The Association Between Type of Insurance Plan, Out-of-Pocket Cost, and Adherence to Antihypertensive Medications in Medicare Supplement Insurance Enrollees.

BACKGROUND: Medicare supplement insurance, or Medigap, covers 21% of Medicare beneficiaries. Despite offsetting some out-of-pocket (OOP) expenses, remaining OOP costs may pose a barrier to medication adherence. This study aims to evaluate how OOP costs and insurance plan types influence medication adherence among beneficiaries covered by Medicare supplement plans. METHODS: We conducted a retrospective analysis of the Merative MarketScan Medicare Supplement Database (2017-2019) in Medigap enrollees (≥65 years) with hypertension. The proportion of days covered (PDC) was a continuous measure of medication adherence and was also dichotomized (PDC ≥0.8) to quantify adequate adherence. Beta-binomial and logistic regression models were used to estimate associations between these outcomes and insurance plan type and log-transformed OOP costs, adjusting for patient characteristics. RESULTS: Among 27,407 patients with hypertension, the average PDC was 0.68 ±â€…0.31; 47.5% achieved adequate adherence. A mean $1 higher in 30-day OOP costs were associated with a 0.06 (95% confidence intervals [CIs]: -0.09 to -0.03) lower probability of adequate adherence, or a 5% (95% CI: 4%-7%) decrease in PDC. Compared with comprehensive plan enrollees, the odds of adequate adherence were lower among those with point-of-service plans (odds ratio [OR]: 0.69, 95% CI: 0.62-0.77), but higher among those with preferred provider organization (PPO) plans (OR: 1.08, 95% CI: 1.01-1.15). Moreover, the association between OOP costs and PDC was significantly greater for PPO enrollees. CONCLUSIONS: While Medicare supplement insurance alleviates some OOP costs, different insurance plans and remaining OOP costs influence medication adherence. Reducing patient cost-sharing may improve medication adherence.

Disparities Among Those With Advance Directives in a Medicare Supplement Population.

Advance directives (ADs) detail patients' end-of-life (EOL) care preferences. We estimated AD prevalence rates among a Medicare Supplement population and determined characteristics associated with having ADs. We also estimated the impact of having an AD on EOL Medicare expenditures among respondents who later died. Survey respondents with an AD (72%) were significantly more likely to be female, older, nonminority, higher income and education, and have more comorbid conditions. Following regression adjustments, EOL expenditures were significantly lower for those with ADs in the last 3 months (-US$11 189) and 1 month (-US$6092) prior to death. Patients with ADs specifying their wishes for EOL care had significantly lower medical expenditures during the last few months of life. However, disparities exist among those with ADs that may warrant interventions.

Adverse and Advantageous Selection in the Medicare Supplemental Market: A Bayesian Analysis of Prescription drug Expenditure.

This paper develops an extended specification of the two-part model, which controls for unobservable self-selection and heterogeneity of health insurance, and analyzes the impact of Medicare supplemental plans on the prescription drug expenditure of the elderly, using a linked data set based on the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey data for 2003-2004. The econometric analysis is conducted using a Bayesian econometric framework. We estimate the treatment effects for different counterfactuals and find significant evidence of endogeneity in plan choice and the presence of both adverse and advantageous selections in the supplemental insurance market. The average incentive effect is estimated to be $757 (2004 value) or 41% increase per person per year for the elderly enrolled in supplemental plans with drug coverage against the Medicare fee-for-service counterfactual and is $350 or 21% against the supplemental plans without drug coverage counterfactual. The incentive effect varies by different sources of drug coverage: highest for employer-sponsored insurance plans, followed by Medigap and managed medicare plans.

Variations in county-level costs between traditional medicare and medicare advantage have implications for premium support.

Concern about the future growth of Medicare spending has led some in Congress and elsewhere to promote converting Medicare to a "premium support" system. Under premium support, Medicare would provide a "defined contribution" to each Medicare beneficiary to purchase either a Medicare Advantage (MA)-type private health plan or the traditional Medicare public plan. To better understand the implications of such a shift, we compared the average costs per beneficiary of providing Medicare benefits at the county level for traditional Medicare and four types of MA plans. We found that the relative costs of Medicare Advantage and traditional Medicare varied greatly by MA plan type and by geographic location. The costs of health maintenance organization-type plans averaged 7 percent less than those of traditional Medicare, but the costs of the more loosely structured preferred provider organization and private fee-for-service plans averaged 12-18 percent more than those of traditional Medicare. In some counties MA plan costs averaged 28 percent less than costs in traditional Medicare, while in other counties MA plan costs averaged 26 percent more than traditional Medicare costs. Enactment of a Medicare premium-support proposal could trigger cost increases for beneficiaries participating in Medicare Advantage as well as those in traditional Medicare.

