Understanding the municipal-level design and adaptation of pay-for-performance schemes across two states of Brazil.

The design of complex health systems interventions, such as pay for performance (P4P), can be critical to determining such programmes' success. In P4P programmes, the design of financial incentives is crucial in shaping how these programmes work. However, the design of such schemes is usually homogenous across providers within a given scheme. Consequently, there is a limited understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of P4P design elements from the implementers' perspective. This study takes advantage of the unique context of Brazil, where municipalities adapted the federal incentive design, resulting in variations in incentive design across municipalities. The study aims to understand why municipalities in Brazil chose certain P4P design features, the associated challenges and the local adaptations made to address problems in scheme design. This study was a multiple case study design relying on qualitative data from 20 municipalities from two states in Northeastern Brazil. We conducted two key informant interviews with municipal-level stakeholders and focus group discussions with primary care providers. We also reviewed municipal Primary Care Access and Quality laws in each municipality. We found substantial variation in the design choices made by municipalities regarding 'who was incentivized', the 'payment size' and 'frequency'. Design choices affected relationships within municipalities and within teams. Challenges were chiefly associated with fairness relating to 'who received the incentive', 'what is incentivized' and the 'incentive size'. Adaptations were made to improve fairness, mostly in response to pressure from the healthcare workers. The significant variation in design choices across municipalities and providers' response to them highlights the importance of considering local context in the design and implementation of P4P schemes and ensuring flexibility to accommodate local preferences and emerging needs. Attention is needed to ensure that the choice of 'who is incentivized' and the 'size of incentives' are inclusive and fair and the allocation and 'use of funds' are transparent.

Does pay-for-performance design matter? Evidence from Brazil.

Pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes have been shown to have mixed effects on health care outcomes. A challenge in interpreting this evidence is that P4P is often considered a homogenous intervention, when in practice schemes vary widely in their design. Our study contributes to this literature by providing a detailed depiction of incentive design across municipalities within a national P4P scheme in Brazil [Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ)] and exploring the association of alternative design typologies with the performance of primary health care providers. We carried out a nation-wide survey of municipal health managers to characterize the scheme design, based on the size of the bonus, the providers incentivized and the frequency of payment. Using OLS regressions and controlling for municipality characteristics, we examined whether each design feature was associated with better family health team (FHT) performance. To capture potential interactions between design features, we used cluster analysis to group municipalities into five design typologies and then examined associations with quality of care. A majority of the municipalities included in our study used some of the PMAQ funds to provide bonuses to FHT workers, while the remaining municipalities spent the funds in the traditional way using input-based budgets. Frequent bonus payments (monthly) and higher size bonus allocations (share of 20-80%) were strongly associated with better team performance, while who within a team was eligible to receive bonuses did not in isolation appear to influence performance. The cluster analysis showed what combinations of design features were associated with better performance. The PMAQ score in the 'large bonus/many workers/high-frequency' cluster was 8.44 points higher than the 'no bonus' cluster, equivalent to a difference of 21.7% in the mean PMAQ score. Evidence from our study shows how design features can potentially influence health provider performance, informing the design of more effective P4P schemes.

Inclusion of disability in primary healthcare facilities and socioeconomic inequity in Brazil

ABSTRACT OBJECTIVE: To describe disability-related performance and inequality nationwide in Brazil, and the changes that took place between 2012 and 2019 after the introduction of Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ). METHODS: We derived scores for disability-related care and accessibility of primary healthcare facilities from PMAQ indicators collected in round 1 (2011-2013), and round 3 (2015-2019). We assessed how scores changed after the introduction of PMAQ. We used census data on per capita income of local areas to examine the disability-specific care and accessibility scores by income group. We undertook ordinary least squares regressions to examine the association between PMAQ scores and per capita income of each local area across implementation rounds. RESULTS: Disability-related care scores were low in round 1 (18.8, 95%CI 18.3-19.3, out of a possible 100) and improved slightly by round 3 (22.5, 95%CI 22.0-23.1). Accessibility of primary healthcare facilities was also poor in round 1 (30.3, 95%CI 29.8-30.8) but doubled by round 3 (60.8, 95%CI 60.3-61.3). There were large socioeconomic inequalities in round 1, with both scores approximately twice as high in the richest compared to the poorest group. Inequalities weakened somewhat for accessibility scores by round 3. These trends were confirmed through regression analyses, controlling for other area characteristics. Disability-related and accessibility scores also varied strongly between states in both rounds. CONCLUSIONS: People with disabilities are being left behind by the Brazilian healthcare system, particularly in poor areas, which will challenge the achievement of universal health coverage.

