Childhood Interests: what they are and why it matters.

This paper examines the concept and moral significance of "childhood interests." This concept is important in medical decision-making for children and more broadly in the field of pediatric ethics. The authors argue that childhood interests are identifiable components of childhood well-being that carry moral weight. Parents have a special role in protecting and promoting these interests and special obligations to do so. These parental obligations are grounded by the independent interests of the child, as well as the good of society more generally. Because parents have these child-rearing obligations, they must also have the authority and wide discretion necessary to fulfill them. However, while parental discretion is wide, it is not unlimited, for it must be used to safeguard and advance childhood interests.

Beneath the Sword of Damocles: Moral Obligations of Physicians in a Post-Dobbs Landscape.

Since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs vs. Jackson Women's Health Organization, a growing web of state laws restricts access to abortion. Here we consider how, ethically, doctors should respond when terminating a pregnancy is clinically indicated but state law imposes restrictions on doing so. We offer a typology of cases in which the dilemma emerges and a brief sketch of the current state of legal prohibitions against providing such care. We examine the issue from the standpoints of conscience, professional ethics, and civil disobedience and conclude that it is almost always morally permissible and praiseworthy to break the law and that, in a subset of cases, it is morally obligatory to do so. We further argue that health care institutions that employ or credential physicians to provide reproductive health care have an ethical duty to provide a basic suite of practical supports for them as they work to ethically resolve the dilemmas before them.

How Should We Think About Clinicians' Individual Antibiotic Stewardship Duties?

The language of antibiotic stewardship is often used to capture the moral importance of individual prescribers doing their part to combat antibiotic resistance. "Stewardship" as an ethics concept borrows from collective action problems-those that cannot be solved by individuals only-like those discussed in the environmental ethics literature. This article suggests that hyper focus on stewardship, however, risks misunderstanding individual prescribers' reasons to limit antibiotic use.

Defending and Defining Environmental Responsibilities for the Health Research Sector.

Six planetary boundaries have already been exceeded, including climate change, loss of biodiversity, chemical pollution, and land-system change. The health research sector contributes to the environmental crisis we are facing, though to a lesser extent than healthcare or agriculture sectors. It could take steps to reduce its environmental impact but generally has not done so, even as the planetary emergency worsens. So far, the normative case for why the health research sector should rectify that failure has not been made. This paper argues strong philosophical grounds, derived from theories of health and social justice, exist to support the claim that the sector has a duty to avoid or minimise causing or contributing to ecological harms that threaten human health or worsen health inequity. The paper next develops ideas about the duty's content, explaining why it should entail more than reducing carbon emissions, and considers what limits might be placed on the duty.

Advocacy and Bioethics: Aspiration, Obligation, and Negotiation.

AbstractA long-standing tenet of healthcare clinical ethics consultation has involved the neutrality of the ethicist. However, recent pressing societal issues have challenged this viewpoint. Perhaps now more than ever before, ethicists are being called upon to take up roles in public health, policy, and other community-oriented endeavors. In this article, I first review the concept of professional advocacy and contrast this conceptualization with the role of patient advocate, utilizing the profession of nursing as an exemplar. Then, I explore the status of advocacy in clinical ethics and how this conversation intersects with the existing professional obligations of the bioethicist, arguing that the goals of ethics consultation and ethical obligations of the clinical ethicist are compatible with the role of professional advocate. Finally, I explore potential barriers to professional advocacy and offer suggestions for a path forward.

Do Physicians Have a Duty to Support Secondary Use of Clinical Data in Biomedical Research? An Inquiry into the Professional Ethics of Physicians.

Secondary use of clinical data in research or learning activities (SeConts) has the potential to improve patient care and biomedical knowledge. Given this potential, the ethical question arises whether physicians have a professional duty to support SeConts. To investigate this question, we analyze prominent international declarations on physicians' professional ethics to determine whether they include duties that can be considered as good reasons for a physicians' professional duty to support SeConts. Next, we examine these documents to identify professional duties that might conflict with a potential duty of physicians to support SeConts.

WE economy: Potential of mutual aid distribution based on moral responsibility and risk vulnerability.

