Health Care Sharing Ministries: What Are the Risks to Consumers and Insurance Markets?

Issue: Health care sharing ministries (HCSMs) are a form of health coverage in which members--who typically share a religious belief--make monthly payments to cover expenses of other members. HCSMs do not have to comply with the consumer protections of the Affordable Care Act and may provide value for some individuals, but pose risks for others. Although HCSMs are not insurance and do not guarantee payment of claims, their features closely mimic traditional insurance products, possibly confusing consumers. Because they are largely unregulated and provide limited benefits, HCSMs may be disproportionately attractive to healthy individuals, causing the broader insurance market to become smaller, sicker, and more expensive. Goal: To understand state regulator perspectives on regulation of HCSMs and the impact of these arrangements on consumers and markets. Methods: Analysis of state laws governing HCSMs in all states; interviews with officials in 13 states; and review of the membership requirements and benefits of five HCSMs. Findings and Conclusions: State regulators voiced concerns regarding the potential risks of HCSMs to consumers and their individual markets. However, in the absence of reliable data describing HCSM enrollment, regulators cannot adequately assess harm. Though limited resources and political constraints have made oversight difficult, all states, regardless of their regulatory approach to HCSMs, should obtain data to better understand the role of HCSMs in their markets.

Assessing income redistributive effect of health financing in Zambia.

Ensuring an equitable health financing system is a major concern particularly in many developing countries. Internationally, there is a strong debate to move away from excessive reliance on direct out-of-pocket (OOP) spending towards a system that incorporates a greater element of risk pooling and thus affords greater protection for the poor. This is a major focus of the move towards universal health coverage (UHC). Currently, Zambia with high levels of poverty and income inequality is implementing health sector reforms for UHC through a social health insurance scheme. However, the way to identify the health financing mechanisms that are best suited to achieving this goal is to conduct empirical analysis and consider international evidence on funding universal health systems. This study assesses, for the first time, the progressivity of health financing and how it impacts on income inequality in Zambia. Three broad health financing mechanisms (general tax, a health levy and OOP spending) were considered. Data come from the 2010 nationally representative Zambian Living Conditions and Monitoring Survey with a sample size of 19,397 households. Applying standard methodologies, the findings show that total health financing in Zambia is progressive. It also leads to a statistically significant reduction in income inequality (i.e. a pro-poor redistributive effect estimated at 0.0110 (p < 0.01)). Similar significant pro-poor redistribution was reported for general taxes (0.0101 (p < 0.01)) and a health levy (0.0002 (p < 0.01)). However, the redistributive effect was not significant for OOP spending (0.0006). These results further imply that health financing redistributes income from the rich to the poor with a greater potential via general taxes. This points to areas where government policy may focus in attempting to reduce the high level of income inequality and to improve equity in health financing towards UHC in Zambia.

Why a national high-risk insurance pool is not a workable alternative to the marketplace.

The Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan (PCIP) was a national high-risk pool established under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) to provide coverage for individuals with preexisting conditions who had been uninsured for at least six months. It was intended to be a temporary program: PCIPs opened in 2010 and closed in April 2014. At that point, those with preexisting conditions could shop for health insurance in the marketplaces, where plans are prevented from using applicants' health status to deny coverage or charge more. This issue brief draws on the PCIP experience to outline why national high-risk pools, which continue to be proposed as policy alternatives to ACA coverage expansions, are expensive to enrollees as well as their administrators and ultimately unsustainable. The key lesson--and the principle on which the ACA is built--is that insurance works best when risk is evenly spread across a broad population.

How to evaluate a potential merger or acquisition.

Economic imperatives in health care financing are compelling a variety of mergers, acquisitions, integrations, and other forms of amalgamation. As hospitals merge, their pathology practices are merging. Physicians are forming clinically integrated groups, both with and without hospitals. Universities, commercial laboratories, and even insurance companies are acquiring laboratories and pathology practices. There are few standards or guidelines to help the practicing pathologist respond to such new undertakings. In the present study, we present a "how-to" guide or template to assist pathologists in evaluating proposals to amalgamate and in managing the alliance. The procedure begins with an articulation of the cons and pros, followed by a series of assessments of the cultures, the market, the organization, and operations, as well as a legal and financial assessment and human resources appraisal of each of the entities. We then outline the method for developing an organizational and operational model for the new merged entity and for performing the feasibility analysis, making a final decision, drafting a contract, and developing the business plan for the new venture.

Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan program. Interim final rule with comment period.

