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1.
J Grad Med Educ ; 16(3): 271-279, 2024 Jun.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38882403

ABSTRACT

Background The 2022 Supreme Court ruling in Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health Organization nullified the constitutional right to abortion, which led to effective bans in at least 14 US states and placed obstetrics and gynecology (OB/GYN) residents in dilemmas where they may have to withhold care, potentially causing moral distress-a health care workforce phenomenon less understood among resident physicians. Objective To identify and explore moral distress experienced by OB/GYN residents due to care restrictions post-Dobbs. Methods In 2023, we invited OB/GYN residents, identified by their program directors, training in states with restricted abortion access, to participate in one-on-one, semi-structured interviews via Zoom about their experiences caring for patients post-Dobbs. We used thematic analysis to analyze interview data. Results Twenty-one residents described their experiences of moral distress due to restrictions. We report on 3 themes in their accounts related to moral distress (and 4 subthemes): (1) challenges to their physician identity (inability to do the job, internalized distress, and reconsidering career choices); (2) participating in care that exacerbates inequities (and erodes patient trust); and (3) determination to advocate for and provide abortion care in the future. Conclusions OB/GYN residents grappled with moral distress and identified challenges from abortion restrictions.


Subject(s)
Gynecology , Internship and Residency , Obstetrics , Humans , Obstetrics/education , Female , Gynecology/education , United States , Male , Adult , Physicians/psychology , Psychological Distress , Interviews as Topic , Pregnancy , Abortion, Legal/psychology , Abortion, Legal/ethics , Morals , Abortion, Induced/psychology , Abortion, Induced/ethics
2.
Hastings Cent Rep ; 54(3): 15-27, 2024 May.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38842894

ABSTRACT

Since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs vs. Jackson Women's Health Organization, a growing web of state laws restricts access to abortion. Here we consider how, ethically, doctors should respond when terminating a pregnancy is clinically indicated but state law imposes restrictions on doing so. We offer a typology of cases in which the dilemma emerges and a brief sketch of the current state of legal prohibitions against providing such care. We examine the issue from the standpoints of conscience, professional ethics, and civil disobedience and conclude that it is almost always morally permissible and praiseworthy to break the law and that, in a subset of cases, it is morally obligatory to do so. We further argue that health care institutions that employ or credential physicians to provide reproductive health care have an ethical duty to provide a basic suite of practical supports for them as they work to ethically resolve the dilemmas before them.


Subject(s)
Moral Obligations , Physicians , Humans , Physicians/ethics , United States , Pregnancy , Female , Abortion, Induced/ethics , Abortion, Induced/legislation & jurisprudence , Supreme Court Decisions
3.
Hastings Cent Rep ; 54(3): 28-34, 2024 May.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38842853

ABSTRACT

In 1971, two years before Roe v. Wade affirmed federal protection for abortion, Judith Jarvis Thomson attempted to demonstrate the wrongs of forced gestation through analogy: you awake to find that the world's most esteemed violinist is wholly, physically dependent on you for life support. Here, the authors suggest that Thomson's intuition, that there is a relevant similarity between providing living kidney support and forced gestation, is realized in the contemporary practice of living organ donation. After detailing the robust analogy between living kidney donation and gestation, we turn to current ethical guidelines incorporated in the United Network for Organ Sharing's requirements for legally authorized organ donation and transplantation. We conclude that if, as we-and Thomson-suggest, organ donation and gestation are relevantly similar, then the ethical framework supporting donation may aid in articulating ethical grounds that will be compelling in informing the legal grounds for a defense of abortion.


Subject(s)
Abortion, Induced , Tissue and Organ Procurement , Humans , Tissue and Organ Procurement/ethics , Tissue and Organ Procurement/legislation & jurisprudence , Abortion, Induced/ethics , Abortion, Induced/legislation & jurisprudence , Female , Pregnancy , United States , Living Donors/ethics , Kidney Transplantation/ethics , Organ Transplantation/ethics
4.
Hastings Cent Rep ; 54(3): 2, 2024 May.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38842868

ABSTRACT

The privacy of the dead is an interesting area of concern for bioethicists. There is a legal doctrine that the dead can't have privacy rights, but also a body of contrary law ascribing privacy rights to the deceased and kin in relation to the deceased. As women's abortion privacy is under assault by American courts and legislatures, the implications of ascribing privacy rights to embryos and fetuses is more important than ever. Caution is called for in this domain.