Pay-for-performance for primary health care in Brazil: A comparison with England's Quality Outcomes Framework and lessons for the future.

Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been widely applied in OECD countries to improve the quality of both primary and secondary care, and is increasingly being implemented in low- and middle-income countries. In 2011, Brazil introduced one of the largest P4P schemes in the world, the National Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ). We critically assess the design of PMAQ, drawing on a comparison with England's quality and outcome framework which, like PMAQ, was implemented at scale relatively rapidly within a nationalised health system. A key feature of PMAQ was that payment was based on the performance of primary care teams but rewards were given to municipalities, who had autonomy in how the funds could be used. This meant the incentives felt by family health teams were contingent on municipality decisions on whether to pass the funds on as bonuses and the basis upon which they allocated the funds between and within teams. Compared with England's P4P scheme, performance measurement under PMAQ focused more on structural rather than process quality of care, relied on many more indicators, and was less regular. While PMAQ represented an important new funding stream for primary health care, our review suggests that theoretical incentives generated were unclear and could have been better structured to direct health providers towards improvements in quality of care.

Indicadores de monitorização e desempenho nas unidades de saúde familiar e os Objetivos do Desenvolvimento Sustentável na saúde (ODS 3): uma análise comparada em Portugal no período de 2013-2018 / Monitoring and performance indicators in family health units and the objectives of Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 3) in health: a comparative analysis in Portugal in the 2013-2018 period

Resumo É considerável a escala da transformação necessária para alcançar todos os Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável (ODS). O terceiro ODS (ODS3), explicitamente, está relacionado com a saúde, visando assegurar vidas saudáveis e bem-estar para todos, em todas as idades. Os Cuidados de Saúde Primários (CSP), neste contexto, constituem a espinha dorsal de um sistema de saúde que pode melhorar a saúde das pessoas, reduzir a despesa e diminuir as desigualdades. Uma forte orientação do sistema para os CSP deve ser temporalmente estável, desde a sua reformulação. Esta análise utiliza o estudo de caso instrumental. Este tipo de estudo de caso oferece a oportunidade de aprender sobre os acontecimentos. Analisamos e debatemos 13 indicadores, comparando ao longo do tempo, os resultados obtidos pela tipologia de unidades de saúde existentes em Portugal: USF-A, USF-B, UCSP, UCSP-M. Os resultados demonstrados são discrepantes, quando se comparam as USF e as UCSP e podem contribuir para o aprofundamento das desigualdades de acesso. Este é um problema que se relaciona com a governação clínica e não com o modelo de unidade de saúde. O empoderamento das coordenações e a melhoria de eficácia da gestão intermédia é aqui fundamental.

Abstract The scale of transformation required to achieve all Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is considerable. The third SDG (SDG3) is explicitly health-related to ensure healthy lives and well-being for all, at all ages. Primary care (PHC), in this context, is the backbone of a health system that can improve people's health, reduce spending and inequalities. A robust system orientation towards PHC must be temporally stable since its reformulation. This analysis uses an instrumental case study. This type of case study provides the opportunity to learn about events. We analyzed and debated 13 indicators, comparing over time, the results obtained by the type of Portuguese health units: USF-A, USF-B, UCSP, UCSP-M. The results show some discrepancies when comparing USFs and UCSPs and may contribute to the deterioration of access inequalities. This is a problem related to clinical governance and not the health unit model. Empowering coordination and improving the effectiveness of middle management is crucial.

In-kind incentives and health worker performance: Experimental evidence from El Salvador.