Reducing wealth inequality is a global challenge that requires the transformation of the economic systems that produce inequality. The economic system comprises: (1) gifts and reciprocity, (2) power and redistribution, (3) market exchange, and (4) mutual aid without reciprocal obligations. Current inequality stems from a capitalist economy consisting of (2) and (3). To sublimate (1), the human economy, to (4), the concept of a "mixbiotic society" has been proposed in the philosophical realm. In this society, free and diverse individuals mix, recognize their respective "fundamental incapability," and sublimate them into "WE" solidarity. Moreover, the economy must have a moral responsibility as a co-adventurer and consider its vulnerability to risk. This study focuses on two factors of mind perception-moral responsibility and risk vulnerability-and proposes a novel wealth distribution model between the two agents following an econophysical approach, whereas the conventional model dealt with redistribution through taxes and institutions. Three models are developed: a joint-venture model in which profit/losses are distributed based on their factors, a redistribution model in which wealth stocks are redistributed periodically based on their factors in the joint-venture model, and a "WE economy" model in which profit/losses are distributed based on the ratio of each other's factors. A simulation comparison reveals that WE economies are effective in reducing inequality, resilient in normalizing wealth distribution as advantages, and susceptible to free riders as disadvantages. However, this disadvantage can be compensated for by fostering fellowship and using joint ventures. This study presents the effectiveness of moral responsibility and risk vulnerability, complementarity between the WE economy and joint economy, and the direction of the economy in reducing inequality. Future challenges include developing an advanced model based on real economic analysis and economic psychology and promoting its fieldwork for worker coops and platform cooperatives to realize a desirable mixbiotic society.

The Ethics of Electronic Tracking Devices in Dementia Care: An Interview Study with Developers.

Wandering is a symptom of dementia that can have devastating consequences on the lives of persons living with dementia and their families and caregivers. Increasingly, caregivers are turning towards electronic tracking devices to help manage wandering. Ethical questions have been raised regarding these location-based technologies and although qualitative research has been conducted to gain better insight into various stakeholders' views on the topic, developers of these technologies have been largely excluded. No qualitative research has focused on developers' perceptions of ethics related to electronic tracking devices. To address this, we performed a qualitative semi-structured interview study based on grounded theory. We interviewed 15 developers of electronic tracking devices to better understand how they perceive ethical issues surrounding the design, development, and use of these devices within dementia care. Our results reveal that developers are strongly motivated by moral considerations and believe that including stakeholders throughout the development process is critical for success. Developers felt a strong sense of moral obligation towards topics within their control and a weaker sense of moral obligation towards topics outside their control. This leads to a perceived moral boundary between development and use, where some moral responsibility is shifted to end-users.

What Do Prospective Parents Owe to Their Children?

I consider the question of what moral obligations prospective parents owe to their future children. It is taken as an almost axiomatic premise of a wide range of philosophical arguments that prospective parents have a moral obligation to take such steps as ensuring their own financial stability or waiting until they are emotionally mature before conceiving. This is because it is assumed that parents have a moral obligation to lay the groundwork for their children's lives to go well. While at first glance such a premise seems benign, I will argue that when it is applied to arguments in assisted reproductive technology, as it is in Julian Savulescu's procreative beneficence argument or as it is in Daniel Groll's recent argument for open gamete donation, we see problems with this premise. Problems in Groll's argument also become apparent when it is scrutinized in connection with this premise.

Values-Based Medicine Is an Ethical Concept for Implementing the Ethical Principles in Daily Practice.

