Beneath the Sword of Damocles: Moral Obligations of Physicians in a Post-Dobbs Landscape.

Since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs vs. Jackson Women's Health Organization, a growing web of state laws restricts access to abortion. Here we consider how, ethically, doctors should respond when terminating a pregnancy is clinically indicated but state law imposes restrictions on doing so. We offer a typology of cases in which the dilemma emerges and a brief sketch of the current state of legal prohibitions against providing such care. We examine the issue from the standpoints of conscience, professional ethics, and civil disobedience and conclude that it is almost always morally permissible and praiseworthy to break the law and that, in a subset of cases, it is morally obligatory to do so. We further argue that health care institutions that employ or credential physicians to provide reproductive health care have an ethical duty to provide a basic suite of practical supports for them as they work to ethically resolve the dilemmas before them.

Another Defense of Abortion: What Transplant Ethics Tells Us about the Ethics of Abortion after Dobbs.

In 1971, two years before Roe v. Wade affirmed federal protection for abortion, Judith Jarvis Thomson attempted to demonstrate the wrongs of forced gestation through analogy: you awake to find that the world's most esteemed violinist is wholly, physically dependent on you for life support. Here, the authors suggest that Thomson's intuition, that there is a relevant similarity between providing living kidney support and forced gestation, is realized in the contemporary practice of living organ donation. After detailing the robust analogy between living kidney donation and gestation, we turn to current ethical guidelines incorporated in the United Network for Organ Sharing's requirements for legally authorized organ donation and transplantation. We conclude that if, as we-and Thomson-suggest, organ donation and gestation are relevantly similar, then the ethical framework supporting donation may aid in articulating ethical grounds that will be compelling in informing the legal grounds for a defense of abortion.

The Dead Unborn, Postmortem Privacy Cases, and Abortion Rights.

The privacy of the dead is an interesting area of concern for bioethicists. There is a legal doctrine that the dead can't have privacy rights, but also a body of contrary law ascribing privacy rights to the deceased and kin in relation to the deceased. As women's abortion privacy is under assault by American courts and legislatures, the implications of ascribing privacy rights to embryos and fetuses is more important than ever. Caution is called for in this domain.

Parthenogenesis, identity, and value.

Parthenogenesis is a form of asexual reproduction in which a gamete (ovum or sperm) develops without being fertilized. Tomer Jordi Chaffer uses parthenogenesis to challenge Don Marquis' future-like-ours (FLO) argument against abortion. According to Marquis, (1) what makes it morally wrong to kill us is that it would deprive us of a possible future that we might come to value-a future "like ours" (FLO) and (2) human fetuses are numerically identical to any adult human organism they may develop into, and thus have a FLO. Chaffer contends that if human ova are capable of parthenogenesis, then they would have a FLO, which contraception may deprive them of, but contends this is absurd. Bruce P. Blackshaw challenges Chaffer, contending sexually fertilized embryos are not identical to unfertilized ovum, but this would yield a more absurd implication, that fertilization deprives an ovum of a FLO! Here I show Marquis' account of identity rules out both Chaffer's and Blackshaw's accounts.

Conscientious refusal or conscientious provision: We can't have both.

Some authors argue that it is permissible for clinicians to conscientiously provide abortion services because clinicians are already allowed to conscientiously refuse to provide certain services. Call this the symmetry thesis. We argue that on either of the two main understandings of the aim of the medical profession-what we will call "pathocentric" and "interest-centric" views-conscientious refusal and conscientious provision are mutually exclusive. On pathocentric views, refusing to provide a service that takes away from a patient's health is professionally justified because there are compelling reasons, based on professional standards, to refuse to provide that service (e.g., it does not heal, and it is contrary to the goals of medicine). However, providing that same service is not professionally justified when providing that service would be contrary to the goals of medicine. Likewise, the thesis turns out false on interest-centric views. Refusing to provide a service is not professionally justified when that service helps the patient fulfill her autonomous preferences because there are compelling reasons, based on professional standards, to provide that service (e.g., it helps her achieve her autonomous preferences, and it would be contrary to the goals of medicine to deny her that service). However, refusing to provide that same service is not professionally justified when refusing to provide that service would be contrary to the goals of medicine. As a result, on either of the two most plausible views on the goals of medicine, the symmetry thesis turns out false.

Revisiting the evolution of the Hippocratic Oath in obstetrics and gynecology.

Hippocrates, an influential figure in ancient Greek medicine, is best known for his lasting contribution, the Hippocratic Oath, which includes a significant message about obstetrics and gynecology. Given the Oath's status as a widely regarded ethical code for medical practice, it requires critical evaluation. The message of the Oath, as it related to obstetrics and gynecology, is expressed in ancient Greek by the phrase "οὐδὲ γυναικὶ πεσσὸν φθόριον δώσω" which translates directly to "I will not give to any woman a harming pessary." The words fetus and abortion were not present in the original Greek text of the Oath. Yet, this message of the Hippocratic Oath has been interpreted often as a prohibition against abortion. In this article, we present a critical linguistic and historical analysis and argue against the notion that the Hippocratic Oath was prohibiting abortion. We provide evidence that the words "foetum" (fetus) and "abortu" (abortion) were inserted in the Latin translations of the Oath, which then carried on in subsequent English versions. The addition of the words "fetus" and "abortion" in the Latin translations significantly altered the Oath's original meaning. Unfortunately, these alterations in the translation of the Hippocratic Oath have been accepted over the years because of cultural, religious, and social reasons. We assert that because the original Hippocratic Oath did not contain language related to abortion, it should not be construed as prohibiting it. The interpretation of the Oath should be based on precise and rigorous translation and speculative interpretations should be avoided.