This interim final rule with comment period sets the payment rates for covered services furnished to individuals enrolled in the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan (PCIP) program administered directly by HHS beginning with covered services furnished on June 15, 2013. This interim final rule also prohibits facilities and providers who, with respect to dates of service beginning on June 15, 2013, accept payment for most covered services furnished to an enrollee in the federally-administered PCIP from charging the enrollee an amount greater than the enrollee's out-of-pocket cost for the covered service as calculated by the plan. The PCIP program was established under Section 1101 of Title I of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care Act).

The Affordable Care Act's pre-existing condition insurance plan: enrollment, costs, and lessons for reform.

The Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan (PCIP) is the temporary, federal high-risk pool created under the Affordable Care Act to provide coverage to uninsured individuals with preexisting conditions until 2014, when exchange coverage becomes avail­able to them. Nearly 78,000 people have enrolled since the program was implemented two years ago. This issue brief compares the PCIP with state-based high-risk pools that existed prior to the Affordable Care Act and considers programmatic differences that may have resulted in lower-than-anticipated enrollment and higher-than-anticipated costs for the PCIP. PCIP coverage, like state high-risk pool coverage, likely remains unaffordable to most lower-income individuals with preexisting conditions, but provides much needed access to care for those able to afford it. Operational costs of these programs are also quite high, making them less than optimal as a means of broader coverage expansion.

Who pays for obesity?

Adult obesity is a growing problem. From 1962 to 2006, obesity prevalence nearly tripled to 35.1 percent of adults. The rising prevalence of obesity is not limited to a particular socioeconomic group and is not unique to the United States. Should this widespread obesity epidemic be a cause for alarm? From a personal health perspective, the answer is an emphatic "yes." But when it comes to justifications of public policy for reducing obesity, the analysis becomes more complex. A common starting point is the assertion that those who are obese impose higher health costs on the rest of the population­a statement which is then taken to justify public policy interventions. But the question of who pays for obesity is an empirical one, and it involves analysis of how obese people fare in labor markets and health insurance markets. We will argue that the existing literature on these topics suggests that obese people on average do bear the costs and benefits of their eating and exercise habits. We begin by estimating the lifetime costs of obesity. We then discuss the extent to which private health insurance pools together obese and thin, whether health insurance causes obesity, and whether being fat might actually cause positive externalities for those who are not obese. If public policy to reduce obesity is not justified on the grounds of external costs imposed on others, then the remaining potential justification would need to be on the basis of helping people to address problems of ignorance or self-control that lead to obesity. In the conclusion, we offer a few thoughts about some complexities of such a justification.

Risk adjustment under the Affordable Care Act: a guide for federal and state regulators.

To achieve the aims of the Affordable Care Act, state and federal regulators must construct an effective system of risk adjustment, one that protects health insurers that attract a disproportionate share of patients with poor health risks. This brief, which summarizes a Commonwealth Fund­supported conference of leading risk adjustment experts, explores the challenges regulators will face, considers the consequences of the law's risk adjustment provisions, and analyzes the merits of different risk adjustment strategies. Among other recommendations, the brief suggests that regulators use diagnostic rather than only demographic risk measures, that they allow states some but limited flexibility to tailor risk adjustment methods to local circumstances, and that they phase in the use of risk transfer payments to give insurers more time to predict and understand the full effects of risk adjustment.

State high-risk pools: an update on the Minnesota Comprehensive Health Association.

State health insurance high-risk pools are a key component of the US health care system's safety net, because they provide health insurance to the "uninsurable." In 2007, 34 states had individual high-risk pools, which covered more than 200 000 people at a total cost of $1.8 billion. We examine the experience of the largest and oldest pool in the nation, the Minnesota Comprehensive Health Association, to document key issues facing state high-risk pools in enrollment and financing. We also considered the role and future of high-risk pools in light of national health care finance reform.

Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plans created by the Affordable Care Act of 2010.

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act includes a provision for the establishment of a temporary high-risk pool, also called the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan (PCIP), to quickly make health insurance available to uninsured individuals with preexisting conditions, many of whom previously had been denied coverage. Twenty-seven states elected to administer the PCIPs for their citizens, while the remaining states and the District of Columbia chose to let their PCIPs be federally administered. This issue brief examines eligibility, benefits, premiums, cost-sharing, and oversight of the PCIP programs, as well as variation of the plans from state to state. The PCIPs will run through December 31, 2013, at which time participants will be transitioned to exchange coverage.