Evaluation of a high-risk case management pilot program for Medicare beneficiaries with Medigap coverage.

The objective was to evaluate the 3-year experience of a high-risk case management (HRCM) pilot program for adults with an AARP Medicare Supplement (Medigap) Insurance Plan. Participants were provided in-person visits as well as telephonic and mailed services to improve care coordination from December 1, 2008, to December 31, 2011. Included were adults who had an AARP Medigap Insurance Plan, resided in 1 of 5 pilot states, and had a Hierarchical Condition Category score>3.74, or were referred into the program. Propensity score weighting was used to adjust for case-mix differences among 2015 participants and 7626 qualified but nonparticipating individuals. Participants were in the program an average of 15.4 months. After weighting, multiple regression analyses were used to estimate differences in quality of care and health care expenditures between participants and nonparticipants. Increased duration in the program was associated with fewer hospital readmissions. Additionally, participants were significantly more likely to have recurring office visits and recommended laboratory tests. The program demonstrated $7.7 million in savings over the 3 years, resulting in a return on investment of $1.40 saved for every dollar spent on the program. Savings increased each year from 2009 to 2011 and with longer length of engagement. The majority of savings were realized by the federal Medicare program. This study focused on quality of care and savings for an HRCM program designed solely for Medicare members with Medicare Supplement coverage. This program had a favorable impact on quality of care and demonstrated savings over a 3-year period.

The effect of supplemental medical and prescription drug coverage on health care spending for Medicare beneficiaries with cancer.

OBJECTIVES: To examine whether patients with newly diagnosed cancer respond differently to supplemental coverage than the general Medicare population. METHODS: A cohort of newly diagnosed cancer patients (n = 1,799) from the 1997-2007 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey and a noncancer cohort (n = 9,726) were identified and matched by panel year. Two-year total medical care spending was estimated by using generalized linear models with gamma distribution and log link-including endogeneity-corrected models. Interactions between cancer and type of insurance allowed testing for differential effects of a cancer diagnosis. RESULTS: The cancer cohort spent an adjusted $15,605 more over 2 years than did the noncancer comparison group. Relative to those without supplemental coverage, beneficiaries with employer-sponsored insurance, other private with prescription drug coverage, and public coverage had significantly higher total spending ($3,510, $2,823, and $4,065, respectively, for main models). For beneficiaries with cancer, supplemental insurance effects were similar in magnitude yet negative, suggesting little net effect of supplemental insurance for cancer patients. The endogeneity-corrected models produced implausibly large main effects of supplemental insurance, but the Cancer × Insurance interactions were similar in both models. CONCLUSIONS: Medicare beneficiaries with cancer are less responsive to the presence and type of supplemental insurance than are beneficiaries without cancer. Proposed restrictions on the availability of supplemental insurance intended to reduce Medicare spending would be unlikely to limit expenditures by beneficiaries with cancer, but would shift the financial burden to those beneficiaries. Policymakers should consider welfare effects associated with coverage restrictions.

Supplemental coverage associated with more rapid spending growth for Medicare beneficiaries.

Lowering both Medicare spending and the rate of Medicare spending growth is important for the nation's fiscal health. Policy makers in search of ways to achieve these reductions have looked at the role that supplemental coverage for Medicare beneficiaries plays in Medicare spending. Supplemental coverage makes health care more affordable for beneficiaries but also makes beneficiaries insensitive to the cost of their care, thereby increasing the demand for care. Ours is the first empirical study to investigate whether supplemental Medicare coverage is associated with higher rates of spending growth over time. We found that supplemental insurance coverage was associated with significantly higher rates of overall spending growth. Specifically, employer-sponsored and self-purchased supplemental coverage were associated with annual total spending growth rates of 7.17 percent and 7.18 percent, respectively, compared to 6.08 percent annual growth for beneficiaries without supplemental coverage. Results for Medicare program spending were more equivocal, however. Our results are consistent with the belief that current trends away from generous employer-sponsored supplemental coverage and efforts to restrict the generosity of supplemental coverage may slow spending growth.

Medicare essential: an option to promote better care and curb spending growth.

