Contractualist tendencies and reasoning in moral judgment and decision making.

The social-contract tradition of Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls has been widely influential in moral philosophy but has until recently received relatively little attention in moral psychology. For contractualist moral theories, ethics is a matter of forming, adhering to, and enforcing (hypothetical) agreements, and morality is fundamentally about acting according to what would be agreed by rational agents. A recent psychological theory, virtual bargaining, models social interactions in contractualist terms, suggesting that we often act as we would agree to do if we were to negotiate explicitly. However, whether such contractualist tendencies (a propensity to make typically contractualist choices) and forms of reasoning (agreement-based cognitive processes) play a role in moral cognition is still unclear. Drawing upon virtual bargaining, we develop two novel experimental paradigms designed to elicit incentivized decisions and moral judgments. We then test the descriptive relevance of contractualism in moral judgment and decision making in five preregistered online experiments (n = 4103; English-speaking Prolific participants). In the first task, we find evidence that many participants show contractualist tendencies: their choices are "characteristically" contractualist. In the second task, we find evidence consistent with contractualist reasoning influencing some participants' judgments and incentivized decisions. Our findings suggest that a propensity to act as prescribed by tacit agreements may be particularly important in understanding the moral psychology of fleeting social interactions and coordination problems. By complementing the rich literature on deontology and consequentialism in moral psychology, empirical approaches inspired by contractualism may prove fruitful to better understand moral cognition.

Robust memory of face moral values is encoded in the human caudate tail: a simultaneous EEG-fMRI study.

Moral judgements about people based on their actions is a key component that guides social decision making. It is currently unknown how positive or negative moral judgments associated with a person's face are processed and stored in the brain for a long time. Here, we investigate the long-term memory of moral values associated with human faces using simultaneous EEG-fMRI data acquisition. Results show that only a few exposures to morally charged stories of people are enough to form long-term memories a day later for a relatively large number of new faces. Event related potentials (ERPs) showed a significant differentiation of remembered good vs bad faces over centerofrontal electrode sites (value ERP). EEG-informed fMRI analysis revealed a subcortical cluster centered on the left caudate tail (CDt) as a correlate of the face value ERP. Importantly neither this analysis nor a conventional whole-brain analysis revealed any significant coding of face values in cortical areas, in particular the fusiform face area (FFA). Conversely an fMRI-informed EEG source localization using accurate subject-specific EEG head models also revealed activation in the left caudate tail. Nevertheless, the detected caudate tail region was found to be functionally connected to the FFA, suggesting FFA to be the source of face-specific information to CDt. A further psycho-physiological interaction analysis also revealed task-dependent coupling between CDt and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), a region previously identified as retaining emotional working memories. These results identify CDt as a main site for encoding the long-term value memories of faces in humans suggesting that moral value of faces activates the same subcortical basal ganglia circuitry involved in processing reward value memory for objects in primates.

Moral aspects of filial concern for a parent living with dementia: Social imaginaries in contemporary narratives.

Many adults face the difficulties of a parent living with dementia. Although not always caregiving for a parent living with dementia, they care about and are concerned for the vulnerability of their parent. This concern is invaluable but often an experience with a far-reaching impact. Qualitative research on filial concerns and experiences of caregiving has resulted in a vast body of knowledge about the experience of family carers. Far less research, however, has examined the moral concern of children. The aim of this study is to gain insight into the normative aspects of their concern. An international collection of 24 books written by adult children about their involvement with an ageing parent was analysed using the Dialogical Narrative Analysis method. Our study shows that the stories deal with children's moral questions about independence, identity, and suffering. These questions can be related to social imaginaries of individualism and progress. The two social imaginaries may have both positive and negative impacts on children's ability to cope with their concern for a parent living with dementia. The moral questions that arise from children's concern seem to originate from both the appeal of the vulnerable parent and from the social imaginaries. These moral sources may compete, resulting in moral friction. Children with a parent living with dementia deliberate upon the personal and societal held beliefs and need moral space to embody their concern.