Values-based medicine (VsBM) is an ethical concept, and bioethical framework has been developed to ensure that medical ethics and values are implemented, pervasive, and powerful parameters influencing decisions about health, clinical practice, teaching, medical industry, career development, malpractice, and research. Neurosurgeons tend to adopt ethics according to their own values and to what they see and learn from teachers. Neurosurgeons, in general, are aware about ethical codes and the patient's rights. However, the philosophy, concept, and principles of medical ethics are rarely included in the training programs or in training courses. The impact of implementing, observing the medical ethics and the patients' value and culture on the course, and outcome of patients' management should not underestimate. The main principles of medical ethics are autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice, dignity, and honesty, which should be strictly observed in every step of medical practice, research, teaching, and publication. Evidence-based medicine has been popularized in the last 40-50 years in order to raise up the standard of medical practice. Medical ethics and values have been associated with the medical practice for thousands of years since patients felt a need for treatment. There is no conflict between evidence-based medicine and values-based medicine, as a medical practice should always be performed within a frame of ethics and respect for patients' values. Observing the principles of values-based medicine became very relevant as multicultural societies are dominant in some countries and hospitals in different corners of the world.

The Ethics of Life as It Could Be: Do We Have Moral Obligations to Artificial Life?

The field of Artificial Life studies the nature of the living state by modeling and synthesizing living systems. Such systems, under certain conditions, may come to deserve moral consideration similar to that given to nonhuman vertebrates or even human beings. The fact that these systems are nonhuman and evolve in a potentially radically different substrate should not be seen as an insurmountable obstacle to their potentially having rights, if they are sufficiently sophisticated in other respects. Nor should the fact that they owe their existence to us be seen as reducing their status as targets of moral concern. On the contrary, creators of Artificial Life may have special obligations to their creations, resembling those of an owner to their pet or a parent to their child. For a field that aims to create artificial life-forms with increasing levels of sophistication, it is crucial to consider the possible ethical implications of our activities, with an eye toward assessing potential moral obligations for which we should be prepared. If Artificial Life is larger than life, then the ethics of artificial beings should be larger than human ethics.

Jewish Ethics of Inmate Vaccines Against COVID-19.

PURPOSE: The COVID-19 pandemic broke out at the end of 2019, and throughout 2020 there were intensive international efforts to find a vaccine for the disease, which had already led to the deaths of some five million people. In December 2020, several pharmaceutical companies announced that they had succeeded in producing an effective vaccine, and after approval by the various regulatory bodies, countries started to vaccinate their citizens. With the start of the global campaign to vaccinate the world's population against COVID-19, debates over the prioritization of different sections of the population began around the world, but the prison population has generally been absent from these discussions. APPROACH AND FINDINGS: This article presents the approach of Jewish ethics regarding this issue, that is, that there is a religious and a moral obligation to heal the other and to take care of his or her medical well-being and that this holds true even for a prisoner who has committed a serious crime. Hence, prisoners should be vaccinated according to the same priorities that govern the administration of the vaccine among the general public. ORIGINALITY: The originality of the article is in a comprehensive and comparative reference between general ethics and Jewish ethics on a subject that has not yet received the proper attention.

Moral obligations towards human persons' wellbeing versus their suffering: An analysis of perspectives of moral philosophy.

What do we owe other persons? Are we as much obliged to promote their wellbeing as we are to reduce their suffering? This question is crucial for a range of social institutions and welfare services, and especially for the health services. To address this question the article investigates prominent positions and arguments in moral philosophy. It finds that while classical utilitarianism claims that there is symmetry in the moral obligation with respect to peoples' wellbeing and their suffering, a wide range of other positions and perspectives argue for an asymmetric relationship with stronger moral obligations towards other persons' suffering than towards their wellbeing. This difference in obligations is supported ontologically by basic differences inherent in wellbeing and suffering and axiologically by a relative (gradual) difference in value. The many well-founded arguments for stronger moral obligations towards other persons' suffering than towards their wellbeing has important implications for health policy; especially for priority setting. Avoiding and reducing suffering should have priority to the promotion and enhancement of wellbeing.

Identity Theft, Deep Brain Stimulation, and the Primacy of Post-trial Obligations.

Patient narratives from two investigational deep brain stimulation trials for traumatic brain injury and obsessive-compulsive disorder reveal that injury and illness rob individuals of personal identity and that neuromodulation can restore it. The early success of these interventions makes a compelling case for continued post-trial access to these technologies. Given the centrality of personal identity to respect for persons, a failure to provide continued access can be understood to represent a metaphorical identity theft. Such a loss recapitulates the pain of an individual's initial injury or illness and becomes especially tragic because it could be prevented by robust policy. A failure to fulfill this normative obligation constitutes a breach of disability law, which would view post-trial access as a means to achieve social reintegration through this neurotechnological accommodation.

