Conceptualising personhood in nursing care for people with altered consciousness, cognition and behaviours: A discussion paper.

The aim of this discussion paper is to explore factors and contexts that influence how nurses might conceptualise and assign personhood for people with altered consciousness, cognition and behaviours. While a biomedical framing is founded upon a dichotomy between the body and self, such that the body can be subjected to a medical and objectifying gaze, relational theories of self, multiculturalism and technological advances for life-sustaining interventions present new dilemmas which necessitate discussion about what constitutes personhood. The concept of personhood is dynamic and evolving: where historical constructs of rationality, agency, autonomy and a conscious mind once formed the basis for personhood, these ideas have been challenged to encompass embodied, relational, social and cultural paradigms of selfhood. Themes in this discussion include: the right to personhood, mind-body dualism versus the embodied self; personhood as consciousness, rationality and narratives of self; social relational contexts of personhood and cultural contexts of personhood. Patricia Benner's and Christine Tanner's clinical judgement model is then applied to consider the implications for nursing care that seeks to reflexively incorporate personhood. Nurse clinicians are able to move between conceptions of personhood and act to support the body, as well as presumed autonomy and relational, social and cultural personhood. In doing so, they use analytical, intuitive and narrative reasoning which prioritises autonomous constructions of self. They also incorporate relational and social contexts of the person receiving care within the possibilities of technological advances and constraints of contextual resources.

Lateral frontoparietal effective connectivity differentiates and predicts state of consciousness in a cohort of patients with traumatic disorders of consciousness.

Neuroimaging studies have suggested an important role for the default mode network (DMN) in disorders of consciousness (DoC). However, the extent to which DMN connectivity can discriminate DoC states-unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS) and minimally conscious state (MCS)-is less evident. Particularly, it is unclear whether effective DMN connectivity, as measured indirectly with dynamic causal modelling (DCM) of resting EEG can disentangle UWS from healthy controls and from patients considered conscious (MCS+). Crucially, this extends to UWS patients with potentially "covert" awareness (minimally conscious star, MCS*) indexed by voluntary brain activity in conjunction with partially preserved frontoparietal metabolism as measured with positron emission tomography (PET+ diagnosis; in contrast to PET- diagnosis with complete frontoparietal hypometabolism). Here, we address this gap by using DCM of EEG data acquired from patients with traumatic brain injury in 11 UWS (6 PET- and 5 PET+) and in 12 MCS+ (11 PET+ and 1 PET-), alongside with 11 healthy controls. We provide evidence for a key difference in left frontoparietal connectivity when contrasting UWS PET- with MCS+ patients and healthy controls. Next, in a leave-one-subject-out cross-validation, we tested the classification performance of the DCM models demonstrating that connectivity between medial prefrontal and left parietal sources reliably discriminates UWS PET- from MCS+ patients and controls. Finally, we illustrate that these models generalize to an unseen dataset: models trained to discriminate UWS PET- from MCS+ and controls, classify MCS* patients as conscious subjects with high posterior probability (pp > .92). These results identify specific alterations in the DMN after severe brain injury and highlight the clinical utility of EEG-based effective connectivity for identifying patients with potential covert awareness.

Sensing, feeling and consciousness.

Living organisms achieve homeostasis by using distinct mechanisms tailored to their physiological complexity. Unicellular organisms as well as plants, which are devoid of nervous systems, rely on covert sensing/detecting and equally covert responding mechanisms. Organisms with nervous systems rely on overt consciousness which is based on homeostatic feelings and the experiences and consequent subjectivity they generate. This article is part of the theme issue 'Sensing and feeling: an integrative approach to sensory processing and emotional experience'.

Capturing the ghost in the machine: a process for development and validation of measures of phenomenal consciousness in delirium.

