The beginning of becoming a human.

According to birth certificates, the life of a child begins once their body comes out of the mother's womb. But when does their organismal life begin? Science holds a palette of answers-depending on how one defines a human life. In 1984, a commission on the regulatory framework for human embryo experimentation opted not to answer this question, instead setting a boundary, 14 days post-fertilization, beyond which any experiments were forbidden. Recently, as the reproductive technologies developed and the demand for experimentation grew stronger, this boundary may be set aside leaving the ultimate decision to local oversight committees. While science has not come closer to setting a zero point for human life, there has been significant progress in our understanding of early mammalian embryogenesis. It has become clear that the 14-day stage does in fact possess features, which make it a foundational time point for a developing human. Importantly, this stage defines the separation of soma from the germline and marks the boundary between rejuvenation and aging. We explore how different levels of life organization emerge during human development and suggest a new meaning for the 14-day stage in organismal life that is grounded in recent mechanistic advances and insights from aging studies.

A critical view on using "life not worth living" in the bioethics of assisted reproduction.

This paper critically engages with how life not worth living (LNWL) and cognate concepts are used in the field of beginning-of-life bioethics as the basis of arguments for morally requiring the application of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and/or germline genome editing (GGE). It is argued that an objective conceptualization of LNWL is largely too unreliable in beginning-of-life cases for deriving decisive normative reasons that would constitute a moral duty on the part of intending parents. Subjective frameworks are found to be more suitable to determine LNWL, but they are not accessible in beginning-of-life cases because there is no subject yet. Conceptual and sociopolitical problems are additionally pointed out regarding the common usage of clear case exemplars. The paper concludes that a moral requirement for the usage of PGD and GGE cannot be derived from the conceptual base of LNWL, as strong reasons that can be reliably determined are required to limit reproductive freedom on moral grounds. Educated predictions on prospective well-being might still be useful regarding the determination of moral permissibility of PGD and/or GGE. It is suggested that due to the high significance of subjective experience in the normativity of beginning-of-life bioethics, the discipline is called to more actively realize the inclusion of people with disabilities. This regards for instance research design, citation practices, and language choices to increase the accessibility of societal debates on the reproductive ethics of genetic technologies.

Potentiality switches and epistemic uncertainty: the Argument from Potential in times of human embryo-like structures.

Recent advancements in developmental biology enable the creation of embryo-like structures from human stem cells, which we refer to as human embryo-like structures (hELS). These structures provide promising tools to complement-and perhaps ultimately replace-the use of human embryos in clinical and fundamental research. But what if these hELS-when further improved-also have a claim to moral status? What would that imply for their research use? In this paper, we explore these questions in relation to the traditional answer as to why human embryos should be given greater protection than other (non-)human cells: the so-called Argument from Potential (AfP). According to the AfP, human embryos deserve special moral status because they have the unique potential to develop into persons. While some take the development of hELS to challenge the very foundations of the AfP, the ongoing debate suggests that its dismissal would be premature. Since the AfP is a spectrum of views with different moral implications, it does not need to imply that research with human embryos or hELS that (may) have 'active' potential should be completely off-limits. However, the problem with determining active potential in hELS is that this depends on development passing through 'potentiality switches' about the precise coordinates of which we are still in the dark. As long as this epistemic uncertainty persists, extending embryo research regulations to research with specific types of hELS would amount to a form of regulative precaution that as such would require further justification.

Responsibility Arguments in Defence of Abortion: When One is Morally Responsible for the Creation of a Fetus.

I argue against responsibility arguments that offer a defence of abortion even on the assumption that the fetus is a person. I focus on argumentation originally offered by Judith Jarvis Thomson and then later defended by David Boonin. I offer thought experiments meant to show that, under certain conditions, one bears moral responsibility for creating a fetus. I then offer a positive argument for when one is morally responsible for the creation of a fetus. This argument relies on the presence of other forms of sex that reasonably approximate the goods of penile-vaginal intercourse. Given the presence of these options, sexual partners who engage in penile-vaginal intercourse bear moral responsibility for the creation of the fetus. While I do not think this argument settles the abortion debate - there still may be other ways to successfully defend abortion - it does explain why responsibility arguments like those offered by Thomson fail.

