Analyzing the use of non-pharmaceutical personal protective measures through self-interest and social optimum for the control of an emerging disease.

Non-pharmaceutical personal protective (NPP) measures such as face masks use, and hand and respiratory hygiene can be effective measures for mitigating the spread of aerosol/airborne diseases, such as COVID-19, in the absence of vaccination or treatment. However, the usage of such measures is constrained by their inherent perceived cost and effectiveness for reducing transmission risk. To understand the complex interaction of disease dynamics and individuals decision whether to adopt NPP or not, we incorporate evolutionary game theory into an epidemic model such as COVID-19. To compare how self-interested NPP use differs from social optimum, we also investigated optional control from a central planner's perspective. We use Pontryagin's maximum principle to identify the population-level NPP uptake that minimizes disease incidence by incurring the minimum costs. The evolutionary behavior model shows that NPP uptake increases at lower perceived costs of NPP, higher transmission risk, shorter duration of NPP use, higher effectiveness of NPP, and shorter duration of disease-induced immunity. Though social optimum NPP usage is generally more effective in reducing disease incidence than self-interested usage, our analysis identifies conditions under which both strategies get closer. Our model provides new insights for public health in mitigating a disease outbreak through NPP.

Influential individuals can promote prosocial practices in heterogeneous societies: a mathematical and agent-based model.

In this paper, we examine how different governance types impact prosocial behaviors in a heterogenous society. We construct a general theoretical framework to examine a game-theoretic model to assess the ease of achieving a cooperative outcome. We then build a dynamic agent-based model to examine three distinct governance types in a heterogenous population: monitoring one's neighbors, despotic leadership, and influencing one's neighbors to adapt strategies that lead to better fitness. In our research, we find that while despotic leadership may lead towards high prosociality and high returns it does not exceed the effects of a local individual who can exert positive influence in the community. This may suggest that greater individual gains can be had by cooperating and that global hierarchical leadership may not be essential as long as influential individuals exert their influence for public good and not for public ill.

Coastal erosion and flooding risk assessment based on grid scale: A case study of six coastal metropolitan areas.

Coastal areas, situated at the critical juncture of sea-land interaction, are confronted with significant challenges from coastal erosion and flooding. It is imperative to evaluate these risks and offer scientific guidance to foster regional sustainable development. This article developed a coastal risk assessment model based on grid scale, integrating both coastal exposure and socio-ecological environment. Fourteen indicators were selected, aiming to offer a systematic approach for estimating and comparing disaster risks in coastal areas. This risk assessment model was applied to Shanghai, New York, Sydney, San Francisco, Randstad, and Tokyo metropolitan areas. The results indicate: (1) Accounting for the protective role of habitat types like mangroves and the distance attenuation effect offered a more precise representation of hazard situation; (2) The integration of the Game Theory weighting method with both subjective Analytic Hierarchy Process and objective CRITIC weighting enhanced the scientific validity and rationality of the results by minimizing deviations between subjective and objective weights; (3) Shanghai exhibited the highest average hazard and vulnerability, San Francisco had the lowest average hazard and Sydney had the lowest average vulnerability; In terms of comprehensive risk, Shanghai possessed the highest average risk, while Sydney presented the lowest. The proposed model framework is designed to swiftly identify high-risk zones, providing detailed information references for local governments to devise efficacious risk management and prevention strategies.

Theoretical analyses for the evolution of biogenic volatile organic compounds (BVOC) emission strategy.

