Improving The Medicare Physician Fee Schedule: Make It Part Of Value-Based Payment.

Alternative Payment Models (APMs) can address the limitations inherent in fee-for-service payment to support new approaches to health care delivery that produce greater value. But the models being tested are directly layered on top of fee-for-service architecture, specifically the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule. Shoring up that architecture to produce greater value, in combination with APMs, should be considered an integral part of the movement to value-based payment. We propose ending the split within the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services between the people managing the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule and those creating and testing APMs, with both groups advised by a revamped Physician-Focused Payment Model Technical Advisory Committee that covers both dimensions of creating greater value.

Effects of gastrostomy fee schedule revision on artificial nutrition routes among older people with dementia in Japan: A time series observational study.

AIM: The present study aimed to investigate the effects of the 2014 Japanese fee schedule revision on trends in artificial nutrition routes, including gastrostomy, nasogastric tube and parenteral nutrition, among older people with dementia, using time series analysis. METHODS: The study used claim data in Japan submitted to Fukuoka Late Elders' Health Insurance from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2016. We identified older people with dementia provided for the first time with artificial nutrition via gastrostomy, nasogastric tube or central venous line and aggregated their data by month. Interrupted time series analyses were used to examine trends in artificial nutrition routes over time. RESULTS: The numbers of older people with dementia receiving nutrition via gastrostomy, nasogastric tube and parenterally declined consistently. The slopes for pre-revision trends in gastrostomy, nasogastric tube and parenteral nutrition procedures were all significantly negative in the interrupted time series analyses. The post-revision trends in gastrostomy and parenteral nutrition continuously had significant negative slopes. In contrast, the significant negative trend in nasogastric tube procedures in the pre-revision period had disappeared during the post-revision period. CONCLUSIONS: The study showed that the fee schedule revision had limited impact on gastrostomy and parenteral nutrition. However the trend for nasogastric tube was ambiguous; hence, sustainable surveillance is required for evidence-based health policy. Geriatr Gerontol Int 2018; 18: 1405-1409.

Repeal of the Sustainable Growth Rate: an overview for surgeons.

BACKGROUND: The Medicare sustainable growth rate (SGR) formula is used to control Medicare spending on physician services. Under the current SGR formula, physicians face an almost 24% cut to the Medicare fee schedule on April 1, 2015. The US House Way & Means and Energy & Commerce Committees and the Senate Finance Committee released jointly proposed legislation to permanently repeal the SGR, and transition Medicare physician payment to a value-based payment method. This review summarizes the key components of the proposed legislation, and discusses some of the political challenges ahead. DATA SOURCES: House Committees on Energy & Commerce and Ways & Means, and the Senate Committee on Finance staff write-ups. CONCLUSIONS: Physician Medicare reimbursement will move from a volume-based model to a value-based model over the next decade. Surgeons should remain engaged with the political process to ensure repeal of the SGR.

Payment generosity and physician acceptance of Medicare and Medicaid patients.

Using 2008 physician survey data, we estimate the relationship between the generosity of fees paid to primary care physicians under Medicaid and Medicare and his/her willingness to accept new patients covered by Medicaid, Medicare, or both programs (i.e., dually enrolled patients). Findings reveal physicians are highly responsive to fee generosity under both programs. Also, their willingness to accept patients under either program is affected by the generosity of fees under the other program, i.e., there are significant spillover effects between Medicare and Medicare fee generosity. We also simulate how physicians in 2008 would have likely responded to Medicaid and Medicare payment reforms similar to those embodied in the 2010 Affordable Care Act, had they been permanently in place in 2008. Our findings suggest that "Medicaid Parity" for primary care physicians would have likely dramatically improved physician willingness to accept new Medicaid patients while only slightly reducing their willingness to accept new Medicare patients. Also, many more primary care physicians would have been willing to treat dually enrolled patients.

Competitive bidding for Medicare Part B clinical laboratory services.

The traditional Medicare fee-for-service program may be able to purchase clinical laboratory test services at a lower cost through competitive bidding. Demonstrations of competitive bidding for clinical laboratory tests have been twice mandated or authorized by Congress but never implemented. This article provides a summary and review of the final design of the laboratory competitive bidding demonstration mandated by the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003. The design was analogous to a sealed bid (first price), clearing price auction. Design elements presented include covered laboratory tests and beneficiaries, laboratory bidding and payment status under the demonstration, composite bids, determining bidding winners and the demonstration fee schedule, and quality under the demonstration. Expanded use of competitive bidding in Medicare, including specifically for clinical laboratory tests, has been recommended in some proposals for Medicare reform. The presented design may be a useful point of departure if Medicare clinical laboratory competitive bidding is revived in the future.

[Development of length of stay and reimbursement in elective hand surgery after the introduction of DRGs in Germany]. / Entwicklung von Verweildauer und Vergütung handchirurgischer Elektiveingriffe durch Einführung der DRGs in Deutschland.