Moral Distress as Moral Heuristic Missing the Mark.

I propose that moral distress may function as a moral heuristic, and one that misses its mark in signifying a fundamental source for nurses' moral suffering. Epistemic injustice is an insidious workplace wrongdoing that is glossed over or avoided in explicit explanations for nurse moral suffering and is substituted by an emphasis on the nurse's own wrongdoing. I discuss reasons and evidence for considering moral distress as a moral heuristic that obfuscates the role of epistemic injustice as a fundamental constraint on nurses' moral reasoning underlying moral suffering.

Comparing First-Year Engineering Student Conceptions of Ethical Decision-Making to Performance on Standardized Assessments of Ethical Reasoning.

The Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2) and Engineering Ethical Reasoning Instrument (EERI) are designed to measure ethical reasoning of general (DIT-2) and engineering-student (EERI) populations. These tools-and the DIT-2 especially-have gained wide usage for assessing the ethical reasoning of undergraduate students. This paper reports on a research study in which the ethical reasoning of first-year undergraduate engineering students at multiple universities was assessed with both of these tools. In addition to these two instruments, students were also asked to create personal concept maps of the phrase "ethical decision-making." It was hypothesized that students whose instrument scores reflected more postconventional levels of moral development and more sophisticated ethical reasoning skills would likewise have richer, more detailed concept maps of ethical decision-making, reflecting their deeper levels of understanding of this topic and the complex of related concepts. In fact, there was no significant correlation between the instrument scores and concept map scoring, suggesting that the way first-year students conceptualize ethical decision making does not predict the way they behave when performing scenario-based ethical reasoning (perhaps more situated). This disparity indicates a need to more precisely quantify engineering ethical reasoning and decision making, if we wish to inform assessment outcomes using the results of such quantitative analyses.

AI Through Ethical Lenses: A Discourse Analysis of Guidelines for AI in Healthcare.

While the technologies that enable Artificial Intelligence (AI) continue to advance rapidly, there are increasing promises regarding AI's beneficial outputs and concerns about the challenges of human-computer interaction in healthcare. To address these concerns, institutions have increasingly resorted to publishing AI guidelines for healthcare, aiming to align AI with ethical practices. However, guidelines as a form of written language can be analyzed to recognize the reciprocal links between its textual communication and underlying societal ideas. From this perspective, we conducted a discourse analysis to understand how these guidelines construct, articulate, and frame ethics for AI in healthcare. We included eight guidelines and identified three prevalent and interwoven discourses: (1) AI is unavoidable and desirable; (2) AI needs to be guided with (some forms of) principles (3) trust in AI is instrumental and primary. These discourses signal an over-spillage of technical ideals to AI ethics, such as over-optimism and resulting hyper-criticism. This research provides insights into the underlying ideas present in AI guidelines and how guidelines influence the practice and alignment of AI with ethical, legal, and societal values expected to shape AI in healthcare.

Moral foundations in autistic people and people with systemizing minds.

BACKGROUND: Do autistic people share the same moral foundations as typical people? Here we built on two prominent theories in psychology, moral foundations theory and the empathizing-systemizing (E-S) theory, to observe the nature of morality in autistic people and systemizers. METHODS: In dataset 1, we measured five foundations of moral judgements (Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity) measured by the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) in autistic (n = 307) and typical people (n = 415) along with their scores on the Empathy Quotient (EQ) and Systemizing Quotient (SQ). In dataset 2, we measured these same five foundations along with E-S cognitive types (previously referred to as "brain types") in a large sample of typical people (N = 7595). RESULTS: Autistic people scored the same on Care (i.e., concern for others) as typical people (h1). Their affective empathy (but not their cognitive empathy) scores were positively correlated with Care. Autistic people were more likely to endorse Fairness (i.e., giving people what they are owed, and treating them with justice) over Care (h2). Their systemizing scores were positively correlated with Fairness. Autistic people or those with a systemizing cognitive profile had lower scores on binding foundations: Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity (h3). Systemizing in typical people was positively correlated with Liberty (i.e., hypervigilance against oppression), which is a sixth moral foundation (h4). Although the majority of people in all five E-S cognitive types self-identified as liberal, with a skew towards empathizing (h5), the percentage of libertarians was highest in systemizing cognitive types (h6). E-S cognitive types accounted for 2 to 3 times more variance for Care than did sex. LIMITATIONS: Our study is limited by its reliance on self-report measures and a focus on moral judgements rather than behavior or decision-making. Further, only dataset 2 measured political identification, therefore we were unable to assess politics in autistic people. CONCLUSIONS: We conclude that some moral foundations in autistic people are similar to those in typical people (despite the difficulties in social interaction that are part of autism), and some are subtly different. These subtle differences vary depending on empathizing and systemizing cognitive types.