We experimentally evaluated the effects of in-kind team incentives on health worker performance in El Salvador, with 38 out of 75 community health teams randomly assigned to performance incentives over a 12-month period. All teams received monitoring, performance feedback and recognition for their achievements allowing us to isolate the effect of the incentive. While both treatment and control groups exhibit improvements in performance measures over time, the in-kind incentives generated significant improvements in community outreach, quality of care, timeliness of care, and utilization of maternal and child health services after 12 months. Gains were largest for teams at the bottom and top of the baseline performance distribution. We find no evidence of results being driven by changes in reporting or by shifting away effort from non-contracted outcomes. These results suggest that in-kind team incentives may be a viable alternative to monetary or individual incentives in certain contexts.

Variation in primary health care services after implementation of quality improvement policy in Brazil.

BACKGROUND: Brazil is the most populous country with a public, universal and free health care system. The National Program for Access and Quality Improvement in Primary Care (PMAQ) was created to improve the quality of primary health care (PHC). OBJECTIVE: To evaluated whether progress generally has been made within Brazil's PHC since PMAQ implementation, and if changes occurred uniformly in the country, while also identifying municipal characteristics that may have influenced the improvement. METHODS: This is an observational study using data from PMAQ external evaluation (2012 and 2014), a 1200-item survey used to evaluate Brazilian PHC quality. After confirming the groupings of items using factor analysis, we created 23 composed indexes (CIs) related to infrastructure and work process. RESULTS: On average, the large majority of CIs showed improvements between 2012 and 2014. Region and city size moderated changes in the PHC indices differently. Overall, there were better improvements in infrastructure in the Northeast compared with other country regions, and in smaller cities (10 000-20 000 people). Infrastructure indices appear to have improved equitably across the country. Work process improvements varied with city size and region. CONCLUSION: Despite similar support of PMAQ across the country, improvements are not predictable nor homogeneous. Non-uniform improvements were seen in Brazil's PHC. Though we do not directly evaluate the effectiveness of the PMAQ (financial reward) method, these initial findings suggest that it is a potentially useful tool to improve health systems, but additional support may be needed in regions that lag behind in quality improvements.

¿Cuál es el impacto de la implementación de bonos de impacto social en programas y servicios sociales?: síntesis rápida de evidencia / What is the impact of implementing social impact bonds in social programs and services?: rapid evidence synthesis

ANTECEDENTES Y OBJETIVO Un bono de impacto social es un mecanismo de financiamiento innovador en que los gobiernos establecen contratos con proveedores de servicios sociales, tal como empresas sociales u organizaciones sin fines de lucro, y con inversionistas, para pagar por el logro exitoso de determinados resultados del ámbito social. Debido a esto la División de Cooperación Público-Privada del Ministerio de Desarrollo Social de Chile solicita esta síntesis de evidencia con el objetivo de sintetizar la información sobre los efectos de la implementación de los bonos de impacto social en el mundo, y de esta manera informar a la toma de decisiones. METODOLOGÍA Utilizando palabras clave como "conditional cash transfer", "social bonds", "pay for performance" y "pay for success financing", se buscó en las bases de datos Web of Science, Social System Evidence, MedLine, Embase, Scopus, HealthSystemsEvidence, HealthEvidence, Epistemonikos, la Biblioteca Cochrane, y PubMed, con el objetivo de identificar revisiones sistemáticas que abordaran la pregunta formulada. Los criterios de inclusión contemplaron mecanismos de financiamiento que incluyeran los tres actores principales de un Bono de Impacto Social: inversionista, institución privada e institución pública que ejecutará la intervención social. Se excluyeron artículos de revisiones, editoriales, comentarios, modelos matemáticos y otros que no incluyeran la evaluación del efecto de los BIS y mecanismos de pago basados en desempeño individual. RESULTADOS -No se encontró evidencia sobre el efecto de bonos de impacto social.

Adding Social Determinant Data Changes Children's Hospitals' Readmissions Performance.

