Foals of mares vaccinated for Hendra virus have a suboptimal response to HeV vaccination.

Hendra virus (HeV) is lethal to horses and a zoonotic threat to humans in Australia, causing severe neurological and/or respiratory disease with high mortality. An equine vaccine has been available since 2012. Foals acquire antibodies from their dams by ingesting colostrum after parturition, therefore it is assumed that foals of mares vaccinated against HeV will have passive HeV antibodies circulating during the first several months of life until they are actively vaccinated. However, no studies have yet examined passive or active immunity against HeV in foals. Here, we investigated anti-HeV antibody levels in vaccinated mares and their foals. Testing for HeV neutralising antibodies is cumbersome due to the requirement for Biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) containment to conduct virus neutralisation tests (VNT). For this study, a subset of samples was tested for HeV G-specific antibodies by both an authentic VNT with infectious HeV and a microsphere-based immunoassay (MIA), revealing a strong correlation. An indicative neutralising level was then applied to the results of a larger sample set tested using the MIA. Mares had high levels of HeV-specific neutralising antibodies at the time of parturition. Foals acquired high levels of maternal antibodies which then waned to below predictive protective levels in most foals by 6 months old when vaccination commenced. Foals showed a suboptimal response to vaccination, suggesting maternal antibodies may interfere with active vaccination. The correlation analysis between the authentic HeV VNT and HeV MIA will enable further high throughput serological studies to inform optimal vaccination protocols for both broodmares and foals.

Horse populations are severely underestimated in a region at risk of Hendra virus spillover.

OBJECTIVE: To identify the size and distribution of the horse population in the Northern Rivers Region of NSW, including changes from 2007 to 2021, to better understand populations at risk of Hendra virus transmission. METHODS: Census data from the 2007 Equine Influenza (EI) outbreak were compared with data collected annually by New South Wales Local Land Services (LLS) (2011-2021), and with field observations via road line transects (2021). RESULTS: The horse populations reported to LLS in 2011 (3000 horses; 0.77 horses/km2) was 145% larger than that reported during the EI outbreak in 2007 (1225 horses; 0.32 horses/km2). This was inconsistent with the 6% increase in horses recorded from 2011 to 2020 within the longitudinal LLS dataset. Linear modelling suggested the true horse population of this region in 2007 was at least double that reported at the time. Distance sampling in 2021 estimated the region's population at 10,185 horses (3.89 per km2; 95% CI = 4854-21,372). Field sampling and modelling identified higher horse densities in rural cropland, with the percentage of conservation land, modified grazing, and rural residential land identified as the best predictors of horse densities. CONCLUSIONS: Data from the 2007 EI outbreak no longer correlates to the current horse population in size or distribution and was likely not a true representation at the time. Current LLS data also likely underestimates horse populations. Ongoing efforts to further quantify and map horse populations in Australia are important for estimating and managing the risk of equine zoonoses.

Infection and transmission of henipavirus in animals.

Henipavirus (HNV) is well known for two zoonotic viruses in the genus, Hendra virus (HeV) and Nipah virus (NiV), which pose serious threat to human and animal health. In August 2022, a third zoonotic virus in the genus Henipavirus, Langya virus (LayV), was discovered in China. The emergence of HeV, NiV, and LayV highlights the persistent threat of HNV to human and animal health. In addition to the above three HNVs, new species within this genus are still being discovered. Although they have not yet caused a pandemic in humans or livestock, they still have the risk of spillover as a potential threat to the health of humans and animals. It's important to understand the infection and transmission of different HNV in animals for the prevention and control of current or future HNV epidemics. Therefore, this review mainly summarizes the animal origin, animal infection and transmission of HNV that have been found worldwide, and further analyzes and summarizes the rules of infection and transmission, so as to provide a reference for relevant scientific researchers. Furthermore, it can provide a direction for epidemic prevention and control, and animal surveillance to reduce the risk of the global pandemic of HNV.