BACKGROUND: Delirium has conventionally been considered a disorder of consciousness. Alertness and arousal are used as surrogates in clinical practice but are insufficient for the purposes of a more dimensional assessment of consciousness. We present a process of development and validation of candidate measures of phenomenal consciousness that could be applied to the diagnosis of delirium. METHODS: First, a narrative review of available instruments in the fields of phenomenal consciousness, including prereflective consciousness, the phenomenal-sensed experience and reflective thought, was undertaken. Eligibility of tools in the context of applicability to delirium was based upon objectivity in test interpretation and the requirement for tester administration. Second, where there was a gap in suitable cognitive tools, new items were derived using the silent generation technique. A process of face and construct validity using a diverse panel of experts was performed, and readability was evaluated. RESULTS: 814 articles were screened from the literature review. Fourteen candidate tools were reported from the three domains of phenomenal consciousness. One of these met the eligibility criteria for a delirium assessment. Fifty-seven new tests of phenomenal consciousness were identified. After a process of item reduction, a total of 26 individual tests were identified. After content validity, 22 of the 26 items were retained. The scale average content validity index was 0.89. The agreement between raters was between 80% and 97%. 100% of responses for face validity were rated as positive. Flesch Reading Ease Score was 91.6 (very easy to read). CONCLUSIONS: Candidate measures of phenomenal consciousness are described, and early validity studies are promising.

Modulation of brain activity in brain-injured patients with a disorder of consciousness in intensive care with repeated 10-Hz transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS): a randomised controlled trial protocol.

INTRODUCTION: Therapeutic interventions for disorders of consciousness lack consistency; evidence supports non-invasive brain stimulation, but few studies assess neuromodulation in acute-to-subacute brain-injured patients. This study aims to validate the feasibility and assess the effect of a multi-session transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS) intervention in subacute brain-injured patients on recovery of consciousness, related brain oscillations and brain network dynamics. METHODS AND ANALYSES: The study is comprised of two phases: a validation phase (n=12) and a randomised controlled trial (n=138). Both phases will be conducted in medically stable brain-injured adult patients (traumatic brain injury and hypoxic-ischaemic encephalopathy), with a Glasgow Coma Scale score ≤12 after continuous sedation withdrawal. Recruitment will occur at the intensive care unit of a Level 1 Trauma Centre in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. The intervention includes a 20 min 10 Hz tACS at 1 mA intensity or a sham session over parieto-occipital cortical sites, repeated over five consecutive days. The current's frequency targets alpha brain oscillations (8-13 Hz), known to be associated with consciousness. Resting-state electroencephalogram (EEG) will be recorded four times daily for five consecutive days: pre and post-intervention, at 60 and 120 min post-tACS. Two additional recordings will be included: 24 hours and 1-week post-protocol. Multimodal measures (blood samples, pupillometry, behavioural consciousness assessments (Coma Recovery Scale-revised), actigraphy measures) will be acquired from baseline up to 1 week after the stimulation. EEG signal analysis will focus on the alpha bandwidth (8-13 Hz) using spectral and functional network analyses. Phone assessments at 3, 6 and 12 months post-tACS, will measure long-term functional recovery, quality of life and caregivers' burden. ETHICS AND DISSEMINATION: Ethical approval for this study has been granted by the Research Ethics Board of the CIUSSS du Nord-de-l'Île-de-Montréal (Project ID 2021-2279). The findings of this two-phase study will be submitted for publication in a peer-reviewed academic journal and submitted for presentation at conferences. The trial's results will be published on a public trial registry database (ClinicalTrials.gov). TRIAL REGISTRATION NUMBER: NCT05833568.

Conscious but not thinking-Mind-blanks during visuomotor tracking: An fMRI study of endogenous attention lapses.