Plants emit biogenic volatile organic compounds (BVOCs) as signaling molecules, playing a crucial role in inducing resistance against herbivores. Neighboring plants that eavesdrop on BVOC signals can also increase defenses against herbivores or alter growth patterns to respond to potential risks of herbivore damage. Despite the significance of BVOC emissions, the evolutionary rationales behind their release and the factors contributing to the diversity in such emissions remain poorly understood. To unravel the conditions for the evolution of BVOC emission, we developed a spatially explicit model that formalizes the evolutionary dynamics of BVOC emission and non-emission strategies. Our model considered two effects of BVOC signaling that impact the fitness of plants: intra-individual communication, which mitigates herbivore damage through the plant's own BVOC signaling incurring emission costs, and inter-individual communication, which alters the influence of herbivory based on BVOC signals from other individuals without incurring emission costs. Employing two mathematical models-the lattice model and the random distribution model-we investigated how intra-individual communication, inter-individual communication, and spatial structure influenced the evolution of BVOC emission strategies. Our analysis revealed that the increase in intra-individual communication promotes the evolution of the BVOC emission strategy. In contrast, the increase in inter-individual communication effect favors cheaters who benefit from the BVOCs released from neighboring plants without bearing the costs associated with BVOC emission. Our analysis also demonstrated that the narrower the spatial scale of BVOC signaling, the higher the likelihood of BVOC evolution. This research sheds light on the intricate dynamics governing the evolution of BVOC emissions and their implications for plant-plant communication.

The paradigm of tax-reward and tax-punishment strategies in the advancement of public resource management dynamics.

In contemporary society, the effective utilization of public resources remains a subject of significant concern. A common issue arises from defectors seeking to obtain an excessive share of these resources for personal gain, potentially leading to resource depletion. To mitigate this tragedy and ensure sustainable development of resources, implementing mechanisms to either reward those who adhere to distribution rules or penalize those who do not, appears advantageous. We introduce two models: a tax-reward model and a tax-punishment model, to address this issue. Our analysis reveals that in the tax-reward model, the evolutionary trajectory of the system is influenced not only by the tax revenue collected but also by the natural growth rate of the resources. Conversely, the tax-punishment model exhibits distinct characteristics when compared with the tax-reward model, notably the potential for bistability. In such scenarios, the selection of initial conditions is critical, as it can determine the system's path. Furthermore, our study identifies instances where the system lacks stable points, exemplified by a limit cycle phenomenon, underscoring the complexity and dynamism inherent in managing public resources using these models.

Enhancing vaccination strategies for epidemic control through effective lockdown measures.

Evolutionary epidemiology models have substantially impacted the study of various infections and prevention methods in the biology field. These models are called Susceptible, Lockdown, Vaccinated, Infected, and Recovered (SLVIR) epidemic dynamics. We explore how human behavior, particularly in the context of disease transmission, is influenced by two intervention strategies: vaccination and lockdown, both of which are grounded in the principles of evolutionary game theory (EGT). This comprehensive study using evolutionary game theory delves into the dynamics of epidemics, explicitly focusing on the transition rate from susceptibility to immunity and susceptibility to lockdown measures. Our research involves a thorough analysis of the structural aspects of the SLVIR epidemic model, which delineates disease-free equilibria to ensure stability in the system. Our investigation supports the notion that implementing lockdown measures effectively reduces the required level of vaccinations to curtail the prevalence of new infections. Furthermore, it highlights that combining both strategies is particularly potent when an epidemic spreads rapidly. In regions where the disease spreads comparatively more, our research demonstrates that lockdown measures are more effective in reducing the spread of the disease than relying solely on vaccines. Through significant numerical simulations, our research illustrates that integrating lockdown measures and efficient vaccination strategies can indirectly lower the risk of infection within the population, provided they are both dependable and affordable. The outcomes reveal a nuanced and beneficial scenario where we examine the interplay between the evolution of vaccination strategies and lockdown measures, assessing their coexistence through indicators of average social payoff.

Effect of Private Deliberation: Deception of Large Language Models in Game Play.

Integrating large language model (LLM) agents within game theory demonstrates their ability to replicate human-like behaviors through strategic decision making. In this paper, we introduce an augmented LLM agent, called the private agent, which engages in private deliberation and employs deception in repeated games. Utilizing the partially observable stochastic game (POSG) framework and incorporating in-context learning (ICL) and chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting, we investigated the private agent's proficiency in both competitive and cooperative scenarios. Our empirical analysis demonstrated that the private agent consistently achieved higher long-term payoffs than its baseline counterpart and performed similarly or better in various game settings. However, we also found inherent deficiencies of LLMs in certain algorithmic capabilities crucial for high-quality decision making in games. These findings highlight the potential for enhancing LLM agents' performance in multi-player games using information-theoretic approaches of deception and communication with complex environments.

Persistence in repeated games encourages the evolution of spite.