Recently Emerged Novel Henipa-like Viruses: Shining a Spotlight on the Shrew.

Henipaviruses are zoonotic viruses, including some highly pathogenic and capable of serious disease and high fatality rates in both animals and humans. Hendra virus and Nipah virus are the most notable henipaviruses, resulting in significant outbreaks across South Asia, South-East Asia, and Australia. Pteropid fruit bats have been identified as key zoonotic reservoirs; however, the increased discovery of henipaviruses outside the geographic distribution of Pteropid fruit bats and the detection of novel henipa-like viruses in other species such as the shrew, rat, and opossum suggest that Pteropid bats are not the sole reservoir for henipaviruses. In this review, we provide an update on henipavirus spillover events and describe the recent detection of novel unclassified henipaviruses, with a strong focus on the shrew and its emerging role as a key host of henipaviruses.

Pathogenicity and virulence of henipaviruses.

Paramyxoviruses are a family of single-stranded negative-sense RNA viruses, many of which are responsible for a range of respiratory and neurological diseases in humans and animals. Among the most notable are the henipaviruses, which include the deadly Nipah (NiV) and Hendra (HeV) viruses, the causative agents of outbreaks of severe disease and high case fatality rates in humans and animals. NiV and HeV are maintained in fruit bat reservoirs primarily in the family Pteropus and spillover into humans directly or by an intermediate amplifying host such as swine or horses. Recently, non-chiropteran associated Langya (LayV), Gamak (GAKV), and Mojiang (MojV) viruses have been discovered with confirmed or suspected ability to cause disease in humans or animals. These viruses are less genetically related to HeV and NiV yet share many features with their better-known counterparts. Recent advances in surveillance of wild animal reservoir viruses have revealed a high number of henipaviral genome sequences distributed across most continents, and mammalian orders previously unknown to harbour henipaviruses. In this review, we summarize the current knowledge on the range of pathogenesis observed for the henipaviruses as well as their replication cycle, epidemiology, genomics, and host responses. We focus on the most pathogenic viruses, including NiV, HeV, LayV, and GAKV, as well as the experimentally non-pathogenic CedV. We also highlight the emerging threats posed by these and potentially other closely related viruses.

Advancing the frontiers: Revolutionary control and prevention paradigms against Nipah virus.

Nipah Virus (NiV) is a highly virulent pathogen that poses a significant threat to human and animal populations. This review provides a comprehensive overview of the latest control and prevention strategies against NiV, focusing on vaccine development, antiviral drug discovery, early diagnosis, surveillance, and high-level biosecurity measures. Advancements in vaccine research, including live-attenuated vaccines, virus-like particles, and mRNA-based vaccines, hold promise for preventing NiV infections. In addition, antiviral drugs, such as remdesivir, ribavirin, and favipiravir, have the potential to inhibit NiV replication. Early diagnosis through molecular and serological assays, immunohistochemistry, and real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction plays a crucial role in timely detection. Surveillance efforts encompassing cluster-based and case-based systems enhance outbreak identification and provide valuable insights into transmission dynamics. Furthermore, the implementation of high-level biosecurity measures in agriculture, livestock practices, and healthcare settings is essential to minimize transmission risks. Collaboration among researchers, public health agencies, and policymakers is pivotal in refining and implementing these strategies to effectively control and prevent NiV outbreaks and safeguard public health on a global scale.

Experimental infection of tick cells with Nipah virus.

Nipah virus (NiV), a highly pathogenic henipavirus of the family Paramyxoviridae, which causes fatal encephalitis in 40-70% of affected patients, was first reported in Malaysia over 20 years ago. Pteropid bats are the natural hosts of henipaviruses, and ticks have been proposed as a possible link between bats and mammalian hosts. To investigate this hypothesis, infection of the tick cell line IDE8 with NiV was examined. Presence of viral RNA and antigen in the NiV-infected tick cells was confirmed. Infectious virions were recovered from NiV-infected tick cells and ultrastructural features of NiV were observed by electron microscopy. These results suggest that ticks could support NiV infection, potentially playing a role in transmission.