Pregnancy and superior moral status: a proposal for two thresholds of personhood.

In this paper, I suggest that, if we are committed to accepting a threshold approach to personhood, according to which all beings above the threshold are persons with equal moral status, there are strong reasons to also recognise a second threshold that would be reached through human pregnancy, and that would confer on pregnant women a temporary superior moral status. This proposal is not based on the moral status of the fetus, but on the moral status of the pregnant woman. It is not only the fetus which is an organism sui generis: the pregnant woman, also, is a unique being. Following almost any view on the moral status of the fetus, the pregnant woman should be regarded, herself, as more than a singular individual. She is, herself, 'more than one'. Pregnant women are also necessary for the continued survival of the human species, and there are important justice-based reasons to recognise the higher status. Furthermore, the recognition of a superior moral status for pregnant women does not imply that pregnancy should always be viewed as desirable, or imply any position on the permissibility of abortion. My proposal is not as radical as it might seem, as it does not require that pregnant women should always receive superior treatment, but only that they should to some extent. It could have a range of potential positive practical consequences. Finally, my approach does not threaten, but rather promotes, human equality.

Less is more: Antibiotics at the beginning of life.

Antibiotic exposure at the beginning of life can lead to increased antimicrobial resistance and perturbations of the developing microbiome. Early-life microbiome disruption increases the risks of developing chronic diseases later in life. Fear of missing evolving neonatal sepsis is the key driver for antibiotic overtreatment early in life. Bias (a systemic deviation towards overtreatment) and noise (a random scatter) affect the decision-making process. In this perspective, we advocate for a factual approach quantifying the burden of treatment in relation to the burden of disease balancing antimicrobial stewardship and effective sepsis management.

Miscarriage, Abortion, and Disease.

The frequency of death from miscarriage is very high, greater than the number of deaths from induced abortion or major diseases. Berg (2017 , Philosophical Studies 174:1217-26) argues that, given this, those who contend that personhood begins at conception (PAC) are obliged to reorient their resources accordingly-towards stopping miscarriage, in preference to stopping abortion or diseases. This argument depends on there being a basic moral similarity between these deaths. I argue that, for those that hold to PAC, there are good reasons to think that there is no such similarity. There is a morally relevant difference between preventing killing and letting die, giving PAC supporters reasons to prioritize reducing abortion over reducing miscarriage. And the time-relative interest account provides a morally relevant difference in the badness of death of miscarriages and deaths of born adults, justifying attempts to combat major diseases over attempts to combat miscarriage. I consider recent developments in the literature and contend that these new arguments are unsuccessful in establishing moral similarities between deaths from miscarriage and abortion, and deaths from miscarriage and disease.

Orphans cannot be after-birth aborted: a response to Bobier.

I offer a response to an objection to my account of the moral difference between fetuses and newborns, an account that seeks to address an analogy between abortion and infanticide, which is based on the apparent equality of moral value of fetuses and newborns.

Egalitarianism, moral status and abortion: a reply to Miller.

Calum Miller recently argued that a commitment to a very modest form of egalitarianism-equality between non-disabled human adults-implies fetal personhood. Miller claims that the most plausible basis for human equality is in being human-an attribute which fetuses have-therefore, abortion is likely to be morally wrong. In this paper, I offer a plausible defence for the view that equality between non-disabled human adults does not imply fetal personhood. I also offer a challenge for Miller's view.

Human equality arguments against abortion.

In this paper, I argue that a commitment to a very modest form of egalitarianism-equality between non-disabled human adults-implies fetal personhood. Since the most plausible bases for human value are in being human, or in a gradated property, and since the latter of which implies an inequality between non-disabled adult humans, I conclude that the most plausible basis for human equality is in being human-an attribute which fetuses have.