Social behavior is divided into four types: altruism, spite, mutualism, and selfishness. The former two are costly to the actor; therefore, from the perspective of natural selection, their existence can be regarded as mysterious. One potential setup which encourages the evolution of altruism and spite is repeated interaction. Players can behave conditionally based on their opponent's previous actions in the repeated interaction. On the one hand, the retaliatory strategy (who behaves altruistically when their opponent behaved altruistically and behaves non-altruistically when the opponent player behaved non-altruistically) is likely to evolve when players choose altruistic or selfish behavior in each round. On the other hand, the anti-retaliatory strategy (who is spiteful when the opponent was not spiteful and is not spiteful when the opponent player was spiteful) is likely to evolve when players opt for spiteful or mutualistic behavior in each round. These successful conditional behaviors can be favored by natural selection. Here, we notice that information on opponent players' actions is not always available. When there is no such information, players cannot determine their behavior according to their opponent's action. By investigating the case of altruism, a previous study (Kurokawa, 2017, Mathematical Biosciences, 286, 94-103) found that persistent altruistic strategies, which choose the same action as the own previous action, are favored by natural selection. How, then, should a spiteful conditional strategy behave when the player does not know what their opponent did? By studying the repeated game, we find that persistent spiteful strategies, which choose the same action as the own previous action, are favored by natural selection. Altruism and spite differ concerning whether retaliatory or anti-retaliatory strategies are favored by natural selection; however, they are identical concerning whether persistent strategies are favored by natural selection.

Second-order optimization strategies for neural network quantum states.

The Variational Monte Carlo (VMC) method has recently seen important advances through the use of neural network quantum states. While more and more sophisticated ansatze have been designed to tackle a wide variety of quantum many-body problems, modest progress has been made on the associated optimization algorithms. In this work, we revisit the Kronecker-Factored Approximate Curvature (KFAC), an optimizer that has been used extensively in a variety of simulations. We suggest improvements in the scaling and the direction of this optimizer and find that they substantially increase its performance at a negligible additional cost. We also reformulate the VMC approach in a game theory framework, to propose a novel optimizer based on decision geometry. We find that on a practical test case for continuous systems, this new optimizer consistently outperforms any of the KFAC improvements in terms of stability, accuracy and speed of convergence. Beyond VMC, the versatility of this approach suggests that decision geometry could provide a solid foundation for accelerating a broad class of machine learning algorithms. This article is part of the theme issue 'The liminal position of Nuclear Physics: from hadrons to neutron stars'.

Evolutionary Game Dynamics with Environmental Feedback in a Network with Two Communities.

Recent developments of eco-evolutionary models have shown that evolving feedbacks between behavioral strategies and the environment of game interactions, leading to changes in the underlying payoff matrix, can impact the underlying population dynamics in various manners. We propose and analyze an eco-evolutionary game dynamics model on a network with two communities such that players interact with other players in the same community and those in the opposite community at different rates. In our model, we consider two-person matrix games with pairwise interactions occurring on individual edges and assume that the environmental state depends on edges rather than on nodes or being globally shared in the population. We analytically determine the equilibria and their stability under a symmetric population structure assumption, and we also numerically study the replicator dynamics of the general model. The model shows rich dynamical behavior, such as multiple transcritical bifurcations, multistability, and anti-synchronous oscillations. Our work offers insights into understanding how the presence of community structure impacts the eco-evolutionary dynamics within and between niches.

A game-theoretic approach for modelling pedestrian-vehicle conflict resolutions in uncontrolled traffic environments.