Hendra Virus: An Update on Diagnosis, Vaccination, and Biosecurity Protocols for Horses.

Hendra virus (HeV) emerged as a zoonotic pathogen in the 1990s, causing low morbidity but high mortality in humans and horses. Pteropid bats are the natural reservoir of HeV and other important zoonotic viruses such as Nipah and Ebola viruses. Equivac HeV, manufactured by Zoetis (Parkville, Victoria, Australia), is the only commercially available vaccine for horses. There is no commercial vaccine for humans. The epidemiology, clinical features, pathology, diagnosis, management, and prevention of HeV will be reviewed.

Nipah Virus Exposure in Domestic and Peridomestic Animals Living in Human Outbreak Sites, Bangladesh, 2013-2015.

Spillovers of Nipah virus (NiV) from Pteropus bats to humans occurs frequently in Bangladesh, but the risk for spillover into other animals is poorly understood. We detected NiV antibodies in cattle, dogs, and cats from 6 sites where spillover human NiV infection cases occurred during 2013-2015.

Henipaviruses: an expanding global public health concern?

Nipah virus (NiV) and Hendra virus (HeV) are highly pathogenic zoonotic viruses of the genus Henipavirus, family Paramyxoviridae that cause severe disease outbreaks in humans and also can infect and cause lethal disease across a broad range of mammalian species. Another related Henipavirus has been very recently identified in China in febrile patients with pneumonia, the Langya virus (LayV) of probable animal origin in shrews. NiV and HeV were first identified as the causative agents of severe respiratory and encephalitic disease in the 1990s across Australia and Southern Asia with mortality rates reaching up to 90%. They are responsible for rare and sporadic outbreaks with no approved treatment modalities. NiV and HeV have wide cellular tropism that contributes to their high pathogenicity. From their natural hosts bats, different scenarios propitiate their spillover to pigs, horses, and humans. Henipavirus-associated respiratory disease arises from vasculitis and respiratory epithelial cell infection while the neuropathogenesis of Henipavirus infection is still not completely understood but appears to arise from dual mechanisms of vascular disease and direct parenchymal brain infection. This brief review offers an overview of direct and indirect mechanisms of HeV and NiV pathogenicity and their interaction with the human immune system, as well as the main viral strategies to subvert such responses.

Batting below Average: Failure to Manage Fatal Zoonotic Diseases.

Zoonotic diseases are those which originate in animals but are transmitted to humans often through an intermediate host such as a wild animal. In Australia Hendra virus (HeV) is a disease of horses with occasional human fatalities and which is spread by the fruit bat. This article explores the lessons learnt from managing the Queensland outbreak of HeV in 1994. The legal framework for the notification and management of prohibited matter including zoonotic diseases in Queensland and New South Wales has been strengthened by provisions in the Biosecurity Act 2015 (NSW) which create strong penalties for failure to notify outbreaks and failure to isolate infected stock and prevent their removal from premises within 24 hours. The response of at least 20% of Queensland equine veterinarians to the new legal obligations has been to cease practising equine medicine. There may be scope for enhanced education of veterinary students in legal obligations under the biosecurity legislation.

Nipah Virus Detection at Bat Roosts after Spillover Events, Bangladesh, 2012-2019.

Knowledge of the dynamics and genetic diversity of Nipah virus circulating in bats and at the human-animal interface is limited by current sampling efforts, which produce few detections of viral RNA. We report a series of investigations at Pteropus medius bat roosts identified near the locations of human Nipah cases in Bangladesh during 2012-2019. Pooled bat urine was collected from 23 roosts; 7 roosts (30%) had >1 sample in which Nipah RNA was detected from the first visit. In subsequent visits to these 7 roosts, RNA was detected in bat urine up to 52 days after the presumed exposure of the human case-patient, although the probability of detection declined rapidly with time. These results suggest that rapidly deployed investigations of Nipah virus shedding from bat roosts near human cases could increase the success of viral sequencing compared with background surveillance and could enhance understanding of Nipah virus ecology and evolution.