Facts and doubts on the beginning of human life - scientific, legal, philosophical and religious controversies.

It is very complicated to give correct answer to the question "How to define human life?" Nowadays dilemmas consider the respect of human life from the birth to death involve not just biology but also other sciences like philosophy, theology, sociology, psychology, law and politics. These sciences evaluate the topic from different points of view. Integration of all of these perspectives could result with a proper definition. The principal purpose of this paper is to try to determine when a human individual begins. If this proves to be too difficult, we might have to settle for a specific stage in the reproductive process before which it would be impossible to say with any plausibility that a human individual exists. It is necessary to return the moral dimension of observation to the science of life. The point is to reconcile the universal ethical principles concerning the absolute value of life with the everyday challenges and dilemmas. It is our deepest conviction that life has an absolute value and that there always remains something indestructible and substantial in life, which may neither be evaluated by anything final, nor completely reduced to the material biological equivalent and the genetic substratum.

Inventory of parenting systems and styles: a measure for early childhood / Inventário de sistemas e estilos parentais: uma medida para a primeira infância / Inventario de estilos y sistemas de crianza: una medida para la primera infância

The Component Model of Parenting (CMP), from an evolutionary perspective, proposes a phylogenetically evolved repertoire of six systems (body contact, body stimulation, face-to-face exchange, object stimulation, and primary care) and two parenting styles (distal and proximal) by combining some of these systems. We developed the Inventory of Parenting Systems and Styles (ISEP) and applied it to hospitals and schools to analyze its psychometric properties. The parenting measure analysis we propose evolved 70 primary caregivers of young children with a mean age of 22.44 months. ISEP consists of 26 daily situations and assesses the most common parenting practices caregivers adopted in each one of them. Besides, we created a Coding Guide to Parenting Practice. It enabled us to classify each response according to the CMP systems. We found a variance of 84.67% and 95.55% in codification agreement between expert judges and a significant intraclass correlation coefficient for all parenting systems, which discloses validity evidence on the response process of the inventory. Our analyses indicated the occurrence of all parental systems, with a prevalence of narrative envelope and body stimulation. Cluster analysis revealed two clusters, one formed by proximal style and another by distal style, in accordance with the interactions of the system, representing a validity of evidence based on the internal structure of the instrument. ISEP provides reasonable measures for research and professional practice in Psychology. Further research with more extensive and diverse samples is necessary to refine the instrument and, especially its guide.(AU)

O Modelo de Componentes da Parentalidade (MCP) da perspectiva evolucionista propõe seis sistemas - contato corporal, estimulação corporal, contato face a face, estimulação por objeto, envelope narrativo e cuidado primário - universais e filogeneticamente evoluídos, e dois estilos parentais - distal e proximal - oriundos da combinação de alguns desses sistemas. Para analisar propriedades psicométricas de uma medida de parentalidade, o Inventário de Sistemas e Estilos Parentais (ISEP) foi aplicado em contexto escolar e hospitalar, em 70 cuidadores primários de crianças com idade média de 24,44 meses. O ISEP, construído para este estudo, apresenta 26 situações cotidianas e solicita que cuidadores indiquem a prática parental mais comumente adotada em cada uma delas, e cada resposta foi classificada em um dos sistemas do MCP por um Guia de Codificação de Práticas Parentais. A concordância entre juízes com a codificação variou entre 84,67% e 95,55%, e os coeficientes de correlação intraclasse foram significativos para todos os sistemas de parentalidade, representando uma evidência de validade por processo de resposta do inventário. As análises indicaram a ocorrência de todos os sistemas parentais, com predominância de envelope narrativo e estimulação corporal. Uma análise de cluster formou dois conglomerados, um derivando o estilo proximal e outro o estilo distal, de acordo com a interação entre os sistemas, constituindo uma evidência de validade baseada na estrutura interna do instrumento. O ISEP mostrou ser uma medida promissora para a pesquisa e a prática profissional em Psicologia. Outras pesquisas com amostras mais amplas e diversificadas são necessárias para refinamento do instrumento e do guia.(AU)