The interactions of motorised vehicles with pedestrians have always been a concern in traffic safety. The major threat to pedestrians comes from the high level of interactions imposed in uncontrolled traffic environments, where road users have to compete over the right of way. In the absence of traffic management and control systems in such traffic environments, road users have to negotiate the right of way while avoiding conflict. Furthermore, the high level of movement freedom and agility of pedestrians, as one of the interactive parties, can lead to exposing unpredictable behaviour on the road. Traffic interactions in uncontrolled mixed traffic environments will become more challenging by fully/partially automated driving systems' deployment, where the intentions and decisions of interacting agents must be predicted/detected to avoid conflict and improve traffic safety and efficiency. This study aims to formulate a game-theoretic approach to model pedestrian interactions with passenger cars and light vehicles (two-wheel and three-wheel vehicles) in uncontrolled traffic settings. The proposed models employ the most influencing factors in the road user's decision and choice of strategy to predict their movements and conflict resolution strategies in traffic interactions. The models are applied to two data sets of video recordings collected in a shared space in Hamburg and a mid-block crossing area in Surat, India, including the interactions of pedestrians with passenger cars and light vehicles, respectively. The models are calibrated using the identified conflicts between users and their conflict resolution strategies in the data sets. The proposed models indicate satisfactory performances considering the stochastic behaviour of road users - particularly in the mid-block crossing area in India - and have the potential to be used as a behavioural model for automated driving systems.

Decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning based on best-response policies.

Introduction: Multi-agent systems are an interdisciplinary research field that describes the concept of multiple decisive individuals interacting with a usually partially observable environment. Given the recent advances in single-agent reinforcement learning, multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) has gained tremendous interest in recent years. Most research studies apply a fully centralized learning scheme to ease the transfer from the single-agent domain to multi-agent systems. Methods: In contrast, we claim that a decentralized learning scheme is preferable for applications in real-world scenarios as this allows deploying a learning algorithm on an individual robot rather than deploying the algorithm to a complete fleet of robots. Therefore, this article outlines a novel actor-critic (AC) approach tailored to cooperative MARL problems in sparsely rewarded domains. Our approach decouples the MARL problem into a set of distributed agents that model the other agents as responsive entities. In particular, we propose using two separate critics per agent to distinguish between the joint task reward and agent-based costs as commonly applied within multi-robot planning. On one hand, the agent-based critic intends to decrease agent-specific costs. On the other hand, each agent intends to optimize the joint team reward based on the joint task critic. As this critic still depends on the joint action of all agents, we outline two suitable behavior models based on Stackelberg games: a game against nature and a dyadic game against each agent. Following these behavior models, our algorithm allows fully decentralized execution and training. Results and Discussion: We evaluate our presented method using the proposed behavior models within a sparsely rewarded simulated multi-agent environment. Although our approach already outperforms the state-of-the-art learners, we conclude this article by outlining possible extensions of our algorithm that future research may build upon.

A fusion of deep neural networks and game theory for retinal disease diagnosis with OCT images.

Retinal disorders pose a serious threat to world healthcare because they frequently result in visual loss or impairment. For retinal disorders to be diagnosed precisely, treated individually, and detected early, deep learning is a necessary subset of artificial intelligence. This paper provides a complete approach to improve the accuracy and reliability of retinal disease identification using images from OCT (Retinal Optical Coherence Tomography). The Hybrid Model GIGT, which combines Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), Inception, and Game Theory, is a novel method for diagnosing retinal diseases using OCT pictures. This technique, which is carried out in Python, includes preprocessing images, feature extraction, GAN classification, and a game-theoretic examination. Resizing, grayscale conversion, noise reduction using Gaussian filters, contrast enhancement using Contrast Limiting Adaptive Histogram Equalization (CLAHE), and edge recognition via the Canny technique are all part of the picture preparation step. These procedures set up the OCT pictures for efficient analysis. The Inception model is used for feature extraction, which enables the extraction of discriminative characteristics from the previously processed pictures. GANs are used for classification, which improves accuracy and resilience by adding a strategic and dynamic aspect to the diagnostic process. Additionally, a game-theoretic analysis is utilized to evaluate the security and dependability of the model in the face of hostile attacks. Strategic analysis and deep learning work together to provide a potent diagnostic tool. This suggested model's remarkable 98.2% accuracy rate shows how this method has the potential to improve the detection of retinal diseases, improve patient outcomes, and address the worldwide issue of visual impairment.

Effects of governmental supportive policies on waste management for two substitutable products made of virgin and waste materials: A game-theoretic approach.

