Radical enhancement as a moral status de-enhancer.

Nicholas Agar, Jeff McMahan and Allen Buchanan have all expressed concerns about enhancing humans far outside the species-typical range. They argue radically enhanced beings will be entitled to greater and more beneficial treatment through an enhanced moral status, or a stronger claim to basic rights. I challenge these claims by first arguing that emerging technologies will likely give the enhanced direct control over their mental states. The lack of control we currently exhibit over our mental lives greatly contributes to our sense of vulnerability. I then argue moral status should be viewed in terms of vulnerability. The enhanced will slowly gain the ability to command their mental states, reducing their vulnerability. These radically enhanced beings will have greater capacities, and possibly an inner life more valuable than our own. They will also be less vulnerable, and as a result, their moral status will be subordinate to our own.

Las ideas de Michael Sandel contra la visión transhumanista del perfeccionamiento de seres humanos / Las ideas de Michael Sandel contra la visión transhumanista del perfeccionamiento de seres humanos / Michael Sandel's ideas against transhumanist vision of the perfection of human beings / Michael Sandel's ideas against transhumanist vision of the perfection of human beings

Las tentadoras promesas del transhumanismo parecen estar cada vez más cerca, pero cabe preguntarse si no resultarán contraproducentes en algún sentido. El profesor Sandel expone los problemas sociales que conllevaría el desarrollo de seres humanos mejorados en nuestra concepción del mérito, la libertad y responsabilidad, el aprecio de la vida como un don, la inclinación a compartir nuestro destino con el de los demás y la concepción de los derechos individuales

Las tentadoras promesas del transhumanismo parecen estar cada vez más cerca, pero cabe preguntarse si no resultarán contraproducentes en algún sentido. El profesor Sandel expone los problemas sociales que conllevaría el desarrollo de seres humanos mejorados en nuestra concepción del mérito, la libertad y responsabilidad, el aprecio de la vida como un don, la inclinación a compartir nuestro destino con el de los demás y la concepción de los derechos individuales

The tempting promises of transhumanism seem to be getting closer and closer, but in some way counterproductive in some way. Professor Sandel presents the social problems that the development of improved human beings would entail in our understanding of merit, freedom and responsibility, the appreciation of life as a gift, the inclination to share our destiny with others and the conception of individual rights

The tempting promises of transhumanism seem to be getting closer and closer, but in some way counterproductive in some way. Professor Sandel presents the social problems that the development of improved human beings would entail in our understanding of merit, freedom and responsibility, the appreciation of life as a gift, the inclination to share our destiny with others and the conception of individual rights

Transhumanism, Moral Perfection, and Those 76 Trombones.

Transhumanism advances an ideology promising a positive human advance through the application of new and as yet unrealized technologies. Underlying the whole is a libertarian ethos married to a very Christian eschatology promising a miraculous transformation that will answer human needs and redress human failings. In this paper, the supposedly scientific basis on which transhumanist promises are built is critiqued as futurist imaginings with little likelihood of actualization. Transhumanists themselves are likened to the affable con man Professor Harold Hill who, in The Music Man, describes as dire social problems whose solution is a youth band he seeks to sell but has no intention of building. Even were some of the transhumanist imaginings to be realized, I argue, the result would be a dystopia in which the few received benefits denied to the many. In advancing imaginary technologies as a solution to human needs, transhumanists and their bioethical fellow travelers handily avoid discussion of or advocacy for the kind of pedestrian social actions that demonstrably could achieve many of their purported goals. So their enthusiasms, I conclude, are not merely fanciful but damaging to the humanist goals they pretend to advance.

Can self-validating neuroenhancement be autonomous?

Consider that an individual improves her capacities by neuroscientific means. It turns out that, besides altering her in the way(s) she intended, the enhancement also changes her personality in significant way(s) she did not foresee. Yet the person endorses her new self because the neuroenhancement she underwent changed her. Can the person's approval of her new personality be autonomous? While questions of autonomy have already gathered a significant amount of attention in philosophical literature on human enhancement, the problem just described-henceforth referred to as the question whether self-validating neuroenhancement can be autonomous-would not appear to have received due consideration. This article takes a step towards remedying the shortage. I start by explicating the main points of departure of its argument. In the subsequent sections of the article, I consider several possible reasons for deeming self-validating neuroenhancement incompatible with autonomy. On the basis of the consideration, I propose that self-validating neuroenhancement can be autonomous.

Frequently overlooked realistic moral bioenhancement interventions.

