Evaluating neuroprivacy concerns in human brain organoid research.

Neuroprivacy, or the privacy of neural data, has attracted considerable interest. Here, we explore the implications of neuroprivacy in human brain organoid research, detailing different interpretations of this right. Findings suggest a limited connection between neuroprivacy and brain organoid research, underscoring the importance of further examination of this critical issue.

Chilean Supreme Court ruling on the protection of brain activity: neurorights, personal data protection, and neurodata.

This paper discusses a landmark ruling by the Chilean Supreme Court of August 9, 2023 dealing with the right to mental privacy, originated with an action for constitutional protection filed on behalf of Guido Girardi Lavin against Emotiv Inc., a North American company based in San Francisco, California that is commercializing the device "Insight." This wireless device functions as a headset with sensors that collect information about the brain's electrical activity (i.e., neurodata). The discussion revolves around whether neurodata can be considered personal data and whether they could be classified into a special category. The application of the present legislation on data (the most obsolete, such as the Chilean law, and the most recent EU law) does not seem adequate to protect neurodata. The use of neurodata raises ethical and legal concerns that are not fully addressed by current regulations on personal data protection. Despite not being necessarily considered personal data, neurodata represent the most intimate aspects of human personality and should be protected in light of potential new risks. The unique characteristics of neurodata, including their interpretive nature and potential for revealing thoughts and intentions, pose challenges for regulation. Current data protection laws do not differentiate between different types of data based on their informational content, which is relevant for protecting individual rights. The development of new technologies involving neurodata requires particular attention and careful consideration to prevent possible harm to human dignity. The regulation of neurodata must account for their specific characteristics and the potential risks they pose to privacy, confidentiality, and individual rights. The answer lies in the reconfiguration of human rights known as "neurorights" that goes beyond the protection of personal data.

Ethical considerations for integrating multimodal computer perception and neurotechnology.

Background: Artificial intelligence (AI)-based computer perception technologies (e.g., digital phenotyping and affective computing) promise to transform clinical approaches to personalized care in psychiatry and beyond by offering more objective measures of emotional states and behavior, enabling precision treatment, diagnosis, and symptom monitoring. At the same time, passive and continuous nature by which they often collect data from patients in non-clinical settings raises ethical issues related to privacy and self-determination. Little is known about how such concerns may be exacerbated by the integration of neural data, as parallel advances in computer perception, AI, and neurotechnology enable new insights into subjective states. Here, we present findings from a multi-site NCATS-funded study of ethical considerations for translating computer perception into clinical care and contextualize them within the neuroethics and neurorights literatures. Methods: We conducted qualitative interviews with patients (n = 20), caregivers (n = 20), clinicians (n = 12), developers (n = 12), and clinician developers (n = 2) regarding their perspective toward using PC in clinical care. Transcripts were analyzed in MAXQDA using Thematic Content Analysis. Results: Stakeholder groups voiced concerns related to (1) perceived invasiveness of passive and continuous data collection in private settings; (2) data protection and security and the potential for negative downstream/future impacts on patients of unintended disclosure; and (3) ethical issues related to patients' limited versus hyper awareness of passive and continuous data collection and monitoring. Clinicians and developers highlighted that these concerns may be exacerbated by the integration of neural data with other computer perception data. Discussion: Our findings suggest that the integration of neurotechnologies with existing computer perception technologies raises novel concerns around dignity-related and other harms (e.g., stigma, discrimination) that stem from data security threats and the growing potential for reidentification of sensitive data. Further, our findings suggest that patients' awareness and preoccupation with feeling monitored via computer sensors ranges from hypo- to hyper-awareness, with either extreme accompanied by ethical concerns (consent vs. anxiety and preoccupation). These results highlight the need for systematic research into how best to implement these technologies into clinical care in ways that reduce disruption, maximize patient benefits, and mitigate long-term risks associated with the passive collection of sensitive emotional, behavioral and neural data.

Virtual emotions and Criminal Law.