Ethics support for ethics support: the development of the Confidentiality Compass for dealing with moral challenges concerning (breaching) confidentiality in moral case deliberation.

BACKGROUND: Confidentiality is one of the central preconditions for clinical ethics support (CES). CES cases which generate moral questions for CES staff concerning (breaching) confidentiality of what has been discussed during CES can cause moral challenges. Currently, there seems to be no clear policy or guidance regarding how CES staff can or should deal with these moral challenges related to (not) breaching confidentiality within CES. Moral case deliberation is a specific kind of CES. METHOD: Based on experiences and research into MCD facilitators' needs for ethics support in this regard, we jointly developed an ethics support tool for MCD facilitators: the Confidentiality Compass. This paper describes the iterative developmental process, including our theoretical viewpoints and reflections on characteristics of CES tools in general. RESULTS: The content and goals of the ethics support tool, which contains four elements, is described. Part A is about providing information on the concept of confidentiality in MCD, part B is a moral compass with reflective questions, part C focuses on courses of action for careful handling of moral challenges related to confidentiality. Part D contains general lessons, best practices and tips for dealing with confidentiality in future cases. CONCLUSIONS: This paper concludes with providing some lessons-learned related to developing ethics support tools and some reflections on issues of quality and normativity of ethics support tools.

Nostalgia increases punitiveness by intensifying moral concern.

We addressed the relation between nostalgia and moral judgment or behavior. We hypothesized that nostalgia, a social emotion, increases moral concern (H1), nostalgia intensifies punitiveness against moral transgressors (H2), and that the nostalgia-punitiveness link is mediated by moral concern (H3). We conducted three cross-sectional (Studies 1, 2, 4) and one experimental (Study 3) investigations (N = 1145). The investigations, involving distinct operationalizations of the relevant constructs (nostalgia, moral concern, punitiveness) and diverse samples (U.S., Canadian, and European Prolific workers, French business school students, Dutch community members), yielded results consistent with the hypotheses. Nostalgia keeps one's moral compass in check. The findings enrich the emotions and morality literatures.

How prehospital emergency personnel manage ethical challenges: the importance of confidence, trust, and safety.

BACKGROUND: Ethical challenges constitute an inseparable part of daily decision-making processes in all areas of healthcare. Ethical challenges are associated with moral distress that can lead to burnout. Clinical ethics support has proven useful to address and manage such challenges. This paper explores how prehospital emergency personnel manage ethical challenges. The study is part of a larger action research project to develop and test an approach to clinical ethics support that is sensitive to the context of emergency medicine. METHODS: We explored ethical challenges and management strategies in three focus groups, with 15 participants in total, each attended by emergency medical technicians, paramedics, and prehospital anaesthesiologists. Focus groups were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. The approach to data analysis was systematic text condensation approach. RESULTS: We stratified the management of ethical challenges into actions before, during, and after incidents. Before incidents, participants stressed the importance of mutual understandings, shared worldviews, and a supportive approach to managing emotions. During an incident, the participants employed moral perception, moral judgments, and moral actions. After an incident, the participants described sharing ethical challenges only to a limited extent as sharing was emotionally challenging, and not actively supported by workplace culture, or organisational procedures. The participants primarily managed ethical challenges informally, often using humour to cope. CONCLUSION: Our analysis supports and clarifies that confidence, trust, and safety in relation to colleagues, management, and the wider organisation are essential for prehospital emergency personnel to share ethical challenges and preventing moral distress turning into burnout.