Many supporters of 'moral bioenhancement' (MBE), the use of biomedical interventions for moral improvement, have been criticised for having unrealistic proposals. The interventions they suggest have often been called infeasible and their implementation plans vague or unethical. I dispute these criticisms by showing that various interventions to implement MBE are practically and ethically feasible enough to warrant serious consideration. Such interventions include transcranial direct current stimulation over the medial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, as well as supplementation with lithium and omega-3. Considering their efficacy and feasibility, it is strange that these interventions have rarely been proposed or discussed as MBE. I review evidence that each of those interventions can reduce antisocial behaviour, reduce racial bias, increase executive function or increase prosocial traits like fairness and altruism. I then specify and defend realistic, ethically permissible ways to implement these interventions, especially for violent offenders and public servants-the former as rehabilitation and the latter to meet the high standards of their occupations. These interventions could be given to violent offenders in exchange for a reduced sentence or compulsorily in some cases. Potential intervention methods for non-prisoners include increasing the USDA-recommended dose of omega-3, encouraging food companies to supplement their products with omega-3 or trace lithium, requiring MBE for employment as a police officer or political leader, and insurance companies providing discounts for undergoing MBE. In some reasonably limited form, using these interventions may be a good first step to implement the project of MBE.

Why Human Enhancement is Necessary for Successful Human Deep-space Missions.

While humans have made enormous progress in the exploration and exploitation of Earth, exploration of outer space remains beyond current human capabilities. The principal challenges lie in current space technology and engineering which includes the protection of astronauts from the hazards of working and living in the space environment. These challenges may lead to a paradoxical situation where progress in space technology and the ability to ensure acceptable risk/benefit for human space exploration becomes dissociated and the rate of scientific discovery declines. In this paper, we discuss the predominant challenges of the space environment for human health and argue that development and deployment of a human enhancement policy, initially confined to astronauts - for the purpose of future human space programmes is a rational solution to these challenges.

Carácter ético y prudencia: analisis del acto humano en las decisiones clínico-éticas / Ethical character and prudence: analysis of the human act in clinical-ethical decisions

Se analiza en primer lugar, la mutua interioridad que existe en toda acción humana entre su dimensión ética y técnica y más en concreto en la práctica sanitaria. Se establece que sólo con los hábitos técnicos o éticos o aplicando unas determinadas pautas deliberativas no se puede realizar un discernimiento sobre la bondad o no de una determinada acción. Para ello, se requiere adoptar una perspectiva personal, tanto para uno mismo como cuando se enjuician acciones de otros. Para ello en segundo lugar, es imprescindible la virtud de la prudencia para captar en el contexto concreto el bien a elegir. Esta cualidad ética está muy influida por el carácter ético global de la persona como por la capacidad deliberativa y el conocimiento de los principios éticos. Con respecto a lo segundo es necesario ejercitarse siguiendo las vías habituales por las que la persona toma decisiones y considera una acción determinada como buena o mala. Por ello, no se puede pretender que con métodos técnicos de decisión los profesionales sanitarios deliberen y tomen decisiones éticas. En conclusión es necesario que la prudencia de éstos, se apoye tanto en el carácter ético personal, como en el análisis de casos éticos en consonancia con el propio modo natural de actuar de la razón humana

First, the mutual interiority that exists in every human action between its ethical and technical dimen-sion is analyzed, more specifically in relation to health practice. It is established that by means of technical or ethical habits, or applying certain deliberative guidelines, alone it is not possible to discern between the goodness or not of a certain action. For this to be possible, it is necessary to adopt a personal perspective, both as regards oneself and when judging the actions of others. Secondly, then, the virtue of prudence is essential to choose the most best path in a specific context. This ethical habit is greatly influenced by the overall ethical character of the person and by their deliberative capacity and knowledge of ethical principles. With regard to the second, it is necessary to follow the usual ways by which the person makes decisions and considers a certain action as good or bad. Therefore, it cannot be pretend using technical decision-making methods health professionals will deliberate and make ethical decisions. In conclusion, it is necessary that the prudence of professionals be based both on the personal ethical character and on an analysis of ethical cases in consonance with the natural way in which human reason acts

Moral enhancement, at the peak of pharmacology and at the limit of ethics.

The debate over the improvement of moral capacity or moral enhancement through pharmacology has gained momentum in the last decade as a result of advances in neuroscience. These advances have led to the discovery and allowed the alteration of patterns of human behavior, and have permitted direct interventions on the neuronal structure of behavior. In recent years, this analysis has deepened regarding the anthropological foundations of morality and the reasons that would justify the acceptance or rejection of such technology. We present a review of proposals for pharmacological interventions directed directly towards moral enhancement. In addition, we identify the ethical dilemmas that such interventions may generate, as well as the moral assessment of the authors of these studies. There is a moderate consensus on the risks of any intervention on the intimate structure of the human condition, its autonomy and identity, but there are large differences in explaining the reasons for this concern and especially in justifying such interventions. These findings show that it is necessary to investigate the moral assessment of authors and the ethical dimension within the field of pharmacology in order to identify future trends.

