Ego-Psychopathology Inventory. RESULTS: Patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders scored significantly higher on general psychopatho--logical scales relative to subjects belonging to the other groups. The STEP scale provided good psychometric properties regarding reliability. We also tested convergent and divergent validity of the STEP scale and found that space and time subscale scores of STEP significantly correlated with each other, as well as with the remaining general psychopathological scores. DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION: We introduced the STEP scale as a novel instrument for the assessment of experience of space and time. Its psychometric properties showed high validity and reliability to identify psychopathological symptoms and enabled to differentiate patients with predominantly psychotic symptoms from those with predominantly affective symptoms. The STEP scale provides a standardized measure for assessing disturbances in the experience of space and time. Furthermore, it probably represents a leap forward toward the establishment of an additional dimension of symptoms proposed as "spatiotemporal psychopathology."

[Disturbances of time experience in mental disorders]. / Störungen der Erfahrung von Zeit bei psychischen Erkrankungen.

Experience of time is a field of only little research in psychiatry which is and was often induced by philosophers interested in the human existence in time. This review article underlines the importance to differentiate between several forms of time experience. With respect to current knowledge, there are disturbances of time experience in the sense of knowledge about basal temporal relations only in organic brain disorders, while objective time perception was found to be changed in patients with schizophrenia, but less in those with depression. In contrast, the subjective time feeling seems to be disturbed in several psychiatric diseases. Up to now, however, it is still unclear how especially the subjective time feeling as a psychopathological alteration could be best scientifically investigated, without focusing only on the phenomenological single case level. Therefore, time experience should be studied at different levels of time perception and time feeling in mental disorders combined also with modern neurobiological methods, such as EEG and fMRI, in order to clarify in which specific way changed time experience is present in mentally ill patients and how this could be relevant for the pathophysiology of these illnesses.

The Temporality of Situated Cognition.

Situated cognition embeds perceptions, thoughts, and behavior within the contextual framework of so-called "4E cognition" understanding cognition to be embodied, enactive, extended, and embedded. Whereas this definition is primarily based on the spatial properties of a situation, it neglects a fundamental constituent: the cognitive situation as enduring. On a subpersonal level, situated cognition requires the integration of information processing within a minimal temporal extension generating the basic building blocks of perception and action ("microlayer" of time). On a personal level, lived situations and experienced narratives leading to our biography can be defined by their broader temporal horizons ("macrolayer" of time). The macrolayer of time is based on and emerges from information processing on the microlayer of time. Whereas the constraints on the microlayer are primarily defined by the integrity of neurobiological processes within an individual cognitive system, the temporal horizons and subsequently the situational context on the macrolayer are defined by the complex affordances of a situation on a personal or interpersonal level. On both time layers, cognition can be defined as a continuous dynamic process, reflecting the transition from one situated state to another. Taken together, the events forming the delimiting horizons of these situations correspond to the temporal structure of the cognitive process along which it continuously proceeds. The dynamic driving and enabling this transition from state to state is synonymous with the inherent flow of time. Just as the layers of time, flow and structure, are inseparably connected. The integration of temporal flow and temporal structure into the continuous dynamic process constitutes the enduring situatedness of cognition. By providing everyday examples and examples from psychopathology, we highlight the benefits of understanding cognitive processes as part of enduring situations.

Disturbed time experience during and after psychosis.

Disturbances in time experience have been argued to play a significant, if not causative role in the clinical presentation of schizophrenia. Phenomenological considerations suggest a fragmented or dis-articulated time experience causing both primary symptoms such as hallucinations, delusions, and self-disorders, as well as an intersubjective desynchronization. We employed content analysis on material collected from patients diagnosed with schizophrenia using the Time Questionnaire to generate hypotheses on possible disturbances of time experience in schizophrenia. As a key result we find evidence for the distinction between acute psychotic and post-psychotic syndromes. Acute psychosis is predominantly a disturbance of the passage of time, whereas the remission from psychosis is primarily defined by changes in the experience of the explicit structure of time integrating past, present, and future. We discuss our findings with regards to previous insights and observations on time experience and time perception. We suggest our findings hold significance for the diagnostic and therapeutic understanding of schizophrenia as well as for future integrative research on time experience in general.