This article examines the role that Criminal Law should play in regulating the non-therapeutic use of immersive Virtual Reality (VR), specifically its massive use by consumers. The starting point has been to consider VR as an intermediate risk scenario, for the purposes of Criminal Law, between the criminality entirely generated in the physical world and that developed in the 2D digital environments [cybercrimes and criminality linked to social networks and persuasive Artificial Intelligence (AI)]. Firstly, specialize literature has been analyzed to establish the nature of virtual reality. From a technical standpoint, virtual reality is a neurotechnology infused with high-risk artificial intelligence; an inseparable synthesis of non-invasive neurotechnology and a set of AI systems, considered high-risk for the fundamental rights of citizens. From the perspective of its functioning, VR is a "transformative" neurotechnology capable of altering what people perceive as reality. This is possible, because its realism lies in the emotional immersion of the user in the virtual experience, similarly to how our brain functions. Therefore, the key idea in the immersive functioning of virtual reality is its capacity to evoke and modify human emotions, which results its greater harmful potential compared to the 2D environment. From there, three central and specific areas of (legally unaddressed) risk arise: (1) the special comprehensive nature of the data collected and stored during its use; (2) its ability to mentally reproduce the "physical" experience of the avatar in the user; and (3) its significant capacity to manipulate individuals. Secondly, the paper examines both the reported cases and the foreseeable criminality in virtual worlds or "proto-metaverse," focusing on the three risk areas, and exemplifying them with attacks on mental privacy, sexual freedom, and consumer manipulation. Finally, it is proposed that Criminal Law should also intervene (as soon as possible) to define the "red lines" of massive virtual reality use by citizens. With a democratic and human-centered approach, a basic legal framework is outlined for the criminalization of specific harms and risks associated with virtual reality, adapting the existing legal framework as necessary.

Chilean neurorights legislation and its relevance for mental health: Criticisms and outlook / La legislación chilena sobre neuroderechos y su relevancia para la salud mental: Críticas y perspectivas

Abstract Background Recently, the academic world has established a series of reconfigurations of emerging human rights, in order to safeguard the mental integrity of people exposed to neurotechnologies. The recommendations of different stakeholders and a literature review support regulation of these technologies. There are different proposals for regulation, some in soft law and others in objective law. The type of regulation chosen can have repercussions on clinical practice, research, and public policy. The constitutional enactment of neurorights in Chile has been criticized in the academic fields of neuroethics and law as having potential negative effects on mental health research. Objective To analyze in light of the available literature whether the construction of neurorights could create ethical conflicts in the field of mental health, or if it could offer protection against the disruptive use of various neurotechnologies. Method This analysis included a narrative review of studies included in the PsycInfo, Springer, JSTOR, Medline, Scopus, PubMed, CINALH, and Web of Science databases, without restrictions on language or year of publication. Results The enactment of neurorights as hard law is found not to be detrimental to the field of mental health. Discussion and conclusion This article argues that the regulation of neurorights does not threaten the framework of an ecosystem that uses neurotechnologies. On the contrary, such regulation offers protections to people within the complex system of neurotechnologies.

Resumen Antecedentes Recientemente, el mundo académico ha establecido una serie de reconfiguraciones de derechos humanos emergentes, con el fin de salvaguardar la indemnidad mental de las personas expuestas a las neurotecnologías. Las recomendaciones de las diferentes partes interesadas y de una revisión bibliográfica son la regulación de estas. Existen diferentes ejemplos de regulación, algunos de derecho blando y otros de derecho objetivo. El tipo de regulación puede tener repercusiones en la práctica clínica, la investigación y las políticas públicas de una comunidad. La consagración constitucional chilena de los neuroderechos ha sido criticada desde el mundo académico de la neuroética y también desde el derecho argumentándose que podría ser negativa para la investigación en salud mental. Objetivo Analizar a la luz de la literatura disponible si la constitucionalización de los neuroderechos es éticamente conflictiva en el campo de la salud mental o más bien la protege frente del uso disruptivo de diversas neurotecnologías. Método Revisión narrativa de estudios incluidos en las siguientes bases de datos (PsycInfo, Springer, JSTOR, Medline, Scopus, PubMed, CINALH y Web of Science) sin restricciones de idioma o año de publicación. Resultados No se considera que la consagración de los neuroderechos como hard law sea perjudicial en el ámbito de la salud mental. Discusión y conclusión Se discute si los neuroderechos son una regulación amenazante en el marco de un ecosistema que utiliza neurotecnologías. Se concluye que, a pesar de las críticas, no lo es, sino que favorece la protección de las personas del uso inapropiado de neurotecnologías.