Medicare's core benefit design reflects private insurance as of 1965, with separate coverage for hospital and physician services (and now prescription drugs) and no protection against catastrophic costs. Modernizing Medicare's benefit design to offer comprehensive benefits, financial protection, and incentives to choose high-value care could improve coverage and lower beneficiary costs. We describe a new option we call Medicare Essential, which would combine Medicare's hospital, physician, and prescription drug coverage into an integrated benefit with an annual limit on out-of-pocket expenses for covered benefits. Cost sharing would be reduced for enrollees who seek care from high-quality low-cost providers. Out-of-pocket savings from lower premiums and health care costs for a Medicare Essential enrollee could be $173 per month, compared to what an enrollee would pay with traditional Medicare, prescription drug and private supplemental coverage. Financed by a budget-neutral premium, we estimate that this new plan choice could reduce total health spending relative to current projections by $180 billion and reduce employer retiree spending by $90 billion during 2014-23. Given its potential, such an alternative should be a part of the debate over the future of Medicare.

Recent proposals to limit Medigap coverage and modify Medicare cost sharing.

As policymakers look for savings from the Medicare program, some have proposed eliminating or discouraging "first-dollar coverage" available through privately purchased Medigap policies. Medigap coverage, which beneficiaries obtain to protect themselves from Medicare's cost-sharing requirements and its lack of a cap on out-of-pocket spending, may discourage the judicious use of medical services by reducing or eliminating beneficiary cost sharing. It is estimated that eliminating such coverage, which has been shown to be associated with higher Medicare spending, and requiring some cost sharing would encourage beneficiaries to reduce their service use and thus reduce pro­gram spending. However, eliminating first-dollar coverage could cause some beneficiaries to incur higher spending or forego necessary services. Some policy proposals to eliminate first-dollar coverage would also modify Medicare's cost sharing and add an out-of-pocket spending cap for fee-for-service Medicare. This paper discusses Medicare's current cost-sharing requirements, Medigap insurance, and proposals to modify Medicare's cost sharing and eliminate first-dollar coverage in Medigap plans. It reviews the evidence on the effects of first-dollar coverage on spending, some objections to eliminating first-dollar coverage, and results of research that has modeled the impact of eliminating first-dollar coverage, modifying Medicare's cost-sharing requirements, and adding an out-of-pocket limit on beneficiaries' spending.

Time is money: outpatient waiting times and health insurance choices of elderly veterans in the United States.

Growth in the number of days between an appointment request and the actual appointment reduces demand. Although such waiting times are relatively low in the US, current policy initiatives could cause them to increase. We estimate multiple-equation models of physician utilization and insurance plan choice for Medicare-eligible veterans. We find that a 10% increase in VA waiting times increases demand for Medigap insurance by 5%, implying that a representative patient would be indifferent between waiting an average of 5 more days for VA appointments and paying $300 more in annual premium.

How do seniors respond to 100% cost-sharing for prescription drugs? Quality of the evidence underlying opinions about the Medicare Part D coverage gap.

Popular press coverage of the Medicare Part D coverage gap is based largely on research conducted using retrospective analyses of administrative claims data. These datasets are incomplete because they lack information about methods of obtaining medication that are commonly used by seniors, including free samples, generic drug discount programs, over-the-counter substitution, and patient assistance programs. As a result, evidence about the effects of 100% cost sharing on seniors is limited and suboptimal. Although the current deficit of information about the coverage gap is not entirely unexpected because the Medicare Part D program is relatively new, reliance on claims-based analyses to inform questions that claims data cannot possibly address accurately has tended to mislead and politicize rather than produce constructive policy guidance. Numerous important health policy questions remain unaddressed. These questions are becoming especially important as optimal approaches to providing health care to seniors are the subject of an increasingly vigorous debate.

Patient Cost-Sharing and Hospitalization Offsets in the Elderly.

In the Medicare program, increases in cost sharing by a supplemental insurer can exert financial externalities. We study a policy change that raised patient cost sharing for the supplemental insurer for retired public employees in California. We find that physician visits and prescription drug usage have elasticities that are similar to those of the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE). Unlike the HIE, however, we find substantial "offset" effects in terms of increased hospital utilization. The savings from increased cost sharing accrue mostly to the supplemental insurer, while the costs of increased hospitalization accrue mostly to Medicare.

Falling into the coverage gap: Part D drug costs and adherence for Medicare Advantage prescription drug plan beneficiaries with diabetes.