Time dilation and acceleration in depression.

BACKGROUND: A recent meta-analysis left open a significant question regarding altered time perception in depression: Why do depressed people overproduce short durations and under-produce longer durations if their present experience is that time flows slowly? Experience and judgement of time do not seem to accord with one another. ANALYSIS: By excluding two of the six studies on methodological grounds from a previous meta-analysis of medium-length interval productions, and re-analysing the remaining four studies, the present paper finds that subjective time accelerates from initial dilation within present experience (approximately 1 s duration) to subsequent acceleration within working memory (approximately 30 s duration) when depressed. PROPOSALS: It is proposed that depressive time dilation and acceleration refer to the default mode and central executive networks, respectively. The acceleration effect is suggested to occur due to mood congruency between long intervals, boredom, and depression. This mood congruency leads to the automatic recall of intrusive, negative, and non-specific autobiographical long-term memories used to judge intervals from previous experience. Acceleration in working memory then occurs according to the contextual change model of duration estimation. LIMITATIONS: The meta-analysis is limited to four studies only, but provides a potential link between time experience and judgement within the same explanatory model. CONCLUSIONS: Similarities between psychological time dilation/acceleration and physical time dilation/acceleration are discussed.

Bayes, time perception, and relativity: The central role of hopelessness.

Time judgement and time experience are distinct elements of time perception. It is known that time experience tends to be slow, or dilated, when depressed, but there is less certainty or clarity concerning how depression affects time judgement. Here, we use a Bayesian Prediction Error Minimisation (PEM) framework called 'distrusting the present' as an explanatory and predictive model of both aspects of time perception. An interval production task was designed to probe and modulate the relationship between time perception and depression. Results showed that hopelessness, a symptom of severe depression, was associated with the ordering of interval lengths, reduced overall error, and dilated time experience. We propose that 'distrusting the future' is accompanied by 'trusting the present', leading to the experiences of time dilation when depressed or hopeless. Evidence was also found to support a relative difference model of how hopelessness dilates, and arousal accelerates, the rate of experienced time.

Interrupted Time Experience in Autism Spectrum Disorder: Empirical Evidence from Content Analysis.

Although the experience of time is of central relevance for psychopathology, qualitative approaches to study the inner experience of time have been largely neglected in autism research. We present results from qualitative data acquired from 26 adults with high functioning autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Employing inductive content analysis we identified a distinct pattern of interrupted time experience in ASD. Individuals with ASD seemed to implement structured and routine behavior by future planning to guarantee that the present passed uninterrupted. We reason that the success of corresponding compensatory mechanisms determines the development of distress and noticeable symptoms. Considering recent theories on Bayesian perceptual inference we relate the syndrome of interrupted time experience to the putative neuronal mechanisms underlying time experience.

Subjective remaining lifetime and concreteness of the future as differential predictors of preparation for age-related changes.

Demographic changes have been linked to the expectation of cuts in government-provided social security services, emphasizing individual responsibility to prepare for old age and concomitant challenges and changes. Accordingly, the identification of psychological variables predicting preparation is a matter of theoretical as well as practical importance. We thus consider different aspects of a person's future time as theoretically prominent psychological predictors of preparation. The subjectively perceived quantity of remaining lifetime, the concreteness of future time, and preparation for life domains indicative of an active third age as well as of a more dependent fourth age were assessed in a longitudinal study in a core sample of N = 593 participants (30-80 years old at T1) at two measurement occasions 4 years apart. The quantity of subjective remaining lifetime predicted subsequent changes in preparation, but this effect was restricted to preparation for the fourth age. In contrast, a more open and concrete outlook on ones' personal future predicted changes in preparation for an active third age. Our findings highlight the importance of distinguishing between different aspects of future time-its quantity versus its relation to goals and action plans-when predicting specific facets of developmental self-regulation.