BACKGROUND: Since its introduction in Germany, the DRG (Diagnosis-Related Groups) system is often fraught with negative connotations. Frequent points of criticism are a deterioration of patient care by decreasing length of stay (LOS) in hospital and a decline in reimbursement. The following investigation analyzes and compares the development of length of stay and reimbursement in hand surgery based on the 3 most common elective procedures. MATERIAL AND METHODS: The main diagnoses scaphoid nonunion (PSA), Dupuytren's contracture (DK) and rhizarthrosis (RIA) were evaluated for number of cases, length of stay, reimbursement per day and total reimbursement in 2000 as well as 2010 based on the data of our clinic. Patients covered by the Employers' Liability Insurance were not included. Only inpatient cases were considered. RESULTS: In PSA and RIA an increase in the number of cases is reported (PSA: +11 cases; RIA: +26 cases) and a decrease in DK ( - 7 cases). The sum of the total hospital days declined despite rising case numbers predominantly between 65 (RIA) and 260 days (DK). The average LOS decreased by 3.1 days at DK (48.4%) to 4.1 days at PSA (52.6%). Average revenues per day in 2000 amounted to 379 €, which corresponds to 442 € adjusted for inflation in 2010. Average revenue per day in 2010 was 755 € (RIA), 797 € (PSA) and 876 € (DK). Revenue per case in 2010 were only higher than in 2000, when 5 (RIA) or 6 hospital days (DK and PSA) were not exceeded. CONCLUSION: With declining revenue per case, the average income per day increased by a reduction in hospital days. A positive or at least equivalent revenue situation can thus only be achieved by a distinct concentration of labor and reduction of hospital days under the DRG-system.

Physician payment outlook for 2012: déjà vu.

Physician spending is complex related to national health care spending, government regulations, health care reform, private insurers, physician practice, and patient utilization patterns. In determining payment rates for each service on the fee schedule, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) considers the amount of work required to provide a service, expenses related to maintaining a practice, and liability insurance costs. The value of 3 types of resources are adjusted on a yearly basis of the combined total multiplied by a standard dollar amount, called the fee schedules conversion factor, which was $33.98 in 2011, to arrive at the payment amount. This factor will stay almost the same ($34.03) unless a 27.4% cut in the sustainable growth rate (SGR) takes place or CMS enacts further reductions. With a 27.4% cut, the conversion factor will be $24.67 in 2012 after the first 2 months if Congress fails to act. Since the inception of Medicare programs in 1965, several methods have been used to determine the amounts paid to physicians for each covered service. The SGR was enacted in 1997 to determine physician payment updates under Medicare Part B with intent to reduce Medicare physician payment updates to offset the growth and utilization of physician services that exceed gross domestic product (GDP) growth. This is achieved by setting an overall target amount of spending for physicians' services and adjusting payment rates annually to reflect differences between actual spending and the spending target. Since 2002, the SGR has annually recommended reductions in Medicare reimbursements. Payments were cut in 2002 by 4.8%. Since then, Congress has intervened on 13 separate occasions to prevent additional cuts from being imposed. The Medicare physician payment rule of 2012, which is still undergoing revisions -- but considered as the final rule-- is a 1,235 page document, released in November 2011. In this manuscript, we will describe important aspects of the 2012 physician fee schedule which include potentially disvalued services under the physician fee schedule, expansion of the multiple procedure payment reduction (MPPR) policy, establishment of the value-based payment modifier, changes to direct practice expenses (PEs), electronic prescribing, the Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS), and lab testing signatures, along with their implications. Additionally, the impact of multiple changes on interventional pain management will be described. In conclusion, interventional pain management is facing widespread challenges in the U.S. health care system. A historic reform, which has been passed by Congress and signed into law whose survivability is not quite known yet, is affecting medicine drastically in the United States. Interventional pain management, like other evolving specialties will probably most likely suffer under the new affordable health care law and regulatory burden.

Medicare physician payment rules for 2011: a primer for the neurointerventionalist.

Physicians generally have been affected by significant changes in the patterns of medical practice evolving over the past several decades. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, also called ACA for short, impacts physician professional practice dramatically. Physicians are paid in the USA for their personal services. The payment system is highly variable in the private insurance market; however, governmental systems have a formula based payment, mostly based on the Medicare payment system. Physician services are billed under part B. The Neurointerventional practice is typically performed in a hospital setting. The VA system is a frequently cited successful implementation of a government supported health care program. Availability of neurointerventional services at many VA medical centers is limited. Since the inception of the Medicare program in 1965, several methods have been used to determine the amounts paid to physicians for each covered service. Initially, the payment systems compensated physicians on the basis of their charges. In 1975, just over 10 years after the inception of the Medicare program, payments changed so as not to exceed the increase in medical economic index. The involvement of medical economic index failed to curb increases in costs, leading to the determination of a yearly change in fees by legislation from 1984 to 1991. In 1992, the fee schedule essentially replaced the prior payment system that was based on the physician's charges, which also failed to curb the growth in spending. Thus, in 1998, the sustainable growth rate system was introduced. In 2009, multiple unsuccessful attempts were made by Congress to repeal the formula. The mechanism of the sustainable growth rate includes three components that are incorporated into a statutory formula: expenditure targets, growth rate period and annual adjustments of payment rates for physician services.