Revisiting work engagement from a moderated-mediation vantage point / Reevaluación de la implicación en el trabajo desde el enfoque mejor de mediación moderada

This paper aimed to shed light on (1) heavy-work investment (HWI) of time and efforts as a mediational mechanism between intrinsic/extrinsic motivation (predictors) and work engagement (WE) as an outcome, and (2) the moderation effect of employment contract type (permanent vs. temporary employees) on the association between work motivation and HWI. Data from 242 high-tech subjects - engineers (68.2%) and engineering students (31.8%) - was collected. Apart from correlational relationships, only investment of effort (and not time) is a partial mediator in the relationship between extrinsic motivation and WE, but is a suppressor variable for intrinsic motivation. Moreover, the associations between intrinsic/extrinsic motivation and HWI were found stronger for temporary employees. Theoretical and practical implications and future research suggestions are discussed

Este trabajo trata de arrojar luz sobre (1) la inversión de tiempo y esfuerzo en trabajo duro (HWI) como mecanismo mediador entre la motivación intrínseca/extrínseca (predictores) y la implicación en el trabajo como resultado y (2) el efecto moderador del tipo de contrato laboral (empleados fijos frente a temporales) en la asociación entre motivación laboral y HWI. Se recogieron datos de 242 sujetos empleados en alta tecnología, de los cuales el 68.2% eran ingenieros y el 31.8% estudiantes de ingeniería. Aparte de las relaciones correlacionales, únicamente la inversión en esfuerzo (y no en tiempo) es mediador parcial de la relación entre motivación extrínseca e implicación en el trabajo, pero es una variable supresora de la motivación intrínseca. Además, se encontró que las asociaciones entre motivación intrínseca/extrínseca y HWI eran más sólidas en los empleados temporales. Se comentan las implicaciones teóricas y prácticas, así como sugerencias para la investigación futura

Frontera and integrity in the 'social contract for the Spanish science', 1907-1939 / Boundaries and integrity in the 'Social Contract for Spanish Science', 1907-1939

En este artículo se analizan las relaciones entre ciencia y política en el primer tercio del siglo XX español desde la perspectiva del Contrato Social para la Ciencia. En él se muestra que en dicho periodo se instituyó un auténtico contrato social para la ciencia en España, aunque surgieron algunos problemas de frontera e integridad. Dichos problemas son analizados y se defiende que los problemas de frontera fueron resultado de la concepción de las relaciones entre ciencia y política de los gobiernos conservadores, mientras que los problemas de integridad tuvieron que ver con la activación de redes de influencia en la concesión de las becas para la formación en el extranjero. Finalmente, el análisis revela que estos problemas no invalidaron el contrato social para la ciencia en España (AU)

This article analyzes the relationship between science and politics in Spain in the early 20th century from the perspective of the Social Contract for Science. The article shows that a genuine social contract for science was instituted in Spain during this period, although some boundary and integrity problems emerged. These problems are analyzed, showing that the boundary problems were a product of the conservative viewpoint on the relationship between science and politics, while the integrity problems involved the activation of networks of influence in the awarding of scholarships to study abroad. Finally, the analysis reveals that these problems did not invalidate the Spanish social contract for science (AU)

Choice of contracts in the British National Health Service: an empirical study.

Following major reforms of the British National Health Service (NHS) in 1990, the roles of purchasing and providing health services were separated, with the relationship between purchasers and providers governed by contracts. Using a mixed multinomial logit analysis, we show how this policy shift led to a selection of contracts that is consistent with the predictions of a simple model, based on contract theory, in which the characteristics of the health services being purchased and of the contracting parties influence the choice of contract form. The paper thus provides evidence in support of the practical relevance of theory in understanding health care market reform.

[Collective versus selective contracts from a legal point of view]. / Kollektivvertrag versus Einzelvertrag aus juristischer Sicht.

The historically proven organisational model of service relations between sickness funds and healthcare providers are collective contracts. A collective contract as a standards treaty ("Normenvertrag") is particularly pronounced concerning the panel doctor law ("Vertragsarztrecht") defining medical care on the basis of the principle of benefits in kind governing benefit claims of the insured in case of illness. The collective contract is a suitable instrument for ensuring both consistent and exhaustive provision of care and for organising the conditions of care, especially the quality and reimbursement of professional medical services. For several years the legislator has been "experimenting" with parallel contract design patterns such as the contract of integrated care in the form of selective contracts between health insurances or their associations and healthcare providers or groups of healthcare providers. More recently, allowances for conclusion of such contracts have been supposed to lead to competition between the contractual systems. It is doubtful whether this "push-start" will contribute to overcoming the systematic legal disadvantages of selective contracting as an organisational model for the provision of healthcare services to the insured.

Contracts in radiology practices: contract types and key provisions.

A contract between a radiology group and its physician member(s) provides the foundation for the professional relationships in a group practice. The parties are not in positions of parity; contract provisions are structured to maintain the primacy of the group over the individual members. An integration clause should be included to preclude reliance on communications that are not memorialized by the language of the contract. Precise, unambiguous terms must be used to convey the intentions of the parties. The contract should have a clear date of initiation and, if applicable, an effective date of termination. Mechanisms for termination and modification should be expressed clearly to minimize the risk of judicial interference. The method of determining and adjusting the salary and other benefits of the radiologist should be stated, as consideration is necessary to support the existence of a legal contract. The obligations of the radiologist to the practice are often stated in general terms to maximize the group's flexibility. Finally, other key clauses that are discussed in the paper should be incorporated into the contract.

Have "evergreen" provider contracts lost their bloom?

An "evergreen contract" is one that automatically renews itself from year to year, unless one of the contracting parties acts at specified intervals (which may be annually or as long as several years) to give notice in the manner required to terminate the otherwise perpetual agreement. Such contracts are in contrast to fixed-term agreements, where both parties must affirmatively agree to extend the term beyond the initial specified term. Such "evergreen contracts" are legally valid, but for compelling reasons health plans and providers may want to consider terminating their evergreen provider contracts now in favor of a contract with a fixed term.