Disturbed Experience of Time in Depression-Evidence from Content Analysis.

Disturbances in the experience of time have been a commonly reported feature of depressive disorders since the beginning of modern psychiatry and psychological research. However, qualitative research approaches to investigate the phenomenon are rarely used. We employed content analysis to investigate disturbances of time experience in Major Depressive Disorder. Our analysis from 25 participants showed that individuals with Major Depressive Disorder subjectively seem to have lost the ability to influence or change the present, resulting in an impersonal and blocked future. The present is rendered meaningless, the past unchangeably negative, and the passage of time turned into a dragging, inexorable, and viscous continuance. The overall,-possibly intersubjective-concept of time experience, remains largely intact, causing or adding to depressive mood and suffering. We elaborate on how these findings reflect previous theories on the experience of time in depression. This study might encourage future inquiries into both the phenomenal and neuroscientific foundation of time experience under psychopathological conditions.

The brain and the subjective experience of time. A voxel based symptom-lesion mapping study.

The aim of the study was to identify the anatomical bases involved in the subjective experience of time, by means of a voxel based symptom-lesion mapping (VLSM) study on patients with focal brain damage. Thirty-three patients (nineteen with right-hemisphere lesions -RBD, and fourteen with left lesion- LBD) and twenty-eight non-neurological controls (NNC) underwent the semi-structured QUEstionnaire for the Subjective experience of Time (QUEST) requiring retrospective and prospective judgements on self-relevant time intervals. All participants also completed tests to assess general cognitive functioning and two questionnaires to evaluate their emotional state. Both groups of brain-damaged patients achieved significantly different scores from NNC on the time performance, without differences between RBD and LBD. VLSM showed a cluster of voxels located in the right inferior parietal lobule significantly related to errors in the prospective items. The lesion subtraction analysis revealed two different patterns possibly associated with errors in the prospective items (the right inferior parietal cortex, rolandic operculum and posterior middle temporal gyrus) and in the retrospective items (superior middle temporal gyrus, white matter posterior to the insula).

Abnormal Time Experiences in Major Depression: An Empirical Qualitative Study.

BACKGROUND: Phenomenological psychopathology, through theoretical and idiographic studies, conceptualizes major depressive disorder (MDD) as a disorder of time experience. Investigations on abnormal time experience (ATE) in MDD adopting methodologies requested by the standards of empirical sciences are still lacking. Our study aimed to provide a qualitative analysis, on an empirical ground and on a large scale, of narratives of temporal experiences of persons affected by MDD. METHODS: We interviewed 550 consecutive patients affected by affective and schizophrenic disorders. Clinical files were analysed by means of consensual qualitative research. RESULTS: Out of 100 MDD patients, 96 reported at least 1 ATE. The principal categories of ATE are vital retardation - the experience of a stagnation of endogenous vital processes (37 patients), the experience of present and future dominated by the past (29 patients), and the experience of the slackening of the flow oftime (25 patients). A comparison with ATE in schizophrenia patients showed that in MDD, unlike in schizophrenia, there is no disarticulation of time experience (disorder of temporal synthesis) but rather a disorder of conation or inhibition of becoming. LIMITATIONS: The interview style was not meant to make a quantitative assessment ("false negatives" cannot be excluded). CONCLUSIONS: Our findings confirm the relevance of distinctive features of ATE in MDD, support the hypothesis of an intrinsic disordered temporal structure in depressive symptoms, and may have direct implications in clinical practice, especially in relation to differential diagnosis, setting the boundaries between "true" and milder forms of depression, and neurobiological research.

Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspective of Exile: On Time and Space Experiences.