On pharmacological neuroenhancement as part of the new neurorights' pioneering legislation in Chile: a perspective.

The so-called neurorights are emerging human rights, or rather reconfigurations of already existing human rights, seeking to address the impact of the possible misuse of neurotechnologies, which have the potential to become more invasive and harmful in the future if not regulated. The aim of specifying neurorights is to protect the dignity and autonomy of the individual in the face of neurotechnological advances. Recently, Chile proposed a Constitutional reform inspired by the neurorights, opening a debate. One of the proposed neurorights is fair and equitable access to cognitive enhancement, which will be the specific object of this perspective article. Starting from the legal proposal, we analyse and discuss some perspectives on cognitive enhancement, or "neuroenhancement", which could be considered as part of enhancement neurotechnologies, pointing out that pharmacological enhancers, or "smart drugs", might be considered as part of these enhancers. We present a classification of the different types of cognitive enhancements as it has been proposed in the literature, into which pharmacological cognitive enhancement can be included, concluding that there is currently no agreement amongst scholars and lawyers about the ethical consideration of pharmacological cognitive enhancement. We therefore argue that it is necessary for the legislator to explicitly address the issue in the proposed regulations, in order to take a clear position on the topic, as it has been done in the United Kingdom, where the pharmacological neuroenhancers have been explicitly excluded from the regulation. If pharmacological neuroenhancers are going to be considered neurotechnologies, then new law proposals should seek harmonization with the already existing legislation regulating pharmacological health and consumer rights (both globally, taking into account international drug laws, and locally, according to each country's internal regulations) and of course, with the whole system of fundamental rights. Finally, we briefly discuss the ethical problem of equitable access to this new type of neurotechnologies (as part of the neurorights) and leave the debate open for new insights from the scientific community on the possible consequences of including (or not) pharmacological neuroenhancers as neurotechnologies for cognitive enhancement in the framework of the ethical and legal debate.

Minding Rights: Mapping Ethical and Legal Foundations of 'Neurorights'.

The rise of neurotechnologies, especially in combination with artificial intelligence (AI)-based methods for brain data analytics, has given rise to concerns around the protection of mental privacy, mental integrity and cognitive liberty - often framed as "neurorights" in ethical, legal, and policy discussions. Several states are now looking at including neurorights into their constitutional legal frameworks, and international institutions and organizations, such as UNESCO and the Council of Europe, are taking an active interest in developing international policy and governance guidelines on this issue. However, in many discussions of neurorights the philosophical assumptions, ethical frames of reference and legal interpretation are either not made explicit or conflict with each other. The aim of this multidisciplinary work is to provide conceptual, ethical, and legal foundations that allow for facilitating a common minimalist conceptual understanding of mental privacy, mental integrity, and cognitive liberty to facilitate scholarly, legal, and policy discussions.

Contextual and Cultural Perspectives on Neurorights: Reflections Toward an International Consensus.

The development and use of advanced and innovative neuroscience, neurotechnology and some forms of artificial intelligence have exposed potential threats to the human condition, including human rights. As a result, reconceptualizing or creating human rights (i.e. neurorights) has been proposed to address specific brain and mind issues like free will, personal identity and cognitive liberty. However, perceptions, interpretations and meanings of these issues-and of neurorights-may vary between countries, contexts and cultures, all relevant for an international-consensus definition and implementation of neurorights. Thus, we encourage reflecting on the proactive inclusion of transnational, cross-cultural and contextual considerations and concerns to contribute to the global discourse. This inclusion does not mean endorsing ethical relativism but rather a call to foster a universal understanding of key concepts and concerns. Including contextual and cultural perspectives may truly anticipate global concerns which could be addressed while developing and implementing neurorights. Consequently, any ethical and/or legal regulatory framework(s) for the translational and transnational use of advanced neuroscience, neurotechnology and some forms of artificial intelligence intended to protect and safeguard human dignity should be contextually and culturally mindful, responsible, respectful and inclusive of not only human rights and fundamental freedoms but also of neurocognitive cultural diversity.