OBJECTIVE: To compare drug costs and adherence among Medicare beneficiaries with the standard Part D coverage gap versus supplemental gap coverage in 2006. DATA SOURCES: Pharmacy data from Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug (MAPD) plans. STUDY DESIGN: Parallel analyses comparing beneficiaries aged 65+ with diabetes in an integrated MAPD with a gap versus no gap (n=28,780); and in a network-model MAPD with a gap versus generic-only coverage during the gap (n=14,984). PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Drug spending was 3 percent (95 percent confidence interval [CI]: 1-4 percent) and 4 percent (CI: 1-6 percent) lower among beneficiaries with a gap versus full or generic-only gap coverage, respectively. Out-of-pocket expenditures were 189 percent higher (CI: 185-193 percent) and adherence to three chronic drug classes was lower among those with a gap versus no gap (e.g., odds ratio=0.83, CI: 0.79-0.88, for oral diabetes drugs). Annual out-of-pocket spending was 14 percent higher (CI: 10-17 percent) for beneficiaries with a gap versus generic-only gap coverage, but levels of adherence were similar. CONCLUSIONS: Among Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes, having the Part D coverage gap resulted in lower total drug costs, but higher out-of-pocket spending and worse adherence compared with having no gap. Having generic-only coverage during the gap appeared to confer limited benefits compared with having no gap coverage.

Savings needed to fund health insurance and health care expenses in retirement: findings from a simulation model.

MODELING RETIREE HEALTH COSTS: This Issue Brief examines the uncertainty of health care expenses in retirement by using a Monte Carlo simulation model to estimate the amount of savings needed to cover health insurance premiums and out-of-pocket health care expenses. This type of simulation is able to account for the uncertainty related to individual mortality and rates of return, and computes the present value of the savings needed to cover health insurance premiums and out-of-pocket expenses in retirement. These observations were used to determine asset targets for having adequate savings to cover retiree health costs 50, 75, and 90 percent of the time. NOT ENOUGH SAVINGS: Many individuals will need more money than the amounts reported in this Issue Brief because this analysis does not factor in the savings needed to cover long-term care expenses, nor does it take into account the fact that many individuals retire prior to becoming eligible for Medicare. However, some workers will need to save less than what is reported if they keep working in retirement and receive health benefits as active workers. WHO HAS RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS BEYOND MEDICARE?: About 12 percent of private-sector employers report offering any Medicare supplemental health insurance. This increases to about 40 percent among large employers. Overall, nearly 22 percent of retirees age 65 and older had retiree health benefits in 2005 to supplement Medicare coverage. As recently as 2006, 53 percent of retirees age 65 and older were covered by Medicare Part D, 24 percent had outpatient prescription drug coverage through an employment-based plan. Only 10 percent had no prescription drug coverage. INDIVIDUALLY PURCHASED MEDICARE SUPPLEMENTS, 2008: Among those who purchase Medigap and Medicare Part D prescription drug coverage at age 65 in 2008, men would need between $79,000 and $159,000 with median prescription drug expenses (50th percentile and 90th percentiles, respectively), and between $156,000 and $331,000 with prescription spending that is at the 90th percentile. Women would need between $108,000 and $184,000 with median prescription drug expenses (50th and 90th percentiles, respectively), and between $217,000 and $390,000 with prescription spending that is at the 90th percentile. The savings needed for couples would range from $194,000 at the 50th percentile to $635,000 at the 90th percentile. EMPLOYMENT-BASED BENEFITS, 2008: Among those who have employment-based retiree health benefits to supplement Medicare, but who must pay their own premiums, men would need between $102,000 and $196,000 in current savings (50th and 90th percentiles, respectively) to cover health care costs in retirement. Women would need between $137,000 and $224,000, respectively, due to their greater longevity. The savings needed for couples would range from $154,000 to $376,000. INDIVIDUALLY PURCHASED MEDICARE SUPPLEMENTS, 2018: Among those who purchase Medigap and Medicare Part D prescription drug coverage at age 65 in 2018 (currently age 55), men would need between $132,000 and $266,000 with median prescription drug expenses (50th and 90th percentiles, respectively), and between $261,000 and $555,000 with prescription spending that is at the 90th percentile. Women would need between $181,000 and S308,000 with median prescription drug expenses (50th and 90th percentiles), and between S364,000 and $654,000 with prescription spending that is at the 90th percentile. The savings needed for couples would range from $325,000 at the 50th percentile to S1,064,000 at the 90th percentile. RETIREE HEALTH MAY BE DRIVING LONGER TIME IN THE WORK FORCE: The declining availability of retiree health benefits may partly explain the rising labor force participation rate among individuals ages 55-64. Between 1996 and 2006, the labor force participation rate increased from 67 percent to 69.6 percent for men and from 49.6 percent to 58.2 percent for women.