La mejora cognitiva. Entre la Biomedicina y la Neurociencia / Cognition enhancement. Between the Biomedicine and the Neuroscience

Integrada dentro del complejo mejora humana, la mejora cognitiva es un desafío a los programas de innovación educativa que todos los miembros dedicados a la enseñanza han comenzado a tomar en consideración. En este trabajo, se ponen en relación tres aspectos: se trata de llegar a un consenso sobre la tensa relación entre terapia y mejora en términos generales; se plantean las diversas áreas de intervención de mejora cognitiva a medio camino entre la biomedicina y la neurociencia desde el descriptor de neuroeducación como nuevo saber integrador; y, finalmente, se plantean alternativas de lectura ética de todo este proceso de intervención. En concreto se recurre al consecuencialismo y a categorías morales capaces de vertebrar un discurso ético sobre las controvertidas cuestiones que se suscitan en los diversos programas de intervención para la mejora de las capacidades cognitivas

Integrated inside the complex Human Enhancement, the Cognition Enhancement is a challenge to the programs of educational innovation that all education professionals have begun to take into consideration. This paper connnects three ideas: it aims to reach a consensus on the tense relation between therapy and enhancement in general terms; it exposes the diverse areas of intervention of cognitive enhancement as a middle ground between biomedicine and neuroeducation; and, finally, it suggests ethical alternatives of reading of all this intervention process, from the consequentialism perspective and the use of moral categories that allow us to construct an ethical point of view on these controversial questions

The evolution of moral progress and biomedical moral enhancement.

In The Evolution of Moral Progress Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell advance an evolutionary explanation of moral progress by morality becoming more 'inclusivist'. We are prepared to accept this explanation as far as it goes, but argue that it fails to explain how morality can become inclusivist in the fuller sense they intend. In fact, it even rules out inclusivism in their intended sense of moral progress, since they believe that human altruism and prosocial attitudes are essentially parochial. We also respond to their charge that the possibility of moral enhancement by biomedical means that we have defended in numerous publications assumes that moral attitudes are biologically hard-wired to an extent that implies that they are resilient to the influence of cognitive or cultural factors. Quite the contrary, we think they are more open to such influence than they seem to do.

Enhancing Equality.

The range of opportunities people enjoy in life largely depends on social, biological, and genetic factors for which individuals are not responsible. Philosophical debates about equality of opportunities have focussed mainly on addressing social determinants of inequalities. However, the introduction of human bioenhancement should make us reconsider what our commitment to equality entails. We propose a way of improving morally relevant equality that is centred on what we consider a fair distribution of bioenhancements. In the first part, we identify three main positions in the debate on bioenhancement and equality, and we show how each of them fails to meet the demands of a serious commitment to equality. In the second part, we formulate a new proposal that we think better promotes equality of opportunities: people from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds should be given access to bioenhancements while people from privileged socio-economic background should be prohibited from using them. We argue that those who are concerned about the inequality implications of bioenhancement should embrace this solution, rather than reject bioenhancement.

Bioethics of military performance enhancement.

Biological interventions to improve performance, such as amphetamines, have a long history of military use, and in the future may include more advanced biotechnologies. This article discusses the ethics of using biomedical enhancements in the military. The article begins by describing the distinction between biomedical enhancements and interventions intended to prevent, treat or mitigate disease. It then sets forth three principles to guide the ethical use of bioenhancements-proportionality, paternalism and fairness. The article applies these principles to concerns raised by military bioenhancement: safety, fairness in access to military reward, carryover effects to civilian life, whether service members can be ordered to use bioenhancements and when they may be permitted to do so voluntarily.

Why Should We Become Posthuman? The Beneficence Argument Questioned.

Why should we become posthuman? There is only one morally compelling answer to this question: because posthumanity will be a more beneficial state, better than present humanity. This is the Posthuman Beneficence Argument (PBA), the centerpiece of the liberal transhumanist defense of "directed evolution." In this article, I examine PBA and find it deficient on a number of lethal counts. My argument focuses on the writings of transhumanist philosopher Nick Bostrom, who has developed the most articulate defense of PBA and disclosed its metaethical framework. I begin by locating PBA in the context of wider transhumanist claims for the desirability of posthumanity. I identify two crucial components: (1) a model of deliberative rationality, requiring reasons to endorse claims; and (2) the reasons themselves (i.e., the greater beneficence that posthumanity represents). I examine these two conditions, in turn, specifying the claims that they ask us to accept. Following Bostrom, I argue that there is a need for a foundationalist approach that assures us of some universality in the process of valuation. This is required to appropriately ground the moral continuity and appeal to universality that PBA demands. I examine the reasons why this approach ultimately fails, leaving posthumanity as an unintelligible concept with no moral force. I conclude by identifying (and endorsing) a more mature approach to the debate on human enhancement, one that forfeits the grandiose but baseless claims too often found in transhumanist defenses of directed evolution. In short, posthumanity may be a good science fiction trope, but it has no normative force in the moral philosophy of human enhancement.