Subject(s)
Abortion, Induced , Privacy , Humans , Female , United States , Abortion, Induced/legislation & jurisprudence , Abortion, Induced/ethics , Privacy/legislation & jurisprudence , Pregnancy , Abortion, Legal/legislation & jurisprudence , Abortion, Legal/ethics
5.
J Med Philos ; 49(4): 414-432, 2024 Jul 11.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38728420

ABSTRACT

When an abortion is performed, someone dies. Are we killing a human person? Widespread disagreement exists. However, it is not necessary to establish personhood in order to establish the wrongness of abortion: a substantial chance of personhood is enough. We defend The Do Not Risk Homicide Argument: abortions are wrong after 10 weeks gestation because they substantially and unjustifiably risk homicide, the unjust killing of a human person. Why 10 weeks? Because the cumulative evidence establishes a substantial chance (a more than one in five chance) that preborn human beings are persons after 10 weeks (if not before then). We submit evidence from our bad track record, widespread disagreement about personhood (after 10 weeks gestation), problems with theories of personhood, the similarity between preborn human beings and premature newborns, miscalculations of gestational age, and the common intuitive responses of women to their pregnancies and miscarriages. Our argument is cogent because it bypasses the stalemate over preborn personhood and rests on common ground rather than contentious metaphysics. It also strongly suggests that society must do more to protect preborn human beings. We briefly discuss its practical implications for fetal pain relief, social policy, and abortion law.


Subject(s)
Abortion, Induced , Homicide , Personhood , Humans , Pregnancy , Female , Abortion, Induced/ethics , Gestational Age , Philosophy, Medical , Pregnancy Trimester, First
6.
Lancet ; 403(10445): 2751-2754, 2024 Jun 22.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38795714

ABSTRACT

On June 24, 2022, the US Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health Organization marked the removal of the constitutional right to abortion in the USA, introducing a complex ethical and legal landscape for patients and providers. This shift has had immediate health and equity repercussions, but it is also crucial to examine the broader impacts on states, health-care systems, and society as a whole. Restrictions on abortion access extend beyond immediate reproductive care concerns, necessitating a comprehensive understanding of the ruling's consequences across micro and macro levels. To mitigate potential harm, it is imperative to establish a research agenda that informs policy making and ensures effective long-term monitoring and reporting, addressing both immediate and future impacts.


Subject(s)
Supreme Court Decisions , Women's Health , Humans , Female , United States , Pregnancy , Women's Health/legislation & jurisprudence , Health Services Accessibility/legislation & jurisprudence , Women's Rights/legislation & jurisprudence , Abortion, Legal/legislation & jurisprudence , Abortion, Induced/legislation & jurisprudence , Abortion, Induced/ethics
7.
Lancet ; 403(10445): 2747-2750, 2024 Jun 22.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38795713

ABSTRACT

The Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health Organization Supreme Court decision, which revoked the constitutional right to abortion in the USA, has impacted the national medical workforce. Impacts vary across states, but providers in states with restrictive abortion laws now must contend with evolving legal and ethical challenges that have the potential to affect workforce safety, mental health, education, and training opportunities, in addition to having serious impacts on patient health and far-reaching societal consequences. Moreover, Dobbs has consequences on almost every facet of the medical workforce, including on physicians, nurses, pharmacists, and others who work within the health-care system. Comprehensive research is urgently needed to understand the wide-ranging implications of Dobbs on the medical workforce, including legal, ethical, clinical, and psychological dimensions, to inform evidence-based policies and standards of care in abortion-restrictive settings. Lessons from the USA might also have global relevance for countries facing similar restrictions on reproductive care.