El Modelo Componencial del Parentaje (MCP), desde una perspectiva evolutiva, propone seis sistemas (contacto corporal, estimulación corporal, contacto cara a cara, estimulación con objetos, envoltura narrativa y atención primaria), universales y filogenéticamente evolucionados, así como dos estilos parentales (distal y proximal) que se originan combinando algunos de ellos. Para analizar las propiedades psicométricas de una medida parental, se aplicó el Inventario de Estilos y Sistemas de Crianza (ISEP), en el contexto escolar y hospitalario, a 70 cuidadores primarios de niños con una edad media de 24,44 meses. El ISEP fue construido para el presente estudio, presenta 26 situaciones cotidianas y crianza los cuidadores deben indicar la práctica parental más común adoptada en cada una de ellas. Una Guía de Codificación de Prácticas Parentales permite clasificar cada respuesta en uno de los sistemas del MCP. La concordancia entre los jueces con la codificación varió entre 84,67% y 95,55% y los coeficientes de inter-correlación en todos los sistemas parentales fueron significativos, evidenciando su validez por el proceso de respuesta al inventario. Los análisis indicaron la ocurrencia de todos los sistemas parentales, con predominio de envoltura narrativa y estimulación corporal. Un análisis de clusters formó dos conglomerados, derivando el estilo proximal y el estilo distal, según la interacción entre los sistemas, constituyendo evidencia de validez basada en la estructura interna del instrumento. El ISEP demostró ser una medida valida y fiable para la investigación y la práctica profesional en Psicología. Se necesita más investigación con muestras más grandes y diversificadas para perfeccionar el instrumento.(AU)

Saúde mental e abortamento voluntário na audiência pública da ADPF442/STF / Mental health and voluntary abortion in the public hearing of ADPF442/STF / Salud mental y aborto voluntario en la audiencia pública del ADPF442/STF

O estudo teve como objetivo identificar os argumentos da estratégia de persuasão dos discursos apresentados na audiência pública sobre a Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental-ADPF 442, realizada em 2018, cujo propósito era discutir sobre a interrupção voluntária da gravidez até a 12ª semana. Para tal, foi realizada uma pesquisa de abordagem qualitativa, analítico-descritiva e documental. O objeto de análise foi o registro da audiência, apresentado em vídeo, disponibilizado na plataforma digital YouTube, e em ata lavrada pelo STF, ambos de acesso público. A partir de uma análise do discurso, identificou-se os argumentos utilizados na estratégia de persuasão, que foram sistematizados em quatro categorias de argumentos para cada um dos dois grupos identificados: o grupo pró e o grupo contra a descriminalização do aborto. As três primeiras categorias, Saúde mental, Direito e Saúde pública, mesmo com diferenças na forma de apresentar o argumento, se repetem nos dois grupos. Todavia, a quarta categoria, Pressupostos, se diferenciou. No grupo pró descriminalização do aborto, apresentou-se como Pressupostos filosóficos e científicos, e no grupo contra, como Pressupostos morais. Por fim, a defesa da saúde mental das mulheres foi o principal argumento numa forma de humanizar o sofrimento vivido pelas que desejam abortar e não encontram o suporte do Estado para assegurar sua dignidade, cidadania e efetiva igualdade, garantidas constitucionalmente.(AU)