Attention lapses (ALs) are complete lapses of responsiveness in which performance is briefly but completely disrupted and during which, as opposed to microsleeps, the eyes remain open. Although the phenomenon of ALs has been investigated by behavioural and physiological means, the underlying cause of an AL has largely remained elusive. This study aimed to investigate the underlying physiological substrates of behaviourally identified endogenous ALs during a continuous visuomotor task, primarily to answer the question: Were the ALs during this task due to extreme mind-wandering or mind-blanks? The data from two studies were combined, resulting in data from 40 healthy non-sleep-deprived subjects (20M/20F; mean age 27.1 years, 20-45). Only 17 of the 40 subjects were used in the analysis due to a need for a minimum of two ALs per subject. Subjects performed a random 2-D continuous visuomotor tracking task for 50 and 20 min in Studies 1 and 2, respectively. Tracking performance, eye-video, and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) were recorded simultaneously. A human expert visually inspected the tracking performance and eye-video recordings to identify and categorise lapses of responsiveness as microsleeps or ALs. Changes in neural activity during 85 ALs (17 subjects) relative to responsive tracking were estimated by whole-brain voxel-wise fMRI and by haemodynamic response (HR) analysis in regions of interest (ROIs) from seven key networks to reveal the neural signature of ALs. Changes in functional connectivity (FC) within and between the key ROIs were also estimated. Networks explored were the default mode network, dorsal attention network, frontoparietal network, sensorimotor network, salience network, visual network, and working memory network. Voxel-wise analysis revealed a significant increase in blood-oxygen-level-dependent activity in the overlapping dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and supplementary motor area region but no significant decreases in activity; the increased activity is considered to represent a recovery-of-responsiveness process following an AL. This increased activity was also seen in the HR of the corresponding ROI. Importantly, HR analysis revealed no trend of increased activity in the posterior cingulate of the default mode network, which has been repeatedly demonstrated to be a strong biomarker of mind-wandering. FC analysis showed decoupling of external attention, which supports the involuntary nature of ALs, in addition to the neural recovery processes. Other findings were a decrease in HR in the frontoparietal network before the onset of ALs, and a decrease in FC between default mode network and working memory network. These findings converge to our conclusion that the ALs observed during our task were involuntary mind-blanks. This is further supported behaviourally by the short duration of the ALs (mean 1.7 s), which is considered too brief to be instances of extreme mind-wandering. This is the first study to demonstrate that at least the majority of complete losses of responsiveness on a continuous visuomotor task are, if not due to microsleeps, due to involuntary mind-blanks.

Network mechanisms of ongoing brain activity's influence on conscious visual perception.

Sensory inputs enter a constantly active brain, whose state is always changing from one moment to the next. Currently, little is known about how ongoing, spontaneous brain activity participates in online task processing. We employed 7 Tesla fMRI and a threshold-level visual perception task to probe the effects of prestimulus ongoing brain activity on perceptual decision-making and conscious recognition. Prestimulus activity originating from distributed brain regions, including visual cortices and regions of the default-mode and cingulo-opercular networks, exerted a diverse set of effects on the sensitivity and criterion of conscious recognition, and categorization performance. We further elucidate the mechanisms underlying these behavioral effects, revealing how prestimulus activity modulates multiple aspects of stimulus processing in highly specific and network-dependent manners. These findings reveal heretofore unknown network mechanisms underlying ongoing brain activity's influence on conscious perception, and may hold implications for understanding the precise roles of spontaneous activity in other brain functions.

A synergistic workspace for human consciousness revealed by Integrated Information Decomposition.

How is the information-processing architecture of the human brain organised, and how does its organisation support consciousness? Here, we combine network science and a rigorous information-theoretic notion of synergy to delineate a 'synergistic global workspace', comprising gateway regions that gather synergistic information from specialised modules across the human brain. This information is then integrated within the workspace and widely distributed via broadcaster regions. Through functional MRI analysis, we show that gateway regions of the synergistic workspace correspond to the human brain's default mode network, whereas broadcasters coincide with the executive control network. We find that loss of consciousness due to general anaesthesia or disorders of consciousness corresponds to diminished ability of the synergistic workspace to integrate information, which is restored upon recovery. Thus, loss of consciousness coincides with a breakdown of information integration within the synergistic workspace of the human brain. This work contributes to conceptual and empirical reconciliation between two prominent scientific theories of consciousness, the Global Neuronal Workspace and Integrated Information Theory, while also advancing our understanding of how the human brain supports consciousness through the synergistic integration of information.