OBJECTIVES: To determine whether social determinants of health (SDH) risk adjustment changes hospital-level performance on the 30-day Pediatric All-Condition Readmission (PACR) measure and improves fit and accuracy of discharge-level models. STUDY DESIGN: We performed a retrospective cohort study of all hospital discharges meeting criteria for the PACR from 47 hospitals in the Pediatric Health Information database from January to December 2014. We built four nested regression models by sequentially adding risk adjustment factors as follows: chronic condition indicators (CCIs); PACR patient factors (age and sex); electronic health record-derived SDH (race, ethnicity, payer), and zip code-linked SDH (families below poverty level, vacant housing units, adults without a high school diploma, single-parent households, median household income, unemployment rate). For each model, we measured the change in hospitals' readmission decile-rank and assessed model fit and accuracy. RESULTS: For the 458 686 discharges meeting PACR inclusion criteria, in multivariable models, factors associated with higher discharge-level PACR measure included age <1 year, female sex, 1 of 17 CCIs, higher CCI count, Medicaid insurance, higher median household income, and higher percentage of single-parent households. Adjustment for SDH made small but significant improvements in fit and accuracy of discharge-level PACR models, with larger effect at the hospital level, changing decile-rank for 17 of 47 hospitals. CONCLUSIONS: We found that risk adjustment for SDH changed hospitals' readmissions rate rank order. Hospital-level changes in relative readmissions performance can have considerable financial implications; thus, for pay for performance measures calculated at the hospital level, and for research associated therewith, our findings support the inclusion of SDH variables in risk adjustment.

Análise dos atributos dos cuidados primários em saúde utilizando os prontuários eletrônicos na cidade do Rio de Janeiro / Analysis of the attributes of primary health care using the electronic medical records in the city of Rio de Janeiro

Resumo A epidemiologia desempenha um papel estratégico neste estágio do ciclo de política, contribuindo para o estabelecimento de metas, alocação de recursos e uso de sistemas de informação. Em 2009, a Secretaria Municipal de Saúde do Rio de Janeiro iniciou uma reforma do modelo de atenção, utilizando como principal influência o conceito de Atenção Primária em Saúde. Este estudo avalia a tendência de indicadores selecionados do "pay-for-performance" que mensuram o processo de cuidado em saúde na APS da cidade. Estudo de painéis repetidos, a partir dos registros administrativos e clínicos dos prontuários eletrônicos no período de 2012 a 2016. Foram escolhidos sete indicadores que analisaram o desempenho longitudinal dentro da meta estabelecida, entre aqueles que representam acesso, longitudinalidade, coordenação do cuidado - atributos da APS, assim como outras características dos serviços como desempenho assistencial e eficiência econômica. Este estudo demonstrou que a descentralização da gestão para níveis mais próximos do usuário é potencialmente exitoso para o registro de dados clínicos, caso seja realizado um adequado monitoramento dos indicadores, auditorias clínicas frequentes e realizado periodicamente um "feedback" aos profissionais de saúde com os dados e indicadores acompanhados.

Abstract Epidemiology plays a strategic role at this stage of the policy cycle, contributing to goal setting, resource allocation and use of information systems. In 2009, the Municipal Health Secretariat of Rio de Janeiro initiated a reform of the health care model under the main influence the Primary Health Care concept. This study evaluates the trend of selected pay-for-performance indicators that measure the health care process in the city's PHC. This a study on repeated panels, from the administrative and clinical records of electronic medical records in the period from 2012 to 2016. We selected seven indicators that analyzed longitudinal performance within the established goal, among those that represent access, longitudinality, coordination of care - APS attributes, as well as other characteristics of the services, such as care performance and economic efficiency. This study demonstrated that management decentralization to levels closer to the user is potentially successful for the recording of clinical data under an adequate monitoring of indicators, regular clinical audits and feedback to health professionals, along with data and indicators monitoring.

Effect of a Financial Incentive for Colorectal Cancer Screening Adherence on the Appropriateness of Colonoscopy Orders.