Militaries and the duty of care to enhanced veterans.

This article argues that there is a duty of care held by the State to military veterans who have been technologically enhanced as part of their military service. It suggests that enhancements may be permanent, persistent or protracted and demonstrates how enhancements generate additional moral responsibilities from the chain of command. The paper concludes by demonstrating how this institutional duty of care relates to issues such as informed consent.

Enhancement, hybris, and solidarity: a critical analysis of Sandel's The Case Against Perfection.

This article presents a critical analysis of the views of Michael Sandel on human enhancement in his book The Case Against Perfection (2007). Sandel argues that the use of biotechnologies for human enhancement is driven by a will to mastery or hybris, leading to an 'explosion of responsibility' and a disappearance of solidarity. I argue that Sandel is using a traditional concept of solidarity which leaves little room for individual differences and which is difficult to reconcile with the modern trend towards individual autonomy and cultural heterogeneity. With reference to the sociology of Giddens, I argue that the 'explosion of responsibility' can be considered an expression of the insecurity in modern society and the need for reflexivity in personal and social life. I argue that the need for reflexivity is a driving social and cultural force behind the interest in human enhancement, and that this trend can go together with a commitment to take care of the needs of others. I agree with Sandel that there is a risk that human enhancement may develop into 'hybris', particularly when enhancement is driven by scientism and a naturalist reduction of human values to neurological processes. Enhancement based on scientism will threaten solidarity defined by Honneth as an interactive relationship aimed at the mutual recognition of individual identities in relation to a shared value horizon. I will call for a reflective approach in which human enhancement technologies are explored in the context of a 'system of reference'. Such a reflective approach will help to protect against the hybris of scientism and to maintain solidarity with vulnerable groups.

What Demarks the Metamorphosis of Human Individuals to Posthuman Entities?

Humans often seek to improve themselves, whether through self-discipline or through the use of science and technology. At some point in the future, techniques might become available that will change humans to such a degree that they might have to be regarded as something other than human: posthuman. This essay tries to define the point at which such a human-to-posthuman metamorphosis may occur. This is achieved by discerning what is it that makes human substance distinct, i.e. what is the human essence. This is accomplished by examining the features of the human body, looking at the mode of human existence in society and trying to grasp the importance of the body-soul relationship. Throughout the process, humans are compared to animals as well as entities from literature, film, and the gaming world. These are used as case studies to shape and test the ideas developed throughout the essay. This essay's conclusions might become useful when decisions will have to be made as to the legal status of posthumans, by providing a tool for discerning when metamorphosis has occurred. Moreover, insights from this essay might also inform debates surrounding the ethical status of certain modalities of human enhancement.

Transcranial electrical stimulation for human enhancement and the risk of inequality: Prohibition or compensation?

Non-invasive brain stimulation is used to modulate brain excitation and inhibition and to improve cognitive functioning. The effectiveness of the enhancement due to transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) is still controversial, but the technique seems to have large potential for improvement and more specific applications. In particular, it has recently been used by athletes, both beginners and professionals. This paper analyses the ethical issues related to tDCS enhancement, which depend on its specific features: ease of use, immediate effect, non-detectability and great variability of effects. If tDCS were to become widespread, there could be some potential side effects, especially the rise of inequality in many selective competitive contexts. I discuss two possible scenarios to counter this effect: that of prohibition and that of compensation, each supported by reasons and arguments that seem plausible and worthy of consideration. In conclusion, I show why I think the scenario of compensation is the preferable one.

Compulsory moral bioenhancement should be covert.

Some theorists argue that moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory. I take this argument one step further, arguing that if moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory, then its administration ought to be covert rather than overt. This is to say that it is morally preferable for compulsory moral bioenhancement to be administered without the recipients knowing that they are receiving the enhancement. My argument for this is that if moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory, then its administration is a matter of public health, and for this reason should be governed by public health ethics. I argue that the covert administration of a compulsory moral bioenhancement program better conforms to public health ethics than does an overt compulsory program. In particular, a covert compulsory program promotes values such as liberty, utility, equality, and autonomy better than an overt program does. Thus, a covert compulsory moral bioenhancement program is morally preferable to an overt moral bioenhancement program.