The human brain consists of billions of neurons which process sensory inputs, such as sight and sound, and combines them with information already stored in the brain. This integration of information guides our decisions, thoughts, and movements, and is hypothesized to be integral to consciousness. However, it is poorly understood how the brain regions responsible for processing this integration are organized in the brain. To investigate this question, Luppi et al. employed a mathematical framework called Partial Information Decomposition (PID) which can distinguish different types of information: redundancy (available from many regions) and synergy (which reflects genuine integration). The team applied the PID framework to the brain scans of 100 individuals. This allowed them to identify which brain regions combine information from across the brain (known as gateways), and which ones transmit it back to the rest of the brain (known as broadcasters). Next, Luppi et al. set out to find how these regions compared in unconscious and conscious individuals. To do this, they studied 15 healthy volunteers whose brains were scanned (using a technique called functional MRI) before, during, and after anaesthesia. This revealed that the brain integrated less information when unconscious, and that this reduction happens predominantly in gateway rather than broadcaster regions. The same effect was also observed in the brains of individuals who were permanently unconscious due to brain injuries. These findings provide a way of understanding how information is organised in the brain. They also suggest that loss of consciousness due to brain injuries and anaesthesia involve similar brain circuits. This means it may be possible to gain insights about disorders of consciousness from studying how people emerge from anaesthesia.

Distinct dynamic connectivity profiles promote enhanced conscious perception of auditory stimuli.

The neuroscience of consciousness aims to identify neural markers that distinguish brain dynamics in healthy individuals from those in unconscious conditions. Recent research has revealed that specific brain connectivity patterns correlate with conscious states and diminish with loss of consciousness. However, the contribution of these patterns to shaping conscious processing remains unclear. Our study investigates the functional significance of these neural dynamics by examining their impact on participants' ability to process external information during wakefulness. Using fMRI recordings during an auditory detection task and rest, we show that ongoing dynamics are underpinned by brain patterns consistent with those identified in previous research. Detection of auditory stimuli at threshold is specifically improved when the connectivity pattern at stimulus presentation corresponds to patterns characteristic of conscious states. Conversely, the occurrence of these conscious state-associated patterns increases after detection, indicating a mutual influence between ongoing brain dynamics and conscious perception. Our findings suggest that certain brain configurations are more favorable to the conscious processing of external stimuli. Targeting these favorable patterns in patients with consciousness disorders may help identify windows of greater receptivity to the external world, guiding personalized treatments.

Altered states of consciousness caused by a mindfulness-based programme up to a year later: Results from a randomised controlled trial.

BACKGROUND: Mindfulness-based programmes (MBPs) have shown beneficial effects on mental health. There is emerging evidence that MBPs may also be associated with marked deviations in the subjective experience of waking consciousness. We aimed to explore whether MBPs can have a causal role in different types of such states. METHODS: We conducted a pragmatic randomised controlled trial (ACTRN12615001160527). University of Cambridge students without severe mental illness were randomised to an 8-week MBP plus mental health support as usual (SAU), or to SAU alone. We adapted the Altered States of Consciousness Rating Scale (OAV, 0-100-point range) to assess spontaneous experiences in daily life, and included it as a post-hoc secondary outcome at the end of the one-year follow-up questionnaire. Two-part model analyses compared trial arms, and estimated dose-response effects of formal (meditation) and informal (daily activities) mindfulness practice during the year. Sensitivity analyses correcting for multiple comparisons were conducted. RESULTS: We randomised 670 participants; 205 (33%) completed the OAV. In comparison with SAU, MBP participants experienced unity more frequently and intensively (two-part marginal effect (ME) = 6.26 OAV scale points, 95% confidence interval (CI) = 2.24, 10.27, p = 0.006, Cohen's d = 0.33) and disembodiment more frequently (ME = 4.84, 95% CI = 0.86, 8.83, p = 0.019, Cohen's d = 0.26). Formal practice predicted spiritual, blissful and unity experiences, insightfulness, disembodiment, and changed meanings. Informal practice predicted unity and blissful experiences. Trial arm comparisons and informal practice effects lost significance after corrections for multiple comparisons, but formal practice dose-response effects remained significant. CONCLUSIONS: Results provide a novel suggestion of causal links between mindfulness practice and specific altered states of consciousness. To optimise their impact, practitioners and teachers need to anticipate and handle them appropriately. Future studies need to confirm findings and assess mechanisms and clinical implications.