Performance incentives for preventive care may encourage inappropriate testing, such as cancer screening for patients with short life expectancies. Defining screening colonoscopies for patients with a >50% 4-year mortality risk as inappropriate, the authors performed a pre-post analysis assessing the effect of introducing a cancer screening incentive on the proportion of screening colonoscopy orders that were inappropriate. Among 2078 orders placed by 23 attending physicians in 4 academic general internal medicine practices, only 0.6% (n = 6/1057) of screening colonoscopy orders in the preintervention period and 0.6% (n = 6/1021) of screening colonoscopy orders in the postintervention period were deemed "inappropriate." This study found no evidence that the incentive led to an increase in inappropriate screening colonoscopy orders.

The politics of implementing a performance measurement program (PMAQ) at the front line of primary health care in Goiania, Brazil: a qualitative political analysis

We develop a political policy analysis to understand how front line health workers in Goiania evaluate the Brazilian NationalProgram for Improving Access and Quality of Primary Care (PMAQ). We interviewed 25 front liners, including doctors, nurses, community health agents and local managers. Analysis was based on political themes highlighted by the public policy/implementation and performance measurement political literature. We explored seven key themes: adherence, organizational capacity, participation, alternative logics, feedback, perceived impact and culture of assessment. Results show the need to deconstruct rhetoric/ambiguities on the front line of implementation, by means of fostering organizational capacity, knowledge, participation and policy feedback.

Opções para a implementação do pagamento por desempenho na saúde: um overview de revisões sistemáticas / Options for the implementation of pay for performance in health: an overview of systematic reviews

O pagamento por desempenho é usado em todo o mundo para apoiar a melhoria dos processos e resultados em saúde, mas ainda há considerável lacuna de conhecimento sobre seus efeitos, especialmente pela variedade de modelos e contextos. Esta síntese de evidências usa o resultado de revisões sistemáticas para apresentar três opções para apoiar o uso de incentivos financeiros em programas e serviços de saúde: 1) adotar medidas de desempenho objetivas, simples e voltadas para o curto prazo; 2) estabelecer como base para a concessão de incentivos critérios absolutos, relativos ou mistos, fáceis de ser compreendidos e acompanhados e 3) utilizar incentivos financeiros ou de reconhecimento com magnitude adequada ao nível de motivação necessário para a mudança de pretendida. Além disso, o uso de incentivos requer a participação ativa dos sujeitos envolvidos e deve ser precedido de planejamento rigoroso apoiado pelas melhores evidências, para determinar os seguintes elementos: o agente alvo; objetivos e metas; forma de mensuração, monitoramento e avaliação dos resultados; modalidade de recompensas. Fatores institucionais e contextuais podem afetar significativamente a implementação e os resultados. O monitoramento e avaliação dos incentivos devem focar a adequação aos resultados pretendidos e a ocorrência de efeitos involuntários ou indesejados.

Payment for Performance (P4P) is widely used in the world to improvement of processes and results in health, but there is still considerable lack of knowledge about its effects, especially the variety of models and contexts. This evidence brief used results of systematic reviews to pro vide three options to support the use of P4P in health: 1) adopt performance measures objective, simple and focused on the short term; 2) establish the basis for the granting of absolute criteria incentives, relative or mixed, but easy to be understood and followed and 3) use financial incentives or recognition adequate to the level of motivation needed to change desired. In addition, the use of incentives requires the active participation of the subjects involved and should be preceded by rigorous planning supported by the best evidence to determine the following: the target agent; goals and objectives; form of measurement, monitoring and evaluation of results; type of rewards. institutional and contextual factors can significantly affect implementation and results. The monitoring and evaluation should focus on the adequacy of the intended results and the occurrence of unintended or unwanted effects.

An Evaluation of Performance Thresholds in Nursing Home Pay-for-Performance.