Who has a meaningful life? A care ethics analysis of selective trait abortion.

Trait Selective Abortions (TSA) have come under critique as a medical practice that presents potential disabled infants as burdens and lacking the potential for meaningful lives. This paper, using the author's background as a disabled person, contends that the philosophy underpinning TSAs reflects liberal society's lack of a theory of needs. The author argues for a care ethics based approach informed by disability analyses to engage with TSAs.

Navigating the post-Dobbs landscape: ethical considerations from a perinatal perspective.

Restrictive abortion laws have impacts reaching far beyond the immediate sphere of reproductive health, with cascading effects on clinical and ethical aspects of neonatal care, as well as perinatal palliative care. These laws have the potential to alter how families and clinicians navigate prenatal and postnatal medical decisions after a complex fetal diagnosis is made. We present a hypothetical case to explore the nexus of abortion care and perinatal care of fetuses and infants with life-limiting conditions. We will highlight the potential impacts of limited abortion access on families anticipating the birth of these infants. We will also examine the legally and morally fraught gray zone of gestational viability where both abortion and resuscitation of live-born infants can potentially occur, per parental discretion. These scenarios are inexorably impacted by the rapidly changing legal landscape in the U.S., and highlight difficult ethical dilemmas which clinicians may increasingly need to navigate.

Termination of pregnancy in lupus nephritis: A bioethical analysis with the integrative method.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE: Termination of pregnancy in patients with rheumatic diseases is controversial and a bioethical analysis is rarely performed. In this study we analysed the case of a pregnant patient with lupus nephritis unresponsive to treatment, for whom termination of pregnancy is considered. METHODS: The integrative model was applied combining different normative ethical theories. RESULTS: From a utilitarian perspective, termination of pregnancy is justifiable, seeking the greatest benefit for the greatest number of stakeholders. Deontology justifies both terminating and continuing the pregnancy, focusing on the action itself and on autonomy. In virtue ethics the importance of decisions rests with the person who performs the action seeking flourishing; termination of pregnancy would be justifiable. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS: Interruption of pregnancy is a justifiable solution following the integrative model. Bioethical analysis of paradigmatic cases is essential to ensure the best possible action and as a precedent for future similar situations in rheumatology.

Ethical research when abortion access is legally restricted.

Risks and benefits of some clinical research may be altered.

Legal Risks and Ethical Dilemmas for Clinicians in the Aftermath of Dobbs.

This Viewpoint discusses the ways in which the Supreme Court's ruling in Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health Organization, which triggered abortion bans or restrictions in half of states, presents serious legal risks to clinicians and major ethical dilemmas.

Confronting the Medical Community's Complicity in Marginalizing Abortion Care.

This Viewpoint discusses the exclusion of abortion care from many established medical sources (such as hospitals) and from coverage by many major payers and how the health care system should legitimize and ensure clinician training in safe abortion care.

Abortion Rights after Artificial Wombs: Why Decriminalisation is Needed Ahead of Ectogenesis.

Significant scientific progress has been made toward artificial womb technology, which would allow part of human gestation to occur outside the body. Bioethical and legal scholars have argued that artificial wombs will challenge defences of abortion based in arguments for protecting bodily autonomy, for a pregnant person could have the foetus transferred to an artificial womb instead of being terminated. Drawing on examples from the common law jurisdictions of Canada, the USA, and the UK, I assess three ways scholars have argued abortion might be defended after ectogenesis (through redefining foetal viability, through a property right, and through a right to avoid genetic parenthood). I argue that while each of these proposals has strategic merit, each has significant legal and ethical limitations. Taking the normative position that abortion will remain a vital healthcare resource, I make the case for protecting abortion rights from a challenge posed by ectogenesis by focusing on decriminalisation.

If fetuses are persons, abortion is a public health crisis.

Pro-life advocates commonly argue that fetuses have the moral status of persons, and an accompanying right to life, a view most pro-choice advocates deny. A difficulty for this pro-life position has been Judith Jarvis Thomson's violinist analogy, in which she argues that even if the fetus is a person, abortion is often permissible because a pregnant woman is not obliged to continue to offer her body as life support. Here, we outline the moral theories underlying public health ethics, and examine the COVID-19 pandemic as an example of public health considerations overriding individual rights. We argue that if fetuses are regarded as persons, then abortion is of such prevalence in society that it also constitutes a significant public health crisis. We show that on public health considerations, we are justified in overriding individual rights to bodily autonomy by prohibiting abortion. We conclude that in a society that values public health, abortion can only be tolerated if fetuses are not regarded as persons.