In recent years, the concept of sustainability has attracted a great amount of attention, due to increasing energy resources scarceness. Waste recycling is known as an efficient approach to improve sustainability and save energy. In this view, a sustainable supply chain is established in the current study to investigate the effects of waste recycling on sustainable development. The considered supply chain consists of the government, two manufacturers, a supplier, a waste depot, and a recycler. Under this structure, two substitutable products are made of the virgin and recyclable waste materials. The supplier provides the virgin materials for the first product. The waste depot collects the non-recycled waste, whereas the recycler recycles it and supplies the recycled waste for the second product. Also, the government supports the second product to provide an incentive for its members to collect and recycle more waste. Then, the game theory is applied to make decisions under the considered structure. Finally, the results are revealed and some managerial insights are provided. It is derived that the governmental supportive policies play a significant role in resources conservation and energy storage. Moreover, increasing the quality of the product made of the recyclable waste improves the government's utility.

Deterministic theory of evolutionary games on temporal networks.

Recent empirical studies have revealed that social interactions among agents in realistic networks merely exist intermittently and occur in a particular sequential order. However, it remains unexplored how to theoretically describe evolutionary dynamics of multiple strategies on temporal networks. Herein, we develop a deterministic theory for studying evolutionary dynamics of any [Formula: see text] pairwise games in structured populations where individuals are connected and organized by temporally activated edges. In the limit of weak selection, we derive replicator-like equations with a transformed payoff matrix characterizing how the mean frequency of each strategy varies over time, and then obtain critical conditions for any strategy to be evolutionarily stable on temporal networks. Interestingly, the re-scaled payoff matrix is a linear combination of the original payoff matrix with an additional one describing local competitions between any pair of different strategies, whose weights are solely determined by network topology and selection intensity. As a particular example, we apply the deterministic theory to analysing the impacts of temporal networks in the mini-ultimatum game, and find that temporally networked population structures result in the emergence of fairness. Our work offers theoretical insights into the subtle effects of network temporality on evolutionary game dynamics.

Research on regenerative braking control of electric vehicles based on game theory optimization.

The energy-efficient, clean, and quiet attributes of electric vehicles offer solutions to conventional challenges related to resource scarcity and environmental pollution. Consequently, thorough research into harmonizing energy recuperation during braking, enhancing vehicle stability, and ensuring occupant comfort in electric vehicles is imperative for their effective advancement. The study introduces a regenerative braking control strategy for electric vehicles founded on game theory optimization to enhance braking performance and optimize braking energy utilization. Develop a regenerative braking control approach based on the dynamic model of an electric vehicle equipped with hub motors. Employing game theory, we establish participants, control variables, strategy sets, benefit functions, and constraints to optimize the coefficient K for regenerative braking. The efficacy and superiority of the control strategy model are validated through joint simulations using Matlab/Simulink and AVL Cruise. Research findings indicate: (1) Speed tracking error remains below 3% in both NEDC and CLTC-P simulations, underscoring the effectiveness of the dynamic model and control strategy devised in this study. (2) The energy recovery rate achieved by the game theory-based optimization strategy surpasses that of the Cruise self-contained strategy and fuzzy control strategy by 18.06% and 4.5% in the NEDC simulation, and by 13.48% and 3.85% in the CLTC-P simulation, respectively. The adhesion coefficient curves implemented on the front and rear axles, derived from the game theory optimization control strategy, closely approximate the ideal adhesion coefficient curve, leading to a substantial enhancement in the car's braking stability. The degree of jerk magnitude regulated by the game theory optimization strategy consistently falls within the ±3 m/s³ threshold, resulting in a considerable enhancement in the comfort of vehicle occupants. These outcomes underscore the efficacy of the game theory-based optimized control strategy in enhancing energy recovery, braking stability, and comfort throughout the braking process of the vehicle.

An Underwater Source Location Privacy Protection Scheme Based on Game Theory in a Multi-Attacker Cooperation Scenario.