Subject(s)
Supreme Court Decisions , Female , Humans , Pregnancy , Abortion, Induced/legislation & jurisprudence , Abortion, Induced/ethics , Abortion, Legal/legislation & jurisprudence , Health Personnel , Health Workforce , United States , Women's Health
9.
Bioethics ; 38(5): 419-424, 2024 Jun.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38652592

ABSTRACT

Parthenogenesis is a form of asexual reproduction in which a gamete (ovum or sperm) develops without being fertilized. Tomer Jordi Chaffer uses parthenogenesis to challenge Don Marquis' future-like-ours (FLO) argument against abortion. According to Marquis, (1) what makes it morally wrong to kill us is that it would deprive us of a possible future that we might come to value-a future "like ours" (FLO) and (2) human fetuses are numerically identical to any adult human organism they may develop into, and thus have a FLO. Chaffer contends that if human ova are capable of parthenogenesis, then they would have a FLO, which contraception may deprive them of, but contends this is absurd. Bruce P. Blackshaw challenges Chaffer, contending sexually fertilized embryos are not identical to unfertilized ovum, but this would yield a more absurd implication, that fertilization deprives an ovum of a FLO! Here I show Marquis' account of identity rules out both Chaffer's and Blackshaw's accounts.


Subject(s)
Parthenogenesis , Humans , Female , Pregnancy , Male , Abortion, Induced/ethics , Value of Life , Fertilization , Ovum , Fetus
10.
Bioethics ; 38(5): 445-451, 2024 Jun.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38518194

ABSTRACT

Some authors argue that it is permissible for clinicians to conscientiously provide abortion services because clinicians are already allowed to conscientiously refuse to provide certain services. Call this the symmetry thesis. We argue that on either of the two main understandings of the aim of the medical profession-what we will call "pathocentric" and "interest-centric" views-conscientious refusal and conscientious provision are mutually exclusive. On pathocentric views, refusing to provide a service that takes away from a patient's health is professionally justified because there are compelling reasons, based on professional standards, to refuse to provide that service (e.g., it does not heal, and it is contrary to the goals of medicine). However, providing that same service is not professionally justified when providing that service would be contrary to the goals of medicine. Likewise, the thesis turns out false on interest-centric views. Refusing to provide a service is not professionally justified when that service helps the patient fulfill her autonomous preferences because there are compelling reasons, based on professional standards, to provide that service (e.g., it helps her achieve her autonomous preferences, and it would be contrary to the goals of medicine to deny her that service). However, refusing to provide that same service is not professionally justified when refusing to provide that service would be contrary to the goals of medicine. As a result, on either of the two most plausible views on the goals of medicine, the symmetry thesis turns out false.


Subject(s)
Conscience , Humans , Pregnancy , Conscientious Refusal to Treat/ethics , Female , Abortion, Induced/ethics , Personal Autonomy , Ethics, Medical , Physicians/ethics , Refusal to Treat/ethics
11.
Am J Obstet Gynecol ; 230(5): 469.e1-469.e5, 2024 May.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38413328

ABSTRACT

Hippocrates, an influential figure in ancient Greek medicine, is best known for his lasting contribution, the Hippocratic Oath, which includes a significant message about obstetrics and gynecology. Given the Oath's status as a widely regarded ethical code for medical practice, it requires critical evaluation. The message of the Oath, as it related to obstetrics and gynecology, is expressed in ancient Greek by the phrase "οὐδὲ γυναικὶ πεσσὸν φθόριον δώσω" which translates directly to "I will not give to any woman a harming pessary." The words fetus and abortion were not present in the original Greek text of the Oath. Yet, this message of the Hippocratic Oath has been interpreted often as a prohibition against abortion. In this article, we present a critical linguistic and historical analysis and argue against the notion that the Hippocratic Oath was prohibiting abortion. We provide evidence that the words "foetum" (fetus) and "abortu" (abortion) were inserted in the Latin translations of the Oath, which then carried on in subsequent English versions. The addition of the words "fetus" and "abortion" in the Latin translations significantly altered the Oath's original meaning. Unfortunately, these alterations in the translation of the Hippocratic Oath have been accepted over the years because of cultural, religious, and social reasons. We assert that because the original Hippocratic Oath did not contain language related to abortion, it should not be construed as prohibiting it. The interpretation of the Oath should be based on precise and rigorous translation and speculative interpretations should be avoided.


