Angels and Devils: Dilemmas in Dual-Use Biotechnology.

Dual-use research, which results in knowledge that can be used for both good and ill, has become increasingly accessible in the internet age to both scientists and the general public. Here, we outline some major milestones for dual-use policy and present three vignettes that highlight contemporary dual-use issues in biotechnology.

The warrior in the machine: neuroscience goes to war.

Ever since Stone Age men discovered that knapping flint produced sharp stone edges that could be used in combat as well as for cooking and hunting, technological advances of all kinds have been adapted and adopted by the military.The opportunities provided by modern neuroscience are proving no exception, but their application in a military context is accompanied by complex practical and ethical considerations.

Animal biowarfare research: historical perspective and potential future attacks.

A biological attack on livestock or poultry could result in the loss of valuable animals, costs related to the containment of outbreaks and the disposal of carcasses, lost trade and other economic effects involving suppliers, transporters, distributors and restaurants; however, it is not possible to secure all livestock, and livestock are much less well guarded than human targets. Thus, the vulnerability of the livestock industry to the introduction of biological agents varies for the following reasons: (i) the majority of lethal and contagious biological agents are environmentally resilient, endemic in foreign countries and harmless to humans, making it easier for terrorists to acquire, handle and deploy these pathogens, (ii) with animals concentrated in fewer production facilities and frequently transported between these facilities, a single pathogen introduction could cause widespread infection and (iii) the extent of human travel around the globe makes it difficult to exclude exotic animal diseases as possible biological agents. Historically, many governments have developed and planned to use biological agents for direct attacks on livestock or poultry. In the past, developed nations have actively developed biological weapons to target animals. The potential spectrum of bioterrorism ranges from isolated acts against individuals by individuals to tactical and strategic military attacks and state-sponsored international terrorism intended to cause mass casualties in animals, humans or both. This review provides an overview of the past development and use of biological weapons and describes potential future attacks.

[New challenges in the biological weapons convention]. / Biologisten aseiden kieltosopimuksen uudet haasteet.

Microbes and their toxins are biological weapons that can cause disease in humans, animals or plants, and which can be used with hostile intent in warfare and terrorism. Biological agents can be used as weapons of mass destruction and therefore, immense human and social and major economical damage can be caused. Rapid development of life sciences and technologies during the recent decades has posed new challenges to the Biological Weapons Convention. The Convention states that the States Parties to the BWC strive to ensure that the Convention remains relevant and effective, despite changes in science, technology or politics.

Biological warfare agents.

Biological warfare agents are a group of pathogens and toxins of biological origin that can be potentially misused for military or criminal purposes. The present review attempts to summarize necessary knowledge about biological warfare agents. The historical aspects, examples of applications of these agents such as anthrax letters, biological weapons impact, a summary of biological warfare agents and epidemiology of infections are described. The last section tries to estimate future trends in research on biological warfare agents.

The role of genomics in the identification, prediction, and prevention of biological threats.

In all likelihood, it is only a matter of time before our public health system will face a major biological threat, whether intentionally dispersed or originating from a known or newly emerging infectious disease. It is necessary not only to increase our reactive "biodefense," but also to be proactive and increase our preparedness. To achieve this goal, it is essential that the scientific and public health communities fully embrace the genomic revolution, and that novel bioinformatic and computing tools necessary to make great strides in our understanding of these novel and emerging threats be developed. Genomics has graduated from a specialized field of science to a research tool that soon will be routine in research laboratories and clinical settings. Because the technology is becoming more affordable, genomics can and should be used proactively to build our preparedness and responsiveness to biological threats. All pieces, including major continued funding, advances in next-generation sequencing technologies, bioinformatics infrastructures, and open access to data and metadata, are being set in place for genomics to play a central role in our public health system.

The command of biotechnology and merciful conquest in military opposition.

Biotechnology has an increasingly extensive use for military purposes. With the upcoming age of biotechnology, military operations are depending more on biotechnical methods. Judging from the evolving law of the theory of command, the command of biotechnology is feasible and inevitable. The report discusses some basic characteristics of modern theories of command, as well as the mature possibility of the command theory of military biotechnology. The evolution of the command theory is closely associated with the development of military medicine. This theory is expected to achieve successes in wars in an ultramicro, nonlethal, reversible, and merciful way and will play an important role in biotechnological identification and orientation, defense and attack, and the maintenance of fighting powers and biological monitoring. The command of military biotechnology has not become a part of the virtual military power yet, but it is an exigent strategic task to construct and perfect this theory.