Ensuring source location privacy is crucial for the security of underwater acoustic sensor networks amid the growing use of marine environmental monitoring. However, the traditional source location privacy scheme overlooks multi-attacker cooperation strategies and also has the problem of high communication overhead. This paper addresses the aforementioned limitations by proposing an underwater source location privacy protection scheme based on game theory under the scenario of multiple cooperating attackers (SLP-MACGT). First, a transformation method of a virtual coordinate system is proposed to conceal the real position of nodes to a certain extent. Second, through using the relay node selection strategy, the diversity of transmission paths is increased, passive attacks by adversaries are resisted, and the privacy of source nodes is protected. Additionally, a secure data transmission technique utilizing fountain codes is employed to resist active attacks by adversaries, ensuring data integrity and enhancing data transmission stability. Finally, Nash equilibrium could be achieved after the multi-round evolutionary game theory of source node and multiple attackers adopting their respective strategies. Simulation experiments and performance evaluation verify the effectiveness and reliability of SLP-MACGT regarding aspects of the packet forwarding success rate, security time, delay and energy consumption: the packet delivery rate average increases by 30%, security time is extended by at least 85%, and the delay is reduced by at least 90% compared with SSLP, PP-LSPP, and MRGSLP.

Belief inducibility and informativeness.

We consider a group of receivers who share a common prior on a finite state space and who observe private correlated messages that are contingent on the true state of the world. Our focus lies on the beliefs of receivers induced via the signal chosen by the sender and we provide a comprehensive analysis of the inducible distributions of posterior beliefs. Classifying signals as minimal, individually minimal, and language-independent, we show that any inducible distribution can be induced by a language-independent signal. We investigate the role of the different classes of signals for the amount of higher order information that is revealed to receivers. The least informative signals that induce a fixed distribution over posterior belief profiles lie in the relative interior of the set of all language-independent signals inducing that distribution.

A mechanistic model of gossip, reputations, and cooperation.

Social reputations facilitate cooperation: those who help others gain a good reputation, making them more likely to receive help themselves. But when people hold private views of one another, this cycle of indirect reciprocity breaks down, as disagreements lead to the perception of unjustified behavior that ultimately undermines cooperation. Theoretical studies often assume population-wide agreement about reputations, invoking rapid gossip as an endogenous mechanism for reaching consensus. However, the theory of indirect reciprocity lacks a mechanistic description of how gossip actually generates consensus. Here, we develop a mechanistic model of gossip-based indirect reciprocity that incorporates two alternative forms of gossip: exchanging information with randomly selected peers or consulting a single gossip source. We show that these two forms of gossip are mathematically equivalent under an appropriate transformation of parameters. We derive an analytical expression for the minimum amount of gossip required to reach sufficient consensus and stabilize cooperation. We analyze how the amount of gossip necessary for cooperation depends on the benefits and costs of cooperation, the assessment rule (social norm), and errors in reputation assessment, strategy execution, and gossip transmission. Finally, we show that biased gossip can either facilitate or hinder cooperation, depending on the direction and magnitude of the bias. Our results contribute to the growing literature on cooperation facilitated by communication, and they highlight the need to study strategic interactions coupled with the spread of social information.

Evolution of Cooperation in Spatio-Temporal Evolutionary Games with Public Goods Feedback.

In biology, evolutionary game-theoretical models often arise in which players' strategies impact the state of the environment, driving feedback between strategy and the surroundings. In this case, cooperative interactions can be applied to studying ecological systems, animal or microorganism populations, and cells producing or actively extracting a growth resource from their environment. We consider the framework of eco-evolutionary game theory with replicator dynamics and growth-limiting public goods extracted by population members from some external source. It is known that the two sub-populations of cooperators and defectors can develop spatio-temporal patterns that enable long-term coexistence in the shared environment. To investigate this phenomenon and unveil the mechanisms that sustain cooperation, we analyze two eco-evolutionary models: a well-mixed environment and a heterogeneous model with spatial diffusion. In the latter, we integrate spatial diffusion into replicator dynamics. Our findings reveal rich strategy dynamics, including bistability and bifurcations, in the temporal system and spatial stability, as well as Turing instability, Turing-Hopf bifurcations, and chaos in the diffusion system. The results indicate that effective mechanisms to promote cooperation include increasing the player density, decreasing the relative timescale, controlling the density of initial cooperators, improving the diffusion rate of the public goods, lowering the diffusion rate of the cooperators, and enhancing the payoffs to the cooperators. We provide the conditions for the existence, stability, and occurrence of bifurcations in both systems. Our analysis can be applied to dynamic phenomena in fields as diverse as human decision-making, microorganism growth factors secretion, and group hunting.