OBJECTIVE: Performance thresholds are commonly used in pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives, where providers receive a bonus payment for achieving a prespecified target threshold but may produce discontinuous incentives, with providers just below the threshold having the strongest incentive to improve and providers either far below or above the threshold having little incentive. We investigate the effect of performance thresholds on provider response in the setting of nursing home P4P. DATA SOURCES: The Minimum Data Set (MDS) and Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting (OSCAR) datasets. STUDY SETTING AND DESIGN: Difference-in-differences design to test for changes in nursing home performance in three states that implemented threshold-based P4P (Colorado, Georgia, and Oklahoma) versus three comparator states (Arizona, Tennessee, and Arkansas) between 2006 and 2009. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: We find that those farthest below the threshold (i.e., the worst-performing nursing homes) had the largest improvements under threshold-based P4P while those farthest above the threshold worsened. This effect did not vary with the percentage of Medicaid residents in a nursing home. CONCLUSIONS: Threshold-based P4P may provide perverse incentives for nursing homes above the performance threshold, but we do not find evidence to support concerns about the effects of performance thresholds on low-performing nursing homes.

Pagamento por desempenho em sistemas e serviços de saúde: uma revisão das melhores evidências disponíveis / Pay-for-performance in health care services: a review of the best evidence available

O Pagamento por Desempenho (P4P) é usado em todo o mundo visando à melhoria dos resultados em saúde, e no Brasil é base do Programa Nacional de Melhoria do Acesso e da Qualidade (PMAQ), lançado pelo Ministério da Saúde, em 2011. Revisou-se a literatura publicada entre 1998 e janeiro de 2013, sobre a efetividade do P4P, para produzir resultados ou padrões de acesso e qualidade na saúde. Foram recuperados e analisados 138 estudos, sendo incluídos 41 (14 revisões sistemáticas, 7 ensaios clínicos e 20 estudos observacionais). Estudos mais rigorosos foram menos favoráveis ao P4P, enquanto estudos observacionais apontaram efeitos positivos do P4P sobre a qualidade e o acesso nos serviços de saúde. Limitações metodológicas dos estudos observacionais podem ter contribuído para tais resultados, mas a variedade de resultados está mais ligada aos aspectos conceituais e contextuais dos esquemas de P4P avaliados, reforçando a heterogeneidade de modelos e resultados do P4P. O P4P pode ser útil para promover o alcance de objetivos em sistemas de saúde, especialmente no curto prazo e para ações pontuais que exijam menos esforço dos provedores de serviços de saúde, mas deve ser utilizado com cautela e com planejamento rigoroso do modelo, considerando-se também efeitos indesejáveis ou adversos.

Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been widely used around the world seeking to improve health outcomes, and in Brazil it is the basis of the National Program for Improving Access and Quality (PMAQ). The literature published between 1998 and January 2013 that evaluated the effectiveness of P4P to produce results or patterns of access and quality in health was scrutinized. A total of 138 studies, with the inclusion of a further 41 studies (14 systematic reviews, 07 clinical trials and 20 observational studies) were retrieved and analyzed Among the more rigorous studies, favorable conclusions for P4P were less frequent, whereas observational studies were more favorable to positive effects of P4P on the quality of, and access to, health services. Methodological limitations of observational studies may have contributed to these results, but the range of results is more linked to the conceptual and contextual aspects of the use of the P4P schemes reviewed, the heterogeneity of P4P models and results. P4P can be helpful in promoting the achievement of objectives in health care systems, especially in the short term and for specific actions requiring less effort of health care providers, but should be used with caution and with a rigorous planning model, also considering undesirable or adverse effects.

Pay-for-performance and efficiency in primary oral health care practices in Chile / Pago por desempeño y eficacia de las prácticas de atención sanitaria primaria oral en Chile

Background Payment mechanisms for health care providers have been used as a strategy to improve management, health indicators, cost containment, equity and efficiency. Among the mechanisms implemented in the past decade is pay-for-performance (P4P). In Chile, it was incorporated since 2003 in primary care in addition to the salary by seniority and training. Objectives To assess the impact of P4P on the efficiency of primary oral health care providers in Chile. Methods We performed a retrospective cohort study to compare the performance of oral healthcare practices belonging to primary health providers measured by the rate of dental discharge in 6 year-old children between years in which P4P was used and years in which P4P was not used, in the 52 municipalities of the Metropolitan Region of Chile. We also explored whether rurality, and the human development index (HDI) had an association with the efficiency of health care teams. We calculated the rate of discharge per 1000 patients, and its adjusted and unadjusted association with the predictors of interest, using a Random-effects Poisson regression. Results We found statistically significant differences in the rate of dental discharges when comparing P4P versus no P4P (822.59/1000 and 662.59/1000, respectively, p < 0.0001) and high versus low HDI (692.23/1000 and 832.85/1000, respectively, p = 0.01). Rurality was not statistically associated with P4P (727.24/1000 in rural and 770.19/1000 in urban municipalities, p = 0.553). Unadjusted and adjusted rate ratios were very similar. Conclusions P4P financial incentives can improve the performance of primary care dental practices, and seem to be useful interventions to improve the performance of oral health care providers.