Abolishing morality in biomedical ethics.

In biomedical ethics, there is widespread acceptance of moral realism, the view that moral claims express a proposition and that at least some of these propositions are true. Biomedical ethics is also in the business of attributing moral obligations, such as "S should do X." The problem, as we argue, is that against the background of moral realism, most of these attributions are erroneous or inaccurate. The typical obligation attribution issued by a biomedical ethicist fails to truly capture the person's actual obligations. We offer a novel argument for rife error in obligation attribution. The argument starts with the idea of an epistemic burden. Epistemic burdens are all of those epistemic obstacles one must surmount in order to achieve some aim. Epistemic burdens shape decision-making such that given two otherwise equal options, a person will choose the option that has the lesser of epistemic burdens. Epistemic burdens determine one's potential obligations and, conversely, their non-obligations. The problem for biomedical ethics is that ethicists have little to no access to others' epistemic burdens. Given this lack of access and the fact that epistemic burdens determine potential obligations, biomedical ethicists often can only attribute accurate obligations out of luck. This suggests that the practice of attributing obligations in biomedical ethics is rife with error. To resolve this widespread error, we argue that this practice should be abolished from the discourse of biomedical ethics.

A critical take on procreative justice.

Herjeet Kaur Marway recently proposed the Principle of Procreative Justice, which says that reproducers have a strong moral obligation to avoid completing race and colour injustices through their selection choices. In this article, we analyze this principle and argue, appealing to a series of counterexamples, that some of the implications of Marway's Principle of Procreative Justice are difficult to accept. This casts doubt on whether the principle should be adopted. Also, we show that there are some more principled worries regarding Marway's idea of a strong pro tanto duty not to complete injustices through one's procreative choices. Nonetheless, we believe Marway's arguments point in the right general direction regarding duties and structural injustice. Thus, in the final part, we suggest a positive proposal on how it would be possible to respond to the cases we raise. More specifically, we explore the suggestion that agents have a pro tanto duty to participate in eliminating structural injustice. Importantly, this duty can be satisfied, not only in procreation choices but in multiple ways.

Brain Pioneers and Moral Entanglement: An Argument for Post-trial Responsibilities in Neural-Device Trials.

We argue that in implanted neurotechnology research, participants and researchers experience what Henry Richardson has called "moral entanglement." Participants partially entrust researchers with access to their brains and thus to information that would otherwise be private, leading to created intimacies and special obligations of beneficence for researchers and research funding agencies. One of these obligations, we argue, is about continued access to beneficial technology once a trial ends. We make the case for moral entanglement in this context through exploration of participants' vulnerability, uncompensated risks and burdens, depth of relationship with the research team, and dependence on researchers in implanted neurotechnology trials.

A critical view on using "life not worth living" in the bioethics of assisted reproduction.

This paper critically engages with how life not worth living (LNWL) and cognate concepts are used in the field of beginning-of-life bioethics as the basis of arguments for morally requiring the application of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and/or germline genome editing (GGE). It is argued that an objective conceptualization of LNWL is largely too unreliable in beginning-of-life cases for deriving decisive normative reasons that would constitute a moral duty on the part of intending parents. Subjective frameworks are found to be more suitable to determine LNWL, but they are not accessible in beginning-of-life cases because there is no subject yet. Conceptual and sociopolitical problems are additionally pointed out regarding the common usage of clear case exemplars. The paper concludes that a moral requirement for the usage of PGD and GGE cannot be derived from the conceptual base of LNWL, as strong reasons that can be reliably determined are required to limit reproductive freedom on moral grounds. Educated predictions on prospective well-being might still be useful regarding the determination of moral permissibility of PGD and/or GGE. It is suggested that due to the high significance of subjective experience in the normativity of beginning-of-life bioethics, the discipline is called to more actively realize the inclusion of people with disabilities. This regards for instance research design, citation practices, and language choices to increase the accessibility of societal debates on the reproductive ethics of genetic technologies.