Novel Hendra Virus Variant Circulating in Black Flying Foxes and Grey-Headed Flying Foxes, Australia.

A novel Hendra virus variant, genotype 2, was recently discovered in a horse that died after acute illness and in Pteropus flying fox tissues in Australia. We detected the variant in flying fox urine, the pathway relevant for spillover, supporting an expanded geographic range of Hendra virus risk to horses and humans.

A recombinant VSV-vectored vaccine rapidly protects nonhuman primates against lethal Nipah virus disease.

SignificanceConcern has increased about the pandemic potential of Nipah virus (NiV). Similar to SARS-CoV-2, NiV is an RNA virus that is transmitted by respiratory droplets. There are currently no NiV vaccines licensed for human use. While several preventive vaccines have shown promise in protecting animals against lethal NiV disease, most studies have assessed protection 1 mo after vaccination. However, in order to contain and control outbreaks, vaccines that can rapidly confer protection in days rather than months are needed. Here, we show that a recombinant vesicular stomatitis virus vector expressing the NiV glycoprotein can completely protect monkeys vaccinated 7 d prior to NiV exposure and 67% of animals vaccinated 3 d before NiV challenge.

Novel Hendra Virus Variant Detected by Sentinel Surveillance of Horses in Australia.

We identified and isolated a novel Hendra virus (HeV) variant not detected by routine testing from a horse in Queensland, Australia, that died from acute illness with signs consistent with HeV infection. Using whole-genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis, we determined the variant had ≈83% nt identity with prototypic HeV. In silico and in vitro comparisons of the receptor-binding protein with prototypic HeV support that the human monoclonal antibody m102.4 used for postexposure prophylaxis and current equine vaccine will be effective against this variant. An updated quantitative PCR developed for routine surveillance resulted in subsequent case detection. Genetic sequence consistency with virus detected in grey-headed flying foxes suggests the variant circulates at least among this species. Studies are needed to determine infection kinetics, pathogenicity, reservoir-species associations, viral-host coevolution, and spillover dynamics for this virus. Surveillance and biosecurity practices should be updated to acknowledge HeV spillover risk across all regions frequented by flying foxes.

Henipaviruses-A constant threat to livestock and humans.

In this review, we highlight the risk to livestock and humans from infections with henipaviruses, which belong to the virus family Paramyxoviridae. We provide a comprehensive overview of documented outbreaks of Nipah and Hendra virus infections affecting livestock and humans and assess the burden on the economy and health systems. In an increasingly globalized and interconnected world, attention must be paid to emerging viruses and infectious diseases, as transmission routes can be rapid and worldwide.

A new Hendra virus genotype found in Australian flying foxes.