This article addresses the experience of exile from an interdisciplinary perspective (philosophy and psychiatry). The main purpose is to try to understand the experience of exile by rehearsing a psychopathological perspective to address it, so it can help with the treatment of disorders that come with this experience. Furthermore, the article tries to explore the experience and reflection of philosophers and thinkers who, being exiled themselves, tried to understand and explain this radical human experience, focusing on the experience of time and space.

Time perception in depression: a meta-analysis.

BACKGROUND: Depressive patients frequently report to perceive time as going by very slowly. Potential effects of depression on duration judgments have been investigated mostly by means of four different time perception tasks: verbal time estimation, time production, time reproduction, and duration discrimination. Ratings of the subjective flow of time have also been obtained. METHODS: By means of a classical random-effects meta-regression model and a robust variance estimation model, this meta-analysis aims at evaluating the inconsistent results from 16 previous studies on time perception in depression, representing data of 433 depressive patients and 485 healthy control subjects. RESULTS: Depressive patients perceive time as going by less quickly relative to control subjects (g=0.66, p=0.033). However, the analyses showed no significant effects of depression in the four time perception tasks. There was a trend towards inferior time discrimination performance in depression (g=0.38, p=0.079). The meta-regression also showed no significant effects of interval duration. Thus, the lack of effects of depression on timing does not depend on interval duration. However, for time production, there was a tendency towards overproduction of short and underproduction of long durations in depressive patients compared to healthy controls. LIMITATIONS: Several aspects, such as influences of medication and the dopaminergic neurotransmitter system on time perception in depression, have not been investigated in sufficient detail yet and were therefore not addressed by this meta-analysis. CONCLUSIONS: Depression has medium effects on the subjective flow of time whereas duration judgments basically remain unaffected.

From naturalistic neuroscience to modeling radical embodiment with narrative enactive systems.

Mainstream cognitive neuroscience has begun to accept the idea of embodied mind, which assumes that the human mind is fundamentally constituted by the dynamical interactions of the brain, body, and the environment. In today's paradigm of naturalistic neurosciences, subjects are exposed to rich contexts, such as video sequences or entire films, under relatively controlled conditions, against which researchers can interpret changes in neural responses within a time window. However, from the point of view of radical embodied cognitive neuroscience, the increasing complexity alone will not suffice as the explanatory apparatus for dynamical embodiment and situatedness of the mind. We suggest that narrative enactive systems with dynamically adaptive content as stimuli, may serve better to account for the embodied mind engaged with the surrounding world. Among the ensuing challenges for neuroimaging studies is how to interpret brain data against broad temporal contexts of previous experiences that condition the unfolding experience of nowness. We propose means to tackle this issue, as well as ways to limit the exponentially growing combinatoria of narrative paths to a controllable number.

Development of a non-invasive polysomnography technique for dogs (Canis familiaris).

Recently dogs (Canis familiaris) have been demonstrated to be a promising model species for studying human behavior as they have adapted to the human niche and developed human-like socio-cognitive skills. Research on dog behavior, however, has so far almost exclusively focused on awake functioning. Here we present a self-developed non-invasive canine polysomnography method that can easily be applied to naive pet dogs. N=22 adult pet dogs (with their owners present) and N=12 adult humans participated in Study I. From these subjects, N=7 dogs returned on two more occasions for Study II. In Study I, we give a descriptive analysis of the sleep electroencephalogram of the dog and compare it to human data. In order to validate our canine polysomnography method in Study II, we compare the sleep macrostructure and the EEG spectrum of dogs after a behaviorally active day without sleep versus passive day with sleep. In Study I, we found that dogs' sleep EEG resembled that of human subjects and was generally in accordance with previous literature using invasive technology. In Study II, we show that similarly to previous results on humans daytime load of novel experiences and sleep deprivation affects the macrostructural and spectral aspects of subsequent sleep. Our results validate the family dog as a model species for studying the effects of pre-sleep activities on the EEG pattern under natural conditions and, thus, broaden the perspectives of the rapidly growing fields of canine cognition and sleep research.