A preliminary epistemological ″human ecology″ framework for understanding the limits of bioethics.

This article tries to set up the epistemological bases of the science of ″human ecology″. This term has started to be used as a synonymous of morality, especially in the Catholic moral social doctrine that used for the first time to justify its marriage prospectives. We look at both terms together (human plus ecology) and we propose that human ecology should be a discipline that in the first time study human behavior and population (objective) using the postulates of the science of ecology (method) and then, once a conceptual framework for social sciences disciplines such as bioethics can be settle, could be used as a way to support or not moral postulates in the name of ecology. We conclude by defining which should be the methods of knowledge acquisition, the limits and the validity of what should be considered ″Human ecology″, that is to say, the ecology of the humans.

Sophie de Grouchy's Political Thought in the Letters on Sympathy (1798).

This article proposes a reading of Sophie de Grouchy's moral, political, and economic thought as embedded in the tradition of natural jurisprudence, adapted to the context of the French First Republic. A close reading of her French translation of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiment and her eight Letters on Sympathy confirms that there are points to be made by reading her works in the context of the language of early modern natural law. This sheds light on the important question of how to read revolutionary republicanism emanating from multiple traditions other than the neo-Roman discourse of non-domination.

Cardiac organoids do not warrant additional moral scrutiny.

Certain organoid subtypes are particularly sensitive. We explore whether moral intuitions about the heartbeat warrant unique moral consideration for newly advanced contracting cardiac organoids. Despite the heartbeat's moral significance in organ procurement and abortion discussions, we argue that this significance should not translate into moral implications for cardiac organoids.

Shaping a moral body in family dinner talk: Children's socialization to good manners concerning bodily conduct.

The family meal has been extensively investigated as a site for children's acquisition of eating-related behaviors and attitudes, as well as culture-specific rules and assumptions. However, little is known about children's socialization to a constitutive dimension of commensality and even social life: good manners concerning bodily conduct. Drawing on 20th century scholarship on body governmentality and good manners, and building on recent studies on family meal as a socialization site, the article sheds light on this overlooked dimension of family commensality. Based on a corpus of more than 20 h of videorecorded family dinner interactions collected in Italy, and using discourse analysis, the article shows that family mealtime constitutes a relevant arena where parents control their children's conduct through the micro-politics of good manners. By participating in mealtime interactions, children witness and have the chance to acquire the specific cultural principles governing bodily conduct at the table, such as "sitting properly", "eating with cutlery", and "chewing with mouth closed". Yet, they are also socialized to a foundational principle of human sociality: one's own behavior must be self-monitored according to the perspective of the generalized Other. Noticing that forms and contents of contemporary family mealtime talk about good manners are surprisingly similar to those described by Elias in his seminal work on the social history of good manners, the article documents that mealtime still constitutes a privileged cultural site where children are multimodally introduced to morality concerning not only specific table manners, but also more general and overarching assumptions, namely the conception of the body as an entity that should be (self)monitored and shaped according to moral standards.

Pulling the lever in a hurry: the influence of impulsivity and sensitivity to reward on moral decision-making under time pressure.