Trends in detection of warfare agents. Detection methods for ricin, staphylococcal enterotoxin B and T-2 toxin.

An overview of the different detection methods available for ricin, staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB) and T-2 toxin is presented here. These toxins are potential biological warfare agents (BWA). The aim of this review is not to cover all the papers that had been published but rather to give an overall picture of the trend in the detection methodologies for potential biological warfare agents as we do see the emerging threats from these three toxins. The advantages and disadvantages of each methodology as well as the detection limit will be reviewed. It seems that mass spectrometry has created a niche for analysis of proteinaceous toxins, ricin and SEB as well as molecular toxin, T-2 toxin given its high sensitivity, high selectivity, high specificity and capability to identify and quantify unknown agents simultaneously in a short time frame. But its main drawbacks are its sophisticated instrumentation and its high cost. Improvised immunoassay may be an alternative.

Weapons of mass destruction: Overview of the CBRNEs (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives).

The events of September 11, 2001, made citizens of the world acutely aware of disasters consequent to present-day terrorism. This is a war being waged for reasons obscure to many of its potential victims. The term "NBCs" was coined in reference to terrorist weapons of mass destruction, i.e., nuclear, biological and chemical. The currently accepted acronym is "CBRNE" which includes Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive weapons. Non-nuclear explosives are the most common terrorist weapon now in use. Nuclear and radiological weapons are beyond the scope of this publication, which focuses on the "CBEs", i.e. chemical, biological and explosive weapons. Although neurologists will not be the first responders to CBEs, they must know about the neurological effects in order to provide diagnosis and treatment to survivors. Neurological complications of chemical, biological and explosive weapons which have or may be used by terrorists are reviewed by international experts in this publication. Management and treatment profiles are outlined.

Emerging natural threats and the deliberate use of biological agents.

Over the past several years there has been an increasing awareness and interest by the medical community, the media, and government at all levels regarding the need to plan for and defend against biological weapons. This article offers an overview of various new and emerging natural biological threats.

The challenge of preparation for a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear terrorist attack.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, but, in the contemporary scene, it has established itself in a manner which commands the most serious attention of the authorities. Until relatively recently, the major threat has been through the medium of conventional weaponry and explosives. Their obvious convenience of use and accessibility guarantees that such methods will continue to represent a serious threat. However, over the last few years, terrorists have displayed an enthusiasm for higher levels of carnage, destruction and publicity. This trend leads inexorably to the conclusion that chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) methods will be pursued by terrorist organisations, particularly those which are well organised, are based on immutable ideological principles, and have significant financial backing. Whilst it is important that the authorities and the general public do not risk over-reacting to such a threat (otherwise, they will do the work of the terrorists for them), it would be equally ill-advised to seek comfort in denial. The reality of a CBRN event has to be accepted and, as a consequence, the authorities need to consider (and take seriously) how individuals and the community are likely to react thereto and to identify (and rehearse in a realistic climate) what steps would need to be taken to ameliorate the effects of such an event.

[Scientific progress and new biological weapons]. / Progrès scientifiques et nouvelles armes biologiques.

The biological weapons are different from conventional weapons, because living germs hold an extraordinary and predictable potential for multiplication, propagation and genetic variation during their dissemination in a susceptible population. Only natural pathogens (1rst generation weapons) have been used in the past (smallpox virus, plague, anthrax, toxins...). However, new threats are emerging, due to the rapid progress of scientific knowledge and its exponential worldwide diffusion. It is possible to synthesize microorganisms from in silico sequences widely diffused on Internet (poliovirus, influenza...), thus resulting in the accessibility of very dangerous virus confined today in high-security laboratories (virus Ebola...). It is possible also to "improve" pathogens by genetic manipulations, becoming more resistant or virulent (2nd generation weapons). Finally, one can now create de novo new pathogens by molecular breeding (DNA shuffling), potentially highly dangerous for naive populations (3rd generation weapons). Making biological weapons does not require too much technological resources and appears accessible to terrorists, due to low cost and easy use. Although the destructive consequences are difficult to predict, the psychological and social damages should be considerable, because of the highly emotional burden in the population associated to the transgression by man of a taboo of life.

The potential of antibody-mediated immunity in the defence against biological weapons.

Antibody-mediated immunity (AMI) has been used for the treatment and prevention of infectious diseases for > 100 years, and has a remarkable record of safety, efficacy and versatility. AMI can be used for defence against a wide variety of biological weapons, and passive antibody (Ab) therapy has the potential to provide immediate immunity to susceptible individuals. Recent advances in the Ab field make it possible to generate Abs with enhanced antimicrobial functions. There are significant gaps in our understanding of Ab function, such that the development of Ab-based strategies remains a largely empirical exercise. Nevertheless, the advantages inherent in the therapeutic and prophylactic use of AMI provide a powerful rationale for continued development that will undoubtedly yield many new vaccines and therapeutic Abs.