Antecedentes Se han venido utilizando mecanismos de pago a los profesionales de la atención sanitaria para mejorar la gestión, los indicadores sanitarios, la contención de costes, la equidad y la eficacia. Entre los mecanismos introducidos en el último decenio se encuentra el pago por desempeño- pay for performance (P4P). En Chile, se lleva incorporando a la atención primaria desde 2003, además del salario por antigüedad y la formación. Objetivos Evaluar el impacto del P4P sobre la eficacia de los profesionales de la atención sanitaria oral primaria en Chile. Métodos Realizamos el estudio comparativo de un grupo, para comparar el desempeño de las prácticas de los cuidados sanitarios orales de los profesionales de la salud primaria, medido mediante el índice de las altas dentales en niños de seis años, entre los años en que se utilizó el P4P y los años en que no, en cincuenta y dos municipios de la región metropolitana de Chile. También exploramos si la ruralidad y el índice de desarrollo humano (IDH) estaban asociados a la eficacia de los equipos de atención sanitaria. Calculamos el índice de altas por 1000 pacientes, y su asociación ajustada y no ajustada a los predictores del interés, utilizando el modelo de regresión de los efectos aleatorios de Poisson. Resultados Encontramos diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el índice de altas dentales al comparar P4P frente a no P4P (822,59/1000 y 662,59/1000, respectivamente, p < 0,0001), y el elevado frente al bajo IDH (692,23/1000 y 832,85/1000, respectivamente, p = 0,01). La ruralidad no estuvo estadísticamente asociada al P4P (727,24/1000 en municipios rurales y 770,19/1000 en municipios urbanos, p = 0,553). Los ratios no ajustados y ajustados fueron muy similares. Conclusiones Las incentivas financieras P4P pueden mejorar el desempeño de las prácticas de atención primaria dental, y parecen resultar unas intervenciones útiles para mejorar el desempeño de los profesionales de la atención sanitaria oral.

Implementing the physician quality reporting system in an academic multispecialty group practice: lessons learned and policy implications.

The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) introduced the Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS) in 2007. PQRS was developed as a value-based, pay-for-reporting initiative intended to increase quality and decrease costs. Jefferson University Physicians (JUP) was an early participant in this voluntary program. In this article, the policy context for CMS's launch of PQRS and JUP's implementation strategy, lessons learned, and an account of benefits and barriers to participation are reviewed. In 2010, JUP achieved 94% provider participation and an average incentive of $772 per participating provider. Net incentives earned across JUP in 2010 topped $171 000, although these earnings were significantly offset by implementation and maintenance costs. PQRS represents CMS's first step toward aligning quality and cost in the ambulatory care setting. Faculty practice plans must be prepared to meet this challenge in order to avoid future penalties and to advance quality of care.

Percepção do médico sobre pagamento por desempenho no gerenciamento de doenças cardiovasculares: o caso de uma operadora de plano de saúde / The physician's perception on the use of pay-per-performance in a management program of cardiovascular diseases: the case of a health plan provider