BACKGROUND: Making timely moral decisions can save a life. However, literature on how moral decisions are made under time pressure reports conflicting results. Moreover, it is unclear whether and how moral choices under time pressure may be influenced by personality traits like impulsivity and sensitivity to reward and punishment. METHODS: To address these gaps, in this study we employed a moral dilemma task, manipulating decision time between participants: one group (N = 25) was subjected to time pressure (TP), with 8 s maximum time for response (including the reading time), the other (N = 28) was left free to take all the time to respond (noTP). We measured type of choice (utilitarian vs. non-utilitarian), decision times, self-reported unpleasantness and arousal during decision-making, and participants' impulsivity and BIS-BAS sensitivity. RESULTS: We found no group effect on the type of choice, suggesting that time pressure per se did not influence moral decisions. However, impulsivity affected the impact of time pressure, in that individuals with higher cognitive instability showed slower response times under no time constraint. In addition, higher sensitivity to reward predicted a higher proportion of utilitarian choices regardless of the time available for decision. CONCLUSIONS: Results are discussed within the dual-process theory of moral judgement, revealing that the impact of time pressure on moral decision-making might be more complex and multifaceted than expected, potentially interacting with a specific facet of attentional impulsivity.

WE economy: Potential of mutual aid distribution based on moral responsibility and risk vulnerability.

Reducing wealth inequality is a global challenge that requires the transformation of the economic systems that produce inequality. The economic system comprises: (1) gifts and reciprocity, (2) power and redistribution, (3) market exchange, and (4) mutual aid without reciprocal obligations. Current inequality stems from a capitalist economy consisting of (2) and (3). To sublimate (1), the human economy, to (4), the concept of a "mixbiotic society" has been proposed in the philosophical realm. In this society, free and diverse individuals mix, recognize their respective "fundamental incapability," and sublimate them into "WE" solidarity. Moreover, the economy must have a moral responsibility as a co-adventurer and consider its vulnerability to risk. This study focuses on two factors of mind perception-moral responsibility and risk vulnerability-and proposes a novel wealth distribution model between the two agents following an econophysical approach, whereas the conventional model dealt with redistribution through taxes and institutions. Three models are developed: a joint-venture model in which profit/losses are distributed based on their factors, a redistribution model in which wealth stocks are redistributed periodically based on their factors in the joint-venture model, and a "WE economy" model in which profit/losses are distributed based on the ratio of each other's factors. A simulation comparison reveals that WE economies are effective in reducing inequality, resilient in normalizing wealth distribution as advantages, and susceptible to free riders as disadvantages. However, this disadvantage can be compensated for by fostering fellowship and using joint ventures. This study presents the effectiveness of moral responsibility and risk vulnerability, complementarity between the WE economy and joint economy, and the direction of the economy in reducing inequality. Future challenges include developing an advanced model based on real economic analysis and economic psychology and promoting its fieldwork for worker coops and platform cooperatives to realize a desirable mixbiotic society.

Restore and Rebuild (R&R): a protocol for a phase 2, randomised control trial to compare R&R as a treatment for moral injury-related mental health difficulties in UK military veterans to treatment as usual.

BACKGROUND: Exposure to potentially morally injurious events is increasingly recognised as a concern across a range of occupational groups, including UK military veterans. Moral injury-related mental health difficulties can be challenging for clinicians to treat and there is currently no validated treatment available for UK veterans. We developed Restore and Rebuild (R&R) as a treatment for UK veterans struggling with moral injury-related mental health difficulties. This trial aims to examine whether it is feasible to conduct a pilot randomised controlled trial (RCT) of R&R treatment compared with a treatment-as-usual (TAU) control group. METHODS: We will use a feasibility single-blind, single-site RCT design. The target population will be UK military veterans with moral injury-related mental health difficulties. We will recruit N=46 veteran patients who will be randomly allocated to R&R (n=23) or TAU (n=23). Patients randomised to R&R will receive the 20-session one-to-one treatment, delivered online. Veterans allocated to TAU, as there are currently no manualised treatments for moral injury-related mental health problems available, will receive the one-to-one treatment (online) typically provided to veterans who enter the mental health service for moral injury-related mental health difficulties. We will collect outcome measures of moral injury, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), alcohol misuse, common mental disorders and trauma memory at pretreatment baseline (before randomisation), end of treatment, 12 weeks and 24 weeks post-treatment. The primary outcome will be the proportion of patients who screen positive for PTSD and moral injury-related distress post-treatment. ETHICS AND DISSEMINATION: This trial will establish whether R&R is feasible, well-tolerated and beneficial treatment for veterans with moral injury-related mental health difficulties. If so, the results of the trial will be widely disseminated and R&R may improve access to effective care for those who struggle following moral injury and reduce the associated negative consequences for veterans, their families and wider society. TRIAL REGISTRATION NUMBER: ISRCTN99573523.