BACKGROUND: Hendra virus (HeV) has caused lethal disease outbreaks in humans and horses in Australia. Flying foxes are the wildlife reservoir from which the virus was first isolated in 1996. Following a heat stress mortality event in Australian flying foxes in 2013, a novel HeV variant was discovered. This study describes the subsequent surveillance of Australian flying foxes for this novel virus over a nine year period using qRT-PCR testing of tissues from flying foxes submitted primarily for Australian bat lyssavirus diagnosis. Genome sequencing and characterisation of the novel HeV variant was also undertaken. METHODS: Spleen and kidney samples harvested from flying fox carcasses were initially screened with two real-time qRT-PCR assays specific for the prototype HeV. Two additional qRT-PCR assays were developed specific for the HeV variant first detected in samples from a flying fox in 2013. Next-generation sequencing and virus isolation was attempted from selected samples to further characterise the new virus. RESULTS: Since 2013, 98 flying foxes were tested and 11 were positive for the new HeV variant. No samples were positive for the original HeV. Ten of the positive samples were from grey-headed flying foxes (GHFF, Pteropus poliocephalus), however this species was over-represented in the opportunistic sampling (83% of bats tested were GHFF). The positive GHFF samples were collected from Victoria and South Australia and one positive Little red flying fox (LRFF, Pteropus scapulatus) was collected from Western Australia. Immunohistochemistry confirmed the presence of henipavirus antigen, associated with an inflammatory lesion in cardiac blood vessels of one GHFF. Positive samples were sequenced and the complete genome was obtained from three samples. When compared to published HeV genomes, there was 84% sequence identity at the nucleotide level. Based on phylogenetic analyses, the newly detected HeV belongs to the HeV species but occupies a distinct lineage. We have therefore designated this virus HeV genotype 2 (HeV-g2). Attempts to isolate virus from PCR positive samples have not been successful. CONCLUSIONS: A novel HeV genotype (HeV-g2) has been identified in two flying fox species submitted from three states in Australia, indicating that the level of genetic diversity for HeV is broader than first recognised. Given its high genetic relatedness to HeV, HeV-g2 is a zoonotic pathogen.

Development and validation of an IgM antibody capture ELISA for early detection of Hendra virus.

Zoonotic transmission of Hendra virus (HeV) from primary hosts (pteropid bats) to horses, and, occasionally, onward adventitious spread to humans, is associated with high mortality rates in both affected secondary species. The introduction of an effective recombinant G protein vaccine for use in horses has been a major advance for the suppression of disease risk. However, equine HeV vaccination induces neutralising antibody that is indistinguishable from a post infection immune response when using most first line serology assays (eg. VNT and some ELISAs). We have constructed and evaluated an IgM antibody capture (MAC) ELISA which employs yeast expressed HeV nucleoprotein (N). All other serology tests use the G protein which does not detect early infection and is present in the current Hendra virus vaccine and may cause ambiguity in interpretation of results. Thus, this is the first test developed using a N protein which can successfully detect a recent (primarily within the last four weeks) infection of horses with HeV and is not affected by vaccination induced antibody. Testing a limited panel (21 samples) of post infection sera, a normal serum panel (288 samples) and a post vaccination panel (163 samples), we have estimated DSe to be 100 % (95 % CI, 83.9-100.0 %) and DSp to be 98.4 % (95 % CI, 96.8-99.4 %) relative to assigned serology results (VNT, ELISA and Luminex) for the test panels. The HeV IgM MAC ELISA is intended to supplement other molecular and serology test results, with selective use, and is the only serology test which can provide an indication for recent infection which is otherwise not available.

Evaluation of henipavirus chemical inactivation methods for the safe removal of samples from the high-containment PC4 laboratory.

Henipaviruses, Hendra (HeV) and Nipah (NiV), are highly pathogenic zoonotic agents that pose a serious health risk to human life, and as such are restricted to physical containment 4 (PC4) laboratories. For further analysis of virus-infected biological specimens, it is necessary to ensure absolute inactivation of any infectious virus present before removal from the PC4 laboratory. To evaluate the inactivation of HeV and NiV within infected samples, two chemical inactivation methods were assessed. Henipavirus-infected cell monolayers treated with 4 % paraformaldehyde (PFA) showed the complete inactivation of infectious virus, with an inactivation period of 15 min resulting in more than 8-log decrease in infectious titre. NiV-infected tissue samples treated with 10 % neutral-buffered formalin (NBF) showed a complete reduction of infectious virus in 7/8 ferret organs incubated for 24 h, with the remaining tissue demonstrating complete virus inactivation after 48 h. The chemical inactivation methods described herein evaluated two simple methods of henipavirus inactivation, resulting in the complete inactivation of infectious virus - an essential requirement for the safe removal and handling of biological samples from the PC4 laboratory.