Neuroderechos: Ser o no ser. Una propuesta de adscripción sistemática en el ordenamiento jurídico español / Neurorights: To be or not to be. A proposal for systematic ascription to the Spanish legal system

Nuestro cerebro es lo que nos define. Estamos pasando de lasmuy desarrolladas tecnologías para la información y la comunicación (conocidas porsu acrónimo TIC) a las nuevas tecnologías sobre la información y para la comunicacióncon el cerebro. Estos avances neurocientíficos se traducen en notables mejoras parala salud de las personas, pero también en bienes de consumo. Dichas tecnologíascombinadas con la Inteligencia Artificial (IA), podrían usarse para descifrar y manipularprocesos mentales y para aumentar las capacidades cognitivas de las personasconectándolas a las interfaces cerebro-computadora, alterando lo que significaser humano. En lo que sigue, expondremos el estado actual de la neurociencia, suimpacto jurídico, el examen de las escasas iniciativas legislativas sobre el particularcon especial estudio de la propuesta de reforma constitucional chilena de 2020,concluyendo si se hace necesario realizar cambios o adaptar las reglas existentes a lassituaciones nuevas. Se trata en definitiva de modular dogmáticamente la respuesta jurídica ante el imparable avance de la neurociencia y cuestionarse si articular unanueva categoría de derechos como los denominados neuroderechos puede ser o no ser la mejor solución. (AU)

Our brain is what defines us. We are moving from highly developed informationand communication technologies (known by its acronym ICT) to new informationand communication technologies with the brain. These neuroscientific advancestranslate into remarkable improvements for people’s health, but also consumergoods. Such technologies, combined with Artificial Intelligence (AI), could beused to decipher and manipulate mental processes and to increase people’scognitive abilities by connecting them to brain-computer interfaces, alteringwhat it means to be human. In what follows, we will present the current state ofneuroscience, its legal impact, the examination of the few legislative initiativeson the subject with special study of the Chilean constitutional reform proposal of2020, concluding if it is necessary to make changes or adapt the existing rules tonew situations. Ultimately, it is about dogmatically modulating the legal responseto the unstoppable advance of neuroscience and questioning whether articulatinga new category of rights such as the so-called neuro-rights may or may not be the best solution. (AU)

Novel Neurorights: From Nonsense to Substance.

This paper analyses recent calls for so called "neurorights", suggested novel human rights whose adoption is allegedly required because of advances in neuroscience, exemplified by a proposal of the Neurorights Initiative. Advances in neuroscience and technology are indeed impressive and pose a range of challenges for the law, and some novel applications give grounds for human rights concerns. But whether addressing these concerns requires adopting novel human rights, and whether the proposed neurorights are suitable candidates, are a different matter. This paper argues that the proposed rights, as individuals and a class, should not be adopted and lobbying on their behalf should stop. The proposal tends to promote rights inflationism, is tainted by neuroexceptionalism and neuroessentialism, and lacks grounding in relevant scholarship. None of the proposed individual rights passes quality criteria debated in the field. While understandable from a moral perspective, the proposal is fundamentally flawed from a legal perspective. Rather than conjuring up novel human rights, existing rights should be further developed in face of changing societal circumstances and technological possibilities.

Is Your Neural Data Part of Your Mind? Exploring the Conceptual Basis of Mental Privacy.