Epistemic Trust in Scientific Experts: A Moral Dimension.

In this paper, I develop and defend a moralized conception of epistemic trust in science against a particular kind of non-moral account defended by John (2015, 2018). I suggest that non-epistemic value considerations, non-epistemic norms of communication and affective trust properly characterize the relationship of epistemic trust between scientific experts and non-experts. I argue that it is through a moralized account of epistemic trust in science that we can make sense of the deep-seated moral undertones that are often at play when non-experts (dis)trust science.

Extending the concept of moral distress to parents of infants hospitalized in the NICU: a qualitative study in Greece.

BACKGROUND: The hospitalization of infants in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) is an ethically challenging situation. A limited number of studies have extended the concept of moral distress to parents of infants hospitalized in the NICU. This topic requires further investigation. METHODS: The present prospective qualitative study was conducted from February 2023 to May 2023. Data were collected through semistructured in-depth interviews, which were conducted in-person with fifteen parents of infants who were hospitalized in the NICU at the time of the interviews. Purposive sampling was used. The data were classified and analyzed using thematic analysis. RESULTS: Three themes emerged from the data analysis performed for this empirical study. One intrapersonal dimension featuring two aspects (one dynamic and one static) and another interpersonal dimension focusing on parental moral distress emerged from the data analysis. Furthermore, seven subthemes emerged across these themes: (1) self-directed negative feelings were experienced by parents due to their inability to fulfill their caregiving/parental roles; (2) intense internal conflict was experienced by parents in response to a moral dilemma that was difficult, which was perceived as irresolvable; (3) objectively unjustified, self-directed negative feelings of guilt or failure were experienced by parents; (4) parents experienced moral distress due to the poor image of the ill infants; (5) inadequate information may predispose parents to experience moral distress (6) neonatologists' caring behaviors were unduly perceived by parents as paternalistic behaviors; (7) reasonable or justified institutional rules were unduly perceived by parents as constraint. CONCLUSIONS: In general, the results of this study support the integrated definition of parental moral distress proposed by Mooney-Doyle and Ulrich. Furthermore, the present study introduces new information. The study distinguishes between the dynamic and static aspects of the intrapersonal dimension of the phenomenon of parental moral distress. Moreover, participants experienced moral distress because they unduly perceived certain situations as causing moral distress. In addition, inadequate information may predispose parents to experience moral distress. The findings of this study may contribute promote family-centered care in the NICU context.

Morality or competence is more important? The effect of evaluation dimensions on ERP responses to neutral faces depends on contextual valence and self-relevance.

Recent studies have shown that the processing of neutral facial expressions could be modulated by the valence and self-relevance of preceding verbal evaluations. However, these studies have not distinguished the dimension (i.e., morality and competence) from verbal evaluations. In fact, there is a hot controversy about whether morality or competence receives more weight. Therefore, using the ERP technique, the current study aimed to address this issue by comparing the influence of morality and competence evaluations on behavioral and neural responses to neutral facial expressions when these evaluations varied with contextual valence and self-relevance. Our ERP results revealed that the early EPN amplitudes were larger for neutral faces after receiving evaluations about self relative to evaluations about senders. Moreover, the EPN was more negative after a competence evaluation relative to a morality evaluation when these evaluations were positive, while this effect was absent when these evaluations were negative. The late LPP was larger after a morality evaluation compared to a competence evaluation when these evaluations were negative and directed to self. However, no significant LPP effect between morality and competence evaluations was observed when these evaluations were positive. The present study extended previous studies by showing that early and late processing stages of faces are affected by the evaluation dimension in a top-down manner and further modulated by contextual valence and self-relevance.