Subject(s)
Gynecology , Hippocratic Oath , Obstetrics , Obstetrics/history , Obstetrics/ethics , Humans , Gynecology/history , Gynecology/ethics , History, Ancient , Female , Pregnancy , Abortion, Induced/ethics , Abortion, Induced/history
12.
Med Health Care Philos ; 27(2): 205-216, 2024 Jun.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38308115

ABSTRACT

Trait Selective Abortions (TSA) have come under critique as a medical practice that presents potential disabled infants as burdens and lacking the potential for meaningful lives. This paper, using the author's background as a disabled person, contends that the philosophy underpinning TSAs reflects liberal society's lack of a theory of needs. The author argues for a care ethics based approach informed by disability analyses to engage with TSAs.


Subject(s)
Abortion, Induced , Disabled Persons , Humans , Female , Pregnancy , Abortion, Induced/ethics , Philosophy, Medical , Ethical Analysis , Ethics, Medical
13.
J Perinatol ; 44(5): 628-634, 2024 May.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38287137

ABSTRACT

Restrictive abortion laws have impacts reaching far beyond the immediate sphere of reproductive health, with cascading effects on clinical and ethical aspects of neonatal care, as well as perinatal palliative care. These laws have the potential to alter how families and clinicians navigate prenatal and postnatal medical decisions after a complex fetal diagnosis is made. We present a hypothetical case to explore the nexus of abortion care and perinatal care of fetuses and infants with life-limiting conditions. We will highlight the potential impacts of limited abortion access on families anticipating the birth of these infants. We will also examine the legally and morally fraught gray zone of gestational viability where both abortion and resuscitation of live-born infants can potentially occur, per parental discretion. These scenarios are inexorably impacted by the rapidly changing legal landscape in the U.S., and highlight difficult ethical dilemmas which clinicians may increasingly need to navigate.


Subject(s)
Perinatal Care , Humans , Female , Pregnancy , Infant, Newborn , Perinatal Care/ethics , Abortion, Induced/ethics , Abortion, Induced/legislation & jurisprudence , United States , Fetal Viability , Decision Making/ethics
14.
Reumatol Clin (Engl Ed) ; 20(1): 20-23, 2024 Jan.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-37481339

ABSTRACT

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE: Termination of pregnancy in patients with rheumatic diseases is controversial and a bioethical analysis is rarely performed. In this study we analysed the case of a pregnant patient with lupus nephritis unresponsive to treatment, for whom termination of pregnancy is considered. METHODS: The integrative model was applied combining different normative ethical theories. RESULTS: From a utilitarian perspective, termination of pregnancy is justifiable, seeking the greatest benefit for the greatest number of stakeholders. Deontology justifies both terminating and continuing the pregnancy, focusing on the action itself and on autonomy. In virtue ethics the importance of decisions rests with the person who performs the action seeking flourishing; termination of pregnancy would be justifiable. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS: Interruption of pregnancy is a justifiable solution following the integrative model. Bioethical analysis of paradigmatic cases is essential to ensure the best possible action and as a precedent for future similar situations in rheumatology.


Subject(s)
Abortion, Induced , Lupus Nephritis , Female , Humans , Pregnancy , Abortion, Induced/ethics
19.
JAMA ; 328(17): 1695-1696, 2022 11 01.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-36318123

ABSTRACT

This Viewpoint discusses the ways in which the Supreme Court's ruling in Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health Organization, which triggered abortion bans or restrictions in half of states, presents serious legal risks to clinicians and major ethical dilemmas.


Subject(s)
Abortion, Induced , Health Services Accessibility , Physicians , Supreme Court Decisions , Female , Humans , Pregnancy , Abortion, Induced/ethics , Abortion, Induced/legislation & jurisprudence , Abortion, Legal/ethics , Abortion, Legal/legislation & jurisprudence , Ethics, Medical , Liability, Legal , Morals , Physicians/ethics , Physicians/legislation & jurisprudence , United States , Health Services Accessibility/ethics , Health Services Accessibility/legislation & jurisprudence
20.
JAMA ; 328(17): 1701-1702, 2022 11 01.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-36318124

ABSTRACT

This Viewpoint discusses the exclusion of abortion care from many established medical sources (such as hospitals) and from coverage by many major payers and how the health care system should legitimize and ensure clinician training in safe abortion care.


Subject(s)
Abortion, Induced , Complicity , Health Services Accessibility , Female , Humans , Pregnancy , Abortion, Induced/ethics , Health Services Accessibility/ethics , Ethics, Medical
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