The study aimed to identify the arguments of the persuasion strategy of the speeches presented at the public hearing on the Action Against the Violation of Constitutional Fundamental Rights -ADPF 442, held in 2018, whose purpose was to discuss the voluntary interruption of pregnancy until the 12th week. To this end, a qualitative, analytical-descriptive, and documentary research was carried out. The object of analysis was the video recording of the hearing available on the YouTube platform, and in minutes drawn up by the STF, both of which are public. Based on a discourse analysis, the arguments used in the persuasion strategy were identified, which were systematized into four categories of arguments for each of the two identified groups: the group for and the group against the decriminalization of abortion. The first three categories, Mental Health, Law and Public Health, even with differences in the way of presenting the argument, are repeated in both groups. However, the fourth category, Assumptions, differed. In the group for the decriminalization of abortion, it was presented as Philosophical and Scientific Assumptions, whereas the group against, as Moral Assumptions. Finally, the defense of women's mental health was the main argument in a way of humanizing the suffering experienced by those who wish to have an abortion and do not find the support of the State to guarantee their dignity, citizenship, and effective equality, constitutionally guaranteed.(AU)

El estudio tuvo como objetivo identificar los argumentos de la estrategia de persuasión de los discursos presentados en la audiencia pública sobre el Argumento por Incumplimiento de un Percepto Fundamental -ADPF 442, realizada en 2018, con el objetivo de discutir la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo hasta la 12.ª semana. Para ello, se llevó a cabo una investigación cualitativa, analítico-descriptiva y documental. El objeto de análisis fue la grabación de la audiencia, que está disponible en la plataforma digital YouTube, y actas levantadas por el Supremo Tribunal Federal -STF, ambas de acceso público. A partir de un análisis del discurso se identificaron los argumentos utilizados en la estrategia de persuasión, los cuales se sistematizaron en cuatro categorías de argumentos para cada uno de los dos grupos identificados: el grupo pro y el grupo en contra de la despenalización del aborto. Las tres primeras categorías ("salud mental", "derecho" y "salud pública") aún con diferencias en la forma de presentar el argumento se repiten en ambos grupos. Pero difiere la cuarta categoría "supuestos". En el grupo a favor de la despenalización del aborto se presentó como "supuestos filosóficos y científicos", y en el grupo en contra, como "supuestos morales". Finalmente, la defensa de la salud mental de las mujeres fue el principal argumento en un intento por humanizar el sufrimiento que viven aquellas que desean abortar y no encuentran el apoyo del Estado para garantizar su dignidad, ciudadanía e igualdad efectiva, preconizadas por la Constitución.(AU)

Stem cell ethics and policy: What's old is new again.

Stem cells are increasingly being used to model human development and disease in the form of self-organizing embryo models, brain organoids, and neurological chimeras. These new research directions are resurrecting old embryo debates around moral status and personhood. Hyun considers how these old questions are tackled in these new contexts.

Progesterone: The Key Factor of the Beginning of Life.

Progesterone is the ovarian steroid produced by the granulosa cells of follicles after the LH peak at mid-cycle. Its role is to sustain embryo endometrial implantation and ongoing pregnancy. Other biological effects of progesterone may exert a protective function in supporting pregnancy up to birth. Luteal phase support (LPS) with progesterone is the standard of care for assisted reproductive technology. Progesterone vaginal administration is currently the most widely used treatment for LPS. Physicians and patients have been reluctant to change an administration route that has proven to be effective. However, some questions remain open, namely the need for LPS in fresh and frozen embryo transfer, the route of administration, the optimal duration of LPS, dosage, and the benefit of combination therapies. The aim of this review is to provide an overview of the uterine and extra-uterine effects of progesterone that may play a role in embryo implantation and pregnancy, and to discuss the advantages of the use of progesterone for LPS in the context of Good Medical Practice.

Does birth matter?

This paper is a response to a recent paper by Bobier and Omelianchuk in which they argue that the critics of Giubilini and Minerva's defence of infanticide fail to adequately justify a moral difference at birth. They argue that such arguments would lead to an intuitively less plausible position: that late-term abortions are permissible, thus creating a dilemma for those who seek to argue that birth matters. I argue that the only way to resolve this dilemma, is to bite the naturalist bullet and accept that the intuitively plausible idea that birth constitutes a morally relevant event is simply mistaken and biologically misinformed.