Impacts of Central Administration of the Novel Peptide, LEAP-2, in Different Food Intake Models in Conscious Rats.

Liver-expressed antimicrobial peptide-2 (LEAP-2) has mutual antagonism with ghrelin, which evokes food intake under a freely fed state. Nevertheless, the impact of LEAP-2 on ghrelin under time-restricted feeding (TRF), which has benefits in the context of metabolic disease, is still unknown. This study aims to explore the impact of central administration of LEAP-2 on the ingestion behavior of rats, which was evaluated using their cumulative food intake in the TRF state. Before intracerebroventricular (ICV) administration of O-n-octanoylated ghrelin (0.1 nmol/rat), as a food-stimulatory model, the rats received various doses of LEAP-2 (0.3, 1, 3 nmol/rat, ICV). Cumulative food intake was recorded at 1, 2, 4, 8, 12, and 24 h after ICV injection under 12 h freely fed and TRF states in a light phase. In 12 h freely fed and TRF states, central administration of ghrelin alone induced feeding behavior. Pre-treatment with LEAP-2 (1 and 3 nmol/rat, ICV) suppressed ghrelin-induced food intake in a dose-dependent manner in a 12 h freely fed state instead of a TRF state, which may have disturbed the balance of ghrelin and LEAP-2. This study provides neuroendocrine-based evidence that may explain why TRF sometimes fails in fighting obesity/metabolic dysfunction-associated steatotic liver disease in clinics.

Perception-action Dissociations as a Window into Consciousness.

Understanding the neural correlates of unconscious perception stands as a primary goal of experimental research in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. In this Perspectives paper, we explain why experimental protocols probing qualitative dissociations between perception and action provide valuable insights into conscious and unconscious processing, along with their corresponding neural correlates. We present research that utilizes human eye movements as a sensitive indicator of unconscious visual processing. Given the increasing reliance on oculomotor and pupillary responses in consciousness research, these dissociations also provide a cautionary tale about inferring conscious perception solely based on no-report protocols.

Exploring the transformative potential of out-of-body experiences: A pathway to enhanced empathy.

Out-of-body experiences (OBEs) are subjective phenomena during which individuals feel disembodied or perceive themselves as outside of their physical bodies, often resulting in profound and transformative effects. In particular, experiencers report greater heightened pro-social behavior, including more peaceful relationships, tolerance, and empathy. Drawing parallels with the phenomenon of ego dissolution induced by certain psychedelic substances, we explore the notion that OBEs may engender these changes through ego dissolution, which fosters a deep-seated sense of unity and interconnectedness with others. We then assess potential brain mechanisms underlying the link between OBEs and empathy, considering the involvement of the temporoparietal junction and the Default Mode Network. This manuscript offers an examination of the potential pathways through which OBEs catalyze empathic enhancement, shedding light on the intricate interplay between altered states of consciousness and human empathy.

Out-of-body experiences in relation to lucid dreaming and sleep paralysis: A theoretical review and conceptual model.

Out-of-body experiences (OBEs) are characterized by the subjective experience of being located outside the physical body. Little is known about the neurophysiology of spontaneous OBEs, which are often reported by healthy individuals as occurring during states of reduced vigilance, particularly in proximity to or during sleep (sleep-related OBEs). In this paper, we review the current state of research on sleep-related OBEs and hypothesize that maintaining consciousness during transitions from wakefulness to REM sleep (sleep-onset REM periods) may facilitate sleep-related OBEs. Based on this hypothesis, we propose a new conceptual model that potentially describes the relationship between OBEs and sleep states. The model sheds light on the phenomenological differences between sleep-related OBEs and similar states of consciousness, such as lucid dreaming (the realization of being in a dream state) and sleep paralysis (feeling paralyzed while falling asleep or waking up), and explores the potential polysomnographic features underlying sleep-related OBEs. Additionally, we apply the predictive coding framework and suggest a connecting link between sleep-related OBEs and OBEs reported during wakefulness.