Desde os anos 50, os fatores de risco para as doenças cardiovasculares passaram a ser valorizados. O gerenciamento de doenças cardiovasculares (PGC) busca a construção da autonomia e melhoria da qualidade de vida dos pacientes. Em alguns países, para alcançar esses objetivos, tem sido apontada a utilização de programas de pagamento por desempenho (PPP) aos médicos como um dos elementos de melhoria nos processos e nos resultados dos pacientes e na condição de remuneração. O objetivo deste estudo é analisar o ponto de vista dos médicos sobre a implantação dos pagamentos por desempenho vinculados ao PGC em uma operadora de plano de saúde. Trata-se de investigação de caráter qualitativo, do tipo estudo de caso, apresentando entrevistas semiestruturadas com médicos participantes ou não do PGC, em setembro de 2009, tendo como referência as ações implantadas em 2008. Foram entrevistados 23 médicos (14 homens e 09 mulheres). Como resultado foi observado que o incentivo financeiro é reconhecido pelos médicos como importante, mas não determinante da inclusão de pacientes no PGC. O principal motivo apresentado foi a organização do cuidado, no qual o paciente é mais bem acompanhado e controlado, e o trabalho médico, avaliado segundo parâmetros preestabelecidos. O PGC e o PPP têm potencial de transformação do cuidado em saúde. O trabalho multidisciplinar e a maior produtividade nos atendimentos no consultório foram os principais efeitos positivos identificados. Outros estudos são necessários para acompanhar a evolução e os efeitos do pagamento por desempenho no trabalho médico.

Since the '50s, people began to give increasing value to the risk factors for cardiovascular disease. The management of cardiovascular disease (CMP) seeks the construction of patient autonomy and improved quality of life. In some countries, to reach these goals, the use of pay-per-performance (PPP) to physicians has been mentioned as one of the elements of improvement in the process, in patient outcomes and in remuneration conditions. Our goal is to study the medical perspective of the implementation of performance payment linked to the CMP. This is a qualitative research, a case study, using semi-structured interviews with PGC participating and non-participating doctors. The interviews were conducted in September 2009, based on the actions implemented in 2008. We interviewed 23 doctors (14 men and 9 women). The main reason cited for the inclusion of CMP patients was the organization of their care, in which the patient is well controlled and monitored and medical work is evaluated by pre-established parameters. The financial incentive is recognized as important but not determining of the inclusion of patients. The CMP and the PPP have the potential to transform health care, improving outcome indicators. Multidisciplinary work and increased productivity in appointments in the practice were the main positive effects identified. Further studies are required to observe the progress and effects of performance payment.

A estratégia dos bônus: três pressupostos e uma consequência / Bonus strategy: three assumptions and one consequence

A 'estratégia dos bônus' é definida como a prática, por parte dos empregadores, de procurar fazer com que os empregados trabalhem mais e melhor usando como incentivo a concessão de vantagens monetárias adicionais ao salário, condicionadas ao aumento de produtividade. Dois exemplos da estratégia são mencionados, um deles referente à Secretaria da Educação do Estado de São Paulo, outro à Universidade de São Paulo. Examinam-se a seguir três pressupostos da estratégia a concepção penosa do trabalho, o trabalhador imbuído do espírito do capitalismo e a recompensa monetária como única forma de incentivo procurando-se mostrar que nenhum deles tem validade universal, sendo portanto estritamente falsos. Apresentam-se a seguir evidências adicionais para a invalidade dos pressupostos, oriundas do trabalho de professores aposentados, ou que já têm condições de se aposentar, mas continuam na ativa. Na última seção é exposta a consequência mais nefasta do uso da estratégia dos bônus: a 'idiotização' da sociedade.

The 'bonus strategy' is defined by employers as a way to seek to make the workers work more and better using grants for additional monetary benefits to wages as an incentive, conditional on an increase in productivity. Two examples of the strategy are mentioned, one of them referring to the Department of Education of the State of São Paulo and the other to the University of São Paulo (USP). It examines the following three assumptions of the strategy the conception of painful labor, workers imbued with the spirit of capitalism, and monetary reward as the only form of incentive in an attempt to show that none of them have universal validity and are therefore strictly false. Then we present the additional evidence for the invalidity of the assumptions, derived from the work of retired teachers and teachers who have the credentials to retire, but that are still working. In the last section, the most disastrous consequence of the use of the bonus strategy is exposed: the 'idiotization' of society.