Developing vaccines to counter bioterrorist threats.

Large and innovative research programs are underway to define the immune parameters for vaccines against a wide array of pathogens considered to represent a potential bioterrorist threat. However, the development and utilization of such vaccines presents a number of predicaments that have not previously been addressed by the field of vaccinology.

Hospital preparedness for possible nonconventional casualties: an Israeli experience.

Since 9/11, hospitals and health authorities have been preparing medical response in case of various mass terror attacks. The experience of Tel Aviv Sourasky Medical Center in treating suicide-bombing mass casualties served, in the time leading up to the war in Iraq, as a platform for launching a preparedness program for possible attacks with biological and chemical agents of mass destruction. Adapting Quarantelli's criteria on disaster mitigation to the "microinfrastructure" of the hospital, and including human behavior experts, we attempted to foster an interactive emergency management process that would deal with contingencies stemming from the potential hazards of chemical and biological (CB) weapons. The main objective of our work was to encourage an organization-wide communication network that could effectively address the contingent hazards unique to this unprecedented situation. A stratified assessment of needs, identification of unique dangers to first responders, and assignment of team-training sessions paved the way for program development. Empowerment through leadership and resilience training was introduced to emergency team leaders of all disciplines. Focal subject matters included proactive planning, problem-solving, informal horizontal and vertical communication, and coping through stress-management techniques. The outcome of this process was manifested in an "operation and people" orientation supporting a more effective and compatible emergency management. The aim of article is to describe this process and to point toward the need for a broad-spectrum view in such circumstances. Unlike military units, the civilian hospital staff at risk, expected to deal with CB casualties, requires adequate personal consideration to enable effective functioning. Issues remain to be addressed in the future. We believe that collaboration and sharing of knowledge, information, and expertise beyond the medical realm is imperative in assisting hospitals to expedite appropriate preparedness programs.

Proliferation of biological weapons: challenges and responses.

The threat posed by the proliferation of biological weapons (BW) confronts all strata of our society, from the individual, the nation, or the region to the truly international. The history of state-run offensive BW programmes and the attacks in the United States with powdered anthrax demonstrate that existing measures fall short of addressing this threat. This article examines the current regime and the concerns that confront it in order to suggest possible responses across the social strata that may mitigate future proliferation of BW.

Biological warfare--an emerging threat.

As we approach the 21st century, there is an increasing worldwide awareness and threat regarding the use of biological warfare agents both for war and terrorist attack. Biological agents include microorganisms or biological toxins that are used to produce death in humans, animals and plants. They are characterized by low visibility, high potency, substantial accessibility and relatively easy delivery. Biological warfare agents are unconventional weapons that can be delivered by unconventional means like aerosol sprays, food and water contamination, conventional explosive munitions or by covert injections. Because of their concealed delivery, easy transportation and difficult identification they are readily adaptable for terrorist operations or to gain political advantages. The detection of such attack requires recognition of the clinical syndromes associated with various biological warfare agents. Diagnosis can be made on clinical grounds and on investigations. Protective measures can be taken against biological warfare agents. These should be implemented early (if warning is received) or later (once suspicion of agent use is made). After the confirmation of diagnosis emergency medical treatment and decontamination are performed in rapid sequence. Patients are then evacuated and specific therapy is given according to the agent involved. Appropriate emergency department and hospital response could significantly limit the morbidity and mortality of biological warfare agents.

Genome projects and gene therapy: gateways to next generation biological weapons.

Genomic and gene therapy research promise important gains into the treatment of human, animal, and plant diseases. However, there is a military aspect to this research that must be recognized. This research enables a new form of biological warfare named genomic warfare. This is the first peer-reviewed scientific article to discuss this threat in-depth. This article advocates that we begin to deal with this threat. Despite that the United States and many signatories of previous bioweapons treaties have agreed not to use biological weapons, mankind has a track record of using all of the weapons at its disposal. This article has a review of the literature and a basic overview of genomic research and gene therapy, which is followed by a discussion of how this therapy can be weaponized. How genomic warfare weapons might be deployed, how deployment may be detected, and the policies and research that would reduce this threat will be described. It is the aim of this article to clearly articulate that this risk exists and to encourage public health, scientific, political, and military leaders to take action to deal with the risk.