Complexity in the new NHS: longitudinal case studies of CCGs in England.

OBJECTIVE: The reform in the English National Health Services (NHS) under the Health and Social Care Act 2012 is unlike previous NHS reorganisations. The establishment of clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) was intended to be 'bottom up' with no central blueprint. This paper sets out to offer evidence about how this process has played out in practice and examines the implications of the complexity and variation which emerged. DESIGN: Detailed case studies in CCGs across England, using interviews, observation and documentary analysis. Using realist framework, we unpacked the complexity of CCG structures. SETTING/PARTICIPANTS: In phase 1 of the study (January 2011 to September 2012), we conducted 96 interviews, 439 h of observation in a wide variety of meetings, 2 online surveys and 38 follow-up telephone interviews. In phase 2 (April 2013 to March 2015), we conducted 42 interviews with general practitioners (GPs) and managers and observation of 48 different types of meetings. RESULTS: Our study has highlighted the complexity inherent in CCGs, arising out of the relatively permissive environment in which they developed. Not only are they very different from one another in size, but also in structure, functions between different bodies and the roles played by GPs. CONCLUSIONS: The complexity and lack of uniformity of CCGs is important as it makes it difficult for those who must engage with CCGs to know who to approach at what level. This is of increasing importance as CCGs are moving towards greater integration across health and social care. Our study also suggests that there is little consensus as to what being a 'membership' organisation means and how it should operate. The lack of uniformity in CCG structure and lack of clarity over the meaning of 'membership' raises questions over accountability, which becomes of greater importance as CCG is taking over responsibility for primary care co-commissioning.

Corporate governance in Czech hospitals after the transformation.

BACKGROUND: This contribution is a response to the current issue of corporate governance in hospitals in the Czech Republic, which draw a significant portion of funds from public health insurance. This not only has a significant impact on the economic efficiency of hospitals, but ultimately affects the whole system of healthcare provision in the Czech Republic. Therefore, the effectiveness of the corporate governance of hospitals might affect the fiscal stability of the health system and, indirectly, health policy for the whole country. OBJECTIVES: The main objective of this paper is to evaluate the success of the transformation in connection with the performance of corporate governance in hospitals in the Czech Republic. Specifically, there was an examination of the management differences in various types of hospitals, which differed in their ownership structure and legal form. METHODOLOGY/APPROACH: A sample of 100 hospitals was investigated in 2009, i.e., immediately after the transformation had been completed, and then three years later in 2012. With regard to the different public support of individual hospitals, the operating subsidies were removed from the economic results of the corporations in the sample. The adjusted economic results were first of all examined in relationship to the type of hospital (according to owner and legal form), and then in relation to its size, the size of the supervisory board and the education level of the senior hospital manager. A multiple median regression was used for the evaluation. FINDINGS: One of the basic findings was the fact that the hospital's legal form had no influence on economic results. Successful management in the form of adjusted economic results is only associated with the private type of facility ownership. From the perspective of our concept of corporate governance other factors were under observation: the size of the hospital, the size of the supervisory board and the medical qualifications of the senior manager had no statistically verifiable influence on the efficiency of the hospital management, though we did record certain developments as a result of the transformation process. The economic results that were reported were significantly distorted by the operating subsidies from the founder. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS: The results can be used immediately on several practical levels: on the macro level as part of the state's formulation of health policy, particularly in the optimization of the structure of healthcare providers, as well as for the completion of reforms in legal forms and hospital founders, and on the micro level as part of the effective administration and governance of hospitals through corporate governance regardless of the form of ownership.

When patients govern: federal grant funding and uncompensated care at federally qualified health centers.

OBJECTIVE: To determine if the proportion of consumers on federally qualified health center (FQHC) governing boards is associated with their use of federal grant funds to provide uncompensated care. METHODS: Using FQHC data from the Uniform Data System, county-level data from the Area Resource File and governing board data from FQHC grant applications, the uncompensated care an FQHC provides relative to the amount of its federal funding is modeled as a function of board and executive committee composition using fixed-effects regression with FQHC and county-level controls. RESULTS: Consumer governance does not predict how much uncompensated care an FQHC provides relative to the size of its federal grant. Rather, the proportion of an FQHC's patient-mix that is uninsured drives uncompensated care provision. CONCLUSIONS: Aside from a small executive committee effect, consumer governance does not influence FQHCs' provision of uncompensated care. More work is needed to understand the role of consumer governance.

Consumer governance may harm health center financial performance.

INTRODUCTION: Federally qualified health centers (FQHCs), which must be governed by a patient majority, have historically struggled to remain financially viable while caring for a disproportionately low-income and uninsured population. Consumer governance is credited with making FQHCs responsive to community needs, but to the extent that patient trustees resemble the typical low-income FQHC patient, patient trustees might lack the capacity to govern, harming financial performance as a result. Thus, this study sought to empirically evaluate the relationship between FQHC board composition and financial performance. METHODS: Using data from years 2002-2007 of the Uniform Data System and the Area Resource File, and years 2003-2006 of FQHC grant applications, FQHC operating margin was modeled as a function of board and executive committee composition, the interaction between them, general time trends, other FQHC and county-level factors, and FQHC-level fixed effects. Trustees were classified as representative (ie, low-income) consumers, nonrepresentative (ie, high-income) consumers, and nonconsumers on the basis of their self-reported patient status and occupation. RESULTS: Each 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of representative consumers on the board is associated with a 1.7 percentage point decrease in operating margin. This effect becomes insignificant if any consumers serve on the executive committee. There is no significant relationship between the proportion of nonrepresentative consumers and operating margin. CONCLUSIONS: If consumers are given leadership roles on the board, consumer governance does not harm financial performance and may be beneficial enough in other respects to justify its being required as a condition of federal FQHC funding. Without such strengthening of the provision, consumer governance appears to harm financial performance and it is unclear from this study whether it offers other benefits that are significant enough to justify this financial risk.

Legitimacy, trustee incentives, and board processes: the case of public and private non-profit nursing homes.

Using a unique data set, this study explores how type of ownership (government/private) is related to processes of governance. The findings suggest that the neo-institutional perspective and the self-interest rationale of the agency perspective are helpful in explaining processes of governance in both government- and privately owned non-profit organizations. Due to adverse incentives and the quest for legitimacy, supervising governance bodies within local government-owned non-profit institutions pay relatively less attention to the development of high quality supervising bodies and delegate little to management. Our findings also indicate that governance processes in private institutions are more aligned with the business model and that this alignment is likely driven by a concern to improve decision making. By contrast, our data also suggest that in local government-owned institutions re-election concerns of politicians-trustees are an important force in the governance processes of these institutions. In view of these adverse incentives - in contrast to the case of private organizations - a governance code is unlikely to entail much improvement in government-owned organizations.

Scheduling challenges. With overhauled Form 990, hospitals are being asked for more specifics on governance, pay, perks, subsidized care.

With an expanded and overhauled Form 990, hospitals will find themselves digging up and reporting lots more details about executive pay and perks, governance policies, and how much subsidized care they provide. "We look at this as the first step," says the IRS' Theresa Pattara, left, who was project manager for the form's retooling.