Unravelling consciousness and brain function through the lens of time, space, and information.

Disentangling how cognitive functions emerge from the interplay of brain dynamics and network architecture is among the major challenges that neuroscientists face. Pharmacological and pathological perturbations of consciousness provide a lens to investigate these complex challenges. Here, we review how recent advances about consciousness and the brain's functional organisation have been driven by a common denominator: decomposing brain function into fundamental constituents of time, space, and information. Whereas unconsciousness increases structure-function coupling across scales, psychedelics may decouple brain function from structure. Convergent effects also emerge: anaesthetics, psychedelics, and disorders of consciousness can exhibit similar reconfigurations of the brain's unimodal-transmodal functional axis. Decomposition approaches reveal the potential to translate discoveries across species, with computational modelling providing a path towards mechanistic integration.

Critical consciousness and anti-racist action as rooted in family processes.

Racially ethnically marginalized communities in the United States are exposed to structural and interpersonal forms of racism that have harmful effects on their health, wealth, education, and employment (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Racism and Health. https://www.cdc.gov/minorityhealth/racism-disparities/index.html, 2021). Although a plethora of research exists outlining these harmful effects, research examining how youth from diverse backgrounds effectively combat racism is lacking. Emerging research demonstrates that families may play a key role in the development of critical consciousness and participation in anti-racist actions (Bañales et al., Journal of Social Issues, 2021, 77, 964; Blanco Martinez et al., American Journal of Community Psychology, 2022, 70, 278; Lozada et al., Journal of Black Psychology, 2017, 43, 493). Yet, many key family processes have not been examined in relation to youth development of anti-racist practices. The current study included a sample of 327 racially ethnically diverse emerging adults (Mage = 18.80, SD = 1.28, range = 18-25), and explored the association between ethnic-racial socialization (cultural socialization, preparation for bias) and youth critical consciousness (reflection, motivation, action) and anti-racist (interpersonal, communal, political change) actions, and how familism values impact these associations. Results found that ethnic-racial socialization was positively associated with all aspects of critical consciousness and anti-racist actions. Results also found that familism significantly interacted with ethnic-racial socialization to predict some aspects of critical consciousness and anti-racist actions, but not others. Implications of the findings and future research directions are discussed.

Observing the suppression of individual aversive memories from conscious awareness.

When reminded of an unpleasant experience, people often try to exclude the unwanted memory from awareness, a process known as retrieval suppression. Here we used multivariate decoding (MVPA) and representational similarity analyses on EEG data to track how suppression unfolds in time and to reveal its impact on item-specific cortical patterns. We presented reminders to aversive scenes and asked people to either suppress or to retrieve the scene. During suppression, mid-frontal theta power within the first 500 ms distinguished suppression from passive viewing of the reminder, indicating that suppression rapidly recruited control. During retrieval, we could discern EEG cortical patterns relating to individual memories-initially, based on theta-driven visual perception of the reminders (0 to 500 ms) and later, based on alpha-driven reinstatement of the aversive scene (500 to 3000 ms). Critically, suppressing retrieval weakened (during 360 to 600 ms) and eventually abolished item-specific cortical patterns, a robust effect that persisted until the reminder disappeared (780 to 3000 ms). Representational similarity analyses provided converging evidence that retrieval suppression weakened the representation of target scenes during the 500 to 3000 ms reinstatement window. Together, rapid top-down control during retrieval suppression abolished cortical patterns of individual memories, and precipitated later forgetting. These findings reveal a precise chronometry on the voluntary suppression of individual memories.