It has been argued that neural data (ND) are an especially sensitive kind of personal information that could be used to undermine the control we should have over access to our mental states (i.e. our mental privacy), and therefore need a stronger legal protection than other kinds of personal data. The Morningside Group, a global consortium of interdisciplinary experts advocating for the ethical use of neurotechnology, suggests achieving this by treating legally ND as a body organ (i.e. protecting them through bodily integrity). Although the proposal is currently shaping ND-related policies (most notably, a Neuroprotection Bill of Law being discussed by the Chilean Senate), it is not clear what its conceptual and legal basis is. Treating legally something as something else requires some kind of analogical reasoning, which is not provided by the authors of the proposal. In this paper, I will try to fill this gap by addressing ontological issues related to neurocognitive processes. The substantial differences between ND and body organs or organic tissue cast doubt on the idea that the former should be covered by bodily integrity. Crucially, ND are not constituted by organic material. Nevertheless, I argue that the ND of a subject s are analogous to neurocognitive properties of her brain. I claim that (i) s' ND are a 'medium independent' property that can be characterized as natural semantic personal information about her brain and that (ii) s' brain not only instantiates this property but also has an exclusive ontological relationship with it: This information constitutes a domain that is unique to her neurocognitive architecture.

Artificial Intelligence in Medicine: A Sword of Damocles?

Will Artificial Intelligence (AI) re-humanize or de-humanize medicine? As AI becomes pervasive in clinical medicine, we argue that the ethical framework that sustains a responsible implementation of such technologies should be reconsidered. The emergence of AI in the clinical setting will challenge our traditional moral boundaries surrounding discussions of patient care since it is unclear how the implementation of AI will promote and enhance the humanistic dimensions of medical practice. There are reasons for concern regarding 1) the anthropological implications of AI in the clinical context; 2) the method(s) and framework(s) used to address ethical issues in medicine; and 3) the impact of AI on clinical practice, particularly in the nature of clinical judgment. These three concerns are examined in hopes of providing pointers for subsequent and more in-depth discussions regarding clinical practice but the training of future health professionals.

On Neurorights.

In recent years, philosophical-legal studies on neuroscience (mainly in the fields of neuroethics and neurolaw) have given increasing prominence to a normative analysis of the ethical-legal challenges in the mind and brain sciences in terms of rights, freedoms, entitlements and associated obligations. This way of analyzing the ethical and legal implications of neuroscience has come to be known as "neurorights." Neurorights can be defined as the ethical, legal, social, or natural principles of freedom or entitlement related to a person's cerebral and mental domain; that is, the fundamental normative rules for the protection and preservation of the human brain and mind. Although reflections on neurorights have received ample coverage in the mainstream media and have rapidly become a mainstream topic in the public neuroethics discourse, the frequency of such reflections in the academic literature is still relatively scarce. While the prominence of the neurorights debate in public opinion is crucial to ensure public engagement and democratic participation in deliberative processes on this issue, its relatively sporadic presence in the academic literature poses a risk of semantic-normative ambiguity and conceptual confusion. This risk is exacerbated by the presence of multiple and not always reconcilable terminologies. Several meta-ethical, normative ethical, and legal-philosophical questions need to be solved in order to ensure that neurorights can be used as effective instruments of global neurotechnology governance and be adequately imported into international human rights law. To overcome the shortcomings above, this paper attempts to provide a comprehensive normative-ethical, historical and conceptual analysis of neurorights. In particular, it attempts to (i) reconstruct a history of neurorights and locate these rights in the broader history of idea, (ii) outline a systematic conceptual taxonomy of neurorights, (iii) summarize ongoing policy initiatives related to neurorights, (iv) proactively address some unresolved ethico-legal challenges, and (v) identify priority areas for further academic reflection and policy work in this domain.

What Should We Do With People Who Cannot or Do Not Want to Be Protected From Neurotechnological Threats?

Neurotechnologies can pose a threat to people's privacy and mental integrity. Hence the proposal of establishing neurorights (Ienca and Andorno, 2017) and technical principles for the implementation of these rights (Lavazza, 2018). However, concepts such as "the extended mind" and what might be called "the post-human objection" can be said to challenge this protection paradigm. On the one hand, it may be difficult to outline the cognitive boundaries between humans and machines (with the consequent ethical and legal implications). On the other hand, those who wish to make strong use of neurotechnologies, or even hybridize with them, reject the idea that privacy and mental integrity should be protected. However, from the latter view, issues may arise relating to the protection of persons entering into relationships with posthumanist people. This article will discuss these scenarios as well as the ethical, legal, social, and political issues that could follow from them.