Resource expenditure not resource allocation: response to McDougall on cloning and dignity.

This paper offers some comments on bioethical debates about resource allocation in healthcare. It is stimulated by Rosalind McDougall's argument that it is an affront to the human dignity of people with below "liberties-level" health to fund human reproductive cloning. McDougall is right to underline the relevance of resource prioritisation to the ethics of research and provision of new biomedical technologies. This paper argues that bioethicists should be careful when offering comments about such issues. In particular, it emphasises the need to represent accurately the reality of the situation-especially when we are passing judgement on technologies that are in their infancy and whose practical application is yet to be confirmed. The paper also emphasises the importance of the actual context to bioethical debate, and note that it would be better to talk about resource expenditure rather than resource allocation when it comes to discussing the rights and wrongs of how money is spent. It also reiterates the claims made by other writers that social and political philosophy need to have a transparent and considered role in debates about resources.

What about the women? Ethical and policy aspects of egg supply for cloning research.

As more and more countries open their doors to human cloning and embryonic stem cell research, scientists will be confronted with one fundamental problem: where will all the eggs come from? The mass harvesting of eggs raises serious issues about women's health, status and well-being. This paper critically examines proposals for ova supply such as altruistic donation, surplus IVF eggs and commercial sale. It questions the meaningfulness of informed consent and the risk-benefit ratio in a climate where powerful economic and social forces increasingly view the risks to women as the necessary trade-off for scientific advance.

Dolly for dinner? Assessing commercial and regulatory trends in cloned livestock.

As cloning technologies become more widely established, will products enter the food chain sooner than regulatory agencies and the public might be prepared for?

The egg-sharing model for human therapeutic cloning research: managing donor selection criteria, the proportion of shared oocytes allocated to research, and amount of financial subsidy given to the donor.

Recent advances in human therapeutic cloning made by Hwang and colleagues have opened up new avenues of therapy for various human diseases. However, the major bottleneck of this new technology is the severe shortage of human donor oocytes. Egg-sharing in return for subsidized fertility treatment has been suggested as an ethically justifiable and practical solution to overcome the shortage of donor oocytes for therapeutic cloning. Because the utilization of shared oocytes in therapeutic cloning research does not result in any therapeutic benefit to a second party, this would necessitate a different management strategy compared to their use for the assisted conception of infertile women who are unable to produce any oocytes of their own. It is proposed that the pool of prospective egg-sharers in therapeutic cloning research be limited only to younger women (below 30 years of age) with indications for either male partner sub-fertility or tubal blockage. With regards to the proportion of the shared gametes being allocated to research, a threshold number of retrieved oocytes should be set that if not exceeded, would result in the patient being automatically removed from the egg-sharing scheme. Any excess supernumerary oocyte above this threshold number can be contributed to science, and allocation should be done in a randomized manner. Perhaps, a total of 10 retrieved oocytes from the patient may be considered a suitable threshold, since the chances of conception are unlikely to be impaired. With regards to the amount of subsidy being given to the patient, it is suggested that the proportion of financial subsidy should be equal to the proportion of the patient's oocytes being allocated to research. No doubt, the promise of future therapeutic benefit may be offered to the patient instead of financial subsidy. However, this is ethically controversial because therapeutic cloning has not yet been demonstrated to be a viable model of clinical therapy and any promises made to the patient might turn out to be illusionary. Hence, it is proposed that a tangible financial subsidy on the medical fees might be the better option for the patient's welfare.

Creating Fido's twin: can pet cloning be ethically justified?

Taken at face value, pet cloning may seem at best a frivolous practice, costly both to the cloned pet's health and its owner's pocket. At worst, its critics say, it is misguided and unhealthy--a way of exploiting grief to the detriment of the animal, its owner, and perhaps even animal welfare in general. But if the great pains we are willing to take to clone Fido raise the status of companion animals in the public eye, then the practice might be defensible.

Reproductive cloning and a (kind of) genetic fallacy.

Many people now believe that human reproductive cloning--once sufficiently safe and effective--should be permitted on the grounds that it will allow the otherwise infertile to have children that are biologically closely related to them. However, though it is widely believed that the possession of a close genetic link to our children is morally significant and valuable, we argue that such a view is erroneous. Moreover, the claim that the genetic link is valuable is pernicious; it tends to give rise to highly undesirable consequences, and therefore should be combated rather than pandered to. The emphasis on the genetic is unwarranted and unfortunate; rather than giving us moral reason to support reproductive cloning in the case of infertility, the fact that cloning requests are likely to be motivated by the genetic argument gives us reason to oppose its availability.